take up the threads of the problem, not where he had left them, but at a wholly different place. He no longer spoke of checking the growth of the congregations, but laicising the State. According to his new doctrine, the only salvation for Spain lay in changing Art. II of the Constitution and substituting entire religious liberty for mere tolerance. He maintained that, in order to effect this, it would be necessary to dissolve the Cortes. As a matter of fact, the Cortes had agreed admirably with the Liberal Cabinet; and, in any case, its term of life would shortly expire. In view of these circumstances, people concluded that Señor Moret's plan was to create a party of his own in the Cortes. Against this his own friends, the Liberals, set their faces; and the Crown, naturally enough, declined to accede to Señor Moret's demand. The Premier accordingly resigned, and was succeeded by General Lopez Dominguez, a Radical of an uncompromising type, who drafted a law on associations, modelled in most respects on that which M. WaldeckRousseau enacted for France. The Liberal Cabinet, despite an apparently united front, was a house divided against itself; and each fraction of it looked to chance to enable it to break with its leader. The deus ex machina appeared in the person of Señor Moret, who, by means of a series of clever tactical manoeuvres, constrained the Premier to resign. Señor Moret assumed the reins of power, but his Cabinet lived only a week.

The Marquis de la Vega de Arnijo formed a cabinet of conciliation which conciliated nobody, and only intensified the anarchy that prevailed within the Liberal party, which in January 1907 had to cede the reins of power to the Conservatives. The chief of the Conservatives, Señor Maura, then had his innings, which lasted until last spring, when he resigned, not because his majority was in danger but because, for dynastic reasons, he was desirous of pacifying the Liberals and the Radicals. Señor Maura asked the Liberals to concert with him and draw up a formula on the subject of the congregations, which would satisfy them both. But the Liberals acted as though they wished the question to remain open. They declined to sit at the round table provided by the Premier, who thereupon dropped the subject and turned his attention to matters more pressing. During the thirty

three months of the Conservative régime the religious question remained in abeyance.

From a political point of view the so-called clerical question is insignificant. The clergy in Spain is a negligible quantity. The priests and monks have undoubtedly enormous sway over the consciences and often over the property of individuals, but that is because the individual himself confers this power. On the other hand it is a fact that a large number of Spaniards are indifferent in religious matters, and care nothing about the Church, its tenets and its prescriptions. And this section of the population is growing. If these people were properly wrought upon by the State, which has absolute control of education, they could be moulded like clay in the potter's hands. Despite the Concordat, which prescribes Catholic unity, Catholicism in Spain is split up into discordant fractions, which have increased and multiplied since 1869. And, in spite of Art. II of the Constitution, which lays it down that the State religion is Catholicism, everybody is free to adopt any other or no confession, as he thinks fit. In constitutional Prussia, this liberty, although guaranteed by the Constitution, is a delusion. In Spain no such constraint is noticeable. The freedom granted and enjoyed smacks of licence.

That these troubles have not been without their effect on the position of the Spanish monarchy cannot be denied; but, as we have insisted in the earlier portion of this article, the widespread discontent and uneasiness, which undoubtedly exist and may lead to revolutionary attempts, are due far more to economical and social than to religious causes. Further, the dangers which encompass the monarchy emanate rather from the errors of its friends than from the tactics of its enemies. So long as the two parties which divide the Cortes continue to regard the monarchical basis of the State as inviolable, and make manifest their agreement on this head, the dynasty is as secure as any other on the Continent. But there must be no doubt about this, for it cannot be said that the Crown is deeply rooted in the affections of the people. The temper of the army is uncertain; the revolutionary leaders seem confident that they may at least rely upon its friendly neutrality. The outbreaks of last year were really formidable. Had they taken place

in any province but Catalonia, the disaffection might well have spread, and anything might have happened. But rioting in Barcelona is endemic, and is generally discounted as separatist. When the truth was known, the movement, unsupported elsewhere, was already suppressed. But the danger is always there; and the recent revolution in Portugal, should it turn out to be successful, cannot but give encouragement to the republican party in Spain. One thing is clear—that costly expeditions to Morocco must be abandoned, financial economy practised, and anything like new taxes affecting the mass of the people avoided. There is no margin of security to play with.

Harmony between the Monarchist parties, in view of such a position, is essential, if the Spanish nation is to continue to place faith in the Monarchist régime. Apart from wisely-considered economical and financial measures, tending to the promotion of trade and industry, it is of the highest importance that they should come to an agreement on the religious question. The great danger of that question lies in this, that, failing such agreement, one or other of the parties may be driven to have recourse to measures which may undermine the monarchy. As a matter of fact, there is little disagreement as to principles or as to the end in view; the divergence is chiefly on the question of method, and arises largely from mere party strife. Señor Canalejas and the Liberals wish to legislate against the multiplicity of congregations, and to put a stop to religious intolerance. Señor Maura and the Conservatives reply: 'Against your programme we have no insuperable objections; realise it constitutionally, and we will cooperate with you. But do not, in order to enforce your views, call in the aid of parties opposed to the régime we are alike pledged to support.' In the prospect of such co-operation to settle what may otherwise become a dangerous question, lies the chief hope that Spain may at once make a further step towards enlightened regulation of religious, social and economical conditions, and maintain the monarchical system which appears best suited to its political needs.

INDEX

TO THE

TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH VOLUME OF THE
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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