The same thing is found in the white paper where there are many communications. I realize there is some delicacy.

Senator SPARKMAN. I appreciate that fact and I will stick by my statement that I wish they would work out an arrangement whereby they could be released.

Go right ahead, Governor.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA

Mr. STASSEN. Point 6 in this prevailing group's discussion was that it should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communist Government.

I want to make clear this was not labeled point 6 during the conference. These 10 points he merged and I placed the numbers on them for purposes of identification.

I opposed that and I urged that the United States should announce that it considered Formosa a vital part of our perimeter and that we would not permit an armed assault from the mainland on Formosa.

I might say that this was in advance of all this military discussion. This was 2 years ago. Of course, I then gave my view from a basis of my wartime observation in sailing around Formosa and knowing that western area.

I then said in that conference specifically from the State Department transcript:

On the other military question, I am inclined to feel that Formosa is an important strategic area for our own outer perimeter. Here, again, the military judgment should carry. There are excellent air fields in Formosa. If antagonistic air bases exist on Formosa, the Philippine Islands and Japan are quite effectively severed from each other. Formosa is immediately astride of the airway and direct seaway.

We should have in mind the psychological effect of a firm position and the fact that Formosa is still in an uncertain legal position

and so forth.

So that my statement of the issue was very direct and very positive.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD HONG KONG

The seventh point that came forth from this discussion was that it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong if they insisted.

In other words, that the United States should not step in to back up in any way the British.

Here, again, I opposed the view and I said this:

I think if the British take a stand in Hong Kong, they ought to back the British up with everything they want us to back them up with in Hong Kong. These are matters of alternative. And if the British, who must be our close partner in this world picture decide they are going to stand and fight, what do we do? Do we appear before the world as weak and indecisive? Do we back away from our British friends, or do we send ships and give them some air cover and do that sort of thing and indicate that we stand with them in a firm position against the Communist assault in Hong Kong?

I grant these are grave decisions, but I think the whole picture demands that kind of very firm action.

ATTITUDE TOWARD NEHRU

Now the eighth thing from the prevailing discussion came from the point that Premier Nehru had shown a reactionary or arbitrary

tendency and should not be leaned on or assisted as a ladder of nonCommunist forces in Asia.

I contended that Nehru was an important leader of the non-Communist areas of Asia. That India should receive economic aid. That he should not be opposed in his effort to develop his third position in the world struggle.

BLOCKADE OF COMMUNIST CHINESE COAST

The ninth of the prevailing group: That the United States should not approve of the blockade of the Communist Chinese coast by the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, should assist in breaking it, and should send economic aid to the area of China under Communist control; and tenth of the prevailing groups position, that no aid should be sent to the Communist Chinese guerrillas in the south of China, nor to the Chiang Kai-shek forces, or that the military supplies en route to them should be cut off. I contended for our own peace and our own security

American policy should be to prevent Russian Communist imperialistic consolidation of Asia; that every move of opposition to the Communist advance in Asia should be made and all forces resisting communism in Asia should be aided militarily, as well as economically.

STASSEN'S COMMENTS DURING STATE DEPARTMENT CONFERENCE

Now, near the conclusions of the sessions, I sat directly across the conference table-in other words, this I said on the third day in the presence of Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Rosinger, and Dr. Jessup, and the others:

My first comment is on some of the related discussion this morning that has been advanced that along with recognition, other steps were proposedthis is from the transcript of my remarks taken from the State Department in 1949

I say frankly these steps to me could be best characterized as steps that would hasten the victory to the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government. I think that would be the correct characteristic of the related steps that have been advanced along with the urging of recognition at the earliest possible date. If we recognize the Communist Government of China now, clearly that does mean we must at the same time not only withdraw recognition of the other government-the Nationalist Government-but that we must then join in affirmative action to throw the Nationalist Government out of the United Nations. There are no halfway measures on this. You cannot be recognizing a government in one way and then in the United Nations tribunal, in which we are a great leading nation, take a different position to that. Nor should we possibly abstain. That would be a cowardly and weak position to take. So, we would then be in the position of going into the United Nations, with our great prestige, and throw out from the United Nations the representative of whatever you may wish to call them-the remnants of a former government that still has now, and I think will for some foreseeable time, the effective jurisdiction over one-third of the area of China and one-third of its people and that is continuing to put up some form of resistance to the Communist areas.

