or some other rising naval power of the third class, but for a long time to come it will be of significance only in relation to the Imperial navy; and the naval battle which decides Australia's fate may be fought off the Cape of Good Hope or the shores of Alaska. The theory of alliance, as opposed to that of organic union, will not work under such conditions as these.

The conclusion arrived at in reading the debates on defence is that what was needed was some definite common interest to defend. How to supply that is the problem of to-day; and it is doubtful whether we can afford to wait till 1915 for an answer. Believing, as many of us do, with Lord Milner, in an Empire consisting no doubt of nations, completely independent in their local affairs, but having certain great objects and ideals in common, and capable, by virtue of these, of developing a common policy and a common life,' what can we do to work towards that ideal? Lord Milner has supplied us with the only answer: Doing things together... great things if possible, in any case things of some moment and worth doing.' This ideal has doubtless been before the Conference of 1911, and has inspired many of the attempts to solve subsidiary questions, but the unfortunate circumstance that any step (even such a minor one as the subsidising of steamer lines) which indicates departure from the rigid Free Trade doctrine-far more rigid than the doctrine of Adam Smith-would be hailed in the light of a party defection or a triumph for the Opposition, has militated against the discussion of the really vital questions at issue. There is no basis of co-operation between protected and non-protected countries; and so it is becoming more and more difficult to do things together.'

ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN.

Art. 13.-THE DUTY OF THE LORDS.

NINE years ago the power of the Unionist party was unbroken. For over sixteen years, with a brief interlude from 1892 to 1895, it had governed the country. The causes for which it stood the maintenance of the Union, the preservation of the Established Church, a sane but vigorous external policy, genuine social reform combined with constitutional stability-never seemed stronger. The Boer War was over; and, though men prophesied the inevitable cold fit after all the martial excitement we had experienced, no sign of it had appeared. If anyone had then prophesied that within four years' time the Unionist party would have suffered the greatest political catastrophe since the Reform Bill, and that in nine years it would be fighting a desperate battle to preserve the fundamental institutions of the country, he would have been regarded as a lunatic. But the catastrophe has occurred; and the fight in defence of our institutions now going on is, in the judgment of many, all-but hopeless.

In saying this we have no wish to cry over spilt milk. By all means let the dead past bury its dead. But the campaign is not yet over. Indeed, when these pages appear, we shall be entering upon the most critical of all the battles yet waged; and it is essential, if we would avoid further disaster, that we should strive to learn the causes that have brought us to the present pass. How is it that in nine years the party has contrived so completely to lose the confidence of the country; and, in particular, how is it that the attack on the Second Chamber has so nearly reached success? Most people would probably reply that it was the adoption of Tariff Reform, and specially of the so-called food-taxes, as part of the official policy that has been the chief cause of our misfortunes. With this diagnosis, properly understood, we do not disagree. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the root of the mischief was the intrinsic unpopularity of the food-taxes. That they are unpopular no one now doubts. But apart from them altogether, Tariff Reform, as originally advocated, was a fatal policy for a Conservative party to adopt. Some Vol. 215.-No. 428.

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moderate and unpretentious measure of fiscal change might have been well enough. Proposals for a complete reversal of our fiscal policy stood self-condemned in the mouth of a Conservative leader. They cut away the very foundations on which Conservatism rests, and left it at the mercy of any assailant, however contemptible. Thenceforward, to any Unionist appeal to the conservative instincts of the nation the reply was obvious and overwhelming. How could those who claimed that their fiscal policy was revolutionary be entitled to object to the same attribute in the social or constitutional proposals of their opponents? Indeed, any such objections smacked of insincerity. Men began to think that Tariff Reformers were not really zealous in their defence of existing institutions, or even of the rights of property, except so far as such defence was necessary in order to secure the success of their tariff policy.

Nor was the suspicion altogether unjust. If the belief is held or professed that a particular measure is essential to the prosperity of the country, its advocates will properly subordinate to it all other political questions. To the extreme Tariff Reformer the future of religious education, the rights and grievances of the liquor trade, even the maintenance of the Constitution itself, are matters of secondary importance. So long as championship of these causes improves the prospect of Tariff Reform, he is content to fight for them. But it must be on his own terms. If he thinks that the education question diverts public attention from his primary object, he will press for the acceptance of any compromise or surrender that will get it out of the way. So long, and only so long, as the brewers are thought to command considerable voting strength in the country he will be their stalwart ally. Doubts of the popularity of the House of Lords will create corresponding vacillation in his defence of that institution.

