natural reasons, nevertheless they are a sign of the course which pilots ought to steer. It must be therefore confessed that Plutarch has defended the common opinion as learnedly as it can be maintained. The efficient cause, when found out, does not exclude the final cause, and even necessarily supposes it in every action directed by an intelligent being. What grounds therefore do philosophers go upon, when they maintain that eclipses, being a natural consequence of the motion of the planets, cannot be a presage of the death of a king; and that the overflowing of rivers being a natural effect of rains, or melted snows, cannot portend a sedition, the dethroning of a prince, or such like public calamities? I answer that they go upon this ground, that the effects of nature cannot be presages of future contingents, unless they be appointed for that end by a particular intelligent being. It is evident that the laws of nature being left in their general course, would never raise any towers, nor set up watch-lights upon them for the use of pilots. It must be the work of men; it is necessary that their particular wills should apply the virtue of bodies in such a manner as may relate to the end which they propose to themselves. On the other hand, it is manifest that the laws of nature being left in their general course cannot produce any meteors, or the overflowing of a river, whereby the inhabitants of a kingdom may know that there will arise a sedition in two or three years time, which will overthrow the monarchy. It is manifest that a particular intelligent being must needs form those meteors, or those great inundations, that they may be the signs of a change in government: but then it will be impossible to explain them by physical reasons; for that which depends upon the particular will of a man or an angel, is not the object of a science: the causes thereof cannot be found out by philosophy.

Thence it follows, that an event which may be ex

plained by physical reasons, is not a presage of a future contingent, and that such a presage cannot be explained by the laws of nature. So that when Plutarch says, "that the diviner found out the final cause, and the philosopher the efficient cause," he must suppose that a particular spirit so disposed the scull of that ram, that his brains being straitened, and ended sharping over against the middle of the forehead, produced but one horn, which came out in that very place. He must also suppose that this spirit modified the brains of that ram in such a manner, to the end that the Athenians might know that the faction of Pericles would overthrow that of Thucydides, and have all the power in its hands. But that supposition being contrary to the notions whereby we know that none but God can foresee future contingents, cannot be admitted; and so the vulgar opinion about presages cannot be adopted without acknowledging that God produces miraculously, and by a particular will all the natural effects which are looked upon as prognostics. According to that supposition miracles, properly so called, would be almost as frequent as natural effects; which is a prodigious absurdity. Observe, that if God had been willing to work a miracle, to inform the Athenians that one of their factions would be destroyed, he needed not straiten the brains of that ram. He would have produced a horn in the middle of the forehead without making any alteration in the brains, which would have been a stronger proof of the prodigy. However, I hope the reader will find no fault with me, for having made a reflection upon a thought of Plutarch, which is so specious that it might seem to most readers to be a solid one.--Art. PERICLES.

ORACLES.

AGESIPOLIS, king of Lacedemon, once sent to Delphi to know if the opinion of Apollo was agreeable to that given on the famous olympian temple of Jupiter.

We may hence collect a truth, which is otherwise evident enough; namely, that the Pagan religion was founded upon notions of the Deity as false as atheism. I do not speak of the sentiments of the common people only, or the abuse of particular persons: I speak of the public worship, performed by the most eminent persons, and supported by the authority of the state. We have here an instance of a king of Lacedemon, who, after having offered solemn sacrifices, as preparative to an expedition, and even after a favourable answer from the greatest of the gods, goes and consults another Deity, being uncertain whether he will contradict, or confirm this answer. He was therefore of opinion, that the decisions of Jupiter could not always be followed with a safe conscience, and he supposed, that the sentiments of Apollo were not always conformable to those of Jupiter. Was not this to believe, that all the gods, without excepting the greatest, were limited in their knowledge, and that between them and men there was only the difference of more or less? At this rate, the 66 tot capita, tot sensus, so many men, so many minds," was applicable to inhabitants of heaven, as well as earth. They consulted Jupiter, as we consult the most famous advocate of parliament, when we intend to commence a law suit. This advocate's answer does not satisfy a cautious client; but he desires to have the advice of other counsel; and some persons consult the most able doctors in every court of the kingdom. The Pagans did so with respect to their oracles: they consulted several of them upon the same point, to see whether the gods would contradict each other, and to take their measures the better, by comparing their respective answers. Thus their gods were as chimerical, as the deity of Spinoza; for it is as impossible that a limited nature should be God, as it is impossible that the world should be the Supreme Being which governs all things by a wise Providence.

To confirm what is here advanced concerning the false idea which the Pagans entertained of God: they were not scandalized at the different fate of their victims. Those which were offered to one divinity encouraged their hopes, while those offered to another alarmed their fears. Apollo and Diana, twins of Jupiter, often contradicted each other; the brother rejecting an offering, the sister accepting it. Paganism found nothing scandalous in this. The heathens would willingly have found a greater harmony in the promises of good things; but in short they did not believe that the Divine Nature was free from ignorance, caprice, and disagreement; so that they acquiesced in this, as an unavoidable effect of the nature of things. We must not imagine, that Cicero's objections opened the eyes of many among them. "Quid quum pluribus diis immolatur, qui tandem evenit ut litetur aliis, aliis non litetur? Quæ autem inconstantia deorum est, ut primis minentur extis, bene promittant secundis? Aut tanta inter eos dissensio, sæpe etiam inter proximos, ut Apollinis exta bona sint, Dianæ non bona ?*-Whence is it, that in consulting several gods at a time, we sacrifice to some and not to others? And what inconstancy of the gods is it, to threaten in the first entrails, but to appear propitious in the second? Or is there such a disagreement among them, even those the nearest related, that Apollo's victims shall promise success, but Diana's not?"

A modern author has made use of this conduct of Agesipolis, to shew that, in relation to the oracles, the greatest of the gods of Paganism did not preserve his advantage or his superiority. He says, "The oracles of Jupiter, such as those of Trophonius, Dodona, and Hammon, had not so much credit as that

* Cicero de Divinat. lib. 2, c. 17.

+ La Mothe le Vayer.

of Delphi, for they never equalled the latter either in esteem, or in duration. And this is proved by what Xenophon reports of Agesipolis, who, after having consulted Jupiter Olympius, and received his answer, had recourse to Apollo at Delphi, as a judge without appeal, whether he was of the same opinion with his father. Aristotle imputes this kind of religious ridicule to one Hegesippus in the second book of his Rhetorics." This passage furnishes matter for two observations. The first is, that the notions of the Gallican church concerning the council and the Pope, though speaking ex cathedra, may be compared to those of Paganism concerning the oracles of Jupiter, and of Delphi. The olympian Jupiter, when he answered a question, met with great esteem in the minds of the people; much deference was paid to his authority; but in short, his opinion, though delivered ex cathedra or rather ex tripode, did not pass for infallible. Behold the Pope of the Gallican church! The Apollo of Delphi was the judge without appeal: Behold the council! My second observation is, That Agesipolis was in earnest in what he did; there was no religious banter in the case. As for what concerns Hegesippus, I answer nothing for him. He was perhaps malicious enough to attempt ensnaring the oracles, that he might insult them if they did not agree. He might have said, "It is a shame for you to answer yes, and no." Hegesippus, having received an answer from the god at Olympia, interrogated him at Delphi, whether he was of the same opinion with his father, as if it were scandalous for the gods to disagree in their answers.* If Agesipolis had had any ill design against Apollo, in imitation of that malicious person, whose story Esop relates,†

* Aristot. Rhetor. lib. 2, cap. 25, pag. 445, F.

+ Esop in his sixteenth fable, whose title is "The Malicious." He was one who held a sparrow in his hand, and asked