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social affairs, international organization affairs, and so on. I do not think I have the agenda of this conference; I have here the report of this Hot Springs Conference of 1945, called Security in the Pacific: A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Without delaying the committee to look for the agenda, I can give you the chapter headings which would perhaps indicate the scope of the conference:

1. "Significant developments in 1944." That reflects opening statements by representatives of the different delegations.

2. "The future of Japan." That was a round-table discussion. There was a separate round table on the future of Japan.

3. "Economic recovery and progress in Pacific countries." That was a separate round table.

4. "Cultural and race relations," a separate round table. 5. "The future of dependent areas," another round table.

6. "Collective security," which was this field of international organization which has become the United Nations.

I think, as I review that, that that represents the six round tables, one on Japan, one on economic questions, one on cultural questions, one on the future of dependent areas, colonies, and so on, and one on collective security, so you can see the broad scope of the general discussion which took place at the meeting.

A CHANGE IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE FAR EAST

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. What I am getting at with that question is, frankly, Dr. Jessup, the moment of time, if I can locate it, in our foreign policy when our foreign policy toward the Far East changed. I will develop that a little more fully in a minute.

There was a moment of time when our support of the Nationalist Government and Chiang Kai-shek eased off and we moved into the attitude that perhaps after all the Chinese Communist movement was an agrarian movement and was more along the line we should support than the other was.

DID THE IPR HAVE INFLUENCE IN POLICY FORMATION

What I am getting at is, did the IPR have any influence on that thinking of our Government? That has been the charge made, namely that there was a moment of time when they became not pure researchers in objective, but they became a propaganda organization to change our policy in China.

Ambassador JESSUP. I am very glad you asked that question, Senator, because I think the impression created by the statements on that point is completely erroneous.

As I say, the IPR as an international organization, or in its national council, did not take positions. There was never a time in the history of the IPR or of the American Council of the Pacific Council in which we said, "Now, here is a point of view. We must try to promote this point of view."

We were definitely precluded by our rules from doing that and I believe that those rules were steadily followed and that we avoided.

anything of the kind, of taking a position and trying to forward that position.

The only sense in which one could say that the IPR had an influence on foreign policy is this: That the IPR, the International IPR, was an organization which did arrange these meetings from time to time, international meetings, in which leading figures from all of these 10 countries got together and discussed in common these problems.

Now, in 1942 and 1945 we did have officials of the United States Government participating. They were able to sit down with leading Chinese. Hu Shih came to some of these. I do not know whether he was at this one or not. Madame Pandit came to Hot Springs. Representatives of the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Canada, and so on, came. They were all there. And these people from the State Department had an opportunity to sit in these round tables and to have the advantage of this discussion, whatever that advantage

was.

Now, in that sense, you can say that the IPR had an influence, in that it arranged a forum of discussion with the participation of leading figures from many different countries interested in the Pacific, and that people from the State Department attended and were able to participate in the discussions and to appreciate the points of view expressed.

Aside from that, it is completely misleading and false to suggest that the IPR influenced policy in the State Department.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I leave that there with that explanation, because there are some other matters I want to explore with you along this line.

Let me say this, Dr. Jessup, I have known you too long to have any question about your loyalty or about your integrity and all those things.

Ambassador JESSUP. Thank you, sir.

me.

NOT A QUESTION OF BEING A COMMUNIST

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Those things are perfectly clear to I stated on the floor of the Senate what I thought of you and you were kind enough to acklowledge it and I just repeat the same thing. I am not concerned with the question of whether you were a Communist or not, because I know very well you are not. I know that the suggestion you are is just beyond my comprehension. But there were matters of policy where I think you and I may have disagreed, and I want to see if we can't get at those. I can best illustrate what I mean by reading a question that I put into the MacArthur hearings, on pages 463 and 464. This is a quotation of it, where I endeavored to clarify what I thought was the conflict of views in the State Department, about our Far Eastern policy. It was about the time that Secretary Marshall went out there, prior to his being Secretary Marshall, on his first mission. I made this statement and I want to read it to you and see wherein, if anywhere, you disagree with it.

By the way, you edited the white paper, as I understood, that come out in the summer of 1949 on the subject to China? Ambassador JESSUP. Yes, sir.

STATEMENT FROM THE MAC ARTHUR HEARING

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. So that the statements in that were edited by you, and any conclusions drawn in there were along the line of your own thinking.

