crossed a stream, the invaders came upon a large number of carts, wagons, motors, etc., deserted by the living, but encumbered by a multitude of dead, lying in the vehicles, in the river, or in the mud along its banks. The Bulgarian staff were puzzled; they supposed at first that the Turks had been fighting amongst themselves, or that the deaths were due to starvation and exposure. The bodies were not examined. Not for several days was it realised that cholera was the cause of death; and by that time the seeds of mischief had been widely sown. The bulk of the Bulgarian armies reached positions facing the Chatalja lines by Nov. 14, the last few marches being so strenuous that the troops reached the worst-infected area in an exhausted condition, and therefore prone to disease. In less than one week the cholera casualties among the Bulgarians exceeded those of all their previous battles. Arguing stoically that, however bad the plight of his own troops, that of the Turks must be worse, Demetrieff decided on Nov. 17 to attack-in strength upon the Derkos flank, elsewhere as a demonstration. The attack failed; but how near to success the Bulgarians were upon their left will be realised when details are some day published. A few days later negotiations for an armistice commenced.

Meanwhile the Bulgarian 7th and 2nd divisions had occupied all the territory lying between the main areas of the Macedonian and Thracian campaigns, their operations culminating in the capture near Dedeagatch on Nov. 26 of Yaver Pasha with close upon 12,000 men. Thus, after little more than one month's fighting, there remained in the hands of the Turks in Europe only three isolated towns, Adrianople, Scutari and Janina-whose fall is merely a matter of time-the peninsula of Gallipoli, and the capital itself, with the land inside the Chatalja lines. Such are the military events whose results are now being discussed by the peace delegates in London. If the machinations of the Committee and the reviving confidence of the Turkish troops lead to a continuation of the struggle, the problem of how to break down the final resistance of the Turks will be not the least formidable or the least interesting of the military problems raised in the course of the war.

Art. 13.-THE CRISIS IN THE NEAR EAST.

1. Macedonia and the Reforms. By P. Draganof. London: Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency, 1907.

2. The Southern Slav Question. By R. W. Seton Watson London: Constable, 1911.

3. Deutschland und der nächste Krieg. By Friedrich v Bernhardi. Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1912. English translation by A. H. Powles. London: Arnold, 1912. THE origins of the Balkan League, which has revolu tionised the conditions of South-Eastern Europe, are as yet known to very few. The secret has been well kept; and it must be sufficient to say that the League is not a thing of yesterday. It is the outcome of causes which date from far back; but the propositions with regard to reforms in European Turkey, made by Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, in August last, may be taken as a convenient starting-point for tracing the series of events which led immediately to the Balkan War. Few people, probably least of all the Minister himself, can have seen that the introduc tion of those benevolent clauses, which collectively were christened by the grandiose name of 'progressive de centralisation,' was playing into the hands of the Allied Governments. The ludicrous side of the situation was intensified by the remembrance of the dictum laid down a few years before by another Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, There is no Albanian Question,' since it was precisely the excessive mothering of the Albanians by Count Berchtold which gave the Balkan States a new opportunity of airing their grievances with every show of reason. Moreover, it was the question of Albania again which created so serious a development in international complications towards the end of last November.

It is true that even in mid-August the 'Times' foreshadowed difficulties in the path of Count Berchtold's ' progressive decentralisation.' This phrase,' it said, 'portentous enough on paper, fails to satisfy the essentially practical mind of the Bulgarians'; but this solitary note of warning was lost in the general chorus of congratulation bestowed on all sides on the new pro

gramme. For the moment Europe refused to recognise the two main objections to Count Berchtold's scheme, objections on which the Governments of Bulgaria and Servia laid the greatest stress. In the first place, the two Balkan States asked for a positive definition of what was meant by Albania,' the district which was to enjoy, under this Austrian initiative, certain benefits. So far as the Sublime Porte was concerned, Albania was nonexistent. The Ottoman Empire possessed some seven vilayets in Europe; but the region marked as Albania on European maps, which seem to be drawn up on some peculiar system of their own, has not the remotest connexion with the boundaries of any one of these vilayets. Albanians are also to be found in large numbers in the parts known to Europeans as Macedonia. The question of delimitation arose at once. In what districts and how far were Count Berchtold's reforms to be applied?

