participate in the Three Power decisions for Germany. He said that if this was accepted the Soviet Government might desire to ask other states to help in the occupation of the Soviet zone without any right to participate in the decisions of the control commission.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he felt that this brought up the whole question of the future role of France in Europe and that he personally felt that France should play a very important role. He pointed out that France had had a long experience in dealing with the Germans, that they were the largest naval power, and could be of great help in the administration of Germany. He went on to say that Great Britain did not wish to bear the whole weight of an attack by Germany in the future and for this reason they would like to see France strong and in possession of a large army. He said it was problematical how long the United States forces would be able to stay in Europe, and therefore, it was essential that France be relied upon to assist in the long term control of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he did not believe that American troops would stay in Europe much more than two years. He went on to say that he felt that he could obtain support in Congress and throughout the country for any reasonable measures designed to safeguard the future peace, but he did not believe that this would extend to the maintenance of an appreciable American force in Europe.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he felt that France should have a large army since it was the only ally that Great Britain had in the West, whereas the Soviet Union in addition to their own powerful military establishment could count on the support of the Poles.

MARSHAL STALIN said he fully appreciated the necessity of a strong France, which had recently signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union." He added that he had discussed this matter with Daladier before the war and recently in Moscow with General DeGaulle.

THE PRESIDENT then remarked that he felt that France should be given a zone, but that he personally felt that it would be a mistake to bring other nations into the general question of the control of Germany. MARSHAL STALIN observed that if France was given the right to participate in the control machinery for Germany, it would be difficult to refuse other nations. He repeated that he wished to see France a strong power but that he could not destroy the truth, which was that France had contributed little to this war and had opened the gate to the enemy. In his opinion, he said, the control commission for Germany should be run by those who have stood firmly against Germany and have made the greatest sacrifices in bringing victory.

For the text in translation of this Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed at Moscow December 10, 1944, see Department of State Bulletin, January 7, 1945, vol. xII, pp. 39-40.

He did not believe that France should belong on the list of such powers, but that it should be limited to the three nations represented here.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that every nation had had their difficulties in the beginning of the war and had made mistakes. He said that France had gone down before the attacks of the new German tank and air units and while it was true that France had not been much help in the war, she still remained the nearest neighbor of Germany and of great importance to Great Britain. He agreed that it would be inconvenient to add France to the present group of major allies, but he felt that British public opinion would not understand why France was being excluded from a problem which was of such direct concern to her. He observed that the destiny of great nations was not decided by the temporary state of their technical apparatus. He said that sooner or later we would have to take France in. He mentioned, however, that he had been against the participation of France in the present conference, which he understood was the opinion of the President and had gathered here was also that of Marshal Stalin. He concluded by saying that we must provide for France in the future to stand guard on the left hand of Germany otherwise Great Britain might again be confronted with the specter of Germany on the Channel at the Channel ports.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated that he would not like to see France as a participant in the control machinery for Germany, although he had no objection to their being given a zone within the British and Ameri

can zones.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the control commission will be an extraordinary body under the orders of the governments concerned and that there was no reason to fear that basic policy in regard to Germany would be made by this commission."

THE PRESIDENT pointed out at this point that France was in fact a full member of the European Advisory Commission which was the only Allied body, apart from this Conference, which was considering the German problem.

THE PRESIDENT said that he favored the acceptance of the French request for a zone, but that he agreed with Marshal Stalin that France should not take part in the control machinery, otherwise other nations would demand participation. He went on to say, for example, that as a result of the deliberate German destruction of the dikes that large sections of Dutch farm land had been inundated by salt water and that it would be necessary to give the Dutch farmers compensation for a temporary period from German territory. He said that he

It appears that the second note of Hopkins, post, p. 634, was passed to the President at about this point. See this portion of the Matthews minutes, post, p. 629.

understood that it would be at least five years before the flooded lands would be suitable for cultivation. If this was done, and he personally felt that it should be done, the Dutch might well claim a voice in the control machinery for Germany.'

MR. EDEN then pointed out that there was no question of any zones for any other power except France, but that France would not accept a zone of occupation within the British and American zones without participation in the control commission.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that Great Britain could speak for France in the control commission.

THE PRIME MINISTER Supported Mr. Eden's theories and said that if France got a zone they must be given representation in the control commission, otherwise, the question of the administration of the French zone and its relation to the other zones would be impossible of solution. He again pointed out that the control commission would be a subordinate body similar to the European Advisory Council.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the control machinery for Germany would not be an advisory body but would be actively engaged every day in the administration of Germany. He added that he felt French participation would serve as a precedent for others.

THE PRIME MINISTER then suggested that the three Foreign Ministers be asked to study the question in relation to [of the relationship of?] the French zone to the control commission.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the European Advisory Commission had already worked out a definite agreement on a tripartite administration of Germany.s

MR. EDEN replied that there was no intention of reversing that decision but that he felt as a practical matter the question of the relationship of the French zone to that of the control commission should be considered.

