strument by which practical application can be given to a long-established principle of the Inter-American system. The concept of collective action to safeguard the political and territorial integrity of the Western Hemisphere is by no means new.

In 1936, at the Inter-American Conference of Buenos Aires, the American Republics subscribed to the principle of "American solidarity in all noncontinental conflicts."

Again, at the Habana Conference in 1940, the American Republics declared that

Any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty, or the political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against all the states which signed this declaration,

and, they further stated

All the signatory states, or two or more of them, according to circumstances, shall proceed to negotiate the necessary complementary agreements so as to organize cooperation for defense.

Accordingly, the roots of Inter-American military cooperation were firmly planted well in advance of United States entry into the Second World War. Our involvement in that war naturally gave added impetus, and much of lasting value, to hemispheric security was accomplished during the war.

In March of 1942, the Inter-American Defense Board, a commission composed of military and naval technicians from each of the American Republics, was formed for the purpose of studying and recommending the measures necessary for the defense of the continent.

So successful was this body, originally established only as an emergency expedient, that the Inter-American Conference at Mexico City in 1945 declared that a permanent hemispheric military agency is indispensable, and recommended that one should be created.

This same conference produced the Act of Chapultepec, which has been signed by all of the Republics and which established a system of cooperation, later to be made permanent, to meet acts or threats of aggression by any nation, within or without the Western Hemisphere, subject to the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

In practice, however, there cannot be prompt unified military action in resistance to an aggressor unless the participating countries possess military establishments capable of integration into the joint effort.

Considering the number of American Republics and the relatively small armed forces they maintain, nothing short of standardization of arms, equipment, organization, and training will permit the formation of any effective joint force.

The United States, as a result of World War II, alone possesses in adequate measure the means necessary for a program of standardization. Since the United States entered without reservation into the Compact of Chapultepec, it has the unavoidable moral obligation to assume hemispheric leadership in this program.

Since the end of hostilities, many of the Latin-American countries, realizing and willingly accepting their future responsibilities for the defense of the hemisphere, have recognized that only by joint action can they prepare themselves adequately.

Some of them have requested military assistance from the United States, but the President, for lack of enabling legislation, has not been able to authorize the State, War, and Navy Departments to extend in full the assistance desired. Consequently, the purpose of the measure presently proposed is to permit the United States to accomplish what is needful and mutually desirable in the way of military cooperation with, and assistance to, the other countries of the Americas.

I would like to stress the fact here that all the act in question does is authorize the Government to do something. It does not direct or compel any action, but is needed to remove an existing impediment against governmental action by the United States.

The consequence of failure to recognize our national obligation in this respect must be faced squarely in considerating the proposed act. The other American countries are all sovereign states, and they are accustomed to maintaining the armed forces they consider necessary to preserve themselves as such. They look to the United States as indeed we should prefer that they do-to assist them in developing military organizations which, however modest in size, will be nonetheless sufficient to their requirements.

But, if we do not do so, it is inevitable that they will, as they have in the past, seek other sources of supply and instruction. The reintroduction of outside military influences into the vacuum left by cessation of United States military assistance to the Latin-American countries is a detriment which we can forestall by the timely and adequate action which the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act will authorize.

In addition to the military advantages which will be derived by all the participating states from hemispheric military collaboration, there will be a number of important nonmilitary benefits which should prove profitable to the other American countries.

These are only byproducts, which I shall mention briefly. The military training imparted by the United States military missions to the Latin-American countries encompasses considerably more than purely tactical exercises. The increasing application of technology to warfare has introduced a wide variety of arts and skills into the list of military occupational specialities, many of which are equally useful in civil life.

The modernization of Latin-American armed forces will require the education of appreciable numbers of technicians, including specialists in all branches of signal communications and electronics, aircraft and motor vehicle repair and maintenance personnel, surveyors, pharmacists, draftsmen, mechanical-equipment operators, riggers, metal workers, and literally hundreds more. The individuals who acquire these skills in their military and naval services will return to civil life as more productively useful citizens.

I believe that the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act will provide sound and practical means of translating into actuality our planned system of collective action to safeguard the peace and security of the continent. Indeed, I feel that without the assistance which it authorizes the inter-American regional arrangement can never function with full effectiveness. I most earnestly recommend to you favorable consideration of this measure.

I would point out concisely that unless we have such an act, we do an about face on a policy we have been in favor of for at least a decade. This is no more than an implementing measure for a series of agreements in which the United States has participated with the other American Republics, culminating in the Act of Chapultepec.

In the second place, the equipment will be obtained by these nations as is their right, somewhere. We learned from World War II that the introduction of foreign equipment, foreign training methods, are a hazard, a definite hazard to the security of the United States, a definite hazard to the security of the Panama Canal. If we do not furnish them, someone else will, and I think that it is wise policy to remove the existing impediments.

You already know what has been done in a general way on this under the War Powers Act. A program has been arrived at and has been partially implemented by transfer of material and equipment.

The stopping of lend-lease in the fall of 1945 suspended a good deal of that program and it now depends entirely on the temporary measures of the War Powers Act.

Chairman EATON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I have just one question: Is it true, as our subcommittee hearings brought out, that this bill, by increasing the production of United States arms and planes for which Latin-American countries pay, will reduce our own costs and add greatly to our home production?

Secretary PATTERSON. I believe it will add to our potential ̄resources; yes, sir. How materially, I cannot say, but to some degree; yes, sir.

Chairman EATON. Thank you.

We will observe the 5-minute rule now.