I said to General Marshall, asking him to clarify this misunderstanding in my own mind, the following:

I read the white paper through from cover to cover

that last is a little exaggeration. I practically completed it all. I was laid up at the time with my phlebitis difficulties, and I had time to read it.

I read the white paper through from cover to cover, and I came to the conclusion that there were two schools of thought on this matter: The LattimoreVincent school followed by a number of our younger men like John Davis Service, and others in the State Department (I don't think Stilwell was so much, although he was opposed to Chiank Kai-shek), which was opposed to our giving further aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and on the other hand the Wedemeyer school. I was convinced from having seen General Wedemeyer personally that he was in favor of the Chiang Kai-shek support and thought it was a wise policy.

Then I talked to Mr. Jessup about it. Mr. Jessup was appointed head of a special committee. Mr. Jessup obviously was in the Lattimore-Vincent group favoring later recognition, bringing the Commies in and stopping the war by that route.

Then these things happened which gave me a great deal of concern. Quite suddenly General Wedemeyer was removed from the Pentagon in Washington and sent out to California in command of the Sixth Army, which looked like a promotion, but really took him away from any further consideration of these policies.

His report was not published and yet his report, as I read it, as subsequently published and the white paper, indicates his support of the Chiang Kai-shek position and his feeling we should continue to support Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists as one of our allies against this Communist menace.

Then another thing happened which gave me concern, and that was this: Admiral Badger, who had been in charge of our Seventh Fleet and who in that capacity had responsibility for the mainland of China, as distinguished from General MacArthur, who had charge of our island defenses, was removed.

Admiral Badger came back to Washington and he met with our Foreign Relations Committee. We talked with him, and I talked with him privately, and I found that he was very much distressed over the trend. That was brought out very clearly in our MacArthur hearings. While others did not agree, many did.

That is why, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I asked permission of the Senate to go to the Far East; and I went to the Far East because of this concern.

REPORT OF VISIT TO THE FAR EAST

As I said yesterday, you will recall, I suggested to you any Ray Fosdick and Everett Case that we all go, in light of the special mission you have to determine this policy. I thought it was so vitally important.

I came back with the feeling that we were in a very critical situation, and I made a report to that effect to my committee, which I need not go into now.

I came back with the feeling that we were in a very critical situation, and I made a report to that effect which I need not go into now. I came to the feeling that there was a very distinct issue between what you might call the MacArthurWedemeyer group, who felt we had made a serious mistake in our attitude toward the Nationalists, and the other side, headed by the State Department (Dean

Acheson and others) who wanted to build up the group sympathetic with recognizing the Commies. In fact, I was told shortly after I got back that we had given the green light to Great Britain to recognize the Chinese Communists though when I got back, the first thing I did was to urge on Secretary Acheson not to do that under any circumstances.

I was convinced that the movemment in China was a conquest by Russia by a subversive method, and that recognition of the Chinese Communists would simply mean we were conceding that China could go behind the iron curtain.

Now, before I ask you.to comment specifically on that, I want to develop it just a little bit further by introducing here, Mr. Chairman, into the record, a letter which I wrote to Secretary Acheson September 18, last, and a reply from Secretary Acheson to me on September 26, last, in order to get the two views before the committee. Senator SPARKMAN. Let those letters be inserted in the record at this point.

(The material referred to appears in the record, as follows:)

LETTER OF SENATOR H. ALEXANDER SMITH TO SECRETARY OF STATE,
SEPTEMBER 18, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
September 18, 1951.

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,

Secretary of State, Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: A matter of grave concern to many people since the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty is the attitude of the United States and the United Nations toward China. There is a strong feeling that pressures will be brought on the United States by members of the United Nations, and especially by Great Britain, to recognize the Communist Peiping government, and to bring Communist China into the United Nations. This issue will probably not be precipitated unless and until there may be a possible cease-fire armistice in Korea. There is apprehension that cease-fire terms may be developed along the line of the proposals of last winter-the admission of Communist China to the U. N. and the turning over of Formosa to Communist China. I am aware that we have taken the position that we will not permit Communist China to "shoot its way" into the U. N., but it would be relatively easy to develop a formula to overcome this difficulty.

We, of the Foreign Relations Committee, are facing two immediate responsibilities: (1) the appointment of United States delegates to the next Assembly of the U. N., and (2) the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the accompanying security pacts.

