This is the principle on which the hemispheric defense plan is proceeding. It calls for industrial development and coordination; for the improvement of statistical research; for intensive modernization of highways and railways; for the linking of communications; for air bases well supplied with replacements; for manpower inventories and plans for the use of masses of workers; for the interrelation of political defense organizations; for intelligence services covering the entire hemisphere.

This is the framework within which costs-total costs for total planning for total war-must be analyzed. To say that the proposed arms-standardization program will only cost 10- or 15- or 20-million dollars a year gives the impression that this is the final cost. On the contrary, this is the cost of only one phase of a much vaster operation. If the other phases of that operation are undertaken and completed the true cost of the arms-standardization program will appear in a different light. We are only being allowed to peek under one corner of the curtain, not to see the whole stage. Indeed, the provisions for publicity on the proposal are most inadequate. Certainly in Latin America. with the increasing restrictions on the free press and other forms of controlling public thinking, it is extremely unlikely that the Latin-American end of arms deals will be offered for public inspection and criticism. In short, to assess properly the real cost of hemispheric defense, this committee and the people of the Americas should be given the entire picture by those who have been painting in the details during the past 5 years.

Many Latin Americans will look on the proposal, under H. R. 3836, with anxiety and misgivings. It will be opposed by native industrialists, to whom it will spell subservience to industrial interests of the United States. It will be opposed by large masses of the professional and white-collar class. The workers and peasants, who make up 90 percent of the population of those countries, will certainly not welcome it. Many intellectual leaders will also oppose it. In this group, perhaps the weightiest opinion is that of Sr. Eduardo Santos, expresident of Colombia. Señor Santos was the prime mover behind the hemispheric security pact signed in 1945 at Chapultepec. It was his project, agreed to by President Roosevelt and entrusted to Dr. Alberto Lleras, that materialized in the security pact.

Señor Santos, speaking with the authority that his public career and his sponsorship of the security pact give him, is opposed to the arms program under consideration by this committee.

He states that the Latin-American armies are a threat, not to an invader, but to the citizens themselves. He calls attention to the little tyrants that have built their power on their control of the army. He recalls that Colombia was offered naval units in 1937 and that he declined the offer with the statement that "cruisers and battleships will ruin us." Señor Santos expressed grave concern over the relation of the Inter-American Defense Board and the Ministries of War of those countries. He calls for a public crusade "against those who believe that peace can be achived with guns and bombers."

In support of this fortright position, many citizens of Costa Rica have publicly condemened the purchase of arms from the United States and have criticized the creation of a military academy in that country. The attitude of the Costa Ricans is especially significant. The committee no doubt is aware that for decades that little Republic has been held up as an example to the world because it has always had more school teachers than soldiers. I think we may expect widespread support for this viewpoint in Latin America.

The concluding point I want to deal with is this: This arms program, whose relation to a total mobilization of the Western Hemisphere has not been clearly set forth or explained, distracts public attention from the true basis of security and genuine good neighborliness among the peoples of the Americas. That basis is set forth in the Act of Chapultepec, to which all the Republics of this hemisphere are pledged. In various resolutions, the act calls for the improvement of living conditions, better housing for the workers, higher incomes, wider opportunities for education, just and humane labor conditions, public aid for health and nutrition programs, and respect for the right of workers to organize. The raising of living standards is a commitment solemnly made in the Act of Chapultepec and solemnly repeated by the highest officials of all the American governments, including our own. I would not think that these pledges to millions of loyal and war-weary people in Latin America were excluded from Secretary Patterson's statement that the commitments made in Mexico City in 1945 "were real and must be carried out." But the fact is that we have failed to keep those pledges. In this connection our prize exhibit is the Inter-American Economic

and Social Council, created to make good on the social ideals and promises of Chapultepec.

It has

What has the Inter-American Economic and Social Council done? vegetated in its own obscurity, derelict in its responsibility, a waste of public funds, a tragedy for the people of the Americas who expected so much from Chapultepec. And, on the level of private pan-Americanism, we find, barely 2 years after Chapultepec, that those solemn commitments-that called for responsible government, public action-have been converted into personal, private transactions.

While we have been working toward these end products of the bipartisan policy, what has happended to those whose hopes we raised so high? In the state of Sinaloa, Mexico, college professors are receiving $20 (United States) a month. Elementary school teachers in that Republic are paid 50 cents a day (United States currency). In El Salvador a coffee picker takes home 75 cents a day. In Paraguay loggers earn 30 cents a day. In Venezuela there are farm laborers who earn as little as 60 cents a day. In Bolivia, thousands of miners, whose wage claims are now being "negotiated" by soldiers armed with American lend-lease equipment, work for 56, 60, and 75 cents a day.

