bands operating within her territory are partly supplied, trained, and given refuge in neighboring countries and are moving back and forth across the borders. Greece has asked the United Nations for help in dealing with this situation. This is peculiarly a United Nations problem and one with which the United Nations is dealing expeditiously and effectively. In this matter the United States is supporting the Šecurity Council's action energetically.

The second problem confronting the Greek Government is the need for supplies and funds to enable it to meet its internal difficulties, namely, the restoration of order in the country and the averting of economic collapse. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the British Government have been helping Greece with these particular problems, and the present crisis has arisen because those two supports must be withdrawn. To whom was Greece to turn? If Greece had applied to the United Nations or any of its related organizations, the essential element of time would have been lost and the end result, if any, would have been the same.

The United Nations does not of itself possess funds. The Economic and Social Council is an advisory body that recommends economic, financial, and social action to member states. The International Bank, which is just now completing its organization, is set up primarily to make self-liquidating loans for long-term reconstruction purposes. It has not yet made any loans whatsoever. The Economic Commission for Europe is still in its early organization stage.

It may be that at some future time the United Nations will be organized and equipped so as to render emergency aid to member states of the kind now needed in Greece and Turkey. But as the President said, the United Nations and its related organizations are not now in position to extend help of the kind that is required. Even if some organ of the United Nations should decide to recommend assistance. to Greece and Turkey, it would have eventually to turn primarily to the United States for funds and supplies and technical assistance. Even if the project were not blocked by the objections of certain members of the United Nations, much time would have been lost and time is of the essence.

The third problem confronting Greece is one of expert personnel. Greece has linked this problem, and we heartily concur, with the supply of funds. Greece is in the most serious need of expert advice and assistance. We believe, and we think Congress believes, that the expenditure of American funds in Greece and Turkey should be supervised by American experts.

These are the emergency aspects of the problem.

Now Mr. Chairman, I should like to pause at this point and interpolate an observation. That is, if the members of this committee have not seen the report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on Greece, we will be very glad to make it available to them and I suggest that the members of the committee read it.

I should like to read to you at this time, the third recommendation of that report:

The Food and Agriculture Organization was asked by the Greek Government to send a mission to Greece to look primarily into the agricultural situation and such other matters as they wished to look at and make a report. They made a preliminary report in September 1946. This report is dated November 9, 1946. Recommendation

No. 3, made by this associated organization of the United Nations is as follows:

It is recommended that the Greek Government request the Economic and Social Council, and the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, to aid it in securing funds for the continuation of essential food and other imports to cover the period after UNRRA's withdrawal, until expanding exports, international development loans and expanding production enable Grecee to balance its international accounts without special aid. Now that, Mr. Chairman, is essentially what Greece has done. It has in the past asked Great Britain for this assistance. Great Britain has now told her that she can no longer continue it. Greece is now asking the United States of America which is the only source to which she can turn, as indicated by this organization report, as an emergency

matter.

I will continue with my statement:

In the longer range, the United Nations may be able to take over various parts of the economic and financial problem in Greece and Turkey. We are giving serious study and consideration to ways in which the United Nations may take hold of this problem after the present emergency is past.

I have said that the two alternatives that are before us are to give the help requested, or to deny it. An essential step in considering the wisdom of any policy is to look at the alternatives. What are the probable consequences of not extending aid to Greece and Turkey?

I have already indicated what would more than likely happen in Greece. As the President said, however, it is necessary only to glance at the map to realize that the survival and integrity of Greece is of grave importance in a much wider situation. The inexorable facts of geography link the future of Greece and Turkey. Should the integrity and independence of Greece be lost or compromised the effect upon Turkey is inevitable.

But the effect is even wider. Consider for a moment the situation of the countries to the east and south of Turkey. All of them are confronted with the accumulated problems of the past and of the war. Some of them are just emerging into statehood. These nations wish and should be able to develop and maintain free institutions and individual liberties, but untoward circumstances may force them in the other direction. Will these countries be able to solve the extremely difficult problems that confront them in ways compatible with free institutions and individual liberty? It is vital to our own interests to do all in our power to help them solve their economic difficulties in such a way that their choice will be in favor of freedom.

I need not emphasize to you what would more than likely be the effect on the nations in the Middle East of a collapse in Greece and Turkey, and the installation of totalitarian regimes there. Both from the point of view of economics and morale, the effects upon countries to the east would be enormous, especially if the failure in Greece and Turkey should come about as the result of the failure of this great democracy to come to their aid. On the other hand, I ask you to consider the effects on their morale and their internal development should Greece and Turkey receive a helping hand from the United States, the country with which they closely associate the principles of freedom. It is not too much to say that the outcome in Greece and Turkey will be watched with deep concern throughout the vast area from the Dardanelles to the China Sea.

It is also being watched with deepest anxiety by the peoples to the west, particularly the peoples of Europe who, as the President said, are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedom and independence while they repair the damages of war.

As the President has also said, it would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence could be disastrous not only for them but the world. Discouragement and possible failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring people striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

I have tried to outline to you the nature of the present crisis, and to describe some of its implications for the United States. The Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal, will give you an appreciation of the problem from the point of view of their Departments. The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Clayton, and Ambassador Porter, who has just returned from an economic mission in Athens, will give you more facts about the present situation in Greece and an account of the preliminary reconstruction program we have worked out for Greece. Our Ambassadors to Greece and Turkey, Mr. MacVeagh and Mr. Wilson, have been recalled for consultation. If the committee wishes to have the benefit of their views, I request that on account of the nature of their position and official duties, they be heard in executive session.

