That is the best thing I can suggest to carry out one thought that has arisen here a number of times and that is, if we knew what the agree ments were going to be, we could act more intelligently.

At present, we are simply told what it is hoped the agreements are going to be and there is very broad latitude given as to what those agreements should be and some of us have had the experience in the past that protective agreements do not furnish all the things we thought.

For instance, we remember the agreements we were going to have for repayment of lend-lease, and the difference between promise and performance was considerable.

However, in this situation, look at these countries we are talking about. Here is Austria, still under the Army and under a four-power proposition and no chance for a peace treaty for quite a while.

Here are two ex-enemy countries, Italy, and we have Mr. Hoover's statement that Italy does not need this help, and Hungary, where we have this problem that we are in substance going to pay reparations. We have Poland where the chances of making agreements look exceedingly slim, but I am sure we want to help the Poles if we can help them instead of just helping the Communist Party in Poland. Över the week-end we hear that the Greek problem involves $200,000,000 or so, and China, which I cannot help but feel was mentioned here for window dressing, because the amount mentioned is trifling in response to China's total relief needs. $60,000,000 for 450,000,000 people, whose caloric food average is less than any of them in Europe, and we are not going to do anything for China from what we hear.

Why not say, "Here is some relief right now," and the President is authorized to report—not back to the Senate for a two-thirds vote, but to report relief agreements to Congress, to be authorized by majority vote?

Mr. BLOOM. I say this: The same as in UNRRA, if we should authorize an appropriation here of $350,000,000, the Appropriation Committee would maybe appropriate $100,000,000 of that, the same as they did in UNRRA, and appropriate as it goes along, but at least we should give them the implement to use to do what they want to do at the time.

They must go and get the appropriation, but if we reduce it here, I am afraid that you are going to find all the other countries doing the same thing and the people will become discouraged.

Following the other question of Mr. Jarman, as to what the great reason is behind this, if we should lose the Balkans, if we should lose Turkey and Greece and they go into other countries down there, which they can take immediately-they do not have to take them because they can just go in there-we would lose possession down there. That means a great deal to us and one thing I have in mind is the oil situation and if we ever lose that I want to tell you, ladies and gentlemen, we have lost a great deal and we had better be careful.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I have had a number of Members ask for recognition.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hoover made a great deal of the importance of having on-the-spot investigations and studies by qualified experts in the field of relief. As I understand your answer to

Mr. Jarman's question, those on-the-spot investigations have not yet taken in any of these countries.

Mr. WOOD. No; I did not mean to give that impression. have been continuous.

They

Mr. MUNDT. No. special missions have been sent over to make a specific study leading up to this?

Mr. Wood. There have been continuous investigations by the people in the Embassies in these countries, in addition to which there was this investigation, on which we had really expert people, made by the Devastated Areas Subcommittee of the Economic and Social Council. There has not been in these countries a formal investigating committee from the outside, but let me assure you that, for example, we went into Poland this summer and Ambassador Lane and his whole staff were spending a great deal of time, not only in Warsaw, but all over the country, looking at the condition of the crops and interviewing people in various places.

In every country we went into, except Yugoslavia, where that was a very difficult thing to do, and which has not been included here, there have been most searching and continuous examinations of these questions by fully qualified people.

It has not been as was the case with Greece and with the United Nations Devastated Area Subcommittee, a formal commission that went in, but, as a matter of fact, such commissions and such investigations when they do go in, must rely very largely upon the data, and material and background collected by our people in the Embassies. Mr. MUNDT. One of the reasons I asked that is on page 3, where you are talking about Greece, it says—

Sufficient wheat imports are included to provide the non-self-supplying population with about 2,000 calories per person per day—

and then you arrive at a figure of 350,000 metric tons.

It seems to me you have too many variables to arrive at anything definite, such as 350,000 metric tons.

In the first place, to adopt 2,000 calories might mean the Hoover suggestion or it might mean 2,500. But to arrive at 350,000 metric tons, I see nothing to indicate here that you have arrived at anything to show what percentage of that population is included in the category of non-self-supplying population.

