I will go even further. I would extend aid to any country in an effort to stop this march of communism which is so apparent in the world. I do not wish to ask any embarassing questions, but I wish to make this very brief statement. In my opinion Mr. Stalin and his associates will not stop their program of aggressive expansion and spreading communism until the United States takes a firm stand. I believe this is the time for a show-down.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I want to ask if we deny aid to Greece and Turkey will it not in the end result in a marked lessening of the influence and leadership of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which area is all important to us because of oil and other reasons?

Mr. ACHESON. May I deal with that question somewhat cautiously? There are a great many statements of fact that you have put into the question.

May I say this, that if the United States does not accede to the requests that have been made upon it and takes an attitude of indifference toward peoples who wish to maintain their independence and who wish to maintain the institutions with which we sympathize, there will be a very strong conviction throughout the Middle East and throughout the other parts of the world that a great deal of our professions are mere words and that we are not willing to extend substantial help to see that the sort of institutions in which we believe survive.

Mr. MERROW. Mr. Secretary, to me this is a question of maintaining world leadership by the United States. If we deny aid to Greece and Turkey, would it not be a major step in abandoning the world leadership that we are enjoying at the present time?

Mr. ACHESON. I think that I have really covered that, Mr. Merrow. Your question would really get me into a matter of what you mean by "world leadership"; whether we have it, or whether somebody else thinks they are participating in it.

I think I can satisfy you by saying that the whole mission of this country, as the defender of views which are best stated in our own Constitution, and of the set of views which are stated in the United Nations Charter, will be greatly weakened if we do not extend the aid which has been asked in this case.

Mr. MERROW. There is one thing more, Mr. Secretary. I feel very strongly for the success of United Nations and certainly hope that it will grow and become a very powerful organization, but it does seem to me that we are in a very hard game of international politics outside of the United Nations, and I am particularly pleased that we are at last becoming firm and realistic about it.

Chairman EATON. Mrs. Douglas.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. First of all, I do not consider the Foreign Affairs Committee has you on the spot. I want to pay my tribute to you for the great contribution that you have made in your work in the State Department and in the building of the United Nations Organization. Now, the question that I want to ask, is asked out of the most profound concern for this step which we are asked to take.

Frankly, I feel that the problem of Greece is separate from the problem of Turkey. You have told us that unless we bring economic aid to Greece there is the great probability that Greece will collapse economically by March 31; that the people in Greece are starving.

Mr. ACHESON. I did not wish to put a date on that, Mrs. Douglas. Mrs. DOUGLAS. We have used that date as the date that the English will bow out.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes; a very imminent matter.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. The Greeks have gold that will last them for 2 weeks, is that not so?

Mr. ACHESON. A month.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. A month. So help must be given to Greece within the near future, but that is not the situation, in Turkey is it?

Turkey was not ravished by the war. Turkey was not in the war. Turkey does not face the economic collapse that Greece does.

Mr. ACHESON. That is correct.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. As we approach it, Mr. Secretary, this is what troubles me.

.

You have said over and over again that we want to help free democratic nations to maintain the system that they have, that we want them to go on the way that they are going, and we want to help them progress along the democratic path. No one could say that the Turks are progressing on a democratic path.

Mr. ACHESON. I think that you would be quite wrong if you did not say this-if you read carefully what we have in the book that you have before you

Mrs. DOUGLAS. I stayed awake until the late hours of last night reading it.

Mr. ACHESON. I think you will discover in the period from the last war to the present time that the Turks have progressed very measurably along that path. One of the interesting things is that there is an opposition party really functioning as an opposition party in Turkey. Mrs. DOUGLAS. I am aware of that. Would you not say there might be the danger that if we came in and backed up the army of Turkey that the opposition party would not be able to voice its opinions and sentiments and aims and ambitions?

Mr. ACHESON. No, I should not say that.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. No? You do not feel that way?
Mr. ACHESON. No.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. What we propose doing, and I will address this question again later to Mr. Clayton, is to give aid to Turkey so that they can keep. their army going which has about 700,000 men, or somewhere around that figure.

