(The information is as follows:)

Allied military units deployed to Thailand, in addition to U.S. units, consist of a Sabrejet squadron and ground personnel from Australia; a transport aircraft unit and a special air service unit from New Zealand; and a Royal Air Force jet fighter squadron with ground personnel from the United Kingdom. The total number of military personnel in these units is approximately 600. In addition, the United Kingdom maintains a garrison at its base in Singapore and also maintains units in the Federation of Malaya under defense arrangements with that country.

Chairman MORGAN. Dr. Judd.

Mr. JUDD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Plimpton, I wish we could get a little more definite answer than heretofore on the question I raised yesterday as to what extent our Government can or is likely to waive debts that the U.N. has toward us, as it waived the $10 million or so cost of our transporting troops into the Congo.

"Waived" is perhaps not the right word, although the record uses the word "waiver." What it amounts to, as I get it, is that the President paid MATS out of the contingency fund for that cost instead of the U.N. paying MATS, because the U.N. didn't have enough money in its coffers.

To what extent is that likely to be or could that become a regular practice? If we make a loan of $100 million to the U.N. can the President waive repayments on it as he has waived obligations of the U.N. to repay us for services that we rendered in these operations? Somebody ought to make that absolutely clear.

STATEMENT OF ABRAM CHAYES, LEGAL ADVISER TO THE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CHAYES. I think the answer to that is that I don't think the President could waive the payment on a bonded indebtedness owed to the United States, because I don't think that would fall under the general provision in the United Nations Participation Act authorizing contributions of various kinds to the U.N.

I would also add, although perhaps Ambassador Plimpton is more qualified to answer this than I, that I simply cannot imagine the President waiving this debt even if he had authority to do so. There is certainly no intention at any time to do this.

(The following has been supplied for inclusion in the record at this point :)

The President's authority to waive sums owed to the United States by the United Nations is contained in section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287d-1). In relevant part it states:

"SEC. 7. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President, upon the request by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest to comply with such request, may authorize, in support of such activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes * * *

"(2) the furnishing of facilities, services, or other assistance and the loan of the agreed fair share of the United States of any supplies and equipment to the United Nations by the National Military Establishment, under such terms and conditions as the President shall determine;

"(3) the obligation, insofar as necessary to carry out the purposes of clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, of any funds appropriated to the

National Military Establishment or any department therein, the procurement of such personnel, supplies, equipment, facilities, services, or other assistance as may be made available in accordance with the request of the United Nations, and the replacement of such items, when necessary, where they are furnished from stocks.

"(b) Whenever personnel or assistance is made available pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a) (1) and (2) of this section, the President shall require reimbursement from the United Nations for the expense thereby incurred by the United States: Provided, That in exceptional circumstances, or when the President finds it to be in the national interest, he may waive, in whole or in part, the requirement of such reimbursement: Provided further, That when any such reimbursement is made, it shall be credited, at the option of the appropriate department of the National Military Establishment, either to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized in incurring the obligation, or to an appropriate appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the purposes for which expenditures were made.

"(c) In addition to the authorization of appropriations to the Department of State contained in section 8 of this Act, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the National Military Establishment, or any department therein, such sums as may be necessary to reimburse such Establishment or department in the event that reimbursement from the United Nations is waived in whole or in part pursuant to authority contained in subsection (b) of this section ***

From the information supplied the committee, it will be noted that the amount waived for the Congo military operation ($10,317,622) was for the initial airlift. The airlift was provided under the authority of the United Nations Participation Act. Its cost was initially met by the Department of Defense. Subsequently, the Department of Defense was reimbursed for its outlay by funds authorized for fiscal year 1961 contingencies in the Mutual Security Act. Reimbursement by the United Nations for this debt was waived by the President in accordance with section 7(b) of the United Nations Participation Act.

The United States has no present intention of waiving reimbursement from the United Nations for sums presently due the United States for the Middle East and Congo operations. These amounts totaled $32.2 million on March 31, 1962, of which $0.7 was for UNEF and $31.5 was for the Congo.

Mr. JUDD. Again, it is said "Why should we make this contribution and call it a loan? We are never going to get it paid back."

Mr. CHAYES. I think again, to answer that, there is no reason to suppose we are not going to be paid back. The headquarters loan is being paid off regularly. Provisions for repayment of this loan have been made in the regular budget of the U.N. by the resolution authorizing the bond issue. And both my office and the International Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York have looked into it as has Mr. Black of the IBRD, and all agree that there is reasonable assurance of repayment of the United States.

So that I don't think you can say that these bonds will not be paid in due course by the U.N., assuming of course that the U.N. continues in existence. But short of that, I think it will certainly be paid.

Mr. JUDD. That leads to another question. I was looking through some reports and I find that this financial crisis for the U.N. was visible as early as 1957. It says on page 14: "In the case of UNEF, this opposition became apparent as early as 1957. Whereas the first $10 million of expenses for UNEF were assessed on the basis of the regular scale of assessments, there developed an immediate resistance to financing further expenses on this basis, and appeals were made to the major powers to make voluntary contributions."

That is apparently when we began to make contributions out of the contingency fund.

If you look through the schedule here, you see it fell further into debt each year, except one, and then of course the Congo came along and shot the total up.

