Pacific Railroad (ibid., pp. 291–292), and in 1919-20 on the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Road and the Illinois Central System (ibid., pp. 296-298). In more recent years there have been strike votes taken on the railroads over racial issues but strikes have been averted through the intervention of the National Medianon Board (Northrup, Herbert, Organized Labor and the Negro, Harpers, 1944, p. 65) In the automobile industry such issues have caused strikes at Dodge, Packard, and Hudson (ibid., pp. 199–201); in shipbuilding at Mobile (ibid., pp. 225-226) in steel at the Bethlehem Sparrows Point plant (ibid., 224); in aircraft at the Curtiss-Wright plant in Ohio (ibid., pp. 207-208); Associated Press, June 65 1944); in the needle trades at Chicago and Kansas City (Northrup, op, eit, pp 125-126); Spero and Harris, op. cit., p. 338) ; and in the baking industry (Nort rup, op. cit., pp. 31-32). See also Cayton, Horace R., and Mitchell, George S. Black Workers and the New Unions, University of North Carolina Press, 1939, pp. 5-6, 78-80, 215–219, 228–230, 252, 289–291, 296, 316-320, 324; Wesley, Charles H. Negro Labor in the United States, Vanguard, 1927, pp. 79-80, 237, 253, 257, 261. 280. That the power of the Federal Government in labor disputes extended not merely to the sending in of troops to quell disorder and to the issuing of injune tions to prevent violence but also to the remedying of the causes of such disputes, was established beyond question in the decisions sustaining the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act. Thus, in Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation (300 U. S. 515, 553), the Court said:

"The power of Congress over interstate commerce extends to such regulations of the relations of rail carriers to their employees as are reasonably calculated to prevent the interruption of interstate commerce by strikes and their attendant disorders."

In Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B. (301 U. S. 1, 41), in holding that Congress had power to prevent discrimination in employment on account of union membership or activity by any employer engaged in a business, a "stoppage of" whose "operations by industrial strike" would affect commerce, the Supreme Court said:

"When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war."

The unfair employment practices listed in the proposed bill are closely analogons to the unfair labor practices which Congress determined in the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act should be prohibited because of their disruptive effect on commerce. The Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Roberts has pointed out that such practices as this bill rectifies are even more reprehensible than those specified by the labor acts. Thus, in New Negro Alliance v. Grocery Co. (303 U. S. 552, 561), the Supreme Court in determining that picketing by Negroes to secure employment was a labor dispute within the NorrisLaGuardia Act (29 U. S. C. A. 113) stated:

"The act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of the dis pute. The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the part persons of any race, color, or persuasion, and the removal of discrimination against them by reason of their race or religious beliefs is quite as important to those concerned as fairness and equity in terms and conditions of employment can be to trade or craft unions or any form of labor organization or association. Race discrimination by an employer may reasonably be deemed more unfair and less excusable than discrimination against workers on the ground of union affiliation. There is no justification in the apparent purposes or express terms of the act of limiting its definition of labor disputes and cases arising therefrom by excluding those which arise with respect to discrimination in terms and conditions of employment based upon differences of race or color.”

The paralyzing consequences to interstate commerce which arise from discrimination on account of race differ in no material respect from those arising from discrimination on account of union activities. The effect on interstate commerce of bad racial practices by employers or unions have on numerous occasions re quired Federal intervention. The Department of Labor, the National Labor Relations Board, and the National Mediation Board, as well as the many wartime agencies such as the War Labor Board, the War Manpower Commission, and the Fair Employment Practices Committee, have each been called upon to adjust labor disputes where the racial practice of the employer or the union or both were so intertwined in the causes of the disputes that any adjustment effected involved primarily a decision by the Federal agency on the policy to be followed by the

employer and the union with respect to racial practices. As these instances show, Congress in passing this bill will not be placing the Federal Government in a field in which it has not been in the past, but will be merely defining for the first time the policy to be followed by Federal agencies in a type of case which they have already been handling without congressional guidance.