These sample facts, typical of the situation in half the continent where half the people are living on subhuman levels, indicate the fatal weakness of America's position in the world. These facts, and many more like them that are on record, tell us why the crisis is running at fever heat. These facts reveal why an arms program is not the same thing as a security program. Rather, these are the facts of our deep underlying insecurity from which proposals to arm the Americas even beyond present levels distract our attention.

If there were time, the implications of our present position in the hemisphere could be pressed to a deeper and wider analysis. This committee can render a great, perhaps an historic, service by carrying its present inquiry into what Admiral Nimitz has called the infinitely more complex desire to form a structure of peace.

We can take certain constructive steps in this direction. I respectfully suggest the following for your consideration:

First, that this committee look more intensively into some of the problems raised in my foregoing remarks, particularly on the protection of fundamental democratic freedoms and traditional constitutional rights in the Americas;

Second, that the long-postponed Inter-American Economic and Social Conference be held in the near future, with participation by all those groups who are interested in genuine security and who are able to make a contribution to such a conference;

Third, that such a conference be charged with the formulation of a practical and democratic program in keeping with the spirit and objectives laid down in the Act of Chapultepec; and

Fourth, that such a program be worked out in the spirit of the United Nations Charter with a view to expanding through the United Nations a genuine, worldwide, democratic good-neighbor policy.

Mr. GALARZA. I shall just make a statement giving you additional points of information which I hope will throw light on this bill and which bear upon the main points which I have made.

Now, just to summarize the points which I make in this statement. They are six in number:

One, the effect of this bill on the Inter-American system, and its principles, which have been raised before this committee; whether the standardization sale of arms by our country would upset the present balance of power in Latin America; and in general terms, the status quo, both as between nations and within each nation.

The second point I make in this statement takes up the question "How will the sale of American arms effect internal political conditions, including such important questions as civil liberties."

The third point, the cost of this program. You will find some detailed statements with respects to this matter.

Four, the fact, or the point, rather, that the plan to standardize armaments in the hemisphere, is not an isolated proposal. It is a

an over-all trend, and we cannot appreciate the repercussions, ent and the effect of an arms standardization program until w the whole picture.

uld say, speaking in very broad generalizations, that the proto standardize the arms of the hemisphere and to sell arms to tin-American republics, is probably not more than 10 percent whole picture.

fifth point I make, Mr. Chairman, is that there will be wideopposition in Latin America to this proposal.

sixth point is this: That the real framework of Inter-American on is not an armaments program, but a completion, if you will, lization of the social and economic and moral objectives laid the act of Chapultepec in 1945.

are the six points I make, and in the next few minutes, with rmission, Mr. Chairman, I simply want to add additional 1 to what you will find there.

maintenance of the status quo in Latin America by the sale of aments involves two additional points. One point is that at sent time there is a certain proportion in the expenditure of in Latin America, as between the Army, the Navy, and the

'ces.

those proportions I have worked out here, Mr. Chairman: mple, in 1946, the Republic of Colombia spent 68 percent of nal defense budget on the army. The Republic spent 16 perthe navy, and it spent 16 percent on the air forces.

ng from the figures which have been laid before this comt would seem that we propose to reverse those ratios. I hat we will undertake a program which will mean the sale ments in the ratio of about 60 percent for naval craft, about t, or perhaps less than that for the army. I want to emphafact, that the maintenance of the status quo in the distribuhe various types of arms in Latin America, is not at present that is left entirely to the choice of the Latin-American ents; it is a matter of what kind of arms we sell them, and I nced that in the course of years this ratio will be upset. want to make a point in this connection, Mr. Chairman, that he pressures upon the Latin-American governments to buy be not so much their needs to buy, as our needs to sell. er words, I want to recall the testimony that General Vangave before your committee, to the effect that it would be rable from the standpoint of the aviation companies in the tates, to have these contracts with the Latin Americas becould thereby stabilize their production programs.

ot a businessman and have never been in the aviation inI simply want to underscore this point. As the pressure in our aviation industry, this will become an important d there is a danger that we may force certain sales, especially · branch, upon Latin America, which they are not really

to pass on now to the question, a very important one, which laid before this committee, namely: Will the power that hese countries be used against us, eventually, or is there a at this may happen?

