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must be paid if a nation is not to lose its voting rights in the General Assembly. This decision does not affect the bond issue and the arrangements made in connection therewith.

6. We must be realistic, and not sentimental, about the United Nations. It is certainly not perfect. It is sometimes annoying. When it sanctions the use of force other than in self-defense in order to achieve national ends, it stultifies itself dangerously. Its judgments could conceivably become so reckless and so immature as utterly to destroy confidence in it. But this has not happened yet and, in addition to what I listed in paragraph 2, there is much in the United Nations which is hopeful and which justifies a cautious optimism.

Much of the work of the Security Council, for example, has tended to promote peace and security. The late Secretary General did much to prevent disputes from becoming acute and the present Secretary General has made an auspicious beginning. And the work done in the fields of health, food, technical assistance and economic aid generally are both a healing and a constructive world influence.

While the United Nations renders indispensable services, it obviously cannot be our sole reliance for building a peaceful world and the case grows ever stronger for further steps to bring about a true capacity for timely and effective common action by the free world. The United Nations is the place where the free world confronts the Communists. The United Nations is the place where we have useful contact with nations which are not alined. I think there should be such a place.

The fact remains that it is a uniquely valuable as well as a brilliant and effective instrument of international action. Generally speaking, we Americans have done very well at the United Nations. For the Communists, on the other hand, it is a constant worry. We should stay in it and try to build it up. The pending proposal is the best way to do this at this time.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. McCloy.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. McCLOY, FORMER ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT ON DISARMAMENT, AND FORMER U.S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY

Mr. McCLOY. Mr. Chairman, I appear in support of S. 2768, a bill which authorizes the President, on behalf of the United States under certain conditions, to lend up to $100 million to the United Nations.

Others have testified before me on this bill and have dealt with many of its aspects and purposes. I would not wish to take up your time by a repetition of their arguments in support of the bill, with most of which, if not all, I concur. I would, however, like to state my own view of what I believe are the most impelling reasons for its passage. First let me say that I have spent a very substantial part of my life assisting in the preparation of this country for war, and in the maintenance of it, in war. I took part in both World Wars and I have seen develop, and, to a degree, helped in the development of, weapons, which if they do not represent the ultimate in terms of destructive power, at least so closely approach the ultimate, that the possibility of

their employment in war presents mankind with what, I believe, is its most important and most urgent problem-that of war and peace.

I have endeavored to do what I could to advance the cause of sensible disarmament among the powers of the world as one of the means by whch the cataclysm of war could be avoided. But disarmament or control of weapons is only one of the avenues by which we can hope to reach a peaceful and relatively stable world.

Another avenue, and one at least as important, is the development of the means by which international disputes and issues can be discussed and settled otherwise than by war and threats of war. War has become a matter of destruction on so vast and horrendous a scale that every possible alternative must be attempted and developed purely from a national security standpoint.

Some say that modern war has become so completely devastating in its effect that it has become irrational as an instrument of policy. They or others say that neither the Soviet Union nor we wish a war. We can accept both these contentions but merely because war has become wholly irrational and neither the Soviets nor we wish it, there is no assurance that we shall escape one. Political leaders, alas, are not always rational either in their conduct or in their decisions. And events sometimes outdistance rationality.

Not long ago I read what I consider to be an excellent history of the period running from just prior to the outbreak of World War I to the Battle of the Marne. It is called "The Guns of August," and it was written by a woman, Mrs. Tuckman. It has become something of a bestseller.

She brings out the fact, which has come to be realized more and more, that the then statesmen or politicians of the world did not wish a war, certainly not the war that developed, but the pace of events and circumstances were so rapid and there was no time for rational decisions to be taken. Events quite beyond the control of the politicians accelerated to such a degree that all were over the brink before they realized it, with no final ledge on which to check their fall.