Frankly, I have no assurances as to the position of the United States in case of a cease-fire armistice. I need important information in order properly to discharge my present responsibilities.

As you may recall, when I returned from my trip to the Far East in 1949, I wrote a letter to you (on the eve of your departure to Paris) expressing my strong conviction on both the recognition of Communist China by the United States and the status of Formosa. While I do not find any reply to my letter in my files, I do recall that I was informed by Mr. Jessup that we would probably recognize Communist China promptly if the British and India did. I enclose copy of my letter to you dated November 5, 1948.

Then came the Angus Ward case and the seizure of our consulate in Peiping, which, of course, foreclosed any immediate recognition by us. The Korean outbreak the following June further complicated matters.

We need full information whether there was any understanding with our allies on this matter. And I am referring especially to Great Britain. On my visit there a year ago, and again this year, from general conversations, I got the distinct impression that Britain took the position that she would not have recognized Communist China early in 1950, if we had not given reasonable assurances that we would follow and if there had not been an understanding to the same effect with the commonwealth nations.

I have been advised that early in November 1949 Great Britain submitted a remorandum to us on the subject and requested our reply within 2 weeks. Also the British Government said that they awaited replies from the commonwealth nations, and referred to a conference at Singapore.

Will you please furnish me with

(1) The results of the Singapore conference of 1949.

(2) A copy of the British memorandum of early November 1949, advising the United States of the British attitude toward recognition of Communist China. (3) A copy of the reply that the State Department, or you, as Secretary of State, made to the British Government, or to Mr. Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, as to the attitude of the United States with regard to the recognition of Communist China.

I feel that this information is vitally important if we are to meet our responsibilities in considering the confirmation of the United States delegates to the United Nations, and the ratification of the Japanese Treaty.

With kindest personal regards, I remain,

Always cordially yours,

H. ALEXANDER SMITH.

LETTER OF SECRETARY OF STATE, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951

Hon. H. ALEXANDER SMITH,

United States Senate.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, September 26, 1951.

My DEAR Senator SMITH: Since my return from Ottawa I have given earnest thought to your letter of September 18, regarding certain aspects of our past and present policy respecting China.

The United States has consistently opposed and continues to oppose (1) recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, (2) seating representatives of that regime in the United Nations and other international bodies, and (3) turning Formosa over to Communist China. These policies have had and continue to have the full concurrence and support of all branches of the Government.

The United States is firmly opposed to any linkage between an armistice in Korea and the questions of Formosa and Chinese representation in the United Nations. We are well aware of the potential difficulties which such a linkage might cause and have given a great deal of thought to ways in which we might cope with such a possibility. I believe that there is general agreement at present among the other principal nations actively supporting the United Nations effort in Korea in opposition to any such linkage. Furthermore, as you are probably aware, consideration of political subjects is specifically excluded from present cease-fire negotiations. Finally, the policies outlined in the preceding paragraph were fully operative prior to Communist agression in Korea and we do not, for our part, consider that an armistice in Korea, if such should eventuate, would be cause for modification of these policies.

I recall your letter of November 5, 1949, and have looked into the matter of a reply to it. I find that in a letter to you dated November 7, 1949, a copy of which I attach hereto, I pointed out that I had received your letter just as I was leaving for Paris and expressed appreciation for having your views. I added that I would be glad to go into the matter in detail with you when I returned. Since we were in fact able to meet together and discuss the views outlined in your letter shortly after my return, I did not make any further reply.

During the fall of 1949 when it was evident that the question of recognition of the Peiping regime would be under consideration by many foreign governments, we frequently expressed to friendly governments including the British Government the view that hasty recognition would be unwise and that there should be a full exchange of views between concerned governments before action toward recognition was taken by anyone. In line with this the British Government from time to time during the fall of 1949 outlined the development of its views regarding recognition of the Peiping regime. The memorandum early in November 1949 to which you refer was one such expression of their views. Since I was meeting with Mr. Bevin in Paris shortly thereafter, no written comments were submitted to the British Government in connection with this memorandum. I did, however, go into the matter with Mr. Bevin in considerable detail at Paris, making clear to him our view that recognition would be unwise. In a subsequent conversation early in December with the British Ambassador in Washington I further emphasized this view. There can be no doubt that I made clear to them that we were not considering recognition ourselves.

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