Mr. WOOD. That has been very carefully worked out. We have checked many times on the figures as to the total production of wheat and various other grains. That is not just a guess by any means. We also have the data on the number of farm people and the number in urban areas. No figures covering the whole country can be completely accurate down to the last decimal point; I quite agree with you. Mr. MUNDT. To give enough wheat to bring the calory intake up to 2,000 calories per person, which you say this would do, does it mean that this other $25,000,000 worth of food which is going to be made available to Greece will supply them with a calorie intake of much more than 2,000.

Mr. WOOD. That 2,000 includes all food including wheat. Wheat is just one of the elements. It is really the residual element to bring up the calories to 2,000. We figure all the local production, what part of that should be amassed and available to the city dweller, the imports of peas and beans and things of that sort.

Mr. MUNDT. This statement is incorrect, on page 3?

Mr. WOOD. Let me look at that.

What ought to be read into that is that all the foods available for the urban population have been taken into account and the figure of 350,000 metric tons is the residual figure to bring it up to the 2,000 calories.

Mr. MUNDT. Wheat plus everything else?

Mr. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. JAVITS. The point is that Greece's relief need is all wheat. All the money you are going to spend is for wheat?

Mr. MUNDT. Not according to them, they have $23,000,000 worth of other food.

Mr. JAVITS. When I was in Greece, I got the exact estimates. We have a fellow right in the financial mission in Greece who is a very good man. They all checked this figure. It was 357,000 tons. That is what they need to buy. That is the nubbin of their whole problem. Mr. WOOD. They also need to import some meat and sugar and some pulses. Of course, grain and wheat particularly supply many calories. It is the most economical way.

On the other hand you do need some proteins in order to have a diet that can sustain health and life.

In the next paragraph, "b" under there, Mr. Mundt, you will see we are talking about imports of fish, pulses, and cereals other than wheat. I think you could cover the whole caloric intake necessary with wheat, but it is certainly desirable and I might say almost necessary to have some meat, sugar, fat and pulses.

Mr. RICHARDS. I have a question I want to ask: There are $610,000,000 needed for minimum relief.

It is proposed that we contribute 57 percent.

Those figures were based on certain proposed commitments from Great Britain and other countries?

Mr. WOOD. They were taken into account, yes.

Mr. RICHARDS. I believe it was mentioned that Great Britain proposed that they wanted to have $40,000,000?

Mr. WOOD. The amount of $40,000,000 from Great Britain was just for Austria.

Mr. RICHARDS. Since the bottom has fallen out of things in Greece, it is hard for me to conceive of Great Britain abandoning relief to Greece and still giving to these other countries.

Do you anticipate Britain will fall down on her proportionate share of this, in view of what happened in Greece?

Mr. WOOD. We have taken into account, sir, in figuring our Greek problem, that Great Britain would not be able to assist much in that respect.

It is true, of course, that in respect of certain commodities that can be bought in the sterling area, so called, Britain could still help, in spite of the fact that she could not supply things that require dollars for their purchase. We have considered that question very carefully and I might say I do not want to give the impression here that I think my prophetic abilities are infallible nor are those of our economic experts.

That very fact that Britain may be able to help less in this over-all problem than perhaps we even pessimistically have estimated, is an

other terribly important reason for having this the full total of $350,000,000 available as soon as possible.

Mr. RICHARDS. Even that amount might be lower than your estimated minimum of relief?

Mr. WOOD. I was wondering whether in that connection, it might not be possible to proceed on the assurance that we are not going to assign all this money out immediately and perhaps authorize appropriation of the full amount, if the committee and the House feel that it is justified, and then require that when some of these main agreements were made with these countries and have been negotiated, we come back and report on them to the Congress.

If they should not be regarded as satisfactory at that point we would not have committed more than a small proportion of the money and the Congress could, if it thought the agreements unsatisfactory, take whatever action seemed necessary then.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Why does the fact that Britain is pulling out of Greece affect the minimum needs?

