the Congo. The first Security Council meeting on the subject was a consequence of a formal letter to the United Nations which was sent by the Congolese Government asking for the United Nations to intervene in order to expel the Belgians. The Belgian troops you will remember, had come back in because the situation had become so chaotic that the Congolese army was rioting and a good many people were being killed. The Belgian troops came back in. That was shortly after independence and they had just left. They came back in to protect the Belgian citizens. The Congolese Government asked the U.N. to come in and keep order so the Belgians could leave again and this was the basis on which the U.N. originally came in.

Mr. MURPHY. Was this the resolution of November 24?
Mr. CLEVELAND. This was the resolution of July 14, 1960.

Mr. MURPHY. What was the February 21, 1961, Security resolution? Mr. CLEVELAND. That was a further step along the way in which the Security Council enlarged the mandate of the U.N. forces in the Congo that is with the Secretary General-to include the prevention of civil war and for the first time they included the phrase "by the use of force if necessary in the last resort."

Mr. MURPHY. Then in November-November 24, 1961-the Security Council resolution gave them the right to use force in the expulsion of the foreign forces?

Mr. CLEVELAND. It was not the first time that the term "force" was used, but it was the first time it was applied to the expulsion of mercenaries and adventurers, which was the main issue at the time of last November.

Mr. MURPHY. I read from page 281 of the Senate hearings, which states

that the Security Council resolution of November 24, 1961, expanded the mandate further to include an authorization to use the requisite measure of force if necessary for the expulsion of foreign military personnel.

Mr. CLEVELAND. This was the mercenaries point. To push the mercenaries out.

We developed, Mr. Chairman, an analysis of all of the different purposes for which the United Nations is in operation in the Congo under U.N. resolutions. It comes out to 19 different purposes, mandated by several different resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. We would be glad to submit that analysis for the record if you think it would be helpful.

Chairman MORGAN. Without objection, it is so ordered. I think it would be very helpful, Mr. Secretary. (The information is as follows:)

THE PURPOSES WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO SERVE (OR SERVED) UNDER THE SEVERAL UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

The purposes which the United Nations operations in the Congo serve (or served) under the several United Nations resolutions may be conveniently broken down as follows:

1. Called upon Belgium to withdraw troops, nonmilitary and paramilitary personnel, and mercenaries from the Congo.

2. Provided military aid to the Government of the Congo.

3. Called upon members of the United Nations to refrain from actions which would impede or undermine law and order in the Congo, to respect the territorial integrity of the Congo, to refrain from providing military assistance in the Congo except through the United Nations, and to prevent mercenaries from departing for the Congo.

4. Invited the specialized agencies to render appropriate assistance in the Congo.

5. Called upon Belgium to withdraw from Katanga.

6. Called for assistance to the Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order.

7. Assured that the unity, territorial integrity, and political independence of the Congo would be safeguarded.

8. Appealed to all Congolese to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of their internal conflicts.

9. Called for urgent voluntary contributions to the United Nations Fund for the Congo.

10. Accepted the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of the Congo.

11. Urged that all appropriate measures be taken to prevent civil war in the Congo. 12. Called for an investigation to ascertain the circumstances of the deaths of Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Maurice Mpolo, and Mr. Joseph Okito. 13. Urged the convening of Parliament with the necessary protection. 14. Called for retraining and reorganization of Congolese armed units. 15. Called for an end to armed activities against the United Nations.

16. Authorized action, including the use of force if necessary, to arrest and deport foreign military and nonmilitary personnel and mercenaries and to prevent their return.

17. Opposed all secessionist activities, and specifically those of Katanga. 18. Called upon members to help the Congolese Government.

19. Called for the release of parliamentarians who had been jailed.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to direct a couple of questions to the Secretary.

Under the terms of the bond resolution, bonds could be sold up to December 31, 1962. My question is, Does that mean that should this bill fail to pass in this session of Congress would the United States be unable to buy bonds next year?

Mr. CLEVELAND. That is correct, under the present resolution. The bonds do not actually have to be purchased by the end of this year but they have to be pledged formally before the end of this year and purchased by the end of next year and of course we wouldn't be in a position to make a firm pledge unless Congress had acted. Mr. BROOMFIELD. As long as we are propounding hypothetical questions I raised the question a few days ago, and I don't think I got a satisfactory answer, to this problem of the involvement in the Congo. That was done by the General Assembly?

