we are now in 1928 and little has been done. Where the law is too stringent or too lax people always make a law for themselves, and the law relating to divorce has been no exception to this rule. Persons who cannot afford the luxury of a divorce either obtain a separation order from the Magistrates or else make their own arrangements independently of the law. The result in many cases is that the separated husband and wife each form new ties which are not and cannot be consecrated by marriage. The result is the birth of illegitimate children, perhaps not so many as formerly now that contraception is more widely understood, and a general lowering of the moral tone of the country. Surely, not even the Church, however much it may be imbued with mediæval tradition, can uphold a system that has such deplorable consequences. Its attitude is one which connives at adultery. The law in England as regards separation is out of harmony with modern conceptions of the marriage tie. People who have not resumed marital relations after having been judicially separated for three years are extremely unlikely to come together again. They are much more likely to form relationships which must be looked on with less favour by the Church than divorce. The law is for the people, not the people for the law. And any law to be efficacious must fit in with the practical everyday needs of the community, and not be based on an ideal condition which is not attainable so long as such a thing as sex exists. Experience has proved that where laws are too narrow they will always be evaded, indeed, perhaps their very strictness calls into being a feeling that they should be evaded. Where laws are reasonable they are respected and obeyed. Judicial separation for three years should constitute a valid ground for divorce and does so in many countries which have a more practical conception of human relationships than is evidenced by the marriage law in England to-day. It cannot be urged that such a reform would create a laxer moral atmosphere. The experience of countries which have a wider and more human outlook give the lie to any such assumption. The Moslem, with his very great latitude in regard to marriage, is found to avail himself very sparingly of his opportunities. He may have four wives, but in practice

Divorce with him is

he is mostly content with one. simply repudiation, but how very seldom does he exercise it! The very facility with which the marriage tie can be dissolved has not led him to abuse the right, but has tended rather to make him more moral than he probably would have been under a stricter marriage law. The facility with which divorces can be obtained in America is used as an argument to prove that laxity leads to general immorality. But this is not really the case. What has led to the impression is that the Press proclaim from the house-tops any case of a sensational nature, where the parties are well known. America is not any more immoral than the rest of the world.

Another absurdity of the law which calls for reform is that a person marrying a second time, whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from such person for seven years, and shall not have been known by such person to be living within that time, or a person contracting a second marriage in the bonâ fide belief in the death of the other party, cannot be found guilty of bigamy, but the second marriage is void, and any children would be illegitimate if the other party to the marriage is in fact alive at the time of the second marriage. Cases of this nature are of rare occurence, yet none the less the possible children of such unions have an indisputable claim for consideration, and it should be made possible for the party concerned to obtain an order for presumption of death, which on being made absolute after the expiration of six months, the applicant should be entitled to contract a valid marriage.

Wilful desertion without the consent and against the will of the other party and without reasonable cause for two years is a ground for a decree of judicial separation obtainable by either the husband or the wife. In Scotland, since 1573, wilful desertion for four years has been a ground for divorce, and it has not been found to increase immorality in that country. Surely the law of Scotland is worthy of imitation and might be introduced into England without in any way producing a decrease in moral standards. Indeed, it would be well to improve upon it and make wilful desertion for three years a valid ground for divorce. Paradoxical as it may

seem, the very law of England encourages adultery, when adultery is a sine qua non of divorce. The unknown woman and the hotel bill are common form in the Divorce Courts.

The persistent use of alcohol is a source of misery of the most serious character, and leads to cruelty, the communication of disease, and not infrequently to the murder of the wife or husband and the children. Habitual drunkenness is a ground for a separation order, and should in the interests of society be made a ground for divorce on proof that the drunkenness is incurable and that there is no reasonable prospect of joint married life. Drunkenness is worse than cruelty, in that it is more dangerous and creates a moral atmosphere from which it is desirable that the children should be removed.