Now, we keep saying, and you have said it over and over again this morning, Mr. Secretary, "that the Turks must be given aid so that they can maintain their army because of outside pressure. Now, what facts have we to show there is outside pressure? That is my first question. Number 2, if we have the facts to prove there is outside pressure, is it not clearly a matter for the Security Council, just as the Iranian question was a matter for the Security Council?

Mr. ACHESON. I think what we ought to do is to examine quite clearly what we have said about Turkey. We have said that, for reasons which seem valid to the Turks, reasons which originate outside of their area, they feel it necessary to keep a certain military establishment. We are not undertaking to examine whether the Turks are right or wrong about that. That is a matter which they have to decide for themselves just as we would have to decide it for

ourselves.

In order to do that, they are under a strain, an economic strain. During the war they were substantially helped by the United States and the British. We alone transferred equipment in the amount of $90,000,000 to the Turks. The British gave them substantial help.

At the present time, unless some help of a financial and economic sort is given to them, there will be a deterioration in the Turkish economic situation which will produce results that we will not believe are favorable.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. Mr. Secretary, I do not question that one single bit. The question that I am asking is this: If there are outside pressures being brought to bear on Turkey, are we not dangerously running around the United Nations where we decide and act unilaterally in the matter. We handled the matter of Iran through the Security Council. It was very much the same kind of a problem. If these pressures are there, if there are nations bringing pressure upon Turkey, should not we, the United States within the Security Council, lay the problem before the Security Council and demand an answer?

Mr. ACHESON. I think if you really think the matter over you will discover what was before the Security Council in the Iranian matter was quite different, and that what Iran objected to was that there were foreign troops on Iranian soil, and those troops were not withdrawn in accordance with the international agreements under which they entered Iranian soil. That is a perfectly clear and obvious matter. The troops are on the soil, and will they or will they not withdraw? Have they a right to be there? Have they no right to be there? That was the matter that was before the Security Council.

What are you proposing we bring before the Security Council in regard to Turkey? I do not quite understand.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. I want you to explain this word you call pressure. What is this pressure? Is it a nebulous thing, something that we only imagine will be existing in the future, or do we have proof to show that there is pressure at this moment? Do we propose to give financial aid to a country which was not even with us in the war in order that they may build up their army because of some imaginary thing? I do not think that we can maintain our moral position in the world if we do so. Mr. ACHESON. I think what you are really asking me is-do I think that the Turks ought to raise some question with the Security Council. Mrs. DOUGLAS. When the Turks come to us and want us to give them some help so that they can keep up their army in order to resist outside pressures, should we not demand that they take their case to the Security Council and fight it out there. Should we not now use the machinery which we heped build.

Mr. ACHESON. My judgment would be that that would not be a productive course.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. Even if it were not productive, Mr. Secretary, we would have gained much. Suppose we took steps to bring the Turkish matter before the Security Council and they were not productive. We could then act on the unilateral plan that we now have under consideration, but we would have first explored the possibility of settling the problem through the international machinery which we helped set up. If we do not do so are we not culpable morally before the world?

Mr. ACHESON. I should not say so. I really think we ought not to use this word "unilateral" quite as freely as some of us do. Uni

lateral means something that one country does. What we are now talking about here is responding to a request of another country. That at least involves two countries.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. I will finish with one more question so we can go around the table. I am not satisfied with your answer. We are answering in the legislation before us the request of a nation, Turkey. They are asking us to give them aid so they can keep their army going and make it stronger. This has the most serious kind of implications. We talk about pressures and the Turks talk about pressures. Now, aside from unilateral action, or any other kind of action, I do not understand anything at all about the Security Council or the General Assembly if this is not clearly a matter for their jurisdiction. I think that it ought to go there first. If they are unable to act we can always take steps. I do not see from the case as it has been presented, that Turkey is going to collapse overnight, or that X country is going to walk in over the borders overnight. But if X country is going to walk in now or in the future, 700,000 troops will not stop them, so we better get some support from all of the rest of the countries, I would

say.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Judd.

will

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Secretary, are we going into Greece to impose our upon the Greek people, as is so commonly and frequently said, or is the primary objective of our going into Greece an attempt to protect the people there against the imposition of someone else's will upon

them?