I realize your administration was not in power at that time. But do you know why there apparently was not too much of an effort made to bring up and deal earlier with this obvious financial uncertainty or lack of sound foundation under the U.N.?

Mr. PLIMPTON. I think, Congressman, that, if I might put it this way, the situation rocked along until it began to get really serious with the Congo.

In the case of the Gaza strip, some of the smaller nations just didn't want to vote for the expenditures which they would have to pay in their ordinary percentage of them.

The countries, including the United States, which felt it was important to have this Gaza strip operation continued, as you indicated, did make voluntary contributions.

At first, the voluntary contribution was just taken off of the top of the assessments, which had the effect of cutting down the assessment of everybody in proportion to the ordinary assessment percentages. That didn't satisfy the smaller, less financially able countries, and they began pressing for more relief. That led to the adoption of the scheme of having-of cutting down their assessments to a smaller percentage of the whole. The very smallest countries were given, so to speak, 80 percent relief.

There were some 75 countries that got the benefit of 80 percent relief. And the difference was made up by our voluntary contribution. The sums involved-I of course can only guess as to what the considerations were several years ago, but the situation wasn't too serious financially until the Congo appeared on the scene, whereupon, as the committee knows, it got very serious indeed.

Mr. JUDD. These figures show that in 1956 there was a deficit of $9 million; 1957, $21 million; 1958, $29 million; 1959, $28 million. The Gaza strip was quieting down a little bit and no other new explosion. In 1960, $87 million, and 1961, $107 million, which reflected, as you say, the explosion in the Congo.

What you are saying, and I can understand why, is that we were just hoping things would go along and quiet down and we wouldn't have to face up to it, until the Congo compelled us to?

Mr. PLIMPTON. I think that is a correct analysis.

Mr. JUDD. This raises my last question which is more of a philosophical question, or a broad policy question. It arises from the fact that the U.N. itself is an ambiguous sort of organization. That is perhaps not the word. It is neither fish nor fowl, in ordinary lay language. It is not a government with authority to raise armies and carry on the normal functions of a government. On the other hand, it isn't just a forum because it does have some authority to use force. In which direction do you think the U.N. is trending, and perhaps, second, in which direction do you think it should trend? Should it move back toward the original concept of a forum where ideas or charges of whatever nature could be brought before the world's attention? The U.N. could investigate. It could expose. It could approve or it could condemn. It could mobilize public opinion in favor of or against. And these are no mean weapons, of course.

But it did not have forces of its own which it could use as a sovereign government can use its armed forces. Do you think the U.N. should move more in the direction of a forum without force, or move toward becoming a real government with force, in which case, of course the voting mechanism would simply have to be altered to reflect more accurately the power realities in the world—a world government, so to speak?

In which direction do you think it is trending, and in which direction do you think it ought to trend, to be most effective, not just in terms of what you or I might like, but in order to give maximum security and peace with minimum costs and risks in the world in which we live?

Mr. PLIMPTON. In the way it has been trending I think it is clear over the last few years the United Nations has become to a certain extent an effective operating instrument. The Gaza strip is one example. The Congo is another.

I think it is a little difficult, Congressman, to answer philosophical questions of this character, because I think these things depend on the facts and depend on what we are talking about.

I would myself think that the need for an operation like the Congo would not appear in the future. That was, I think, a unique situation. Mr. JUDD. From which we have learned something?

Mr. PLIMPTON. From which we have learned.

I think the unsettled conditions of the world where such an operation might turn out to be necessary are fairly few. Perhaps somewhere in southeast Asia, perhaps in Africa, Ruanda-Urundi, and, we would hope not, it would be a very minor thing if it did.

My own guess would be that it would not be necessary or even appropriate in the future for an operation such as we are in the middle of now to be repeated.

If one looks down the corridors of time as to what sort of world one would like to see developed over the measurable future, I myself don't see anything approaching world government on the horizon.

I think the United Nations after all, you know it is a grammatical error to talk about "the United Nations." You can say "the United States," because we are a unit and country. But the United Nations are "104 governments."

I think in the case of the U.N. the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. But it isn't much greater, and I don't see that it is likely to become much greater in the near future.

Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Hays.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Ambassador, you cited some of these votes in the U.N. about the Afro-Asian nations. I concede you made a point that they didn't vote as a bloc. I don't think you made very much of a point that they voted very much with us.

On the Hungarian thing, which seems very clear cut, you had 42 of them who were either abstaining or against us out of 52.

Mr. PLIMPTON. That is correct.

Mr. HAYS. Out of those 53 nations, are there any of them that we are not giving foreign aid to?

Mr. PLIMPTON. I don't know, sir. There must be some that we don't.

Mr. HAYS. You say "There must be some," but you don't know of any, do you?

Mr. PLIMPTON. I don't think we are giving any to Japan. I may be wrong.

(The following information has been supplied for inclusion in the record at this point:)

The information on the Afro-Asian countries who were receiving U.S. foreign aid in 1961, as correlated with their vote on the "Question of Hungary" in the United Nations, is as follows:

1/ The letter "M" following the country denotes military aid and the letter "E" following the country denotes economic aid.

July 6, 1962

Mr. HAYS. We may not be at the moment, but they have been beneficiaries of pretty massive injections of it. I don't recall the total now, but it runs into the billions. So we have found 1 out of 52 or 53.