Mr. Chairman, I am hoping that there will arrive at any moment now a number of loose-leaf binders which we have made up for each member of this committee. These binders contain a great mass of background material on the history and historical aspects of the present crisis both in Greece and Turkey. It concerns the past political history in those countries, an account of their foreign relations, and their economic conditions.

I hope they will be here at any moment, and will be before you for your use during these hearings.

When the books arrive, you will notice that some of the material in the book is of a classified nature, and I hope that the committee members will respect those classifications.

Chairman EATON. Has the Secretary finished his statement?
Secretary ACHESON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman EATON. The Chair would like to call attention to the fact that there has been a considerable movement all the time among the physical bodies of this group, and we would like to have you refrain and be as still as possible while the questioning goes on, because the questioning is going to be very important in this investigation.

We have a rule in our committee that on the first round we devote 5 minutes to each member, so that every member may have a chance to interrogate. After that, we turn the witness over to the tender mercies of the committee, and everyone has freedom to take as much time as he pleases.

The first question will be asked today by Mr. Vorys of Ohio.

Mr. VORYS. I wonder, Mr. Secretary, if you could give us an idea of how the $400,000,000 authorized is to be spent? We have the bill before us, but it does not tell much about the way in which it will be expended, or the approximate break-down.

Secretary ACHESON. Mr. Vorys, that matter will be covered in detail by Under Secretary Clayton, and Mr. Porter, and in a broad preliminary way, the break-down of the funds which are asked for as between the two countries would be from $275,000,000 to $300,000,000 for Greek needs, depending on how that is situated; from $100,000,000 to $125,000,000 for Turkish needs.

Mr. VORYS. Is it proposed that these will be loans or grants, or can you give us an idea as to the proportion of each? I notice the bill refers to "loans, credits, grants, or otherwise."

Secretary ACHESON. Again, that will be gone into in much more detail than I am able to do it by Mr. Clayton.

The matter should, I think, be left in the discretion of the President. My strong recommendation to the President would be that all of these funds which are used for non-wealth-producing purposes, such as current consumption, and use for the importation of military items, should not be in the form of loans.

If you burden the economies of these two countries with loans for those purposes, you will make it much more difficult for them to be effective borrowers from the International Bank.

If any part of these funds can be used, and we hope some of them can be used, for reconstruction, that is actually putting up some new wealth-producing asset, that could well be in the form of a loan.

Mr. VORYS. With respect to that type of loan, I wonder whether the World Bank would not be able to get under the long-time loans if we were to take care of the temporary matters and our participation would insure stability.

Secretary ACHESON. That is quite correct, Mr. Vorys, and that is our expectation. The amount of funds which would be used for wealth-producing capital properties in this bill would be comparatively small. Some must be included in order to raise immediately the productivity of Greece and also Turkey.

It is only when you take these first initial steps that both countries become sound borrowers from the International Bank.

Mr. VORYS. Just one other question: In your statement you mentioned that 3 weeks ago the British Government informed the State Department about this matter.

Has the State Department only known about this situation for 3 weeks, or is it a fact that the general situation has been known to the Department for some time?

Secretary ACHESON. The general situation in Greece has been known to the Department for the last 20 years. It is nothing new, so far as the situation in Greece is concerned. What is new about it is that we were informed by the British Government on the 24th of February, in a note dated February 21, that they would have to discontinue their financial aid at the end of this fiscal year of theirs, which is March 31.

There have also been some critical new developments in Greece which are new since Mr. Porter's arrival there. Those are matters of detail.

You will see when these books arrive that we have in them a letter from the then Prime Minister of Greece, of the 26th of December, in which he points out the growing crisis in Greece.

We have known that this crisis has been coming on for, of course, some time.

Any observer of Greek conditions knew that and that was why we sent Mr. Porter to Greece.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Bloom.

Mr. BLOOM. Mr. Secretary, the Department can only take recognition of the fact that certain things exist when you receive official notice, is that not right, from the country of England or any other country?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Mr. BLOOм. In your statement you mentioned the fact of food and clothing. Food and clothing is not included in any way in this bill, is it?

Secretary ACHESON. No; food and clothing for relief as such would not be included in the bill before the committee. That is included in the bill which the committee reported out yesterday.

Mr. BLOOм. That is the $350,000,000?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Mr. BLOOM. I believe you also said, Mr. Secretary, "give or deny aid to Greece."

Do you know of any better way to handle the situation than that? Secretary ACHESON. No; I do not.

Mr. BLOOM. There is no other way of doing it except this way that has been presented to the Department and you have to relieve the situation in Greece? Unless it is done the way this legislation calls for, there is no other way?

Secretary ACHESON. That is the only way we know of.
Mr. BLOOм. That is all.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, as you have indicated in your previous statements, and as other people have indicated, this is a very important decision which Congress is now being called upon to make, not only from the standpoint of its impact on the American economy, and the security of the world, but also because of its ramifications concerning the United Nations Organization.

I would like to inquire, therefore, first of all, whether you see any good reason now, why the complete text of the agreement signed at Yalta and Tehran and Potsdam should not be made available to this Congress and the country, that we may have a complete background upon which to base the correct decision at this important juncture in our history?

Secretary ACHESON. I am not prepared to answer that at this time, Mr. Mundt.

As far as I know, practically all of the items of the Yalta and Potsdam protocols have been made public. There may be some of which I am not informed. I will be glad to look into that matter and let the committee have my judgment about it, if you wish.

Mr. MUNDT. I think that is very important, Mr. Secretary, and I wish you would look into it and then give us your definite answer, No. 1, as to whether you can state categorically that the Congress and the country now have the complete texts of these three agreements, and if not, whether you see any reason why we should not have them at this time. I think it imperative that we now have access to all of the information describing the steps by which we have arrived in our present situation.