I place in your hands, Mr. President, this matter with the greatest confidence and I shall await your decision. Signed: Mikolajczyk. WASHINGTON, October 27th, 1944. Roosevelt Papers The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 15, 1944. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The following suggestions as to policy in regard to the Polish question and in particular to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's message of October 26 and recent conversations with the Polish Ambassador are predicated on the possibility that you do not expect to meet with Mr. Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill before the end of the year. The Polish issue is so acute that we believe some statement of this Government's position on general lines is due Premier Mikolajczyk. I therefore suggest for your approval the attached letter for your signature to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk. It covers the points on which from our information we know the Polish Government is especially anxious to learn our attitude. I suggest that Ambassador Harriman, who is shortly returning to Moscow via London, present this letter to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk in person and at the same time discuss the question of Lwów. If as a result of this discussion Ambassador Harriman is convinced of the necessity of our making a last attempt to persuade the Soviet Government to leave Lwów and the oil fields within the frontiers of Poland, I hope you will authorize him on his return to Moscow to take up orally on your behalf the question of Lwów with Mr. Stalin. Enclosure: Suggested letter to Premier Mikolajczyk.1 1 The text of the letter as sent is infra. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR. Roosevelt Papers President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Mikołajczyk WASHINGTON, November 17, 1944. MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have had constantly in mind the problems you are facing in your endeavors to bring about an equitable and permanent solution of the Polish-Soviet difficulties and particularly the questions which you raised in your message of October 26. I have asked Ambassador Harriman, who will bring you this letter, to discuss with you the question of Lwów. While I would have preferred to postpone the entire question of this Government's attitude until the general postwar settlement in Europe, I fully realize your urgent desire to receive some indication of the position of the United States Government with the least possible delay. Therefore, I am giving below in broad outline the general position of this Government in the hope that it may be of some assistance to you in your difficult task. 1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state with the untrammeled right of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit. 2. In regard to the future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement on this subject including the proposed compensation for Poland from Germany is reached between the Polish, Soviet and British Governments, this Government would offer no objection. In so far as the United States guarantee of any specific frontiers is concerned I am sure you will understand that this Government, in accordance with its traditional policy, cannot give a guarantee for any specific frontiers. As you know, the United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization through which the United States together with the other member states will assume responsibility for general security which, of course, includes the inviolability of agreed frontiers. 3. If the Polish Government and people desire in connection with the new frontiers of the Polish state to bring about the transfer to and from the territory of Poland of national minorities, the United States Government will raise no objection and as far as practicable will facilitate such transfer. 4. The United States Government is prepared, subject to legislative authority, to assist in so far as practicable in the post-war economic reconstruction of the Polish state. Very sincerely yours, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 860C.01/11-2544: Telegram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State SECRET LONDON, November 25, 1944-6 p. m. [Received November 25-9:52 p. m.] POLES 125. From Schoenfeld. I saw Mikolajczyk this morning. He told me he had resigned as Premier (my 124 November 24 1) because he felt a Polish-Soviet agreement was a necessity at this time, whereas the three major political parties other than his own felt that the question of frontiers should be left until the end of the war. He realized the attack he would have been subjected to if the Government had made the concessions desired by the Soviets but he 1 Not printed. reasoned that without an agreement, Poland would risk not only the loss of its eastern territories but probably also real compensation in the West. Once the war was over, he believed British and American public opinion would not support radical compensation for Poland in the West. Moreover, without an agreement, Poland was sure to be subjected to severe efforts at communization. The Lublin Committee was already largely Communist and those elements which were not Communist were being rapidly eliminated. If members of the London Government could return to Poland soon, they might succeed in preventing the country's communization. He could agree with those who doubted Soviet intentions, but if there was the slightest chance of success, he thought they should at least try. Furthermore, without an agreement and in view of Soviet advances from the north and the southeast, the Polish Government was faced with the prospect of increasing difficulty in maintaining its communications with and supplying the underground organization of Poland. [If] He could have had more time, he would also have wished to gather up and preserve the "capital of