will want a report on actual progress when the March meeting is over so that a clear judgment can be made by you as to real progress. However, I remain pessimistic and I doubt whether the preparatory work will be sufficiently accomplished to permit an effective conference under the present schedule. Furthermore, the polarization of positions still seems so great that the Conference would be faced with very disparate choices and a difficult negotiating situation. This is a quite unpromising situation and I believe it may well be 1976 or 1977 at the earliest before the Conference is concluded.

Finally, I want to comment on the provisional regime concept. This was first seriously proposed in Mr. Charles Brower's March 1 testimony before this committee. It is an excellent idea and if a satisfactory treaty were open for signature in early 1975, it would be the means of avoiding long years of waiting for the ratification and coming into force of the treaty. If the treaty had already been negotiated the provisional regime concept could have answered the interim regime problem handily. The concept of a provisional regime was put before the Seabed Committee's Subcommittee I on March 19, 1973, by Mr. John N. Moore, head of the U.S. Delegation, with a proposal for a study of precedent for provisional regimes and a request, and I quote:

For our part, we would hope to have at least the tentative views of delegations during the March meeting on this proposal in order to be more fully resopnsive to our own Congress before the Committee's next meeting this summer in Geneva.

The proposal received a good reception, but as of the time I prepared this statement, the request for this really rather innocuous precedent study was still under consideration. Interestingly, the one serious issue raised was whether this study would prejudge the results of the Conference with respect to an international operating agency.

This has been resolved as of yesterday, and the Subcommittee I has recommended that the Secretary General carry out the study. This written recommendation contains phrases to disallow any prejudgment of the issue.

It is far too early to judge how well accepted this idea will become. One problem with the provisional regime is that it might have far less than universal acceptance. This might create serious problems for an organization operating under its umbrella. It also should be noted that it is unlikely that the details of such a provisional regime could be worked out and put into force any earlier than a year after conclusion of the convention.

Mr. Chairman, in summary, I do not believe the provisions of H.R. 9 to be inimical to the iinternational regime hopefully to be established. It does not seem that passage of H.R. 9 would in fact create serious real difficulties in the negotiation of law of the sea questions or preempt the results of the Law of the Sea Conference. I remain convinced that the international regime will not be available in time even with the assistance of this excellent idea of a provisional regime. I urge the passage into law of H.R. 9, the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act.

This concludes my statement, and I thank you.

Mr. DOWNING. Well, the committee wants to thank you, Mr. Dubs, for a very excellent statement. You have addressed yourself really to the main issue, and that is whether H.R. 9 will possibly jeopardize the successful negotiations by our team at the United Nations.

Everybody seems to be for it, but they are fearful that somehow this will upset the negotiations.

The present meeting in New York of the Seabed Committee will conclude this month.

Is that correct?

Mr. DUBS. No. It will conclude at the end of the first week in April. Mr. DOWNING. I do not understand you.

Mr. DUBS. It will conclude at the end of the first week in April. Mr. DOWNING. I see. And what do they hope to accomplish in this meeting?

Mr. DUBS. Basically, one of the problems is that there are not firm schedules for the accomplishment of work at these meetings.

Speaking about the deep seabed regime in particular, it had certainly been hoped that the second reading of the principles of the regime would be completed rather early in the present session, perhaps in the first week or so, and that Subcommittee I Working Group I could then get on with the work on the machinery section, which is the detailed part of the treaty. However, they have not succeeded in this, and last week, it was hoped that work on the principals could be completed by this Monday. It was not completed and it is even doubtful whether it will be completed today. I am forced to be vague with you because schedules, as we know them in the industrial world, do not exist within this group, and there is only a vague understanding of what progress might be made. On a hard basis there perhaps have been 20 or 25 meetings, and please accept that as very approximate, of the working group. They have completed, as of yesterday, only about 18 provisional articles in the regime out of 21.

Now, there are perhaps an equal number of sessions available to this group to complete their work in July and August. Their goal is to complete all their work on the Seabed Treaty by about 3 weeks before the end of the July/August session. Yet the amount of work ahead of them far exceeds that which they already have done, so on that basis I am very pessimistic about their ability to complete the work.

Mr. DOWNING. Why, in your opinion, is your team at the United Nations so fearful that this will jeopardize their efforts to negotiate

a treaty?

Mr. DUBS. I think it is a matter of how one looks at the negotiating process, and this is a very personal view which I cannot substantiate. If one enters into negotiation fearful that everything that one does will make the other party mad or annoyed, it seems to me that one is at a disadvantage in the negotiations. This has tended to be the attitude in the negotiations, even though the actual provisions of H.R. 9 really meet basic U.S. policy, as I see it.

Now, I think that they are entirely correct in saying that the passage of H.R. 9 into law will cause great consternation and much debate by the underdeveloped countries.

There is no doubt of that. However, I think that one must accept that probability within the spirit of a negotiating atmosphere. The question is not whether they will react, but whether the final result of the reaction will be to move the work ahead or to hold it back. I think that the real difference of opinion is on the one hand the view which was broadly expressed by Mr. Brower and Mr. Ratiner, that H.R. 9 will hold the work back, and on the other hand the view which I have expounded this morning, which is in fact, that H.R. 9 will help to move the work ahead.

Mr. DOWNING, Thank you, Mr. Dubs.

Mr. Anderson.

Thank you.

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you.
I have no questions.

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Breaux.

Mr. BREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Dubs, for the statement. I think it states your position very well. You are a member of the team, so to speak, that is representing us in the United Nations.

Is that not correct?