Now I might say further that near the end of the conference, as I characterized my appraisal of this group, I do not recall that anyone in the opposing group objected to my characterization which I then expressed right across the table.

STASSEN'S NOON CONVERSATION WITH JESSUP

Now at recess, at about noon on the third day, disturbed by the prevailing trend of the discussion, I spoke personally to Dr. Jessup. I said I certainly hoped they would not make the tragic mistake of following this recommended program that had been advocated by Mr. Lattimore and his group.

Mr. Jessup responded that he felt that the greater logic was on that side.

Then I pleaded with him that he should not follow that view, and urged that before he moved in that direction, he should go to Tokyo and see General MacArthur and discuss the whole situation with him.

I told him that I had not seen General MacArthur nor had any communication with him since the end of the war but that I knew from the whole wartime experience that he was extremely brilliant and well-informed about these very problems we were dealing with in this conference and that it was in my judgment tremendously important that he go promptly to see General MacArthur and discuss with him the recommended Lattimore program. Dr. Jessup said he might do that and that was the end of the recess conversation.

IMPORTANCE OF VISITING THE SPECIFIC AREA

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Governor Stassen, I might interrupt you there to say that in the course of my examination of Dr. Jessup here, he recalled that prior to my trip in September of this year to the Far East, long before this meeting of yours, that I had urged that he and Ray Fosdick and Dr. Case all go to the Far East before they come to conclusions. I just based that on an experience that I have had in my life that the only way to get the feel of a situation is to go there. You can have all the opinions you want and all the documentation you want but unless you get in the area where there are critical decisions to be made, you cannot get the answers as effectively.

He admitted that they had discussed that but because of inconvenience they could not do it. My judgment is that it might have been more effective to get sound results, than to have this meeting with these experts presenting their documents in the first place. If they had been out there and gotten the feeling they could have come back and gotten these opinions and would have been better able to evaluate them.

The matter was considered seriously about taking the whole committee out there and was turned down for some reason I never understood.

QUESTION OF MEMORY AND TESTIMONY

Mr. STASSEN. I submit at this point in our hearing one of the important questions of correctness of memory and testimony is involved. Dr. Jessup has testified to this committee that he does not recall such a conversation with me and further that recognition of Communist China never was considered or contemplated by him or by the State Department.

Senator Alexander Smith, as you know, has reported a recollection similar to mine in connection with a November 1949 talk that he had with Dr. Jessup.

Dr. Jessup states that Senator Smith must be under a misapprehension.

General Fortier testified before the McCarran committee that in the first week of January 1950, Dr. Jessup told him that the United States, would recognize Communist China within 2 weeks after Britain, who had just issued their recognition at that time, on January 5, 1950. Dr. Jessup says that General Fortier is mistaken.

Thus on this central point he disagrees with the recollection of Senator Smith, General Fortier, and myself.

Now after a careful search, Mr. Robert Matteson, of my staff, has discovered remarkable corroboration of the position of Senator Smith, General Fortier, and myself, from an unexpected source.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATIVE TO RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA

You will recall that on July 1, 1949, Secretary Acheson wrote to Senator Connally that the United States would not recognize Communist China until he, Secretary Acheson, had first consulted with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he reaffirmed this publicly on August 5 and 24, 1949.

Then on November 16, 1949, Secretary Acheson said that the recognition of Communist China was out of the question so long as they held Angus Ward.

On the same day, Foreign Minister Bevin, of Britain, said in the House of Commons, that Britain was waiting for the United States to join with Britain before Britain recognized Communist China. On December 12, 1949, Angus Ward was released.

