Latin-American countries in my classes in English or United States history, I have heard praise for our democratic system and appreciation of what it has meant to the world. The good opinion in which we are held in this hemisphere has increased greatly under the good-neighbor policy. My heart thrilled as I read in Latin-American newspapers and magazines of the surge of appreciation of the apology made by President Truman when he laid a wreath at the monument to the Mexicans killed by United States soldiers at Vera Cruz. Through this Inter-American Military Cooperation Act are we going to open the way for misunderstandings or undemocratic circumstances for which some future President of our country will have to apologize? Chairman EATON. Are there any questions? Mr. FULTON. You said in your statement the bill would make still more difficult the overthrow of unpopular governments. Do you mean by force? Miss CROOKS. Yes. By force or popular opinion. Mr. FULTON. You oppose the bill we are speaking of, then? Miss CROOKS. Yes. Mr. FULTON. That is one of the reasons you oppose it? Miss CROOKS. Yes. Mr. FULTON. May I say to the chairman this is one of the most charming and disarming revolutionists that it has been my privilege to know. Miss CROOKS. You see I have been in these countries and I have seen the great power of some of these governments against the people. Mr. FULTON. But you want to overthrow them by force, do you not? Miss CROOKS. No. What I say is that if we give to these countries better armaments, it will make still more difficult for the people of that country to overthrow their government, because their government will have better arms. Mr. FULTON. You have been there and you want them to be overthrown by force, do you not? Miss CROOKS. I do not interfere in any way with their government. I do not think that is our part to interfere in any way with the government of another country; that is not my point; but I would not want a wrong government here in the United States to be made more popular or have it more impossible for the people of our country to overthrow, because there is military power. You see there is a difference. Here in the United States, we have a democratic country, and the military is one part of our life. In many of the Latin-American countries, the military is the main force. Mr. JACKSON. Miss Crooks, just one brief question: Dealing with the world police force, I dare say there is not a man around this table or a man in the Congress but who would support such an organization, but we are in a world of practicalities and a world of realism in which every step of the way is being contested. You saw last week what happened to the suggestion for a world police force. It was laughed off the board by the Russian emissaries. Sometimes practicality takes the form of guns and ammunition. In the face of that situation, and in the face of the fact that we acknowledge the possibility of achieving that, what we need is something more than a spiritual suggestion that that is advisable. What we need is someone to come before this committee and tell us how this Nation can achieve the goals we all hold in common. Miss CROOKS. The United States, as I understand it, already has a great deal of power in the United Nations, because we have a great many in the Secretariat, and I think it is 37 percent of the expenses of the United Nations that we are meeting. A great country like the United States can do even more toward building up the power of the United Nations, and I think that is our main duty at present. Mr. JACKSON. I think that is what we are doing today; but every international organization which comes before this committee having to do with the United Nations we have endorsed and done everything to strengthen it, but we must not lose sight of the very material factors with which we have to contend. Miss CROOKS. Yes. I think there is a great deal the United States has always done in a material way, and it should continue to do in a material way. I congratulate our Government on what it is doing. I think it has very serious problems before it. Chairman EATON. Thank you, Miss Crooks. Chairman EATON. We have 15 minutes, or nearly so, before Congress meets, and the next witness is Mr. Frederick Libby, executive secretary of the National Council for Prevention of War. STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. LIBBY, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PREVENTION OF WAR, WASHINGTON, D. C. Mr. LIBBY. Before I start, Mr. Chairman, may I ask permission to put into the record, a letter on arming the Americas from Col. R. B. Creager, to Senator Robert A. Taft, as a part of my testimony? Chairman EATON. It will be included in the record. (The letter referred to is as follows:) Hon. ROBERT A. TAFT, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. JUNE 7, 1947. MY DEAR SENATOR: I write on the subject of President Truman's proposal that Congress vest him with authority to transfer to the 21 Latin American Republics to the South American naval vessels, aircraft, and other military equipment for the training of military and naval personnel of these nations and for the repair and maintenance of their armaments. I hope you will pardon a personal reference. I was raised from infancy on the Texas-Mexican frontier when Brownsville was 160 miles from the nearest railroad station. I learned Spanish as I learned English and today speak it to all intents and purposes as well as I do English. For several years I had a branch law office in Mexico City. I have personally known every President of Mexico since Porfirio Diaz. My knowledge of Mexico and Latin America was supposed to be such that both Presidents Harding and Coolidge tendered me an appointment as Ambassador to Mexico. I mention these facts simply and alone that it be not thought I speak in entire ignorance of my subject. The President asks for authority to require such payment as, in his uncontrolled discretion, he may deem satisfactory, and there is no limit proposed upon the expense involved. There is no time limit. His proposal ob viously contemplates the establishment of a permanent policy. The proposal