QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA AT ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I think that is a very wise approach. I am not criticizing it. I am just trying to see what it was.

In that round-table conference did you get on the much-debated question of the recognition of China?

Ambassador JESSUP. Yes, sir. We covered practically every question, I should think, that you could think of in connection with Asia. We covered the broadest possible sweep, and in a statement which has been issued by the Department, so long as you have raised that, sirI think I have it here- the Department pointed out that this was still classified material, and they were not releasing it. They said that I can state that 18 members of the panel spoke on the subject of recognition of Red China, and of these, two-the statement was that Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger-recommended that recognition be extended to Red China. Whether that was with qualification or without qualification I am not prepared to say. The consensus among 11 others was that the situation obtaining at that time was just that recognition could not be withheld for an indefinite period.

In general, they expressed the view that this was largely a matter of timing in the light of future developments.

Five, including Mr. Stassen, recommended that recognition not be considered at that time.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I raise that point because I want to question you a little further in that field tomorrow, when we get to it. I want to raise the question of whether it was brought up at this conference, and I see that it was.

Ambassador JESSUP. Yes, sir; it was brought up.

As I was saying, insofar as I acted as chairman, I tried to raise various questions and bring out points of view, but not to intrude my own opinions. And, as I have said, these were considered confidential and are still so classified. We have discussed that matter. Now, I would like also to point out that neither Dr. Case nor Dr. Fosdick nor I had any thesis to prove or to sustain. We had not formed fixed opinions which we were trying to get supported or anything of that kind. We were still in this period which I have described as a period of groping for information. In most instances in regard to the broad category of questions which we were covering, dealing with the whole of Asia, we had no information about specific views of participants. Here was a list of people who had had experience in various ways and various forms of activity, business, government, and so on, in various parts of Asia.

Senator BREWSTER. You did have information as to the views of the five who had submitted memoranda.

Ambassador JESSUP. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That is another reason why I think the names of those five might be of some interest.

POLICY NOT MADE THROUGH MEMORANDA OR ROUND TABLE

Ambassador JESSUP. They appear on the list which I have introduced.

The next point I think is largely covered by the response I made to Senator Smith's question, namely, that neither the memoranda nor the discussions in the round-table conference made policy.

In addition to these contacts, we discussed matters as I have said, with many officers of the State Department, members of both Houses of Congress-Senator Smith has referred to certain conversations we had with him—and with various other individuals from time to time, and as I have already pointed out, they did not make a report. The matter to which I referred a moment ago is covered in the Secretary's public letter of August 23, where he said:

I shall not ask you to present a report, but I do count on you from time to time as your study progresses, to confer fully and frankly with me and with other principal officers of the Department so that we may have the benefit of your views in framing recommendations which I shall make to the President. and discuss with Members of the Senate and House of Representatives.

JESSUP'S TRIP TO ASIA, EARLY IN 1950

Now, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCarthy's statement, which appears in his brochure, that Mr. Lattimore wrote secret advice and instructions for me in connection with my trip to Asia in early 1950, is completely false. It is apparent that Senator McCarthy has attempted to place this misinterpretation on 1 of the 31 memoranda which I have described.

Because of the insinuation which comes up from this charge of Senator McCarthy, I feel it is necessary for me again to refer to certain personal matters in order to disassociate myself from this charge that I was a fellow who was following the Communist Party line. I have dealt with that as far as the war situation was concerned, but now we are getting into questions of the Far East, and I should like to introduce into the record certain papers here which I will describe, which indicate that I am not a party-liner in far eastern matters in 1939 and 1940.

LETTER TO DR. SCHUMPETER, DECEMBER 16, 1939

Now the documents which I have here deal with another embargo question. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that at that period there was a good deal of discussion as to whether the United States should place an embargo on the shipment of raw materials to Japan, particularly the question of scrap iron, and I was opposed to the imposition of that embargo at that time. You will remember at that time there was no recognized state of war in the Far East. And I should like to read into the record first, a letter which I wrote to Dr. Elizabeth B. Schumpeter, bureau of international research, at Harvard, December 16, 1939. I said:

DEAR DR. SCHUMPETER: Thank you very much for letting me read your interesting article; I agree with a great deal of it. You will be interested to know that most of your points were brought out and stressed in the discussions at the IPR study meeting at Virginia Beach.