Mr. Bloom?

Mr. BLOOM. No questions.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Vorys?

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Secretary, I was trying to recollect the exact date of an act we passed through this committee, I think in 1940, but which did not become law until 1941. It was the first law authorizing sale of arms by our Government of any kind, and it is for this same purpose. Do you remember that law?

Secretary PATTERSON. I do not recall it.

General Ridgeway says he thinks it authorized the sale of sea-coast and antiaircraft equipment only.

Mr. VORYS. It was the act of June 15, 1940, entitled "An act to authorize the Secretaries of War and Navy to assist the governments of American republics to increase their military and naval establishments and for other purposes."

That bill went through this committee. It became law in 1940, but it went through this committee in 1939.

In this committee there has been a long and consistent record of support for legislation assisting the governments of the American republics and other American states to protect themselves against foreign enemies.

Secretary PATTERSON. There is one matter I should have mentioned in my statement to the committee:

We have preliminary arrangements with Canada on standardizations, adoptions of the same calibers, and also looking to joint training.

We have no power, except the War Powers Act, which is about to expire, to carry out that program unless this act is passed or some similar act. That is with Canada. We generally think to the south of us, Mr. Chairman, but there is a great country to the north of us, too.

Mr. VORYS. I have no further questions. I am in favor of the speedy enactment of this legislation.

Chairman EATON. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. The discussion that you have given is concerning a definite plan which relates to the introduction of this bill, is that right? Secretary PATTERSON. A great amount of work has been done by the entire American defense board.

Mrs. BOLTON. Has the work that has been done been based solely on the consideration of military security of the hemisphere against outside attacks?

Secretary PATTERSON. As far as I know, yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. That is the limit in it?

Secretary PATTERSON. Yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. Will it have any effect, directly or indirectly, in furthering or impeding the development of truly democratic political systems in the countries involved?

Secretary PATTERSON. My qualifications on that are limited, Mrs. Bolton.

I am representing the War Department and my only study of the measure has been from an armament viewpoint and very greatly the viewpoint of the security of this Nation.

I did, however, lay myself open to a question like that by discussing some byproducts in my prepared statement. I did that with a little diffidence, getting out of my own business.

It is my personal opinion that it will have the effect that your question indicates, but I might be wrong on that.

Mrs. BOLTON. Would that, to your mind, involve us in greater difficulties?

Secretary PATTERSON. No. I believe, as I indicated, that in cooperation between the United States and the other American states this bill would promote valuable byproducts in introducing more technical skills that could be used in civilian capacities by the people of the other nations.

I do not believe that it would be effective in increasing the tension between them.

Mrs. BOLTON. Nor would it increase the tension between us and them? Would it not alleviate that, to a degree?

Secretary PATTERSON. I am quite sure that is so. I believe so.

Mrs. BOLTON. Canada already has expressed her interest in developing such a program?

Secretary PATTERSON. Oh; yes. A good deal of work has been done on that by the United States-Canada Joint Defense Board. Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Jarman.

Mr. JARMAN. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of the dangers to the Panama Canal.

It just occurred to me, when you did, if the Panama Canal has ever been in any greater danger at any time, than it was from that Scade

that German aviation outfit down in South America. While that was supposed to be a civilian undertaking, I have been impressed that that is the greatest danger, possibly, that the Panama Canal has ever been subjected to. Do you think so?

Secretary PATTERSON. The presence of the civil aviation concerns in South America under German auspices and German personnel was a cause of great concern to the United States in 1940 and 1941, until they were eliminated. That is right. That was right on our doorstep.

Mr. JARMAN. While that was supposed to be civil, we know it was not entirely a civilian proposition.

Secretary PATTERSON. German fliers were operating those lines. Mr. JARMAN. If we let Germany and other countries bring in airplanes to the armies of those countries down there, there will be greater danger of a repetition of that, will there not?

Secretary PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

The military missions that we have in the Latin-American countries now depend for their effectiveness very largely upon the use of United States equipment. That is a connection that is sometimes not appreciated. Their usefulness will be nothing, if you get a lot of weapons there that they cannot instruct in. Weapons from nonhemispheric sources, so that the two go closely together, the work of the United States missions in these countries and the provisions of weapons of United States models and designs,

Mr. JARMAN. They go hand in glove?
Secretary PATTERSON. They do; yes, sir.
Mr. JARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman EATON. Mr. Jonkman.

Mr. JONKMAN. You partially answered a question which I directed to Secretary Marshall a few minutes ago when you said this act was largely permissive and did not direct or order the President to do any one thing or to arm any particular republic.

Secretary PATTERSON. It is wholly permissive, I believe.

Mr. JONKMAN. So in that respect it is unilateral at the present time?

Secretary PATTERSON. Yes; but there is no doubt of the keen interest in this program on the part of the other American Republics.

Mr. JONKMAN. That is the thing I wanted to express on this, and the viewpoint brought out by Dr. Judd, as to possible jealousies of the South American countries if we take the initiative, and also as to possibly an armament race.

Of course, we will have to consider two problems in this program: One is our own defense and another is the defense of the country with which we make the deal.

Is it your thought at the present time that we will have to proceed bilaterally, with one country at a time?

Secretary PATTERSON. Each country would submit a program, I take it, and submit it to our Government through the State Department, and any arrangements that were made for the furnishing of instruction or equipment by the United States would be under auspices of the State Department, and they would be the agency that would consummate any arrangements. They would, of course, consult with the War Department and Navy Department, no doubt.