On December 30, 1949, India recognized Communist China. On January 5, 1950, Britain recognized Communist China. And here is the confirmation of the recollection of Senator Smith, General Fortier, and myself.

WHITE'S ARTICLE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE MEETING

In the January 11, 1950, edition of the New York Times, there is a report of a long-closed conference on January 10, 1950, of Secretary Acheson with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is written by William S. White, whom I have found to be a rather accurate reporter in foreign-policy matters.

I have here a copy of the story in full from the paper itself, which I will leave with the committee. I have a few mimeographed copies of it for other members of the committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you want the whole thing printed in the record?

Mr. STASSEN. Whatever you say.

Senator SPARKMAN. It will be if you wish it.

Mr. STASSEN. I will read the significant part and it is up to the committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. If you think it will be helpful to the committee, of course, we will be glad to have it in there.

Mr. STASSEN. I think it is good to put a whole story in, even though you are only talking about one part.

Senator SPARKMAN. Without objection the entire story will be inserted.

(The material referred to appears in the record, as follows:)

[From the New York Times, Wednesday, January 11, 1950]

(By William S. White-Special to the New York Times)

WASHINGTON, January 10.-Secretary of State Dean Acheson stood unbendingly today before his Republican critics in a long closed conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the administration's refusal to help Formosa militarily.

He was said also, by responsible Senators who heard him, to have offered no promise of substantial military aid to non-Communists lands anywhere in southeast Asia. "About the most" that could be expected by such countries as Burma, Thailand, India, Indochina, summed up the committee chairman. Senator Tom Connally, Democrat, of Texas, was "some aid under point 4." Point 4 is the project of President Truman, yet to be approved by Congress, for economic help to the world's backward areas.

"REPORTORIAL, NOT PHILOSOPHICAL"

Another informant reported that the Secretary "gave a reportorial and not a philosophical" statement, and made no suggestion that a line would be drawn at any particular point in Asia beyond which communism would not be permitted to go.

(The Defense Department today ordered two destroyers to give assistance to and help repair the United States freighter Flying Arrow, shelled off China by Nationalist gunboats. A State Department spokesman said "nobody questions" that the Flying Arrow had been attacked in international waters.)

In a 3-hour appearance before the committee, Mr. Acheson defeated a Republican effort to force him to disclose the nature and source of all the military advice used by the administration in adopting a hands-off policy for Formosa, the island headquarters of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

This attempt was particularly designed to determine whether General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo, who has been represented by some Republicans as favoring the occupation of Formosa, had been consulted.

The intention also was to bring out the recommendations that had been made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To questions along this line, it was reported later by Senator Connally, Mr. Acheson replied that he was not in position to speak for the military leaders, who could speak for themselves.

REFUSES TO GIVE NAMES

Finally, Senator Connally disclosed, Secretary Acheson declined to divulge the names of his juniors who, last month, had prepared a memorandum taking the line that Formosa, island headquarters of the Chinese Nationalist Government, was not strategically vital to the United States and must be written off. Mr. Acheson responded simply to the effect that the document, at all events, was his own responsibility and that he would assume it fully.

The net impression left with a number of informed Senators was that the Secretary had offered no concession to the complaining Republicans anywhere and that the administration was ready to battle its Republican critics on China from here on out without thought of compromise.

Senator Connally, as the principal administration foreign policy spokesman in Congress, made it plain, for his part, that the gloves would stay off.

Asked whether any of Mr. Acheson's antagonists had been "sold" by his presentation, the Senator replied:

"I haven't tried to sell them. You can't sell a stubborn fellow who doesn't want anything."

Senator Connally strongly indicated also that while United States recognition of Communist China would not be accomplished "in a hurry," it was on the way. Asked whether Secretary Acheson in today's discussion has fulfilled his pledge to consult with the committee before acting on the recognition question, Senator Connally observed:

"I think he has fulfilled it now. But very likely he will consult us again before the final action."

An aggressive, and probably a prolonged, Republican attack was clearly foreshadowed by Senator William F. Knowland of California, leader of the pro-China