Mr. CHIPERFIELD. That is what the funds were used for.

Chairman MORGAN. The United Nations took the action although our funds may have been involved.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I want to be able to explain it on the floor.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Let me take that one first. This system of, in effect, rebates to all of the smaller and weaker countries was a system that already existed. The United States already decided to use and had used it in prior years, at the time that this administration took

over

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. It was just as bad under Eisenhower as this administration.

Mr. CLEVELAND. We have been trying very hard to get away from this system. We didn't like it when we first saw it, and we don't like it now. I don't like it any more than you do. What we have been trying to do is get away from this old system to a new system of financing. But to start a new system of financing when the organization is badly in the hole would not, in our judgment, be very businesslike.

So the first problem was to have a stopgap program, in which you can get back to the scrimmage line.

Mr. HAYS. Could we have a clarifying question there?

You mean to say that 80 percent of the countries have been getting a rebate out of the money we pay in?

Mr. CLEVELAND. For the Congo and the U.N. Emergency Force, the arrangement made was that the assessment would be calculated on the regular budget. Voluntary contributions would then be made— which, in practice, have been mostly made by the United States, although in the U.N. Emergency Force some of the other countries have participated-which would go to reduce the amount the smaller countries would in fact have to pay.

This is the system that has meant that for the last 2 or 3 years we have been paying around 4712 percent of the Congo operations, and something over 48 percent of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Congo. It is precisely this system that we have been trying to get away from by developing a system

Mr. HAYS. You didn't have to try to get away from it. Just quit it.

Mr. CLEVELAND. By getting a system of even interim financing that cost us only 33 percent of the take, rather than 472 percent. This is one of the advantages of the bond arrangement, in our judgment. So this is what we are trying to get away from.

What do we do after the bond issue? There are three alternatives, and really only three ways of paying peace and security expenses. One is by assessing them on the regular budget; second is by creating a special scale in which we would have to pay somewhere in the 40 percents, probably, rather than our 32; and the third is by voluntary contributions. They are about the only ways available.

We are going to have to develop with the other countries, and in consultation with the Congress, the combination of those systems that ought to apply on a permanent basis, starting with this next Assembly which meets this fall. But the first problem is to get the U.N. financial affairs in order by this one-time loan arrangement.

That means you don't start the new and hopefully more businesslike arrangement on a shifting-sand basis. This is the purpose of the exercise. The evidence is that the regular budget is in fact paid up within 2 years by practically every country. The record of payment on the regular budget is really extremely good. Because nobody has ever questioned that legally. Questions have been raised legally, politically too, on the Congo and UNEF budgets, and at least the legal questions have now been cleared up by the World Court, which should help on the question of arrearages.

On the domestic jurisdiction question, perhaps Mr. Meeker could address himself to that.

Mr. MEEKER. In our view, there are two reasons why article 2, paragraph 7, does not stand in the way of what the United Nations has been doing in the Congo and why that provision of the charter has not been contravened by what the United Nations has done in the Congo.

In the first place, the Security Council, which initially took action with respect to the Congo and which has continued to do so over the intervening 2 years, took that action under chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, entitled "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression." The action that the Security Council took through the instrumentality of the United Nations Forces in the Congo was action pursuant to article 40. This is the article which provides that the Security Council may take provisional measures in order to prevent the aggravation of a dangerous situation.

The U.S. Government felt, and the members of the Security Council agreed, that the situation in the Congo was, indeed, a dangerous one.

In our view, if the United Nations had not moved in there would have been just that confrontation of the West and the Soviet Union, which Mr. Cleveland has already referred to. We feel that the situation in the Congo was not simply an internal affair, but that it was a situation of great danger to international peace, and a situation calling for the very wisest measures that the United Nations could possibly take.

There is a further reason why, in our judgment, the provisions of paragraph 7 of article 2 have not been contravened by the United Nations action, and that is the fact that the Congolese Government initially asked for the action of the United Nations to help preserve peace in the country, and the Government of the Congo has at all times since given its consent and agreement to the operations of the United Nations there.

This action of the United Nations was first asked for in a message which the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo addressed to the United Nations in July 1960. For those two reasons the international threat to peace which was obviously growing in the Congo, and also the reason that the Government of the Congo itself solicited, asked for, and consented to the actions of the United Nations-we think that article 2, paragraph 7, has not been contravened.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Do you know what the United Nations are going to do about Tshombe?