In the second place, the Bulgarians considered that a 'progressive' application of the reforms proposed by Austria to regions such as the vilayets of Monastir, Kossovo, Salonika and Adrianople was not sufficient. Nothing short of complete autonomy for what Europe knows as Macedonia and Thrace-an autonomy based on the lines of Art. 23 of the Berlin Treaty-satisfied their legitimate desires. In the meantime popular indignation, already seething under the procrastinating policy of the Powers, had been further excited by the Kotchana massacres; and the Sofia press, instigated by a body of ex-Ministers who were temporarily under a cloud and in consequence had everything to gain by extreme measures, clamoured for war. Great pressure was put by the Great Powers upon M. Gueschoff's Cabinet to maintain a pacific policy; and in order to check this excitement, the Ministry was compelled to make a compact with the militant party. The details of that agreement were of the utmost importance in view of the consequent development of affairs.

M. Gueschoff and his colleagues proved that they were not following a peace-at-any-price policy, and that the army was very far from being neglected, as it was rumoured in the newspapers. They believed, however, that the Powers were sincere in their desire to introduce radical reforms in Macedonia, and that it would be far

more advantageous to Bulgaria to gain her ends by pacific means than by a costly and bloody war. At the same time, if it became clear that autonomy for their conationalists across the frontiers could not be secured by peaceful negotiations, the Government would have no hesitation in declaring war. The Ministry had therefore decided to await a more explicit announcement of the meaning of the Austrian programme from Count Berchtold before presenting to the Powers a joint note from the Balkan Allies as to the nature and extent of the reforms which must be introduced by the Great Powers without delay. Failing a favourable reply from this quarter, the confederated states had determined to address the Porte direct; and on the nature of the reception of these overtures would depend the question of peace or war. In the meantime military preparations would be carried on without ostentation, so that Bulgaria would be fully prepared in view of any emergency. In return for this frank and full exposure of the Government's intention, the militant extremists agreed to curb the jingoistic utterances of the Press.

Ever since the Memorandum* issued by the Bulgarian Government to the Powers on August 10, 1903, containing a list of the outrages committed by the bands of several nationalities, under Turkish auspices, on Bulgarian Macedonians, the Bulgarians had known that a deliberate attempt to exterminate their co-nationalists was being made. The wisdom of certain statesmen had caused the growth of a better feeling between Bulgaria and Greece and Servia, so that M. Trikoupis' dream of a Balkan Alliance has actually been realised; but none the less the old campaign of forcible proselytism and terrorism was being continued under the Young Turk régime. Bulgaria, as well as Europe in general, had held out the hand of friendship to the Young Turk, believing that a new and better era had dawned; but the latter had done nothing save to substitute chastisement by scorpions for the former chastisement by whips; and Bulgaria realised that the time had come for a full settlement of claims. It may be that some of the massacres had been evoked

This Memorandum, not published in the British Blue Book, is given in 'Macedonia and the Reforms,' by M. Draganof, p. 16.

by the bomb-outrages of the internal Revolutionary Organisation; but nevertheless the policy of repression was so persistent that many Bulgarians feared that in a few years the extermination might be an accomplished fact, and that the nation in consequence would have no claim in the near future on Macedonia.

Unfortunately the Great Powers were slow to recognise the imminence of war and the urgent necessity for immediate action. At the same time other events combined to render fruitless what can only be described as the eminently moderate attitude of the Sofia Cabinet. Count Berchtold's speech towards the end of September, when he used the ominous phrase 'volcanic soil' and spoke of the highest interests of the Monarchy being en jeu, awakened the greatest misgivings throughout the Balkan States. At the same time the military preparations which were being carried on in both Bulgaria and Servia did not escape the vigilance of the Sublime Porte. A complete train-load of guns and munitions of war destined for Servia was held up at Uskub by the Ottoman authorities. Servia somewhat naïvely requested an explanation of this high-handed procedure; but, without troubling to reply to this diplomatic move, the Turkish Ministry of War suddenly proclaimed its intention of holding general manoeuvres near Adrianople.

Although it must be admitted that this decision on the part of the Turkish Government hastened the declaration of war, it was, from the military point of view, the best thing they could do-if they were determined to fight for their rights in Thrace and Macedonia―since it neutralised in some measure the start already gained by the Allies. It was evident that the Turk would not yield except to the demand of a united Europe-if then-and it was equally evident that such united action was impossible; the only question was whether the crisis was to come at the end of September or of October. It is true that the Ottoman Government tried to postpone the conflict by suggesting the application of reforms on the basis of the agreement with regard to Eastern Roumelia; but the Balkan Confederation had had already too much experience of the dilatory nature of diplomatic conferences and pourparlers; and, as all the world knows, the result of the mobilisation in each of the five countries