Mr. CLEVELAND. By the Security Council action.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. How about the resolution that passed September 20, 1960?

Mr. CLEVELAND. A part of the mandate was then slightly expanded and changed by the General Assembly but the basic authority to go in there and to deal with the problem of civil war there stems from Security Council resolutions.

Mr. MURPHY. July 14.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Beginning on July 14. July 14, July 22, and August 9, 1960.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. What would happen if Cuba had a similar problem where we would be involved, where would we be? Wouldn't this be kind of embarrassing to the United States if we had to support troops in Cuba? In your estimation? Not embarrassing presently to the Congo, I realize that. But suppose this thing was reversed and it was Cuba involved? Wouldn't it be kind of embarrassing for the American people to have to support action within Cuba?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Presumably we wouldn't support the action unless we agreed with it.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. We would still have to pay, would we not?

Mr. CLEVELAND. The action wouldn't take place unless we agreed to it in practice. In the politics of the United Nations it takes a twothirds vote of the General Assembly-first of all-and it takes a Security Council resolution to conduct any mandatory operation. Mr. MURPHY. A simple majority?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Seven votes out of eleven, including the votes of the five permanent members. In the Security Council, of course, we have the veto which we have never needed to use because we have always been able to secure enough abstentions to prevent passage of any proposition that we didn't like.

In the case of the General Assembly, even under the uniting-forpeace resolution, the General Assembly's actions are of course only recommendatory to the countries involved.

The thought that it might be possible to get a two-thirds vote in favor of an action in Cuba that we disagreed with is, I think, unthinkable. The last time the Cuba question came to the United Nations, on the crucial vote the Soviet Union and its partners managed to pick up a total of 11 votes, which is the total number of countries in the Soviet bloc, and no others. So it is indeed very hypothetical.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. One final question. Do you think it will be necessary for the United Nations to once again-if this bill should go through—that it will be necessary for further bond issues to support the United Nations or do you firmly believe this is the end of the bond issues?

Mr. CLEVELAND. I believe, in my own opinion, that this has to be the end of the bond issues. This is the first, and in the Senate bill it proposes that it be the last, and the administration strongly agrees with that. This is a stopgap measure for the purpose of getting back into the black so that we can build on a sound basis a combination of financial arrangements for the future. I would be glad to discuss a little bit what the combinations are that are now under consideration, but that is a matter that won't be hot until the 17th General Assembly this fall.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, certain nations sanctioned the U.N. going into the Congo and the Middle East. Have these nations, who voted to participate there, paid their extra assessment?

Mr. CLEVELAND. No; not all of them. Some of the countries voted for the operation and have failed to pay their assessment, or their full

assessment.

Mr. WHALLEY. Do they have any idea of paying? Do you think they have created the debt to embarrass the United Nations and try to bring something to a head and perhaps get rid of the United Nations?

Mr. CLEVELAND. No; I think this is a matter within several governments, between delegates to the United Nations on the one hand and the minister of finance on the other. The minister of finance makes the decision as to what to spend. The minister of foreign affairs

makes the decision as to how to vote in the Assembly. Sometimes it doesn't come out fully coordinated.

Mr. WHALLEY. The Congo is costing $10 million a month. Would you have an estimate of the cost before they went in, or before it was sanctioned in the first place?

Mr. CLEVELAND. In the first place in the emergency of the summer of 1960 there was no financial estimate presented to the Security Council. The Secretary General was just told to do what the emergency seemed to require. After it had been going for a while, an estimate was made of about $10 million a month which they have stuck to quite closely.

Mr. WHALLEY. Of the $200 million bond issue, how much of that has been spent or obligated?

Mr. CLEVELAND. None of it really has been spent.

Mr. WHALLEY. Aren't they in debt $120 or $130 million?

Mr. CLEVELAND. They have debts, internal and external-some other accounts within the U.N. and some debts to suppliers and governments outside-amounting to, as of March 30, about $137 million, so that in that sense the total account readily absorbs the $25 million or so that was so far purchased of U.N. bonds.