Mr. DUBS. I serve as an expert. "Expert" means that one provides the team with hard technical information to the extent that one can. I am not a negotiator.

Mr. BREAUX. I am interested in having your comments on the points made by our chairman regarding the action of Mr. Moore in tabling the proposed interim policy at the United Nations.

What effect does that have, as far as you are concerned, in promoting or pushing the negotiations along?

Mr. DUBS. I do not think-if I understand your question correctly that tabling of the provisional regime concept, and I think it is important to call it a "provisional regime," rather than an interim regime, really has any effect on the negotiations.

As tabled, it really said only two things. It said first, "Fellow committee members, what do you think about the concept of making sure that the treaty, which we negotiate and sign at the end of the conference, will be immediately put into force before all States have ratified?"

The second thing it said was, "Well, if you think this might be an interesting idea, it is necessary that we have some technical background as to how provisional regimes have worked out." Thus the actual request then is only for a study of precedents, such as the Chicago convention on civil aviation.

Now, with respect to the provisional regime itself, I do not believe that any of the foreign delegations to the Seabed Committee believe

that this is an issue that has any importance in the deliberations today. It is a downstream issue and fears expressed have been mostly because of the possibility that if we discuss this issue or if we carry out these studies, we will in some way prejudice positions on the final treaty. I think they are quite content to have the study, but they are not content to really go into the provisional regime in detail until perhaps the conference itself.

Mr. BREAUX. It is your opinion, then, that the interim policies are a substitute for the provisional regime?

Mr. DUBS. I would think so. To put it in the proper frame of reference, there can be no provisional regime by the standards introduced at the United Nations unless there is first a fully agreed upon treaty. A provisional regime under this concept can only come into being after the treaty itself has been fully negotiated and opened for signature. Therefore the provisional regime does not solve the problems that industry and the country face in the next few years.

If a general treaty-a universal treaty, is open for signature sometime in 1975, which I have said I doubt, it is then that the provisional regime would come into the picture. Even if it should work out so fortuituously, it would still probably take a year to put the provisional regime into effect, so the best that can be expected of a provisional regime, in my view, would be 1976.

Mr. BREAUX. My final question: You point out on page 4 that if the Law of the Sea Convention is successful, you believe it will take about 10 years before it takes effect. That seems like a very long time my mind.

in

What is the reason it will take so long?

Mr. DUBS. Well, actually, in saying 10 years, I meant to imply that starting from where we are today roughly 10 years would pass before we have a treaty in force. The reason it will take so long is this.

For the Law of the Sea Treaty to be truly as useful as I think most of us would like to see, it has to be a universal treaty. That does not mean 10 nations or 20 nations, but it means most nations must accept the treaty. Furthermore, it is quite important that certain nations such as for example Japan and Russia be a party to this treaty.

It is quite clear that it takes a long time for nations to accomplish the domestic actions necessary to ratify a treaty. I am not an expert on treaties and some of your other witnesses are more informed than I. However, many treaties may take 5 or 6 years or more to obtain ratification of a sufficient number of states for the treaty to come. into force.

Mr. BREAUX. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Mills.

Mr. MILLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no questions.

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Studds.

Mr. STUDDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dubs, I am somewhat confused about your position. Your testimony says you are on the U.S. delegation to the Seabed Committee. Is that correct?

Mr. DUBS. Yes, I serve as an expert.

Mr. STUDDS. If I understand your testimony, you are taking an opposite view from that of your own national delegation in the Committee.

Mr. DUBS. You are entirely in error, Mr. Studds. I think that it is important to note from my testimony that I support the objectives without any qualification. I have always supported the objectives of achieving an effective, early, universal treaty, and my testimony has no statement that says that is not so.

I fully embrace the policies that have been laid down by the President's May 23d policy statement, and the various details that go into it.

My question is one of timing, i.e. how much can be accomplished and how quickly.

Mr. STUDDS. Well, that was the thrust. I have just skimmed Mr. Moore's statement very quickly. I have not had time to absorb the full report the chairman referred to, but it reiterates the administration's opposition to the bill you are testifying in favor of, and that is why I said that it seems to me that your comment is in opposition to the government you represent on that Committee.

I would like to ask, if I may, and again my apologies for not having read the statement, but I understand, from skimming it, that Mr. Moore, on behalf of the United States, has tabled the motion on the provisional regime.

Can you give us a rough idea of the provisional regime that was put forth by the United States?

Mr. DUBS. Well, the composition of the provisional regime at this point is quite sketchy and needs to be worked out. The basic elements which should be included in such a regime would be essential parts of the final regime exactly as they are in the final regime, but in skeletal form. In effect, under the provisional regime, seabed exploitation could go forward under the terms of the final treaty, and that of course is a very important and very worthwhile concept."

Now, it is also quite clear that probably all of the organs and organizations of the final regime would not come into force on a provisional basis. However, they might just exist in skeletal form. Mr. STUDDS. I understand that.

Understand my uneasiness.

I am not accustomed to defending the administration as you probably know, but as I scan Mr. Moore's statement here, he reiterateshe summarizes the testimony which the administration made to this subcommittee earlier this year; that it is neither necessary nor desirable to try to halt exploration and exploitation of the seabeds beyond the depth of 200 meters during the negotiation period, provided that such activities are subject to the international regime to be agreed upon and that the international regime include due protection of the integrity of investments made in the interim period.

He is attempting, in every way possible, to assure that seabed mining, when it occurs, will occur under internationaly agreed upon regulations and will be under the regulations of international machinery.

Now, my understanding of what you were saying is that that is not what you want at this time. You want legislation that would permit unilateral regulations prior to the provisional regime.