is a serious one and assuredly should not be adopted without thoughtful consideration and careful evaluation of the possible advantages and the certain dangers and disadvantages involved. I mean advantages or disadvantages and dangers to the United States. The only conceivable advantages would lie in the possibility of having in any future war loyal, well-armed, well-equipped, well-trained allies in the LatinAmerican Republics to the south. When we come to the disadvantages and dangers, we must, first of all, be realistic and recognize the fact that the use of the word "Republics" as applied to the countries of Central and South America is, with a few if any exceptions, a misnomer. Peron is not the only dictator, though Braden and our State Department have apparently been blandly assuming the contrary. Take the The truth is, and every informed person knows, that in the large majority of the countries south of Mexico democracy, as we know it, is a name only. In the majority of them the Presidents are upheld by armed force. armies away, and they would disappear and be substituted overnight. Coups d'etat, or, to use their expression, Cuartelazos, are still the order of the day. Witness Guatemala 2 years ago, two revolutions. Witness a half dozen more tomorrow or next day or next year, but coming up. Mexico is a striking exception to political conditions obtaining in most of the Latin-American Nations. Long strides have been there taken toward democratic methods and free elections. Mexico's constitution of 1916 forbids a President from succeeding himself. In other words, limits him to one term, and this prohibition is being observed and obeyed. The United States would do well to adopt this leaf from Mexico's book. Latin-American revolutions have, in the past and in the main, been fairly tame affairs, but arm and equip them, and their revolutions will cease to be opéra bouffe. Arm, equip, and train armies in these countries, and we are promoting bigger and better wars in Latin America. We are strengthening the power of existing dictators. We are creating or strengthening already existing international rivalries and jealousies. Some get warships; some do not. Some get more arms and equipment than others. Some get none. Mr. Truman says that operations under the proposed measure would be guided by a determination to guard against placing weapons in the hands of groups who might use them against the peace. Easy to say; how infinitely difficult-how impossible-to carry out. Revolutions will not cease. We arm this year the faction which in our judgment and our infinite wisdom should receive a visit from the Yankee Santa Claus; next year a palace revolt occurs and a faction which our infallible judgment disapproves takes over the government, the army, and our arms, ammunition, and equipment. What then? Under the proposed plan we would assume the prerogative of judging as among 21 countries now reasonably friendly toward us. We would assume the right to classify them as worthy or unworthy. We would say to Brazil: You have a sea coast, you have been friendly, we approve of you. We will furnish you a navy and an air force and with arms and ammunition and equipment. What about Argentina, Brazil's rival for South American leadership? Officials say that the plan does not contemplate giving any country greater relative strength than it had before. What would our present State Department officials say about our maintaining the relative military strength of Brazil and Argentina while greatly increasing that of both? Latin Americans are a prideful people. They will never submit to being patronized. They will never permit the "Colossus of the North" to classify their countries as worthy or unworthy of Yankee bounty and decide the degree in which each is entitled to participate in gringo largess. And here the situation in Europe today is pertinent. Associated Press dispatches of June 6 speak of the rising resentment of Europeans against any evidence of American dictation in their affairs. At the State Department in Washington it was said that-and I quote: "One of the main factors being kept in mind is the resentment which develops in European countries whenever it appears that the United States is trying to tell them what to do." And this refers to countries, most of whom owe their very existence as nations to the United States and whose people today are being fed and clothed by us. Latin-American countries owe us no favors and ask nothing except that we respect their sovereignty and not meddle in their internal affairs. The complications involved are infinite and are highly dangerous. Senator Pepper suggests that if the United States moves to arm Latin America, Russia might take, and in reason would be justified in taking, similar steps among the nations friendly to her, thus dividing the world into armed camps. I understand Mr. Wallace is in accord with this view. While I dislike to agree with any national policy advocated by either of these gentlemen, I must admit their reasoning in this particular appeals to me. The President has apparently given no slightest consideration to the cost of his scheme to American taxpayers. His plan contemplates not only the initial cost of arming, equipping, and training of the armies of 21 nations and the furnishing and equipping of navies but also the "repair and maintenance of their armaments." Thus we are asked to assume this as a perpetual burden, or, at least, for an indefinite period. If carried out with anything like adequacy, the plan would be enoromously expensive and, after spending billions, what would we have? The billions would be a total loss. The idea of repayment is ridiculous. When the President wrote of collecting such payments as he, the President, deems satisfactory, he had his tongue in his cheek. The purpose behind the President's plan is doubtless to strengthen the hands of supposedly friendly administrations, and thus prevent the infiltration of communistic elements and the possible taking over by them. No poorer method to attain the desired end could be devised. Stripped of high-flown and altruistic verbiage, the plan means direct intervention in the