86138-62--20

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, I don't know if you want to go into the Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I am not saying you are wrong. But I do read the papers.

Mr. CLEVELAND. The purpose of the exercise is to try to get Katanga reintegrated into the Congo. This has been the policy right along, the policy of the United Nations, with which we have agreed and with which we have supported with material and logistical support and financial support. We have not supported it with troops, as a good many other countries have, by putting their troops in.

Our hope is that it will be possible now to contrive a national reconciliation there, and the U.N. is working very hard on that at this moment.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Referring to the table that my colleague from Illinois, Mr. Chiperfield, brought to our attention, table No. 9-the reductions under Resolution 1732 (XVI) were adopted in the last General Assembly; is that correct?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. At the 1,086th plenary meeting on the 20th of December, 1961.

Mr. CLEVELAND. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The financial crisis of the United Nations was known on that date, was it not?

Mr. CLEVELAND. Yes, sir, it was.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Then why would we have paragraph 5 of the resolution enacted, reducing by 80 percent the assessment of member states whose contributions to the regular budget range from four-tenths of 1 percent to 0.25 percent, and so on? Who sponsored this resolution? Mr. CLEVELAND. These were ways of defining the smaller and weaker countries of the Assembly.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Who sponsored this resolution?

Mr. CLEVELAND. I don't recall who sponsored it in the Fifth Committee. It was passed by a very large majority in the Fifth Committee, which is the Budget Committee.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, could we have the answer as to who sponsored the resolution, and whether we were a party to the sponsorship?

(The information is as follows:)

SPONSORS AND THE VOTE

Who sponsored General Assembly Resolution 1732 (XVI)?

The sponsors of General Assembly Resolution 1732 (XVI) United Nations operations in the Congo: cost estimates and financing (Report of Fifth Committee (A/5066)) were: Burma, Congo (L), Denmark, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Tunisia.

1

The vote on General Assembly Resolution 1732 (XVI)?

The vote was 67 in favor, 13 against, and 15 abstaining as follows:

1 For text of Resolution 1732 (XVI) see appendix A, subappendix 20.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Burleson, you were a U.S. delegate to the General Assembly.

Mr. BURLESON. As I recall India sponsored the resolution originally.

Mr. HAYS. Did the United States vote for it?

Mr. BURLESON. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I can't think of anything we have heard in this committee thus far that will defeat the bill

Mr. HAYS. This has killed the bill this morning. This is enough to kill the bill right here.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. How can we come to the floor with this bill when we have reduced by our voluntary contributions the assessment of other countries, including Communist countries like Cuba, Poland, Yugoslavia-how can we vote for it?

Mr. CLEVELAND. The House of Representatives has voted funds for this same purpose.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If we made a mistake, must we compound it?

Mr. CLEVELAND. For about 4 years, both in the previous administration and at the beginning of this one

Mr. BURLESON. If the gentleman will yield?

Our contributions were also reduced, you know, from 32.5 to 32.2 percent.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Not according to this table. Our gross assessment was $26 million, and there is no reduction.

Mr. BURLESON. I am talking of percentage reductions. It was an adjustment. Some were increased. The Soviets were increased. As I remember seven of the Soviet bloc nations were increased. Two were reduced. It was an adjustment. It was called that, and I think justifiably. Am I substantially correct, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. CLEVELAND. That is correct, Mr. Burleson.

The U.S. percent of contributions to the regular budget, which started at almost 40 percent at the beginning of the U.N., has been coming down gradually, was reduced from 321⁄2 to about 32 per

cent.

Mr. BURLESON. As to total in dollars and cents based on the new assessment rate, I don't know what it amounts to. The total of funds is of course related to the annual budget.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Is my understanding correct that our regular assessment was lowered percentagewise but then we increased our voluntary contribution which action, in effect, increased our total contribution? Mr. BURLESON. The first part of your assumption is definitely cor

rect.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, in order that there will be no misunderstanding about the contents of this table, the gross assessment appears in column No. 2. In the next column, there are listed the reductions effected by Resolution 1732. The figures under that column represent reductions from the regular assessment; is that correct? Do I make my question clear?

Is the second column, in the case of Afghanistan, $32,000, Albania, $25,000, and so on down the line-are these the amounts by which the regular assessments were reduced?

Mr. CLEVELAND. This is for the Congo only, this table.

Chairman MORGAN. Table 9, Mr. Zablocki, deals with the Congo only.