All these phases of the Tariff Reform mind we have actually seen during recent years; and, granted that Tariff Reform is the one thing needful, they are perfectly legitimate. Unfortunately, the average Conservative does not hold any such view. He has accepted Tariff Reform with more or less conviction. But first of all he is a Conservative; and it is for the historic causes

with which Conservatism is associated that in the end he is prepared to fight. Hence has come about a double insincerity. The enthusiastic Tariff Reformer, in order to conciliate the bulk of his supporters, has been obliged to assume a belief in old-fashioned Conservatism; and into the mouth of the Conservative has been put extravagant eulogy of changes to which he has given a reluctant and half-hearted assent. The British electorate, always sensitive to any want of straightforwardness in public men, has been quick to perceive and to resent the consequent unreality of much of the Unionist propaganda.

We do not say that all the electoral misfortunes of the last few years have been due to this feeling. The 'landslide' of 1906 was the outcome of several other causes which need not be here discussed. But the Unionist failure to reap any practical advantage from the reaction against Radicalism which followed that year can only be ascribed to the fact that, much as the moderate man disliked Messrs George and Churchill, he distrusted even more the Unionist party and its leaders. Everywhere has been heard a growing chorus of disgust with both the great parties in the State. The Government is far from popular, but it is less unpopular than the Opposition; and the voters have in consequence decided that it is better to bear those ills they have than fly to others that they know not of.

Nor can it be said that the recent tactics of the Unionist leaders have been calculated to produce a restoration of Unionist credit in the country. Until the autumn of 1909, apart from the fundamental weakness attaching to Conservative advocacy of far-reaching change, no very serious mistake had been made. In particular the leadership of the House of Lords had greatly added to the prestige of that assembly. The defeat of the Education Bill and the rejection of the Licensing Bill were in themselves not unpopular; and the acceptance of the Trades Disputes Bill and the OldAge Pensions Bill was a complete answer to the allegation that the Second Chamber was out of touch with the sentiments and wishes of the working class. By-elections showed that the voters were beginning to recover from their panic of three years before; and there was a hesitating return to a belief that, in spite of all appearances,

the Unionist party might be honest after all. Then came the Budget of 1909. It was financially absurd; it was grossly unjust to the liquor trade; and its land taxes were theoretically indefensible. But no one now pretends that its actual provisions, apart from the speeches by which it was recommended, have adversely affected the prosperity of the country. Even at the time, it was clear that the hostility to it was only partly genuine. But for the indirect effect on the fortunes of Tariff Reform hoped for from its rejection, there is little doubt that the Budget would have been allowed to pass in peace. Articles appeared in the papers urging that, if the Budget were passed, Tariff Reform would be killed; that, if the alternative between taxing the landlord and taxing the foreigner were put before the country, a sweeping electoral victory was certain; that, in the interest of Tariff Reform, it was of immense importance that a Unionist Ministry should be in power before the then next Imperial Conference; and that, if the opportunity of forcing a dissolution were allowed to slip, none might recur.

Such arguments were not likely to attract popular support in any case. But, mingled as they were with the familiar appeals to Conservative sentiment about the rights of property and the constitutional position of the House of Lords, they aroused the contempt of a large section of the voters, particularly in the industrial North, to a degree unparalleled since 1832. It is, perhaps, not yet generally recognised how seriously the prestige of the aristocracy suffered in the election of January 1910. Till then the Lords had been thought, even by their opponents, to be straightforward and disinterested. They might be stupid and even prejudiced, but they were credited with a high sense of public duty. In 1909 they seemed to be entering on a revolution-for it must not be forgotten that, whatever the result of the General Election, a profound change one way or another was almost inevitable-not because the majority of them were really driven to it by fear of national ruin, but because they had allowed themselves to be made the tools of a clique of reckless and impatient enthusiasts. Such conduct was plausibly represented as the merest political trickery. No doubt there were many peers who were not in any way open to