internal affairs of each and every one of the Latin American countries. It means a return to the thoroughly discredited intervention methods obtaining in the years gone by, whose futility and worse were amply demonstrated by experience. We would be turning our backs on the good-neighbor policy which has resulted in some progress and whose foundation stone is nonintervention by one nation in the interal affairs f another and the recognition by each of the absolute sovereignty and independence of all others. For the United States to undertake, by furnishing war materials, to support and strengthen the dictator of X country against threatening communistie elements would have a reverse effect. Natural indignation at our flagrant intervention in their internal affairs would drive multiplied thousands, now quiescent, into the camp of the Communists. Sooner or later our American puppet would be overthrown, either as the result of an Army revolt or at the end of a b'oody revolution, and elements, probably radical and communistic, but certainly bitterly antagonistic to the United States, would take over. What then? Send the Marines? The usual, the practically universal, method, of ousting a president or dietator (synonymous in most of Latin America) is by army revolt. This was graphically illustrated in Argentine a few years ago by the "revolt of the Colonels," as a result of which Peron ascended to power. Under the proposed plan, if adopted, we would have constant troubles and international problem and difficulties with our proteges, difficulties and wars between and among these countries themselves which we would inescapab'y have to settle. Latin American countries never have been, are not now, and, within the foreseeable future. will never be, one large and happly family. Should we become involved in another war, we will either survive through our own effert or perish. Latin America, even if loyal and united, could never save us. With high personal regards, Sincerely, Col. R. B. CREAGER. Mr. LIBBY. I also have two clippings, one an editorial from the Washington Post, May 27. on the subject of this hearing, and the other, a clipping from the Washington Daily News of May 29, I believe it is, on Argentina's purchase of jet planes from Great Britain. May those be included in the record? Chairman EATON. It is agreed. (The information referred to is as follows:) ARMS TRAFFIC We are frankly disquieted by the President's plan to start an arms business with our surplus equipment in Latin America. There are, to be sure, many plausible arguments in favor of it. Other nations are selling arms in Latin America; standardization with our arms would be a boon to any system of hemispherical defense; there are vague guaranties in the proposed bill, such as the one providing that our war material shall not be distributed indiscriminately. But, when all is said about it, we are bound to court many pitfalls in going into this business, sure to create many problems in solving the problem of unifying the hemisphere's defense system. Certainly it will be within our power to shift the balance of power among the republics below the Rio Grande, say, as between Brazil and Argentina.. In our caution we may think we can refrain from so doing by being impartial. By our very impartiality, however, we would be partial, since Argentina already has a head start over its neighbors. It may, indeed, be desirable to be partial, as our interests in continental peace and justice dictate. But the way we administered such a policy would require the wisdom of Solomon. One of the worst features of the arrangement is that it would put a premium on civil war. This is shown by what happened to arms lend-lease to Latin-American nations. Villaroel stayed in power in Bolivia longer than he should because of his lend-lease arsenal; Somoza has vaulted back to power in Nicaragua because of his access to American arms. But the prime problem for the hemisphere defenders is presented by the position of Argentina. Further deportations of Nazis seem to herald a foregive-andforget policy on the part of the Truman administration. The way would then be open to hold the postponed conference on inter-American defense. This would presumably be followed by an arms traffic from America's shores with which President Peron could sharpen the razor he is fashioning for gaining hegemony of the continent below the bu'ge. Doing arms business with Peron is still far off. But the new bill certainly looks in that direction and requires careful scrutiny by Congress and a sounding out of the intentions of the administration. ARGENTINA PURCHASE OF BRITISH JET PLANES REPORTED LONDON, May 23.-Reports circulated in usually reliable quarters today that Argentina had purchased six jet-propelled fighter planes from Britain. Both Argentina and British official sources, however, refused to confirm or deny the story. Reliable informants said President Peron's government had purchased six Gloster Meteor planes of the type which holds the world speed record of 616 miles an hour. The News Chronicle said the contract was signed some time ago, and that "there may be other planes and other arms to follow." "Trade," he said, "now has priority over ideological considerations." Mr. LIBBY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am here today to oppose passage of the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, H. R. 3836, and to suggest an alternative policy that we might profitably follow in our relation with the countries south of us. I attended the hearings at which Secretary Marshall, Secretary of War Patterson, General Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz, and Secretary Forrestal testified, and I recognized the possible value to our armed forces of having a unified system of defense covering the whole of North and South America in case of another war. Their most persuasive argument was one, which I think that they all repeated in one form or another: "If we don't supply this training and equipment, other nations will." In a period in which communism is actively seeking a foothold in both North and South America and when it is recognized that Soviet |