THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW

No. 497.-JULY, 1928.

Art. 1.-THE BERLIN TREATY: FIFTY YEARS AFTERWARDS.

1. The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914. By A. F. Pribram. Harvard University Press, 1920-21. 2. Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 18711914. German Foreign Office, 1922-27.

3. Bismarck's Diplomacy at its Zenith. By J. V. Fuller. Harvard University Press, 1922.

4. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. Vol. III, 1866-1919. Cambridge University Press, 1923.

5. History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919. By G. P. Gooch. Cassell, 1923.

6. The Letters of Queen Victoria. (Second Series.) Vol. III. Edited by George Earle Buckle. Murray, 1928.

And other works.

FIFTY years have elapsed since the Congress of Berlin concluded its sittings, and it is a little surprising that no adequate history of the Congress and of its place in modern history has been attempted. The territorial arrangements in the Balkan Peninsula which have provided the basis of Near Eastern diplomacy down to the present day date back in their essential features to 1878; but this by no means represents its whole significance. It placed a strain on Russo-German friendship which was never properly healed, and furnished perhaps the most important single cause of the reorientations of the European groupings which continued from 1878 onwards; it inaugurated a new phase in British foreign policy, and necessitated a revision of British diplomatic technique; it gave an unexpectedly powerful impetus Vol. 251.-No. 497.

to Balkan nationalism, and, in consequence, gave the death-blow to the Near Eastern policies which two great powers had vigorously pursued for several generations. Its importance, indeed, is recognised; but its significance has still to be assessed. Such comment as has been passed, has been, on the whole, derogatory; and though these fifty years have witnessed some strange reversals of reputation we are still waiting for the fulfilment of Beaconsfield's prophecy that posterity would appreciate the great work performed at Berlin. The Congress had a prejudicial effect on the political careers of Beaconsfield, Andrassy, Corti, Shuvalov, Carathedory, and, indeed, of most of the principal actors; in England Harcourt was declaring before the end of 1878 that the work of the Congress was already moribund, and even the supporters of the statesmen concerned have displayed a temptation to praise their heroes with not very faint damns and to excuse them on the ground that individual responsibility should not be too readily fixed where so many politicians were in co-operation. In unambitious but well-meaning verse an admirer of Salisbury declared,

""Peace with Honour was the message he brought home From the Councils of Berlin many years ago—

Peace he wished for, and, if it was not gained,

The failure was not his, as we now clearly know.'

Such lukewarm enthusiasm for the work at Berlin is typical, and it remains for a later generation to examine the justice of some of these adverse comments.

European diplomacy since 1878 has been characterised by a certain voluble reticence which has more often than not succeeded in misdirecting rather than in mystifying public opinion. Viewed as a readjustment of the map of Europe the Congress was an undoubted failure, and the voluminous Blue, Green, and Yellow Books which discussed the various modifications of the treaty have concentrated attention to these territorial aspects rather than on the broader questions that lay beneath. No solemn international covenant has been so systematically and openly infringed and ignored, in part by the Signatory Powers themselves, as the Treaty

'Poetical Tributes to the memory of the late Marquis of Salisbury' (1904), p. 102.

which was concluded in Berlin in July 1878 "in the name of Almighty God," writes Mr W. H. Dawson.* In the summer of 1880, within two years of the Congress, a second conference had to be called at Berlin to deal with the Greek clauses of the Treaty, and Beaconsfield, in reply to a very secret invitation from the Queen, expressed some bitter comments on the apparent desire of his successor to reverse his policy in many parts of the world. 'The real cause of the dangerous malaise in Turkish affairs is that the Powers are carrying out the provisions of the Conference of Berlin, and not of the Congress.' † In 1885 Bulgaria absorbed Eastern Roumelia; in 1886 Russia repudiated the Batoum clause; Greece received far less territory than was designed for her, and nursed the grievance for a generation; in 1898 Crete was taken under the custody of the powers; Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed by Austria in 1908; and in 1912 the Balkan states proceeded to a redivision of Turkish territory. Some provisions, such as the razing of Turkish fortresses in Bulgaria, the handing over of Albanian territory to Montenegro, the immediate assumption by Serbia and Bulgaria of the Turkish programme of railway construction, proved impracticable. The reaffirmation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was totally disregarded by France, England, and Italy in their North African policies. Nevertheless, these changes, important as they are from many aspects, do not affect the main result of the treaty. The treaty was a compromise which developed into a deadlock, and the very intensity of the struggle over each modification of detail throws into prominence the stalemate which neutralised the Near Eastern policies of the great European powers. It is as a diplomatic stalemate that the Berlin Treaty has influenced the main trend of European history since 1878.