Illustrative of the cases in which the services of the Department of Labor have been used to settle such a dispute is Matter of Layne & Bowler, Inc., arbitration decision by Whitley P. McCoy, awarded March 31, 1942. This case was originally filed with the National Labor Relations Board, being case No. XV-C-759 on their dockets, but was disposed of by that Board by getting all of the parties to agree to abide by the decision of an arbitrator to be appointed by the Director of the United States Conciliation Service of the United States Department of Labor. The dispute arose over the fact that the AFL union had a closed-shop contract with the employer, which however, had never been enforced in respect to some twenty-odd Negro employees whom the AFL had refused to admit to membership. Several years after the entry into the closed shop, several of the Negro employees joined a CIO union. The AFL then, without any notice or request to the employer to discharge the Negro employees, locked the gates of the plant and prevented the Negroes from going to work. This resulted in substantially curtailing the operations of the plant. Upon the intervention of Federal officials the employees were permitted to return to work. Thereupon the AFL demanded that the closed shop be observed and that all Negroes who did not join it be fired and threatened to strike unless their demand was met. As a result 4 of the Negroes joined the AFL and some 20 others were discharged. The arbitrator required the employer to reinstate and give 2 weeks' back pay to such of the Negro employees as should apply for reinstatement and express a willingness to abide by the terms of the closed-shop agreement.

Illustrative of the cases handled by the National Labor Relations Board involving such issues is Matter of Glamorgan Pipe and Foundry Co. (12 L. R. R. 344), in which an employer discharged two white union members because they tried to start a strike when a colored employee was assigned to work as a crane operator. The question presented to the Board was whether the efforts of the two discharged white union employees to start a strike for such a purpose were concerted activities protected by the National Labor Relations Act. The Board issued a complaint charging that the employer by discharging the two white union employees violated the National Labor Relations Act. The trial examiner, after hearing the evidence, found the facts as described here but ruled that efforts of union members to require their employers to discriminate against a worker on account of race were not protected by the National Labor Relations Act. The case was settled without a decision by the Board. (For a collection and discussion of other such cases handled by the National Labor Relations Board, see Northrup, op. cit., pp. 244-247.)

Illustrative of the intervention of the National Mediation Board in racial issues is the role it played in getting the railroads to sign the southeastern agreement, under the terms of which more than a dozen signatory railroads have agreed to follow a discriminatory practice so as to hire and assign new runs to white firemen and not only bar further Negroes from being hired but to displace Negro firemen many of whom have decades of service on the railroad. The refusal of the railroads to acquiesce in the terms of this agreement when proposed by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen led to the intervention of the National Mediation Board which used its services to persuade the railroads to agree to the union's discriminatory proposal. (For a full description of the activities of the National Mediation Board in the field of race relations see Northrup, op. cit., pp. 56-57, 89-101.)

No one has ever questioned that in each of the above cases, and the dozens more of the same kind which they have handled, the Federal agency involved was acting within the scope of Federal power to adjust labor disputes which threatened the commerce of the country with disruption. The compelling sweep of events make it too late to retrace our steps and say that racial employment practices are not within Federal power. Instead, events have made it imperative that Congress lay down a policy to be followed in this field.

In addition to the ample basis for Federal jurisdiction which arises from the tendency of racial employment practices to cause labor disputes, the bill also rests upon the findings that discrimination in employment because of race and color "forces large segments of our population into substandard conditions of living" (sec. 2 (b)). This finding is amply supported by the evidence. Indeed it is a well-recognized fact that racial discrimination results in depressing

wage rates not only for minority groups but for all workers. See for instance Spero and Harris, op. cit., pp. 33, 178, 181, 286-294; Patterson, S. Howard, McGraw-Hill, 1935 p. 71; Johnson, Charles S., The Negro in American Civilization, Henry Holt, pp. 55-58; Taft, Philip, Economics and Problems of Labor, Stackpole, 1942, p. 325.) This ground likewise affords an established basis for Federal regulation. The cases upholding the power of the Federal Government to bar from interstate commerce convict-made goods (Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 299 U. S. 334) and the power similarly to bar goods made at substandard labor conditions (United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100), in their holdings and reasoning recognize in Congress a power con prehensive enough to include the barring from interstate commerce of goods made under discriminatory racial practices in employment. Instead of barring such goods, Congress may make it mandatory that employers whose activities affect commerce, because their products or services compete with those of producers in other States, do not follow practices which depress wage rates.

EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES OF UNIONS WHOSE MEMBERS ARE EMPLOYED BY EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THE BILL

Section 3 (c) makes the bill applicable to any labor union which has 50 or more members in the employ of one or more employers covered by the bill. The same constitutional provisions which afford the bases for congressional regulation of the racial practices of each of the types of employers embraced in the bill likewise afford the basis for requiring the unions composed of employees of such employers to follow consistent racial practices. An examination of the authorities cited above in connection with strikes shows that the labor disputes burdening commerce which arose from racial incidents involved in most instances the racial practices of unions as well as of employers. The congressional power to remedy such burdens to commerce applies equally to employers and to unions.

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AFFORDS ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE PROPOSED ACT

Section 2 (c) of the bill recites that the act is enacted "as a step toward fulfillment of the international treaty obligations imposed by the Charter of the United Nations upon the United States as a signatory thereof to promote 'universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion'" The guild heartily endorses the adoption of the act as part of our fulfillment of our international obligations. The guild also believes that the provisions of article 550 of the Charter, which is quoted in part in section 2 (c) of the proposed bill, as a treaty obligation of the United States provides a firm constitutional basis for the proposed statute. Since article VI of the Constitution of the United States provides that "all treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land" the United States Senate by ratifying the Charter of the United Nations (the Senate ratified the Charter as a treaty on July 28, 1945, 91 Congressional Record 8189– 8190) raised to the stature of the supreme law of the land the obligation of the United States to "promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race." It is generally accepted that one of the human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to by the Charter is the right to employment. See Statement of Essential Human Rights by a committee appointed by the American Law Institute, printed in the Annals of the American Academy for Political and Social Science, January 1946, pages 22-24.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that by reason of arti cle VI of the Constitution, Congress has full power to enact all statutes appropriate to carry out treaties even if prior to the adoption of the treaty, Congress would have lacked constitutional power to deal with the matters encompassed by the statute. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court in Missouri v. Holland (252 U. S. 416, 433, 434), stated:

"It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well-being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to be found No doubt the great body of private relations usually falls within the control of the state, but a treaty may override its power."

* **

THE MEANS WHICH THE BILL EMPLOYS TO REMEDY DISCRIMINATION MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW

It having been demonstrated that long years of discriminatory racial practices by employers and unions has led to recurring labor disputes burdening commerce, the prescription of a program of nondiscrimination by employers and unions is clearly an appropriate means for Congress to adopt to put an end for all time to come to the ills we are at the present suffering because of the failure to follow such a program in the past. The power of Congress to interfere with an employer's right to hire or fire whomsoever he wished for whatsoever reason he wished has already been recognized. The public interest in ending discrimination against union members was held sufficient justification to restrict the employer's former unrestricted powers of running his business as he pleased (Texas & New Orleans Ry. Brotherhood, 281 U. S. 548; Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 1, 43-45). We believe the public interest in ending discrimination against persons because of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry, justifies a like restriction on the employer's powers to run his business as he sees fit.

The remedial provisions of the act, providing for reinstatement with back pay, likewise find full support in the above-cited and other decisions sustaining and applying analogous provisions of the Railway Labor Act and of the National Labor Relations Act.

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD.
ROBERT W. KENNY, President.

ROBERT J. SILBERSTEIN, Executive Secretary.

JUNE 27, 1947.

STATEMENT OF HARRY E. LEONARD, BUSINESS MANAGER, LOCAL UNION B-160, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS-RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES BILL (S. 984-H. R. 2824)

Whereas discrimination in public and private employment on the grounds of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry, with consequent denial of job opportunities to large groups of inhabitants of this country foments strife, creates unrest, disorders, and group tensions, and substantially and adversely affects the general welfare and good order of the country; and

Whereas such job discrimination tends to create and breed vice, degeneration, juvenile delinquency, and crime, thereby causing grave injury to the public safety, general welfare, and good order of this country, and endangering the public health thereof; and

Whereas experience has proven that legislative enactments prohibiting such job discrimination remove some of the sources of strife, unrest, poverty, disease, juvenile delinquency, and crime, and would directly promote the general welfare and good order of our country: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Electrical Workers Local Union B-160, International brotherhood of Electrical Workers, representing 1,047 members, hereby unqualifiedly endorses and urges the passage of the FEPC bill, Senate file 984, and House bill 2824, and further urges the Minnesota delegation in Congress to exhaust every energy and means toward accomplishing this end.

LOCAL UNION B-160, I. B. E. W.
By HARRY E. LEONARD,

Business Manager.

STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE, JUNE 30, 1947

The Liberal Party of New York asks this committee to support, without reservation, S. 984, and to send to the United States Senate before adjournment or recess in July, your recommendation for positive action on the part of that body. It should be evident to this committee that discrimination by interstate corporations, individuals engaged in interstate commerce, or by States receiving Federal aid, against American citizens or other inhabitants of the United States because of their race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry is a matter of concern to the Federal Government. It should be evident that such discrimination foments demestic strife and unrest, endangers the tranquillity of the economic structure, and threatens the rights and privileges of inhabitants of this Nation.

We of the Liberal Party maintain that the denial of equal employment oppor tunities in our society, the consequent failure to utilize the productive abilit of the persons being discriminated against, tends to lower the productive capacities of industry, and deprives large sections of the population of their hare won opportunities to maintain even the barest, minimum standards of living This, in turn, demoralizes the individual, gives totalitarian groups fertile seeds to sow, increases public relief rolls, and makes for group conflicts. Its subsequen danger to public safety and welfare should at once be recognized. That the continuance of such a policy makes for dangerous tensions for our country shou be conceded by even the most fair-minded critic and opponent of this bill. During a period of recession or depression, race conflicts would greatly increase.

That this bill can work in practice is evident from the fact that Executive Order 9346, issued on May 27, 1946, by President Roosevelt, which set up the wartime Fair Employment Practices Commission, operated during a period in our history when the need for unity was at its greatest-and operated sucCESSfully. Persons of all colors, religions, national ancestries fought side by side, died side by side, won side by side. Persons of all colors, religions, national ancestries worked side by side in the factories which help forge the weapons of war and victory.

Let those who would castigate totalitarian governments where freedom of opportunities sorrowfully do not exist, and who equally castigate those who demand passage of this bill, truthfully and candidly ask themselves whether an official or unofficial policy which prevents a person from contributing to his nation's welfare without the shackle of discrimination does not in fact lead to a violation of the basic freedoms of humanity.

We cannot contribute large sums of money and men abroad successfully to annihilate and prevent the spread of totalitarianism while practicing at home a policy which completely negates the purposes of our foreign policy. It is wholly inconsistent with the fundamental rights of man as set forth in our Nation's early and official documents, to permit within our borders racial dis crimination in employment.

This bill, insofar as discrimination in employment is concerned, merely reiter ates the laws of our forefathers. It merely states in legal language what every politically unfettered nonlegal mind knows that "Democracy is that form of society, no matter what its political classification, in which every man has a chance and knows that he has it."

Late in 1941, we were forced to defend our homes. In the immediate future we might well again, if the National Legislature is not wise enough to enact S. 984, be forced to defend our political faith from the hatemonger, or from the political representatives of a foreign country who will be able to capitalize on our weakness and failure to practice at home what we preach abroad-complete and unequivocable democracy and economic, social, and cultural opportunities for all peoples.

The truth is harsh: American çitizens are being discriminated against by other American citizens. The fact is cold: Something can be done to rectify this unmitigated insult to our country's principles. The bill being surveyed by this committee can, if enacted into law, weaken the arguments of those powers who, at a diplomatic conference table, will say to our representatives, as undoubtedly they have: "How can you speak of justice when you withhold the dispensation of economic justice to your own people?" If this bill is enacted into law, a multitude of Americans will have the opportunity to create, to build, to make the United States a nation both feared by those who would wish us harm, and an inspiration for those who seek a pattern on which to base their own governments. More than that, we will continue to be an inspiration to those who continue to fight for freedom, for justice both moral, spiritual, and economie. To do less would be negating our promise to those who gave their lives in World War II-a promise that they were dying, that they were bleeding so that man, the free world over, could walk the streets without the fear of racial, religious, or economic discrimination; so that those who speak with the tongues of bigots would be forever silenced. We have liberated nations: we have freed men and women and children of all religious and political faiths from concentration camps. Yet American citizens linger in industrial concentration camps which say: "You cannot work here if you are of a particular religious faith, if you have a skin other than that of the owner of this plant, if you do not have a grandmother or great-grandmother born in this country."

We ask this committee to liberate, by enactment of S. 984. those men and women of all religious faiths, of all colors and national ancestries, who are, for no fault of theirs, deemed second-class citizens. The bill does not require