In reply to a question from Mr. Molotov, THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that there was no intention of giving the Belgians or Dutch

a zone.

MR. EDEN repeated that the case of France was different and that they would not accept a zone subordinate to British control.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that he felt that there was agreement on the fact that France should be given a zone but should not be given participation in the control commission. The three Foreign Ministers should study the question of the relationship of the French zone to that of the commission.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that he would like to discuss the question of German reparations.

'Perhaps the third note of Hopkins, post, p. 634, was passed to the President at about this point.

See ante, pp. 124-127.

THE PRESIDENT said that in regard to reparations there was first of all the question of the desires and needs of principal allies and then subsequently that of the smaller countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Norway, etc. He said he would like to bring up the question of the Russian desires in regard to the utilization of German manpower."

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they had a plan for reparations in kind but were not ready yet to present any plan in regard to German manpower. He then said that Mr. Maisky would present the Soviet plan.

MR. MAISKY then outlined the Soviet plan for reparations for Germany. He said that the Soviet plan for reparations in kind envisaged two categories: (1) the removal from the national wealth of Germany of plants, machine tools, rolling stock, etc. to be completed within a period of two years after the end of hostilities, (2) yearly payments in kind to last for ten years. He said that in order to restore Soviet economy which had suffered so much from German aggression, and to safeguard the future security of Europe, it would be necessary to reduce German heavy industry by 80%. By heavy industry he meant iron and steel, electrical power and chemical industries. Specialized industry useful only for military purposes should be 100% removed. In this category would fall all aviation factories, synthetic oil refineries, etc. He said that the Soviet Government felt that with 20% of her heavy industry Germany would be in position to cover the economic needs of the country. He said the list of goods to be delivered during the 10 year period could be definitely fixed later on. He further proposed that in the interests of the orderly execution of the reparations plan and for the security of Europe there should be an Anglo-Soviet-American control over German economy which would last beyond the period of the reparations payment. All German enterprises which could be utilized for war purposes should be placed under international control with representatives of the Three Powers sitting on the boards of such enterprises. Mr. Maisky went on to say that in the calculation of losses as a result of German aggression the figures had been so astronomical that a selection and the establishment of a system of priorities for compensation had been necessary. He said that even direct material losses, such as public and private property, factories, plants, railroads, houses, institutions, confiscation of materials, etc. had been so large that no reparations could cover their loss. For this reason, priorities had been established according to indices, (1) the proportional contribution of any one nation to the winning of the war, (2) the material losses suffered by each nation. He said that those countries which had made the highest contribution to the war and had suffered the

Perhaps the fourth note of Hopkins, post, p. 634, was passed to the President at about this point.

highest material losses would come into the first category and all others would fall into the second. Mr. Maisky proposed that there should be set up a special reparations committee of the three governments to sit in Moscow. He concluded that the total reparations shown in withdrawals and yearly payments in kind which the Soviets required would reach a total of ten billion dollars.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he recalled very well the end of the last war and that although he did not participate in the peace settlement he had been very fully informed of the discussions. He remembered well that there had been only two billion pounds extracted from Germany in the form of reparations by the Allies after the last war and that even this would not have been possible had not the United States given Germany credits. He said, for example, that they had taken some old Atlantic liners from the Germans, who had immediately proceeded on credit to build new and better ships. He recognized that the suffering which the Soviet Union had undergone in this war had been greater than any other power, but he felt that the Soviet Union would get nowhere near the sum which Mr. Maisky had mentioned from Germany. He said that at the end of the last war the Allies had also indulged themselves with fantastic figures of reparations but that these had turned out to be a myth. He said that the British Isles had also suffered in this war and that the British Government had disposed of the bulk of its assets abroad despite the generous help of Lend-Lease. He said that the British Isles had to export goods in order to import food, since they were dependent on imports for one-half of their food supply. He said that there would be no victorious country so burdened in an economic sense as Great Britain and that, therefore, if he could see any benefit to Great Britain in large reparations from Germany he would favor such a course but he very much doubted whether this was feasible. He added that other countries, such as Belgium, Holland and Norway also had claims against Germany. He said he was haunted by the specter of a starving Germany which would present a serious problem for the Allies since we could either say "It serves them right" or endeavor to help them. In the latter case, who would pay for the help. The Prime Minister concluded that if you wished a horse to pull a wagon that you would at least have to give it fodder.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that that was right, but care should be taken to see that the horse did not turn around and kick you.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that he had also been through the last war and that he remembered very vividly that the United States had lost a great deal of money. He said that we had lent over ten billion dollars to Germany and that this time we would not repeat our past mistakes. He said that in the United States after the last war the German property that had been sequestered during the war had been