Imprisonment is in many countries a ground for divorce, and such a ground is not unreasonable, as it would not be taken advantage of if that love which passeth all understanding existed between the husband and wife. That such love does exist is well known to those who are brought in contact with prison life. And probably it would be only fair to assume that were divorce allowed where a sentence of imprisonment exceeds three years, it would not be largely taken advantage of, and only if divorce was the lesser of two evils. But where a person has been sentenced to death and the sentence has been commuted to penal servitude for life, it would appear to be only a matter of simple justice that the wife or husband as the case may be should have an option in the matter and not be made to bear a heavy part of the penalty.

The alarming increase of insanity all the world over, not less in England than elsewhere, raises the question as to whether incurable insanity should not be a ground for divorce. It would perhaps be even wiser to go further and say that insanity of any kind should ipso facto annul any marriage. This matter must be looked at from the point of view of the children, and from the children to the larger point of view of the community. It is not in the interest of any nation, or in the interest of the individuals of that nation, to have its population added to by those tainted with insanity. The question of eugenics enters very largely into the subject. Is it

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desirable in the interest of the race and the State that persons who are unfit to marry and propagate healthy children on account of either mental or physical disorder should be permitted to do so? Is it not proper that such measures should be taken to prevent married persons who become unfit to have healthy children from having children at all? On this subject the world has not yet become sufficiently enlightened, but no doubt the time will come when the interests of the possible children and those of the State will predominate over the prejudice and ignorance which now prevails. Insanity brings an end to practically every phase of marriage, and when that insanity is incurable it inflicts an intolerable hardship on the sane husband or wife which should not be permitted by the law of the land. To all intents and purposes the incurably insane person is dead, and has passed out of the life of the sane partner to the marriage contract. What valid reasons are there for not affording relief?

In the interest of the children, in the interest of individuals, in the interest of morality, and in the interest of the State, the time has come for the enactment of a Divorce Law, including all that is good and eliminating all that is bad from previous enactments; and adding to it such provisions as would bring it in line with the social conditions and requirements of modern life untainted by medieval tradition and the theories and practice of a bygone age.

J. E. MARSHALL.

Art. 6.- GOLDY.'

With

The Miscellaneous Works of Oliver Goldsmith. Biographical Introduction by Prof. Masson. (Globe Edition.) Eighth Impression. Macmillan, 1895.

IN a year of memorable centenaries-in this respect an exceptional year, for 1928 has witnessed the honoured recognition, amongst others, of the lives and works of Blake, Bunyan, Ibsen, Tolstoi, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, Meredith, Schubert, and has mourned the passing of Thomas Hardy-it would be improper not to celebrate the second centenary of the birth of Oliver Goldsmith, whose writings and personality entitle him not only to a great and abiding admiration; but to the noblest tribute hearts can pay, that of warm persona. affection.

He belongs to the few whom it has been the easy practice, even in recent years, to praise with counterbalancing excuses. The persistency of this tendency to recognise his qualities generously with half the mind, and then to swamp them with apologies, is due, without doubt, to the continuous compelling interest of Boswell's 'Life of Johnson'; wherein Goldsmith, while often referred to, is frequently made to look something of a vulgarian or a fool. With grudging phrases and occasional belittling incidents, his crudeness, vanity, and many real perversities of temper and mood are subtly exemplified. By so doing, Boswell was able to add humour to his book and to express his own small jealousy -of which possibly he was not fully conscious-over preferences shown by the idolised Johnson to Goldsmith; but it also has had the effect of setting up the little, pock-marked, over-dressed, struggling Irishman in a long-enduring pillory for ridicule. Looking back over the two centuries that have passed since he came into life we can see how unjust that pillory has been.

Yet they all did it. He wrote like an angel, but talked like poor Poll.' There must always be a 'but'; a gibe to blunt the compliment due. And in the circumstances it was to be expected. Goldsmith was a prominent figure in a coterie, a smart coterie and a Club destined to be ever-famous, in which elaborated epigram and play upon words, with pointed chaff and kindly ridicule,