Admiral NIMITZ. Yes, sir; they are included. They are included in the provisions of the act as it is now written.

Mr. SMITH. Was there considerable cooperation between the American states and our own Government in the last war from a naval standpoint?

Admiral NIMITZ. Yes; there was.

I was not in the Atlantic, but I was aware of the assistance that was given by Brazil, particularly, and the furnishing of bases from which our antisubmarine activities were carried on, and they were very valuable.

Mr. SMITH. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman EATON. Mrs. Douglas.

Mrs. DOUGLAS. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman EATON. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. No questions.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Mansfield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I have just one question: Would it be possible for you to put in the record, a list of the naval missions of all countries in Latin America before the war, and a list of our naval missions in Latin America at the present time?

Admiral NIMITZ. We have that list ready now and will be very glad to put it in the record.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Thank you, sir.

(The information is as follows:)

Foreign naval missions were replaced by United States naval missions as follows:

(a) British naval mission: Chile-left at beginning of World War II. (b) British naval mission: Colombia-left about 1935.

(c) Italian naval mission: Ecuador-left 1910.

(d) Italian naval mission: Venezuela-left 1940.

(e) Italian air mission in Peru was replaced by United States Marine Corps air mission in 1940.

NOTE.-Total personnel in all missions is 42 officers and 41 enlisted men.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Judd.

Argentina (naval
advisiors).

Brazil.
Chile.
Colombia.

Ecuador.
Peru.

Venezuela.

Mr. JUDD. Admiral, if we could with any confidence envisage a world of peace, I could see some real objections to this legislation, in that it is our hope that there will increasingly develop in our Latin American countries democratic processes with less of government by force re

quiring revolution by arms, in order to get a change in administration. This legislation could enable those governments in power to entrench themselves more firmly and resist what may be called democratic urges on the part of the people.

Do you anticipate any such results?

Admiral NIMIZ. I do not share your concern, Mr. Judd.

I think that even under the ideal situation that you seek and that we all seek, that there will be an obligation on every country to maintain a force of sufficient strength to guarantee its own security.

In that way, we would avoid having to come to the rescue of a weak nation that has neglected its security. Lack of attention to that detail is one of the things that invites aggression.

Mr. JUDD. Of course, they need strength to resist external aggression, but too much military strength might prevent peaceful changes in administration from the inside.

On the other hand, my whole question was based on an assumption which I know does not exist. We cannot, today, with confidence, assume a world of peace in which there is not the slightest likelihood of any attack upon the Western Hemisphere.

That brings me to the second part of the question: I notice in your statement you say that you have to wait until the Executive order is issued with necessary details as to whether the vessels and equipment will be sold or presented as a gift.

Now is this what you have in mind, that those nations that are financially able to pay for this equipment will pay for it and other nations which are not financially able to pay for it will receive the equipment as gifts?

Admiral NIMITZ. I think that is a matter that is under the control of the Congress as to how much they want to exact for the equipment that is to be transferred. I would expect that nations that are financially able to make substantial payment would make such payment, but I would not set the price at such a high point that we would defeat our own objective.

We will offset from any gift that we might make, the advantages that we receive in not having to pay out of our own treasury the costs of continued maintenance.

Mr. JUDD. I grant you that may be satisfactory from our point of view, but I am thinking at the moment of the Latin-American point of view. If we give a vessel as a gift to one country, either because it is too poor, or because we think that is necessary to restore the balance of power, or because it is in some way to our advantage, and then on the other hand we charge another country for a vessel, will that not promote disharmony among the nations of South America and resentment against us?

Admiral NIMITZ. I think there is a possibility of that, and I think that will have to be handled with great care by the State Department. Mr. JUDD. You think that ought not to be included in the legislation? Admiral NIMITZ. I think that that is a matter that the President, through the State Department, should be entrusted with.

Mr. JUDD. In other words, this is like most legislation, the principle of it is good, it can do a lot of good if it is well handled, but if it is

badly handled it may be loaded with dynamite, both for the hemisphere and for ourselves.

Would you agree with that?

Admiral NIMITZ. I do not share your fear that it is loaded with dynamite.

It might perhaps not be as advantageous to us as we hope it will be, but I have no fear that it has any great danger to us, because these countries are already armed. They are armed with equipment that is old and according to our equipment, it is nonstandard. The worst that can happen is that we do not get the advantages that we hope for. However, I am sure that bringing numbers of officers and men to this country, and letting them go through our schools and subjecting them to our way of life, will be beneficial.

Mr. JUDD. You believe there are certain dangers but the advantages from the standpoint of harmony within the hemisphere and increasing its total strength against any possible aggression from the outside, are much greater?

Admiral NIMITZ. I think that the dangers are very very small. I think that the advantages are quite large and worth striving for. Mr. JUDD. I have no further questions.

Chairman EATON. The Chair would like to make a statement: We have Secretary Forrestal present. This is the second time he has been here and he is anxious to return to his duties. I was wondering if the questions to the admiral could be limited.

Mr. LODGE. I shall be happy to direct my questions to the Secretary of the Navy, if you prefer, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman EATON. Thank you, Admiral.
We appreciate your being here.