Dr. Eaton, I am not speaking now in theory, I am speaking history: There are at least two matters of record which indicate that there is a danger that this power may be used against our country by irresponsible dictators. I want to give you those two instances, if you will permit me:

One, about a year ago there was a revolution in Bolivia. A gov ernment came to power which is antidemocratic. We supported that government. We gave it moral and diplomatic support.

Perhaps the people making that decision did it in good faith, but the interesting thing, Dr. Eaton, is this: That just a year after we had given these people this moral and diplomatic power, they used that power against us by forcing our country to pay 10 cents a pound more for tin than we were paying last year.

It was done through a maneuver with General Peron, by which he raised the ante on us and we were forced to pay 75 cents a pound instead of 65 cents a pound. Today the American housewife is paying more for her canned groceries, and we are paying more for our tin supply, because we handed that power to the present Bolivian Government.

General Peron has made a statement to the effect that he will fight two things: That he will fight communism, and that he will combat capitalist imperialism.

I commend to this committee the very deep study of these two points, because with relation to the second, General Peron is doing a very clever thing: He is pitting the United States against the Communist organizations in his country and in Latin America, and he is identifying, already, the United States as the one major country that he is going to combat because obviously the only country in Latin America known as a capitalist imperialist country, and so identified by the Communists, is the United States.

General Peron, the dictator of Argentina, is giving us advance notice that when and if the time comes, he is going to be fighting not only the Communists in Latin America but he is going to be fighting the United States. He does it very clearly. He calls it capitalist imperialism.

I want to also call your attention to another point in relation to my statement. In the bill, Dr. Eaton, there is a reference to the sale of surplus property in Latin America.

I am glad that that is mentioned, because it seems to me that the sale of arms, since it is a part of a general plan, cannot be disassociated from our whole policy toward Latin American countries in the sale of all kinds of merchandise, and it is most important to bear this relationship in mind.

I want to give you an example: We have been selling surplus properties to Latin America which have both an economic-that is, a peacetime use as well as a potential military use.

One instance, and I want to put it on the record, is the sale of field telephone equipment called walky-talky, with which you are no doubt familiar.

We have sold to Mexico units of this walky-talky system. We have sold them at very low figures. I have it on very reasonable authority, Dr. Eaton, that these same units have been sold in Mexico at profits of 500 and 600 percent, to the Mexican buyer.

Now, in the event of an international crisis in which this hemisphere may find itself involved, do we face the prospect of having this field communications equipment located all over Latin America? Do we know who is going to have this communications equipment? Are we in favor of turning over to speculators and black-marketers, equipment which cost the American taxpayer a good deal of money and which was originally designed for the service of our troops at the front? Are we going to turn this over at less than cost so that black marketers and speculators in Latin America can reap a rich harvest? I only have three more points to make, Dr. Eaton, which are auxiliary to my statement.

I emphasize the point in this general statement that there is a very close relation between the proposal to arm or to improve the arms of the armed forces of Latin America, and the question of internal order and stability.

The function of the armies of Latin America is very often that of acting as an internal police. If at any time you are interested, Dr. Eaton, I can lay before you a summary of the constitutional and legislative rights and duties of the armies of Latin America, which indicate that they are very often used as the domestic police force.

Now, that being the case, to put arms of much greater fire power in the hands of the men who are going to play a double roll, namely, the roll of an external defense force, as well as an internal police force, I think necessarily you are compelled to inquire into the role of the Latin-American armies as an internal police force.

On this point, Mr. Chairman, we come to a very grave consideration, and it is this: (Again I am not speaking theory.) The record of the last 5 years shows that the civil liberties and the constitutional rights of many Latin-American peoples have been suppressed and subverted by the use of American lend-lease arms that we have given to those countries.

Now, Dr. Eaton, the moral conclusion from that to me is a very painful one: I have been in Latin America and I have talked to workers who have been in parades and in mass demonstrations that have been broken up by troops using American lend-lease arms. They have said to me, "It can't be true, can it, that the American people are sending arms down to our armies to break up our demonstrations, and our organizations?"

This is not an isolated instance, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a matter of record and it has been accumulating over the last 5 years.

I very strongly urge you to consider whether this bill does not really and more immediately place in the hands of the national armies, the power by which the suppression of civil liberties and the destruction of constitutional rights, which the Act of Chapultepec is committed to defend, whether that is not the most immediate result of the passage of this legislation.

By the way, Dr. Eaton, and members of the committee, I want to call your attention to a very significant fact:

Some time ago, the Argentine representative on the inter-American defense board was a man by the name of General Arturo Bertollo. He is a military man. He represented his government on the inter