As an officer of the IPR I have not felt free to enter into public discussion about the proposed embargo which I do not favor. It is chiefly because an official position in the IPR makes it impossible for me to speak and write freely that I am withdrawing from the chairmanship. If you will permit me to say so, I think you underestimate the extent to which other officers and members of the staff attempt to live up to this standard. I do not deny that they have made some mistakes. You have probably seen in the Times that the American Council of the IPR has been attacked as a pro-Japanese propaganda agency. No organization working in this field can escape mutually inconsistent charges. On the whole I think the IPR has been able to keep a fairly even balance. I

don't know of any other comparable organization where the Japanese case gets a fairer hearing.

JESSUP'S LETTER TO DR. TUAN-SHENG CHIEN

Then, on March 13, 1940, I wrote a reply to a letter I received from Dr. Tuan-Sheng Chien. He was a Chinese professor of political science at the National Southwestern Associated Universities in Kunming, China. He had been one of the Chinese delegation-of course all Nationalists at that time-at the Virginia Beach conference, and he had written me about this question of the Japanese embargo, and I wrote him as follows:

DEAR DR. CHIEN: I have greatly appreciated your letter written en route back to China. It was a very great pleasure for Mrs. Jessup and for me to see you here and I am only sorry that there were not more occasions on which we could meet with you.

I realize, of course, that my Chinese friends have perhaps been critical of my failure to support actively the campaign in this country for an embargo on Japan. I am sure, however, that you understand my reasons. The first reason is that, great as is my admiration and sympathy for China, I feel that my first duty is to my country, just as your first duty is to yours. I have not been able to satisfy myself that it would be wise policy for the United States to take this type of action against Japan. I have approved the loans to China and have taken occasion to support that policy when opportunity has offered. My second reason has been that as an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I have felt very strongly under an obligation not to take sides on an issue between two of the principal countries represented in the institute. Within the American Council, as you know, there is a difference of opinion and we have tried our best to maintain our reputation for impartial scholarship. I shall be glad to take advantage of every occasion which offers to speak for the cause with which I sympathize but I have no doubt that you will recognize the propriety of the limitations under which I feel I must act.

The cause to which I refer in the last sentence is the cause of Free China.

MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

Now, Mr. Chairman, I submit photostats of editions of the New Masses, which I am informed is a Communist publication which frequently is identified with the Communist Party line, and you will find in both of these, one of August 29, 1939, and the other of September 12, 1939, articles in which this Communist publication, the New Masses, is following the party line by saying "United States must put an embargo on Japan."

I introduce that, Mr. Chairman, to indicate that there is another situation which disproves the insinuation that I was a party liner. Senator SPARKMAN. Without objection, they will be included in the record at this point.

(The excerpts referred to appear in the record as follows:)

[Editorial from New Masses, August 29, 1939]

JAPAN AND BRITAIN

The Far Eastern chess match entered its semifinals last week with a proposal from Great Britain that negotiations with Tokyo be resumed with the cooperation of interested third parties. That means the United States. On the face of it, such a suggestion will hardly meet with American favor. The position of the United States was made clear over a month ago by the abrogation of the 1911 trade treaty. If Congress had heeded the desire of the great proportion of the American people, America's attitude would have been even more sharply defined by the imposition of an embargo upon all trade with the aggressor.

On the other hand, there are circumstances under which Anglo-American cooperation would be valuable. Together with France, these are the powers most directly affected by Japan's insolent, persistent aggression against China. The crucial question is, On what basis shall America cooperate with Britain? If it shall be in defense of the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and the territorial integrity of China, very well. But if the British are trying to involve the United States in the sort of thing which has characterized British diplomacy since Munich, nothing would be more dangerous.

This distraction is doubly important in view of the immediate record in Britain's suspended negotiations with Japan. Straightaway, Sir Robert Craigie recognized the "new order of things" in the Far East. Last week the British agreed to yield the four Chinese prisoners to Japan. Happily, Norman Bentwich, British lawyer, and Sara Margery Fry, a noted social worker, have secured permission to file a writ of habeas corpus which will prevent handing the prisoners over for at least a while.

The Japanese blockade at Tientsin was to be lifted upon the release of the prisoners. Naturally, the Japanese would have double-crossed the British had not the flood at Tientsin virtually lifted the blockade anyway. More than that, the Japanese attacks upon the British continue; Hongkong is now menaced and the international concession at Shanghai endangered. What the Japanese are after, as New Masses indicated in its issue of August 15, is the 50 million ounces of silver now in British care at Tientsin. Of course, they want further concessions, if not cooperation, from England in the invasion of China.

