this Laotian government put together, at least on the technical assistance side, that the U.N. can be helpful. But as far as security is concerned as far as the kind of thing the U.N. is doing in the Middle East, a different way was selected in 1954 and it is a track we are still on. Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I would like to ask one or two questions.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to call your attention to table 9 in this supplemental report of June 25, 1962, on page 17. I understand that Mr. Adair discussed this table, so I will not go into the background in detail. I call attention to the third column: "Reductions under Resolution 1732," and then on the following page, page 18, the total of that column is $11,400,800 and the footnote is:

Reductions in contributions made possible by voluntary contributions from the United States.

My two questions are: Why couldn't the United States make this voluntary contribution of $11,400,800 to the United Nations without having it apportioned under the 80-percent reduction resolution to various countries? For example, it shows that Cuba's assessment was reduced $140,800; and another example on the second page: Yugoslavia a reduction of $243,200. That is my first question.

My second question: From what source did the $11,400,800 come? Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Chiperfield, as you know, this is the arrangement that we are trying to get away from. This is the arrangement that was developed in the last few years of the past administration, It was a method of financing the first U.N. Emergency Force and then financing the first slice of the Congo operation.

When we came into office we found this arrangement already having a certain tradition behind it in the United Nations and we agreed to continue it for the first year or so in supporting the United Nations Emergency Force and the Congo operation. We have never liked it. But I think the reason for it is explainable in terms of the politics of the General Assembly.

Most of the small countries in the General Assembly feel that when the charter implied that the big countries were going to take charge of world security, that that meant that the big countries were going to make all the payments for peace and security operations by the United Nations. Indeed there are a number of countries who think the entire Congo operations should be financed by the five permanent members of the Security Council. If they were going to vote in favor of the continuation of these operations in the General Assembly, they needed some assurance it wasn't going to be charged to them on the same basis as the regular budget. That is how they originally got into it back in 1950.

Our feeling is that this is not a good system. We want to get away from it. The bond issue is the first step in the process of getting away from it and our hope is that by next year we will be fully free of this particular credit system.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I don't care whether the Eisenhower administration was responsible for it or not. I am glad to find that you and I are in agreement on this matter. I don't like it either. I would like to know where they got the $11.4 million.

Mr. CLEVELAND. From the appropriation under chapter 3 of the AID bill, in the previous Congress.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. What is that, sir?

Mr. CLEVELAND. The foreign aid appropriation.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Yes; but what is the section?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Chapter 3. That is the contributions to international organizations chapter.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Thank you very much.

(The following information has been supplied for the record :)

SOURCE OF THE $11,400,800 U.S. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE U.N. AD HOC ACCOUNT IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATION IN THE CONGO FOR THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 1, 1961, TO JUNE 30, 1962

Section 302 of the Act for International Development of 1961 (Public Law 87-195), approved September 4, 1961, authorized the appropriation of $153.5 million for international organizations and programs. In justifying this item, departmental witnesses testified that $27 million of it was being requested for voluntary U.S. contributions for the United Nations military operation in the Congo.

The Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1962, under the head "International Organizations and Programs, Economic Assistance, Title I," also contained this request for these funds. As detailed in Senate Appropriations Committee Report No. 991, $27 million of the total $153.5 million was made available as a voluntary contribution for the U.N. military operation in the Congo. Of this $27 million appropriation $11.4 million was used for the U.S. voluntary contribution for the period November 1, 1961, to June 30, 1962.

This $11,400,800 is the amount set forth in table No. 11, on page 20, of the supplement to joint committee print of February 6, 1962, under the period November 1961 to June 1962.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. May I ask one short question for the record? Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Secretary, has the executive branch given any thought as to the policies or the recommendation of our Government if the Court's opinion is favorable and a number of nations refuse to pay the UNEF, and Congo assessments? I was hoping you could give us an answer if that question is raised on the floor.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Our policy will be to insist on the sanction that the charter itself provides, which is the sanction of the loss of vote in the General Assembly when the arrears of a country exceed the contributions due from it for the preceding full 2 years.

