the Congolese themselves. Belgian paratroopers were flown in as reinforcements to protect Belgian lives and property against mounting excesses by the Congolese armed forces. A Congolese request for U.S. troops to assist in establishing order was refused with the explanation that such aid should come only through the United Nations. The Congolese Government then dispatched an urgent request to the Secretary General for United Nations military assistance, "justified by the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian troops in vioation of the treaty of friendship between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo on June 29, 1960. In response to a letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council concerning the Congo situation, which he viewed as a matter that "may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security," the Council met urgently on July 13. On the following day it adopted a resolution (Doc. S/4387, dated July 14, 1960) which (a) called on Belgium to withdraw their troops from the Congo and (b) authorized the Secretary General, in consultation with the Congolese Government, to provide necessary military assistance until the Congolese security force, in the opinion of the Government, is able to "meet fully their tasks." The vote on this resolution was 8 for (United States), none against, with 3 abstentions (China, France, and the United Kingdom). This resolution and the other relevant resolutions are set forth in appendix 24. Shortly thereafter the Security Council was again back in session, urgently convened by the Secretary General to reconsider the Congo question in the light of the refusal of the authorities in the "independent" Province of Katanga to permit the entry of U.N. troops. The Secretary General warned members that a speedy solution to the question might involve a question of peace or war, and not limited to the Congo alone. Any delay or hesitation might risk values greater than any of those they were designed to protect. In the early hours of August 9, the Council adopted a CeylonTunisia draft resolution by a vote of 9 (United States) to 0, with 2 abstentions (France and Italy). This resolution (Doc. S/4426) called on Belgium "to withdraw its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary General and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council's resolutions." The Council also declared that "the entry of U.N. troops into the Province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution." Resolution S/4426 is contained in appendix 24. The composition of United Nations forces in the Congo is contained in appendix 25. VII. POSSIBILITY OF CHARTER REVISION The provisions of Article 109 of the Charter establish the procedure for calling a general conference to review the charter. Its text follows: 1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference. 2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council. 3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Inasmuch as there had been no general conference to review the Charter prior to the 10th General Assembly, an item on that subject was placed on the agenda at that session. The 10th General Assembly under resolution 992(X) decided in principle to hold a charter review conference at an appropriate time and established a Committee on Arrangements for a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter. This committee of the whole was charged with the responsibility of making recommendations on the time and place for the conference and on organizations and procedures in consultation with the Secretary General. The Committee, which has had this matter under consideration ever since its establishment, has reported to the 12th, 14th, and 16th sessions of the General Assembly the opinion of the great majority of United Nations members that the international atmosphere has not been auspicious for a constructive review of the Charter. This question will again be on the agenda of the 17th session. However, there is no indication at present that there is such general agreement on the objectives of a Charter Review Conference as to warrant a recommendation by the Committee on Arrangements that a conference be held in the near future. Any amendment of the Charter requires a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly or the conference and ratification by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations to bring it into force. Given the present international atmosphere, most members have been very pessimistic about a Charter Review Conference having a constructive outcome. The United States has shared the view of the majority of the members that the time is not yet propitious. In the absence of a deeper and wider recognition of common interests among U.N. members generally than now exists, a review conference could easily prove so contentious as to destroy rather than strengthen the United Nations. In addition there is the firm opposition of the U.S.S.R. to any discussion of Charter changes. This opposition has been expressed not only with respect to a conference for an overall review of the Charter, but also with respect to certain specific amendments relating to enlargement of principal organs of the United Nations. The Soviet position is that there should not even be any discussion of Charter changes in the absence of a change in the representation of China in the United Nations and that the Soviet Union will not ratify any Charter amendments until the Chinese Communists are seated. In view of the Soviet position and the fact that the Charter provides that the veto power is applicable in the ratification process to amendments to the Charter, there appears to be little possibility of any Charter revisions. The Department of State has nevertheless been very much concerned with the relationship between a review of the Charter and