Mr. WHALLEY. Where has the money been coming from to pay the $10 million per month Congo cost?

Mr. CLEVELAND. It is mostly held in the form of accounts payable. Mr. WHALLEY. Is the money being borrowed?

Mr. CLEVELAND. In practice, governments have made payments and are waiting for their reimbursement from the United Nations. That is true of us. We have conducted $31 million more of airlift and other military supply and logistic operations than we have been paid for.

Mr. WHALLEY. If the bond issue goes through, you will have $63 million after paying your bills and that will not last too long.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, the presumption is that, assuming a favorable decision from the World Court, a part of the past-due bills will be paid for by collecting the arrearages and only to the extent that is not fully successful will it be necessary to use the bond money to pay off some of these past debts. Our hope obviously is that the maximum portion of the bond money can be used for current expenses and that arrearages will be collected to the maximum extent to pay off the past-due obligations, but that won't be 100 percent, obviously.

Mr. WHALLEY. I don't think too many people are optimistic about the Court decision, or if it is made, that a nation like Russia would pay anyway.

I think I and a lot of other fellows realize the value of the United Nations, and I think that the $200 million has to be paid and are hopeful that something can be done to be sure there isn't a repetition.

Mr. CLEVELAND. I think the most important ingredient in the ultimate solution will precisely be not to make the U.N. dependent on the Soviets. Not to make it a question of whether the Soviets pay or not is the crucial matter in the future of the United Nations, because that delivers the whole thing in their hands.

I hear people say in this country, "Well, why should we pay unless the Soviets are paying?"

Well, the United Nations is operating in our interest, because it is operating in accordance with the charter and the charter is in our

interest in the world as it stands. It is cutting across the national interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviet knows that and they are therefore reluctant to pay. This is the case of the burglar who can hardly be expected to be enthusiastic about paying for the police force. But that does not relieve the town's No. 1 householder from obligations to the civilized community.

Mr. WHALLEY. Do you think the Soviet bloc would like to get rid of the United Nations?

Mr. CLEVELAND. I think that they would very clearly like to make the United Nations a building in which meetings are held with megaphones attached so that they can make loud speeches and that is their idea of what the United Nations ought to be. Our idea of what it ought to be is an operating organization for peace that can move into situations that require the attention of a third party in international politics.

Mr. WHALLEY. Do the nations that get into the United Nations now realize their responsibility-that they might be called upon to pay not only the regular assessments but the extra assessments? Do they willingly come in or does somebody ask them to come in?

up.

Mr. CLEVELAND. They sometimes require a little persuasion to pay

Mr. WHALLEY. In other words, somebody asks them to come in? Mr. CLEVELAND. The application to come into the United Nations? Mr. WHALLEY. Yes.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Oh, yes. Every country has to propose itself for membership in the club. This has been the case of every country.

No country has ever made conditions on its own entry. This is one of the many problems in the Chinese representation issue. The Chinese Communists have listed some conditions. They argue that they won't come in unless we do this, that, and the other thing. It is the first country that has ever tried to make conditions on its own membership.

Mr. WHALLEY. With regard to Vietnam-do you think the United Nations would vote to go in and do the job the United States is trying to do itself? Or do you think they feel there is no use thinking about it because there is not enough money available anyway?

In other words, why doesn't the U.N. participate in southeast Asia? Mr. CLEVELAND. Because back in 1954 a different kind of international arrangement was agreed to by the main powers concerning the Geneva Conference and the International Control Commission on the ground and the cochairmanship of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and all the rest of the machinery. There hasn't really been a place for the United Nations in that scheme of things. The kinds of third-party truce supervision associated with U.N. activities in Kashmir, Korea, and other places.

Mr. WHALLEY. If the United States stopped in southeast Asiawould the United Nations pick it up?

Mr. CLEVELAND. The Russians are also participating on the other side and in effect the southeast Asia situation is held together to the extent that it is by the balance of power locally between the Soviet power and American power. That is the ultimate reality. Actually, there is a United Nations presence in Laos which is sort of on vacation. It is a technical assistance representative. It may be when they get