General LEMAY. Well, I am familiar with all of these arguments for the Polaris system and before I start, let me say that I think we should have some of them. I don't believe we should put all of our strategic forces into this weapons system, and for many reasons. I am familiar with all the arguments about how invulnerable this weapons system is. I don't believe all those arguments, either. But let us assume for a minute that they are invulnerable. Now, what is the enemy going to do with its long-range missiles, its long-range bomber force, and so forth? The submarine is invulnerable, and they come to war. That leaves all of that available to hit our warmaking capacity in this country. And don't think we are going to be ignored. There have been too many examples of the United States throwing the balance.

Mr. ROBACK. The chairman, when he was talking about shelters, considered the condition if deterrence fails. Are you talking about the case if deterrence fails? Have you deserted the deterrence item now? General LEMAY. Yes, deterrence must have failed if we are going to war.

Mr. ROBACK. Using your terms of reference, then, would it be a greater deterrent factor if you had that sea-based system?

General LEMAY. No. I don't think that a sea-based system alone will produce the deterrence that we need.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. There will be no guarantee against striking of our cities and our land military bases?

General LEMAY. No, and I don't think it would be a deterrence because the Polaris system is going to cost in the neighborhood of at least 10 times the Minuteman fixed system. At least 10 times. And it is not invulnerable at all. I don't think we should discuss that question here in open session, but I bring up one thing that is generally known: It is in a submarine. We defeated the submarine threat in the last war, and it is reasonable to assume that we might be able to do it again if we set out to do it.

(The information requested is classified and has been retained in the subcommittee files.)

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you very much, General LeMay, for your appearance here this morning, and your response to the questions. We appreciate it, and it will help us in our deliberations on civil defense.

I might say before we leave the room that Admiral Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, will speak tomorrow morning on mobile missile systems with particular reference to the Navy's Polaris missile submarine.

There has been considerable newspaper comment on the relative advantages of missile-launching submarines and fixed hardened ICBM sites. The committee wants to develop the record on this point to determine the civil defense implications, and to insure that full attention is being devoted to our civil defense problem in this respect. The subcommittee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

(The following information, requested by Chairman Holifield, on the air-launched ballistic missile project known as Sky Bolt, was submitted for the record by General LeMay :)

The Skybolt is a long-range, two-stage, ballistic air-to-surface missile designed to be launched against strategic targets from aircraft traveling at both subsonic and supersonic speeds. The B-52, which will comprise the bulk of the manned strategic force for the next few years, will carry a number of these weapons externally in addition to its normal internal combat load. Equipping the B-52 with the Skybolt will provide a significant increase in the firepower and operational flexibility of the strategic force. The Skybolt can be launched from outside of the enemy defense perimeter from an infinite number of positions which an enemy cannot predetermine or reasonably predict, thus providing the United States with the first realistic capability for omnidirectional ballistic missile attack. Mounted on the long-range B-52 force it provides a degree of mobility and speed of reaction that cannot be matched. Because the bulk of the B-52 force is in being, paid for, and established as a proven and operationally reliable force, it will not require an expensive initial investment. The Skybolt will deliver a destructive payload with accuracy equal to or better than other mobile strategic systems. Because of its unique air mobile capability and the resultant imposition of new demands upon an enemy defense system the Skybolt will provide a valuable adjunct to our military force. Additionally, the Skybolt concept represents the forerunner of air mobile systems of unlimited growth potential in speed, range, and areas of operations.

CIVIL DEFENSE

Part III-Relation to Missile Programs

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 1960

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., Hon. Chet Holifield (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Members present: Chet Holifield, Joe M. Kilgore, Mrs. Martha W. Griffiths, and R. Walter Riehlman.

Also present: Herbert Roback, staff administrator; Carey Brewer, special consultant; Douglas Dahlin, staff attorney; and Paul Ridgely, investigator.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The subcommittee will be in order.

This morning, we are pleased to receive testimony from Adm. Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, on the subject of mobile missile systems, with particular reference to the Polaris missile system.

The main purpose of our hearings this week has been to examine our Nation's capability to survive the effects of a possible enemy attack. We have received extensive testimony from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization concerning the status of civil defense shelter construction and OCDM activities in the field of postattack recovery planning.

In my opinion, the evidence presented to the subcommittee indicates that our population is almost completely unprepared to cope with the catastrophic impact of a possible enemy attack. Few shelters have been constructed and only modest resources have been stockpiled for the emergency care of survivors in a post-attack situation.

The subcommittee is particularly concerned over the civil defense implications of hardened bases and ICBM sites in the continental United States. A concentrated enemy assault against those bases would subject possibly our entire population and much of our food resources to the deadly effects of radioactive fallout.

Admiral Burke, I'm sure you share our concern in this respect. As one who is directly charged with the responsibility of protecting our country from a possible enemy attack, you have no doubt given much thought to this problem.

The subcommittee appreciates your willingness to appear this morning, and we welcome your testimony on the particular question of mobile missile systems as well as on other matters you may wish to discuss concerning the problem of protecting our people in the event of an enemy attack.

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STATEMENT OF ADM. ARLEIGH BURKE, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. W. F. RABORN; REAR ADM. J. S. McCAIN; AND COMDR. E. C. BARNHARDT III

Admiral BURKE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is an honor and a privilege to appear before this committee today to present the Navy's concept of mobile missile bases.

Our national military forces structure must be such as to deter the Soviets from initiating general war, and to destroy their capability and will to continue the war effectively should deterrence fail.

Deterrence exists so long as the Soviets conclude that our surviving military capability will be such as to cause unacceptable damage to the U.S.S.R. after an initial attack upon us, or our allies, regardless of its nature. Implicit in the foregoing is that this surviving capability will be used inevitably and inexorably until their capability and will to continue are destroyed.

In making this, a rational enemy would consider the probably surviving U.S. military capability in its entirety. But undoubtedly, he would give greatest weight to an estimate of our surviving retaliatory forces. This follows because he might conclude that if he could escape devastation by our nuclear retaliation, he could continue the war to a favorable conclusion.

We must therefore insure that our nuclear delivery forces have the requisite degree of survivability. How can this be accomplished while at the same time minimizing the possibility of our country being devastated in any exchange? There are several measures that should be considered. Their effectiveness changes with weapon development. Some measures that have been feasible and effective in the past are less effective now, and will be even less effective in the future.

A brief analysis follows of those measures worthy of consideration as contributing to this survivability.

DIVERSITY OF WEAPONS SYSTEM

A diversity of nuclear delivery system, capable of retaliation from many directions, ranges, sources, delivery means, and commands reduces their individual probability of destruction. Geography is our ally here, since the Sino-Soviet territory is one land mass surrounded by free world territory and the oceans. A diversified threat increases the enemy's problem immeasurably. A surprise attack cannot possibly destroy a diversified retaliatory system. The enemy's problem of defense against those remaining becomes unmanageable.

It is not necessary that each of these diverse weapons systems be sufficient in itself to destroy the U.S.S.R., but their combined residual capability must be such as to do so with an ample safety factor. Multiple retaliatory systems will also insure against the effectiveness of possible innovation in tactics, technique, or technology that might be achieved to nullify the retaliatory capabilities of a single system, or of a small number of systems operating from a single medium.