Mr. WOOD. It does not.

Mr. BLOOM. She is not pulling out of Greece?

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I should not use that word.

Mr. WOOD. I think we all understand what is meant there.

Mr. RICHARDS. How much was originally proposed for Britain to contribute?

If Britain falls down, and it is entirely possible that she may, the whole thing will be on the United States, practically?

Mr. WOOD. No, sir.

Mr. BLOOM. What is Canada doing?

Mr. WOOD. Canada has always been a strong helper.

Australia and New Zealand I am sure would want to do something. I cannot speak for them.

The Norwegians are going to help, I feel confident. I think Sweden will help, also.

Mr. JUDD. Is there not somewhere a table saying what it is anticipated each country will be able to give?

Mr. WOOD. No, sir; because we do not know that.

One of the things, to get them really signed up, one of the things that must be done, in order to get specific pledges of help, is for us to decide what we are going to do.

We go to them and say: "Here is what we are going to do. Now what will you do?" Then we get them to sign on the dotted line.

We cannot today tell you what these other countries are going to do, exactly.

Mr. RICHARDS. According to your figures, you might say we have obtained 18 percent from Britain and that allows 10 percent for the rest of the nations altogether.

Now if Great Britain would probably have to fall down, I am just wondering about that.

Mr. Wood. It does not mean they have to fall down in all respects. As I say, there are certain items available for purchase with sterling. Mr. CHIPERFIELD. In the program that we put into operation in Italy before the UNRRA program could get under way, there was involved $148,000,000 for relief supplies.

I have asked one of your men and find this is not a secret. We furnished $134,000,000 of the cost and the United Kingdom furnished $14,000,000.

Mr. RICHARDS. Then, on account of supplies she had on hand or could purchase, I understand she was able to furnish more in another country than she could in Greece.

If they get out of their relief proposition in Greece, and as important as Greece is to the British Empire and everybody knows it, I just cannot figure where they will get in the picture anywhere else at all.

Mr. WOOD. As I say, we know they are going to help to spend $40,000,000 in Austria, which is almost half of the quarter of $350,000,000. Mr. JUDD. Does that still stand?

Mr. WOOD. That still stands.

They are supplying, for example, wool in Austria which is an essential import. We would not generally supply that, because wool is available for purchase with sterling.

Mr. JUDD. What it really amounts to, is that we are debating whether we should make an initial payment of $100,000,000 or an initial payment of $350,000,000? Is that not it? The others are not going to come through to $610,000,000, and there is no use kidding ourselves or kidding the people.

Mr. Woon. I would say the assumption that the others would pick up that balance is not beyond the bounds of possibilities but is on the optimistic side; yes.

Mr. LODGE. I wanted to ask Mr. Bloom whether or not in the conference they had with the President, the question of deterioration in Britain's position had been considered in connection with this particular bill, which was our immediate problem.

Mr. Bloom is not here now, however.

Mr. WOOD. Regarding Dr. Judd's question as to whether we are unduly optimistic: You might bear in mind that the Argentine, for example, has not made any very great contribution to relief during the UNRRA period. They never joined UNRRA. They did make available some wheat, but it is well known that the Argentine is a country where some of these relief supplies will be available for export.

We are hoping that the Argentine and other countries will prove a much larger contributor to the total in this case, than in the case of UNRRA, and that might well go to overbalance considerably the lack of supplies that we might find in the case of other countries.

It is for that reason I am not quite willing to go as far as you are, admitting the uncertainty of it, and reach the conclusion that the $350,000,000 would necessarily be only a first payment.

I am not ready to say that I feel sure we could not get the balance taken care of by others.

Mr. JUDD. There is a real advantage, however, in being candid and saying this is recognized that it is not at all impossible that further payments will be required?

Mr. WOOD. I would certainly agree with you on that.

Mr. JUDD. I can support a program better when the cards are on the table and we know that it is not to be impossible that there will be further payments.