The Near Eastern question has a habit of eluding definition, but certain main factors in the problem in its 19th century form are clear. After three hundred years of confident prophecy of the imminent decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire a Turkish state based strategically

* Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,' III, 143.

† 'Letters of Queen Victoria' (Second Series), vol. III, p. 144.

on Constantinople and the Straits has continued to exist and to defy all attempts at its abolition. The value of Turkey as a buffer between conflicting European interests has been too great to allow the cause of Christian emancipation full play, and the attitude of the powers towards emancipation and reform has varied as it concerns either the fate of outlying provinces or the fate of the core of the empire itself; an inevitable though confusing contradiction of which the rival 'Jingo' and 'atrocity' agitations in England in the 'seventies form an admirable example. In the earlier stages of the modern history of Turkey in Europe the powers displayed a minimum of opposition to the setting up of a series of autonomous states composed of the border principalities of the Turkish Empire, the Danubian principalities, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. A new stage was reached when the same process threatened the inner ring of provinces, in Bulgaria and Macedonia, and the powers disputed this issue with a vehemence which appeared to threaten European war. A third stage may be observed in which the growing power of the Balkan states modified the problem in many aspects, presenting both new obstacles to Turkey's opponents and a new threat to Turkey herself. In these later phases of the Near Eastern question Bulgaria played the decisive part, the peculiarities of Balkan geography strengthening the importance of territorial proximity. Russia, the aggressive power in the 19th century, met with no decisive diplomatic or military opposition until she had pushed the Ottoman frontier back, step by step, to the Balkan Mountains, a range which provided the last effective geographical barrier on the eastern side of the peninsula. The excellence of this line for defensive purposes was shown in the two campaigns of 1828-29 and 1877; and the appearance of the British fleet in the Sea of Marmora in 1878 was an unpleasant reminder to Russia that after an exhausting campaign in the Balkan Mountains she might still have to meet the forces of Turcophil Western powers before Constantinople. The rapid descent by Russian troops on Constantinople was impossible as long as the Western powers could transfer troops rapidly from the Mediterranean and the Turks in possession of the Balkan passes could delay the most formidable military advance.

As the problem appeared in the 'seventies, the integrity of Turkey could be threatened only by Russian control of the Balkan passes or by an agreement in favour of partition between the European powers. Any agreed partition would have the powerful support of Bismarck, who regarded Turkey and the Turks as an intolerable nuisance; and Russia saw such agreement as a possible though not perhaps a very likely solution. Austria might be bought off by the recognition of her claims in the western half of the peninsula; Italy and France might be relied on to hold back through their hostility to the aims of the Central Powers. Germany might be persuaded to compel Austria to accept an agreement, or even to throw her weight on the side of Russia. And if agreement could be reached with these four powers, the risk might be taken of ignoring England's opposition. In 1876 and 1877 negotiations do proceed with considerable success along these lines, as long as the vital question of the Bulgarian passes remains untouched. From a very early stage in the crisis this becomes the main interest of all the powers. After agreeing at Reichstadt in July 1876 to give Serbia, in the event of victory against Turkey, extensions of territory in Bosnia and Novi Bazar, and limiting the future of Bulgaria and Roumelia to a single line reference, Austria and Russia in the Convention of Budapest, signed on March 18, 1877, omitted all reference to Serbia, and agreed to constitute 'Bulgaria, Albania and the rest of Roumelia' as independent states. The Russian government in its plans for turning the war to political advantage, contemplated the creation of a strong Bulgarian state, which, dominated by Russia, would bring Constantinople a stage nearer; but the Budapest Convention compelled her to promise Austria that the establishment of a great compact Slavic or other state is excluded.' The Big Bulgaria of San Stefano brought England and Austria together in opposition, and by the Berlin Treaty the southern boundary of Bulgaria was to stop at the Balkan Mountains, the boundary line following the principal chain of the Great Balkan, from Cengei in the east to the summit of Kosica (Art. XIV). The Sultan was to have the right of providing for the defence of this (and other) frontiers by erecting fortifications and maintaining