energy" that Poland still disposes of abroad. If the parties could have united on a policy this would have been a source of strength in withstanding efforts to produce a Communist Poland. But divided they were necessarily ineffective. Furthermore, there were several hundred thousand Poles in western Europe and perhaps even a million in Germany. A surprising number had already been found in prison camps in recently captured German territory. He would have liked to recruit them for military service both in the interest of the war effort and of their own rehabilitation and to use them as a nucleus to build up Poland anew. But the Supreme Allied Command felt it was too late to train them for the war effort and would permit only the numbers necessary to replace losses in existing Polish military units. Without unity among the parties and without greater support from the Allies, he could not hope to bring about this conservation of Polish energies. In all the circumstances, he had felt obliged to resign. Mikolajczyk referred to his recent conversation with Harriman and said he was grateful for the President's willingness to intervene with Stalin regarding Lwów and the oil areas in Galicia, but he had not felt he could take advantage of it since he could not in any case secure his own government's support for the general boundary settlement proposed by the Soviet Government. Mikolajczyk said that perhaps he was wrong in this estimate of the future and "the others" right, but this was his honest conviction and in the circumstances he had not felt he could stay on as Prime Minister. As for his immediate plans, Mikolajczyk said he did not know what he would do. I asked him whether, in case Kwapiński failed to form a government, he would perhaps undertake to do so. He said he would not. He spoke throughout with quiet simplicity and, though somewhat more subdued than usual, retained all his normal calm and self-possession. Only as I took leave of him and told him how sorry I was that he had given over, did he show any emotion. He expressed deep appreciation of the understanding that had always been shown him from the American side and asked me to express his appreciation and great admiration to the President. WINANT Roosevelt Papers SECRET The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President WASHINGTON, November 25, 1944. TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT Subject: Resignation of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk I assume that you have read Ambassador Harriman's report of the 23rd (No. 10326) from London,' regarding his conversation with Mikolajczyk, and that you have noted that Mikolajczyk's decision to resign was because he was unable to obtain the support of his Government to his program of a settlement of the territorial issue with the Soviet Union. Mikolajczyk's resignation will, in our opinion, render the Polish question much more acute and difficult. The Polish Government in London without him, and possibly his like-minded colleagues, will have no basis whatsoever for continued negotiations with the Government or the Lublin Committee. We must anticipate, therefore, that the Soviet Government will be quick to take advantage of Mikolajczyk's resignation in order to proceed more vigorously with the establishment of the Lublin Committee as the sole representative authority of Poland. We could easily be faced with a most difficult problem in regard to Poland. On the one hand, we would have the Lublin Committee backed by the Soviet Government but which, according to all our information, has very little support inside Poland; and on the other, the Government in London which we recognize, probably led by Polish socialists who adamantly refuse to consider the Soviet proposals. We are following the situation with the closest attention and we recommend that for the moment our best policy is to take no action but carefully watch developments. 1 Not printed. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR. 860C.01/11-2644 SECRET The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President [WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1944. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: Resignation of Mikolajczyk I think you will be interested in looking at the two enclosed telegrams in regard to the Polish situation, the first reporting a conversation between Mikolajczyk and Schoenfeld in which the former explained in some detail his reasons for resigning' and the latter quoting extensively from British press discussion of the subject. You will notice that a number of British papers erroneously attribute Mikolajczyk's resignation to our refusal to guarantee Polish frontiers. In order to counteract the London news stories regarding the frontier guarantee, the Department on November 25 released the following statement: The specific question of the guarantee of the Polish frontier by this Government was not and could not have been an issue since this Government's traditional policy of not guaranteeing specific frontiers in Europe is well known. 1 Ante, pp. 210-212. 'Not printed. 865.01/12-144 EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR. The Secretary of State to the President [WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1944. SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT [Excerpts]1 These international developments of the past two or three days will be of especial interest to you: New Polish Cabinet. Schoenfeld reports that the new Polish Government is generally considered to be made up of the anti-Russian wing of the London Poles. The Chairman of the Lublin Committee, Osobka-Morawski, in a speech reported by the Soviet press, has indicated the willingness of his organization to cooperate with Mikolajczyk but only on the platform supported by the Lublin Committee. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR. 1 For other excerpts from this memorandum, see post, pp. 250, 266, 430. |