many more of our people would be in favor of the bond issue if Russia's quota would be comparable to the United States. They would feel more inclined then toward the United States contributing. Who sets up the percentage of assessments each year, such as 1962-the 14 percent for Russia and the 32 percent for the United States? Mr. STEVENSON. That is determined by the Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly, Mr. Congressman. That is comprised of all 104 members, one representative from each. The United States was represented on that Committee in the last General Assembly by Philip Klutznick. It was represented years ago by Arthur Vandenberg, when I was first there, and I assisted him on that Committee. Let me say that the reason that there is a disparity between the assessment of the United States and the assessment of the Soviet Union for the regular budget of the U.N. is that there is a disparity in the capacity to pay of the two countries as determined by the Budgetary Committee of the U.N.; that is to say, that generally speaking, as I said a moment ago, most figures would seem to indicate that, based on ability to pay, the United States should pay something like 44 or 45 percent of the U.N. assessments, whereas the Soviet Union has a much, much smaller proportion. Therefore, its contribution on that basis is much smaller. It is very much smaller. is about one-third. As to the $100 million that we are seeking as appropriation from the Congress for the purchase of these bonds of the United Nations, that figure was arrived at because we had been paying almost half of the Congo operation. By repayment it would be reduced to the same 32-percent assessment that we are paying elsewhere. Furthermore, the money could come quicker from this country because of its capacity to pay, because it was an emergency matter. I must tell you, sir, it is getting very acute, the longer the delay goes on. It is harder and harder for the United Nations to commit itself as to its needs and fulfill various obligations it has. That is the way that amount was arrived at. It will be reduced by repayment to exactly the same percentage, 32 percent, as our contribution to the normal budget. It Ambassador Plimpton points out that the assessment of the Soviet Union is really 17% percent because you have to include in its figure the figure for Byelorussia and for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic which is all part of the U.S.S.R. Mr. WHALLEY. Russia gets three or four votes in the United Nations Mr. STEVENSON. With its two satellites it gets three. Mr. WHALLEY. Against our one. Mr. STEVENSON. Yes. Mr. WHALLEY. And 17 percent total against our 32 percent. Mr. WHALLEY. Do you think there is some possibility to bring the percentages closer for 1963? Mr. STEVENSON. I think it is fixed-I think it was fixed last time for 3 years to come. One year has elapsed and 2 years to go. The Soviet ante was increased last year while ours was decreased in the last session. Ours was decreased slightly and theirs increased by nearly 11⁄2 percent, I think. Mr. WHALLEY. What was Russia's original percentage? You said the United States was 40 percent. 86138-62-4 Mr. STEVENSON. I think 7.73 was its original percentage. It has gone up from Mr. WHALLEY. I don't think we would mind getting the bonds, if Russia would pay a fair comparison. Mr. STEVENSON. I would hope we could do that. The Russian assessment has increased since the organization was established from 7.73 percent to 17.47 percent. Ours has gone down from something like 40 percent to 32 percent. So the trend that you are speaking about has been going on. Mr. WHALLEY. If the gross national product of the world was based on hours worked instead of wage scale I doubt that we would have 45 percent of GNP. I think that would be the area that they should look into and our percentage should be based on the actual number of hours worked. Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Farbstein? Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, although I have serious disagreements with some of the actions of the United Nations and some of the positions taken by our country, I nevertheless will vote for the bill because I feel that weighing in the balance the pros against the cons I think that the United Nations fills a great void in world relations. I would like to ask a question first, in connection with the advisory opinion of the World Court. Supposing that the World Court finds that the peacekeeping operation should be considered as part of the regular operational budget, what then? By that I mean will those countries which fail to make their payments automatically lose their votes? Mr. STEVENSON. That is our interpretation, that the consequences of article 19 would apply to all nations for all purposes, whatever the money was used for. Mr. FARBSTEIN. When you say that is "our" interpretation, will you be a little more definitive? When you say "ours" is that an opinion of a majority of the members of the United Nations or the United States? Mr. STEVENSON. Perhaps I chose the word ineptly, Mr. CongressI think that that is the attitude of everyone, and hope that that interpretation of article 19 is universal. man. Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you. The next question I would like to ask is in connection with the peacekeeping operations, and that has to do somewhat with policy. I wonder if you could please answer or give the reason for your vote against the Brazzaville resolution in the United Nations. Mr. STEVENSON. The Brazzaville resolution for the benefit of members of the committee Mr. FARBSTEIN. I can't hear you. Mr. STEVENSON. The Brazzaville resolution for the benefit of the members of the committee was a resolution introduced during the last session of the General Assembly which called for negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. This resolution was introduced over the objection of the United States because we were committed at that time to the exploration of a project, of which we had been the originator, which had been initiated in an effort to resolve the question of the Palestine refugees or make some progress toward the implementation of the resolution of 1948 by a special commission headed by Joseph Johnson, which was then working in the field, in the Middle East and had visited all the countries and was attempting to come up with some solution for this apparently insoluble problem. We couldn't ride two horses at the same time. Our position had to be in favor of the proposal that we had advanced, and then when a proposal was advanced against our judgment and without consultation we, of course, had to vote against it. Mr. FARBSTEIN. Do you then take the position that the Johnson Conciliation Commission which was to deal with refugees was similar in effect to the resolution that required or directed the warring countries to sit down for the purpose of talking peace? Mr. STEVENSON. I didn't say they were similar. I said that the United States had this means-had adopted this means of trying to restore peace to the Middle East. Mr. FARBSTEIN. Would you say that one was exclusive of the other? Couldn't they both simultaneously be put into effect, the Johnson Conciliation Commission which sought to work something out in connection with the refugee question, and also the warring countries could sit down for the purpose of talking peace generally, which incidentally is the prime function of the United Nations? Mr. STEVENSON. Our conclusion was the reverse, that we could not possibly support both of them. We were trying to get votes for the Johnson resolution. We had to get Arab votes if possible to pass it. The chance of getting any fruitful negotiations after 15 years seemed to us extremely remote between Israel and its neighbors. The one hope was to begin to act, do something. Talk had been fruitless and unavailing for all of these years. This was the decision that our delegation reached at the time, and the State Department reached. Whether it was right or wrong it was for that reason that we reached it. Mr. FARBSTEIN. No further questions. Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Ambassador, I, being more or less the cleanup man, will try to be quick. I have some questions that arise out of others which I think may help to clear our record. In answer to a question as to possible efforts to revise the charter, would your plans include an attempt to revise the charter so as to clarify this point of assessments, if the World Court decision was either unfavorable or not effective? Mr. STEVENSON. We don't think that there is any clarification necessary on the question of the liability—on the question of the sanctions that follow from nonpayment of assessments. Therefore, we wouldn't think that any review of the charter would include any amendment to article 19. Mr. MAILLIARD. If the World Court should disagree with that view, then certainly this ought to be something to be considered. Mr. STEVENSON. Yes; if the Court disagreed. Mr. MAILLIARD. Is there any reasonable explanation why the Latin American countries have been so slow to pledge any support to this bond issue? Mr. STEVENSON. Only their poverty. Mr. MAILLIARD. I would think maybe with our Alliance for Progress they could sneak out a few dollars to help out the U.N. Mr. STEVENSON. I think some of them, we think a number of them will and are waiting for us. Until we act, they are not going to. Actually there are various views that everybody expressed about these peacekeeping operations. I don't attribute this only to Latin American states. There are many who feel that these peacekeeping operations should be supported in toto by the large powers, by the great powers, and that they shouldn't become a burden on the national budgets of these small powers which are only distantly involved. This would be true of a number of the smaller Latin American countries who have taken this position. It is also true of other countries. Basically the problem of Latin America is one of acute budgetary difficulties in virtually all of the republics. Mr. MAILLIARD. Governor, there was also some mention about the suggestion that was made that these funds would be made available through the mutual security appropriation, possibly the contingency fund, and I understand your response to be that you would want something more solid than that. Isn't it true that most of the Congo operation has been funded out of the mutual security appropriations, including a substantial amount, I believe, out of the contingency fund? Mr. STEVENSON. I can't tell you the exact figure, Mr. Congressman, how much has been paid out of contingency fund. When I said "firmer," I meant what we have to look forward to is a permanent. plan for the financing of the United Nations. Mr. MAILLIARD. I thought the record shouldn't stand that the contingency fund would not be a source of funds in an emergency, and a proper one. Mr. STEVENSON. Yes. I apologize if I left any such impression. I didn't mean to say that. I meant to say that I think this is a matter that we shouldn't deal with as a contingency because it is going to be a permanent matter. (The following table has been supplied for insertion in the record:) Source of U.S. contribution to U.N. military operations in the Congo through June 30, 1962 Mr. MAILLIARD. My final question: I wonder, since I think our hearing today has indicated the Congo is going to be a slightly inflammatory subject in the debate on this bill, if we could have for the record a chronology of the mandates upon which the Congo operations have been based? Mr. STEVENSON. Surely. Mr. MAILLIARD. Whether they arose out of the General Assembly action or out of the Security Council or some other authority of the Secretary General. If we get into a debate on the floor of the House, then we will have an authentic statement of the sources of the U.N. mandates for the operations in the Congo. Mr. STEVENSON. By all means we will do that, sir. I had an impression it was already in the committee print. Mr. MAILLIARD. Perhaps it is. I haven't found it in a way that is quite clear to me. Mr. STEVENSON. Secretary Cleveland reminds me we submitted a full analysis to the Senate committee, and we can do it here. There is on page 98 of the committee print of February 6, under appendix 21, a summary of resolutions authorizing the United Nations presence in the Congo. I think we can do a much more comprehensive job than that. Mr. MAILLIARD. I did glance at that. I think a simple narrative might serve our purposes a little bit better. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. (The following information has been supplied for the record:) A simple narrative summary of resolutions authorizing United Nations presence in the Congo can be found in appendix 21 on page 98 of the Joint Committee Print on Information on the Operations and Financing of the United Nations, February 6, 1962. A fuller narrative follows (taken from hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, February 1962, entitled "Purchase of United Nations Bonds," pp. 93-98): SUMMARY OF RESOLUTIONS AUTHORIZING UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE CONGO Resolution of July 13, 1960.-On the basis of the request from the Government of the Congo, the Security Council adopted a resolution authorizing the Secretary General "to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security of forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks." No finding was made that a threat to international peace and security existed. Resolution of July 22, 1960.-The Security Council passed a further resolution, in the preamble of which it stated that the complete restoration of law and order in the Congo would effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. That resolution called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops and requested all states to refrain from any action that might impede the restoration of law and order or that might undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo. Resolution of August 9, 1960.—In early August, United Nations troops were forcibly stopped from entering Katanga. The Secretary General immediately brought this situation to the attention of the Security Council which, in its resolution of August 9, made clear that the Secretary General's responsibilities were to cover Katanga as well as the other Provinces of the Congo. The Council specifically affirmed that the U.N. forces in the Congo were not to be a party to or intervene in the resolution of any internal political conflicts. General Assembly resolution of September 20, 1960.-After the dismissal of Lumumba in September 1960, the Security Council met once again but could not |