Instead of facing up firmly to Japan, the British Government now projects the possibility that the Nine Power Treaty will be entirely disavowed. Over the week end, the Foreign Office reiterated its stand that "Britain does not regard treaies as eternal, and is prepared to consider any constructive proprosals the Japanese Government may make regarding the modification of existing treaties." It is this "let's kiss and make up" attitude which constitutes the best reason why the United States should go into any Far Eastern conference with a policy that flows from its historic position and its national interest.

[Editorial from New Masses, September 12, 1939]

NO FAR EASTERN MUNICH

The second imperialist war is going on in Europe. But the Far East remains one of its fronts. A major corollary of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact was the easing of Japanese pressure upon England and the United States, which reflects also the strengthened position of China.

British diplomacy in the Far East during the past decade can only be explained in the same terms as the refusal of Tory England to support Ethiopia, Spain, and Czechoslovakia despite the crucial positions of these nations in the lifelines of the Empire. The British Tories were prepared to assist Japan, as they assisted Germany, for the purpose of preparing an attack upon the Soviet Union, thwarting the victory of the Chinese people, and arriving at terms with Japan at the expense of the United States. The Soviet nonaggression pact with Germany scotched all that. However, just because Soviet action broke the back of Japanese pro-axis policy, the Chamberlain government attempts to use this circumstance to bring about Far Eastern cooperation with the Japanese. In the Washington Merry-Go-Round for September 4, Drew Pearson and Robert Allen report that the retiring British ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, called upon the State Department "to explain that his Government, long at sword's point with the Japanese, now was trying frantically to negotiate a deal The British propose to patch things up with the Japanese by recognizing many of their claims in China, in return for which they want Japan to mass an army against Siberia."

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The changes in the Japanese Cabinet likewise reenforce the possibility of closer Japanese cooperation with Great Britain. Nor would it be mistaking the basic Tory policy to emphasize that its unwilling war against German fascism does not preclude a Munich in the Far East.

Needless to say, China and the Soviet Union would be the direct victims of such a policy. But equally as much would the national interests of the United States suffer. Like the Soviet Union, the United States is now in a unique position to exercise independent pressure against Japan in the east, just as the best interests of American and world peace can be served by independent Amer

ican action for a democratic (not a Munich) peace in Europe. America's basic and long-range interest can only be served by the victory of the Chinese people, which requires a complete embargo upon Japan, credits and material aid to China, and a Far Eastern foreign policy completely independent of Downing Street.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA

Ambassador JESSUP. Now, Mr. Chairman, the recent public discussions of this question of the round table conference and of American policy have focused largely on the question of the policy of the United States with respect to the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, and therefore I should like to lay before the committee a statement in regard to this policy. This is a statement of the policy of the United States and the Department of State. I shall first summarize the main points in connection with this problem and then go into some detail on a chronological basis.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. As you are aware, I addressed a letter to the Secretary of State on this subject and connected subjects, and tomorrow when we talk further I propose to introduce in the record my letter to the Secretary of State and his reply, so at that time we can discuss some of the features of that correspondence. Ambassador JESSUP. Yes, sir.

By way of summary, Mr. Chairman, first, the United States has never considered the recognition of Communist China. It has continued to recognize the National Government of China.

2. The United States has consistently asserted its influence against the recognition of Communist China by other governments.

3. The United States has consistently supported the National Government of China as the representative of China in the United Nations and has opposed the seating of representatives of Peiping.

4. The United States has never agreed with any other government that the United States would under any given circumstances recognize Communist China.

5. The United States has never expressed its approval or concurrence with the action taken by any other government in recognizing Communist China.

6. The Department of States has never recommended to the President or to the National Security Council that the United States recognize Communist China.

Those are the broad principles, Mr. Chairman, the broad statement, of what the policy of the United States, through the State Department, has actually been on this question of recognition. That is documented by the history which I now would like to lay before the committee.

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Senator SMITH of New Jersey. In the first one you say "The United States has never considered *" You mean in the sense of doing it, but it certainly has considered it.

Ambassador JESSUP. That is correct, Senator. That word might be subject to misinterpretation. It naturally considered the problem. What I meant by that was that it has never reached the point at which it contemplated that that action might be taken.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I wanted to make that clear. I thought your word "considered" might be misconstrued.