improving the functioning of the United Nations. In a study of the overall subject of charter review, the question of financing the United Nations was given considerable attention. This subject has also been studied by nongovernmental groups within the United States. Some of the groups within the United States and abroad which have studied the subject have expressed the view that some of the financial problem of the United Nations might be reduced by the substitution of a weighted voting plan for the one state-one vote plan. For the most part, this opinion has been accompanied by a recommendation that the weighted voting plan be based on the amount of the member state's contribution to the United Nations. The reaction of the smaller powers and newer states among U.N. members to the idea of any plan of weighted voting has been extremely negative since they attach great importance to the charter principle of the sovereign equality of states reflected in the one state-one vote provisions of the Charter. Nevertheless, these ideas from various sources inside and outside the United States have been studied by the Department of State and will be most helpful as background material when there is improvement in the international climate. Presently, however, there remains such a sharp difference of opinion between the East and the West and between the anticolonial, less developed newer states and the older powers as to negate any hope for reaching agreement with respect to specific revisions of the Charter. SUBAPPENDIXES TO "OPERATIONS AND FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS" APPENDIX 1 Sixteenth session-Agenda item 54 RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY [on the report of the Fifth Committee (A/5076)] 1739 (XVI). The United Nations financial position and prospects The General Assembly, Having taken note of the statement made by the Acting Secretary-General at the 899th meeting of the Fifth Committee, on 19 December 1961, concerning the United Nations financial position and prospects,1 Bearing in mind the activities and programmes of work of the United Nations that have been approved by the General Assembly, Recognizing that the ability of the United Nations to discharge its responsibilities and to implement its programmes requires it to have adequate and assured financial resources, Considering that, under existing circumstances, extraordinary financial measures are required and that such measures should not be deemed a precedent for the future financing of the expenses of the United Nations, 1. Authorizes the Secretary-General to issue United Nations bonds in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the annex to the present resolution; 2. Further authorizes the Secretary-General, subject to such decisions as the General Assembly may hereafter adopt, to utilize the proceeds from the sale of such bonds for purposes normally related to the Working Capital Fund; 3. Decides to include annually in the regular budget of the United Nations, beginning with the budget for the year 1963, an amount sufficient to pay the interest charges on such bonds and the instalments of principal due on the bonds. 1086th plenary meeting, 20 December 1961. ANNEX Terms and conditions governing the issue of United Nations bonds 1. The aggregate principal amount of the United Nations bonds authorized under General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 (hereinafter called the bonds) shall be limited to the equivalent of $US200,000,000. 2. Bonds may be issued expressed in United States dollars (hereinafter called dollars) and in such other currencies as the Secretary-General shall determine. The principal of and interest on any bond shall be payable in the currency in which such bond is expressed. 3. In order to determine the dollar equivalent, for the purpose of paragraph 1 above, of any bond which has been issued expressed in a currency other than dollars, the principal amount of such bond shall be translated, as at the date on which such bond shall be sold or agreed to be sold, into dollars at such rates as the Secretary-General, after consultation with the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, shall determine. 4. The bonds shall bear interest at the rate of 2 per cent per annum, payable annually, on the principal amount thereof outstanding and unpaid from time to time. 1 A/C.5/907.1 5. The principal amount of each bond shall be repayable in twenty-five annual instalments in accordance with the following table: At the end of the first year. At the end of the second year. Percent 3. 1 3. 2 3. 2 3. 3 3. 4 3. 4 3. 6 3. 6 3. 6 3. 7 3. 8 3.9 4. 0 4. 0 4. 2 4. 2 4. 2 4. 4 4. 5 4. 5 4.7 4. 7 4. 8 4. 9 5. 1 100. 0 6. The United Nations may at any time prepay at par all or part of the principal amount of the bonds remaining outstanding and unpaid. Partial prepayment shall be applied equally and ratably to all the bonds outstanding and shall be credited against annual instalments of repayments in inverse order of maturity. 7. The bonds shall be offered to States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to the official institutions of such members, and, if the Secretary-General, with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, shall so determine, to non-profit institutions or associations. 8. The bonds may be sold in whole or in part from time to time until 31 December 1962, provided, however, that the Secretary-General may, at any time on or before that date, enter agreements to sell bonds for delivery after that date and on or before 31 December 1963. 9. The Secretary-General shall, after consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, from time to time issue such regulations, not inconsistent with the foregoing paragraphs, and take any and all such further action as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of the above resolution. |