"Nothing," as Winston Churchill once said of the same period, "could break the fatal chain once it had begun to unroll." Developments moved so swiftly, and nervous passions grew so rapidly, that the only clear-cut and popular decisions which could be made were orders for ever-increasing mobilization which, of course, only made matters

worse.

If, in those days of relatively slow communication, the desks of the ministers who had the fearful decisions to make were so cluttered with dispatches, telegrams, and reports that the application of careful thought to them was no longer possible, is it any more likely now, with communication as rapid as it is today, and with the fantastic speeds of modern weapons, that statesmen alone can hope to cope successfully with the pace of events as they would occur in a critical modern crisis?

Defensive systems are being developed with such quick reaction times as to give real meaning to the term "war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication." These dangers are not going to decrease as the proliferation of nuclear weapons advances. One of these days Red China is going to come forward with nuclear weapons; France already has them, and with each new nation that becomes

a nuclear power, the control over the decision as to whether there should be nuclear war or not is diluted.

I believe this all points to the pressing need to maintain and strengthen the machinery of our international peacekeeping institutions. We must, of course, maintain our military strength until we can find an intelligent and effective method of disarmament; we must maintain our alliances in full vigor, and we must maintain an effective diplomatic service, but all these have failed to avoid wars in the past and cannot be exclusively relied upon in the future.

We cannot be certain, to be sure, that the addition of vigorous international institutions will prevent wars, but I submit they are a necessary and vital factor in a period of history when the highest premiums are, and must be, placed on the avoidance of war. TheTM situation, simply stated, demands the existence of reserve positions. This naturally leads us to a consideration of the international machinery we now have for settling international disputes without war and the need for its maintenance. And the only worldwide institution which we have, and the only one in which the great and growing political and power issues of the world can be discussed, and, at least in some degree, dealt with, is the United Nations.

NATO is regional and limited, valuable in itself, but insufficient. We have other means, bilateral and multilateral, with which to attack our international problems, but the United Nations is the only universal forum.

I do not wonder that there is both dissatisfaction and concern over the role of the United Nations, but I do wonder that anyone can seriously think that we would be better off without it, or that it is not deeply in the interests of the United States to support and maintain it. It is far from a perfect instrument, and it has not followed the course that those of us who were at San Francisco when the charter was drawn up thought and hoped it would, but it has performed some deeply significant services in the cause of peace, and any thought. of permitting it to collapse at this moment or of failing to do anything within reason to maintain its vigor seems to me to be completely out of the question so far as the interests of the United States are concerned.

Though it can be said that the United Nations did not prevent situations such as those which the world faced in Egypt some years ago and in the Congo more recently from arising, the United Nations did provide, even if, as some contend, in a somewhat improvised and perhaps awkward manner, an invaluable substitute for what might have developed into the always dangerous confrontation of great powers over a disputed area.

Situations incipient with great hazards have been tamped down to much less dangerous, even if painful, balance, due in large part to United Nations action. Not only was a major war averted, but, I believe, in retrospect, we can say with certainty that in the process the interests of the free world were successfully maintained. Largely because of the United Nations action in the Congo the Soviets have not found it as simple as they thought it was going to be to take over Africa, as the independence movement took effect on that continent. Why else did the Soviets rail so at Mr. Hammarskjold for his activities there?

Just consider for a moment what serious issues face the world today as the testing of even greater weapons of destruction goes on-Berlin, Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, Quemoy, and Matsu are looming up again. would not be difficult to add to the list.

It

Besides these specific issues, there is the great underlying revolution of the underdeveloped nations and the breakup of the old imperial systems. It is one of the great phenomena of history and the whole movement is fraught with dangerous issues.

When we think of the wars the old colonial system generated, we may get some concept of the dangers which could arise in its liquidation. And the one institution in which all these new countries as well as the old ones are gathered is the United Nations. We have not passed through all the risks yet, but if we did not have such an institution, we would have rapidly to invent one and thus far this great revolution of convulsion, whatever it should be called, is being effected without the high world tensions that might, but for the United Nations, have developed.