The next witness is Secretary Forrestal.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES FORRESTAL, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Secretary FORRESTAL. The Secretaries of State and War have already discussed the importance of this legislation to hemispheric security and to the fulfillment of our commitments under the Act of Chapultepec. I am here to endorse their remarks.

At the outset of the last war, the United States was confronted with the enormous task of defending the Western Hemisphere. Defense of the hemisphere is the mutual responsibility of all nations of the Americas, but only to the extent of their several abilities.

The weaker nations must look to the stronger for protection. Nearly all the Latin-American nations offered us cooperation to the fullest extent of their capabilities.

However, this cooperation, from the naval point of view, was hampered by the heterogeneous nature of the various navies. Ships and armament had largely been built by European powers and in many cases were obsolete and incapable of sustaining the operations required by modern warfare.

Training of officers and men in many instances had been patterned on foreign standards and procedures which made close cooperation of those forces with the United States forces exceedingly difficult.

Operations involving South American ships were also curtailed by the lack of ammunition and spare parts which, previously supplied by Europe, were no longer available. In consequence, the United States was required to supply equipment to its Allies in this hemisphere at a time when our own supplies were critically short.

These experiences emphasize the need for a long-range program of modernization and standardization which will permit all of the Americas to play their several parts in a unified hemisphere defense.

There is currently under study within the Navy and State Departments the question of what specific measures can be taken by the Navy Department to assist in this program and to permit the United States Navy to do its part in support of our national policy as indicated by the various agreements which have been reached in inter-American conferences.

Any particular program designed to equip our neighbors must, of course, be under constant review in the light of changing circumstances. Before execution, it must be in accord with the wishes of the recipient nations. It must meet security and over-all defense requirements as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It must be approved by the Department of State to insure that it conforms to the foreign policy of the United States with respect to the particular countries involved.

It is the intention of the Navy Department to substitute newer United States naval vessels for the obsolete types of our neighbors. This substitution is proposed on an approximate basis of equality in tonnage and should result in no appreciable increase in the over-all naval tonnage of any particular country.

To accomplish this, the Navy Department has been holding in reserve for transfer certain naval vessels which are in excess of our present defense requirements. Under the proposed legislation these ships can be made available at a reasonable cost to the other American governments.

The result should be an actual saving to the United States, for in the event of a new threat of aggression the other American governments can be expected to assist in a coordinated defense of the Western Hemisphere, and by their assistance will substantially agument our ability to protect the vitally important Panama Canal; and I may say also that in so doing, we will subtract from the totality of the effort that we ourselves are required to put into that protection.

Moreover, the vessels which we would transfer are vessels whose preservation and safeguarding are today costing us money-money which we will be able to save by transferring the vessels to other American governments.

The United States now maintains naval missions in six of the South American countries at the request of those countries. I would like briefly to outline the nature and scope of assistance rendered by our missions in carrying out the spirit of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere.

The missions function in accordance with the terms of executive agreements negotiated by the United States Department of State with

the governments of the countries to which the missions are assigned. In general terms, their mission is to cooperate with the Ministry of Marine or the Ministry of Defense, as the case may be, in order to educate, indoctrinate, guide, and train the foreign naval personnel along the lines of United States Navy standards; to encourage the standardization of material; and to foster friendly relations and I may add that in my opinion the latter accomplishment is of the greatest importance because the relationships between our people in the naval service and the people of the South American countries has been productive of solid foundations of good will and regard between us and those nations.

The following are examples of the more specific tasks being undertaken or already accomplished by our naval missions in the LatinAmerican countries:

The naval academies in Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia have all adopted as nearly as possible, the curriculum of the United States Naval Academy under the guidance of our naval missions, and are using many of the textbooks in use at the United States Naval Academy.

Similarly, the recruit training schools, trade schools, and specialist schools, patterned after those in the United States Navy, have been established by our naval missions at the request of those countries.

Naval vessels of the Latin-American countries to which United States naval missions are assigned are operated and maintained in accordance with United States standards.

Our naval missions, as I have said before, are ambassadors of good will and have done much toward furtherance of friendship and solidarity among the American nations. The effectiveness of these missions will be greatly increased if United States equipment can be made available to the governments concerned.

In addition to the assistance rendered by our naval missions, we provided during the war for the training in the United States of specially selected naval personnel from the other American republics.

For example, 438 Latin-American officers and cadets were given flight instruction at Corpus Christi. The subchaser training center at Miami and Key West provided training for a total of 1,638 officer and enlisted personnel. Other naval activities at which training was provided were the Naval Academy, the Post Graduate School and various sea frontiers for training afloat. A grand total of 2,652 officers and men were trained in the United States between 1941 and 1945.

In conclusion I should like to emphasize that the Navy Department considers this legislation to be extremely important to the future security of the United States and has consistently given it wholehearted support. I urge your serious consideration of this proposed bill and strongly recommend it for your approval.

Chairman EATON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Vorys?

Mr. VORYS. I have only one question: I wonder, Mr. Secretary, if you could tell us whether you know how we control the building of naval vessels here. I asked Admiral Nimitz and he said we can prevent the building of naval vessels here unless it is desired by us.

I do not know whether it is by treaty or by law. I should know, but I do not.