The procedure for doing this is going to get pretty complicated this fall and we have sorted out pretty well how we think it will go. But the centerpiece of our view on it is that the application of article 19, the "loss of vote" provision, is automatic. It doesn't require anybody to be cut off the list by a vote. A country is cut off the list automatically once a certain procedure has been gone through to see whether they are to be relieved because the arrears are due to conditions beyond their control, as the charter puts it.

My own feeling is that this may well turn out to be one of the most crucial and perhaps the most crucial constitutional crisis in the history of the United Nations because, if the General Assembly were to refuse to apply its own sanction, it seems to me that it would raise serious and wholesale questions about the future of the organization. We feel very strongly and deeply about this particular point, Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Secretary, in the case of article 19 of the charter in which a country automatically loses a vote if they do not pay, is it not necesary to have a two-thirds vote of the Assembly?

Mr. CLEVELAND. In the procedural hassle that would develop, even if you start, as we think you should start with a ruling by the Chair that the country, country X, under article 19, automatically is disqualified from voting, you would undoubtedly have an appeal through country X and its friends from that ruling and

Mr. MURPHY. Where would you go, to the Security Council? Mr. CLEVELAND. No; to the General Assembly itself. The General Assembly makes its own rules, as with any legislature.

Our feeling is under some procedural contingencies you might wind up with a situation where you need a two-thirds vote because budgetary matters and this might be interpreted to be a budgetary matter-and, in any event, all important questions, require such a vote under article 18 of the charter.

Mr. MURPHY. There is an exception though, is there not, in article 19? In the case where it is proven that a country cannot be

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes; but when you come to-well, let me back up on the procedure: The General Assembly would require under its own rules a recommendation from its Committee on Contributions as to whether country X was in arrears due to conditions beyond its control and therefore should be given the benefit of the so-called exculpatory clause of article 19.

Assuming the Committee on Contributions decided that-let us say the Soviet Union-was subject to loss of vote and did not decide the Soviet Union was so poor it couldn't pay, then it would be up to the President of the General Assembly to slice them off the voting list for the next vote. And a very_complicated procedural hassle would then ensue I am sure, which as I say would tend to become one of the U.N.'s most spectacular Donnybrooks before we got through.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. What would be the total amount of money the Executive is asking Congress to make available to the United Nations and the various organizations affiliated during fiscal year 1963? Do you have a figure?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes.

Chairman MORGAN. Could you furnish a list of these for the record? Mr. CLEVELAND. We have a paper which shows a total this year of $258 million for all different kinds of organizations, from all the different kinds of appropriations in the U.S. Government that apply.

Chairman MORGAN. This is World Health and ILO, and all the rest of the international

Mr. CLEVELAND. That is right. About $200 million of that is the U.N. family of organizations as such. And the rest of it is other organizations. We would be glad to furnish this for the record. (The matter referred to follows:)

The amounts shown in the following table are the estimates of U.S. contributions to international organizations and programs for the fiscal year 1963. In addition, if the Congress approves the request currently before it for a $100 million loan to the United Nations, those funds would in all likelihood be made available to the United Nations during fiscal year 1963.

U.S. contributions to international organizations and programs estimated for fiscal year 1963

U.S. contributions to international organizations and programs estimated for fiscal year 1963-Continued

Financing mechanism dependent on progress of "refugee legislation."

3 These amounts will be made available from funds appropriated for Alliance for Progress. 4 Supplemental proposed for later submission.

Assets available to international lending agencies are not included in this table.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, the committee is in receipt of a statement by the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to be presented to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, dealing with the United Nations loan legislation, and without objection we will include it in the record at this point.

(The statement is as follows:)

STATEMENT BY HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ON THE UNITED NATIONS LOAN LEGISLATION, MONDAY, JULY 2, 1962

As you know, I have been in Europe talking with our allies about the Atlantic Alliance. Europe is a land of great creativeness, great promise, great ferment. In every country I have tried, with our European friends, to stress our basic unity. But we have also been talking realistically about differences-trying to identify the points of actual difference, to learn how to deal with them, and to keep them from infecting the relationship between the Atlantic partnership and the rest of the world.

Before discussing some of these points with you, in executive session, I want to say just a word about the legislation you have been considering in public hearings, the proposal to give the President authority to make loans to the United Nations. The United Nations is the framework in which we seek a work