The United Nations, like the League of Nations, was created following a devastating war when people all over the world were impelled to erect an institution which would help us avoid another war. Imperfect as it may be, it functions, and if we allow it to collapse, it would not be a very long time before mankind would be demanding the re-creation of a new institution along similar lines, just as we did after the collapse of the League of Nations, and the ensuance of World War II after it.

If the veto prevents straightforward action, remember it was we who insisted on the veto at San Francisco. We hoped that it would not be abused by too frequent use, but we were as insistent upon having it then as were the Russians. Also, we were the ones who sought hardest of all to build up the power and authority of the Assembly, of which some of us are now complaining, when we could not get our way in the Security Council.

It would be an ominous parallel indeed to the fall of the League of Nations, which was followed by war, if we were to see the United Nations fold at this point of history. I believe we should go to great lengths to preserve the United Nations even if for no other reason than that it might just serve as the ledge, of which I spoke before, to save mankind from going over the brink into the cataclysm of a thermonuclear war.

I repeat, this is not the time either to be scrapping or diminishing the vigor of our peacekeeping machinery. It may well serve as just the reserve position between our diplomacy and the use of force that we may one day desperately need. I have been as critical as any of the attitude of some of the neutrals and so-called nonalined states in their tendency to be bold, provocative, and critical against those whom they do not fear, and to be moderate, or even conciliatory, in their hesitation to offend those whom they do.

The behavior of some of these nations, at the time of the Soviet resumption of atmospheric tests last year, was, in my judgment, indefensible, and I refuse to accept the suggestion that any of these nations represent a repository of higher moral opinion to which U.S. foreign policy must conform.

This is a very far cry, however, from suggesting that the United Nations should not be given all the support, within reason, of which this country is capable. This criticism of the nonalined powers and their failure to assume their full responsibilities is wholly irrelevant to the question of our support of the United Nations. This is the day and period of international institutions, and it is merely turning the clock back to think of withdrawing from them or of reducing our support of them.

We would not think of scrapping the International Bank or the Monetary Fund. They have done much in the way of avoiding financial crises by helping stabilize economies and currencies from which the free world has greatly benefited. If we need stabilizing factors in the financial field, how much more do we need them in the political field, for it is here where the greatest threats lie.

This, I repeat, is the time to maintain and strengthen the United Nations. It is not the time to decry it or turn to isolation. We need something besides a delicately poised balance of terrible military deterrents to preserve the peace. We need new approaches, new and better international institutions, if peace is ever to become more than a precarious interlude to another war.

It is not for me to review here the record of the United Nations in respect to its acceptance of the concepts which guide the United States and the free world, but I do have a very strong impression that we have come off thus far very well in the United Nations. Even with the advent of the new and immature countries, we have not thus far seen, and I do not believe we are apt to see, those policies overwhelmed in the future.

We shall always have to state our case forcibly and well, and we shall have to conduct our policies and make our decisions honestly and fairly, but it is clear to me that the record of votes in the United Nations shows that we have, on the whole, done this and we have on the other hand seen the failure of the Soviet Union to gain its way, time and time again, in its efforts to achieve undue control over the United Nations.

The fact is that it is an open forum in which the machinations of a closed society do not fare too well in spite of heavy and sustained campaigns within the United Nations to induce the new countries to become Communist colonies.

Having these convictions regarding the desirability, and indeed the necessity of having the United States in its own interests give support and assistance to the United Nations, the question follows, "Is this proposal to lend up to $100 million to the United Nations at this time a reasonable and sensible method of doing so?"

I think it is, and I am glad to learn that my successor in the World Bank, Mr. Eugene Black, also feels that it is. I am sure that a number of other alternatives to the proposed bond issue were carefully explored by the General Assembly of the United Nations and that the executive branch of the U.S. Government also carefully considered alternatives.

It is difficult to say that any one method is the best, but I am bound to say that I do not know of any better alternative which could have been proposed. I am certain that, considering its reasonableness and

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