Mr. ACHESON. It is the latter.

Mr. JUDD. I understand the major reason for proposing and adopting this legislation is the belief that it would be dangerous to the security of the United States to have Communist-dominated governments developing in Greece and Turkey. Is that correct?

Mr. ACHESON. That is correct.

Mr. JUDD. Well, would it or would it not be dangerous to the security of the United States to have a Communist-dominated government on the Pacific in China?

Mr. ACHESON. I think we should not look with favor upon that. Mr. JUDD. Mr. Secretary, do you know of any Communist-dominated governments in the world which are not Soviet-dominated? If your reply might get you a reprimand from Pravda, I am willing to excuse you from answering if you prefer.

Mr. ACHESON. Well

Mr. JUDD. But I think it is very important for us to know on the basis of your superior avenues of information whether our Government knows of any Communist-dominated governments in the world which are not Soviet-dominated?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, may I answer this way, and that is, that Communist organizations throughout the world appear to act with a almost exactly the same party line.

Mr. JUDD. Beyond the probability of coincidence?

Mr. ACHESON. It would seem beyond the probability of coincidence. Mr. JUDD. Will you advise the committee whether those who are in control of the Communist Party in China are those whom General Marshall calls the "dyed-in-the-wool Communists," or are those whom he has described and Judge Key has described as unhappy disturbed

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liberals who have associated themselves with the Communist movement in China. Which group is in control?

Mr. ACHESON. My information would lead me to say the former. Mr. JUDD. And is it not true that the leader of the Communists in China, Mao-Tse-Tung, has been since the early twenties, a member of the executive committee of the international Comintern in Moscow, along with Dimitrov now in charge of Bulgaria, and Duclos, of France? Is not Mao one of the half dozen men in control of the Communist movement in the world?

Mr. ACHESON. If you say so I will agree. I do not know of my own knowledge.

Mr. JUDD. Is it not true, just to follow up one of my questions of yesterday, that the Communist movement in China moved into its present area, its base in Shensi Province, only in 1935 and 1936?

Mr. ACHESON. That is correct, and the statement which I made yesterday in regard to 20 years is not accurate in that respect.

Mr. JUDD. Is it not also true that out of the dozen men who control the Communist movement in China, eight or nine of them are from one province, Hunan, in south China?

Mr. ACHESON. I do not know about that.

Mr. JUDD. That is, it is a political clique from one province of south China that has moved in, organized, and controls the Communist movement in north China, and it is not primarily the north Chinese at all, is that not correct?

Mr. ACHESON. I cannot answer that.

Mr. JUDD. You said yesterday that the situation with respect to the Communists in China was different from that with respect to the Communists in Greece, and I believe one of the reasons you gave was that the Communists in China had been there long time and were well established. Is it not also true that one of the reasons that they have been there a long time, and have been growing and become better established is because we have, on numerous occasions, strongly urged the Government of China not to invade the Communist territory and liquidate the Communists but rather to concentrate on helping us against the Japanese? Is that not true?

Mr. ACHESON. I imagine, but I cannot speak of my own knowledge. I should suppose that during the course of the war we were concerned with getting as much help as we possibly could to defeat the Japanese and would hope that all factions in China would contribute to that result.

Mr. JUDD. I was referring particularly to your statement yesterday that the Communists in China have "an army which for years has repulsed all attempts to invade it." The point that I am trying to bring out is that from 1937 to 1945, 8 years, the Chinese Government made no effort to invade the so-called Communist territory, and in the latter part of 1945, after VJ-day, moved into it only on the orders of General MacArthur, in order to get to north China to take the surrender of the Japanese? Is it not true that in contrast the Communists constantly expanded into government territory and blocked the government troops in moving to disarm the Japanese?

Mr. ACHESON. I cannot answer that.

Mr. MUNDT. I think you are asking some highly pertinent and significant questions on which the Secretary apparently is not prepared this morning to answer, so I suggest that you get permission