Secretary MARSHALL. Probably some portions, yes; but we have so many uses with which it has to do that I do not think we should publish it.

Mr. FULTON. Do you intend that this committee know

Secretary MARSHALL (interposing). And I must also say this, that in international affairs of this kind you cannot put everything on the table that is a matter of negotiation; that is almost impossible.

Mr. FULTON. Do you intend a report on China be made to the American Congress without it having access to the facts in the Wedemeyer report?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think so.

Mr. FULTON. Do you think you ought to ask the Congress to act without having the full facts?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think so, from the viewpoint of the tremendous interest being established in the matter, because of the many, many factors and facts that we have been furnished, that have been given in extreme confidence and that cannot be published because they were obtained, in large measure, in confidence. But that is not our work in this particular case.

Mr. FULTON. But as one member of the American public, in order to satisfy my own mind, I therefore take it that is because you regard it as not to the best interest of the Chinese Government that it be made public at this time rather than the fact that you disagree with that portion that General Wedemeyer has written?

Secretary MARSHALL. I will put it this way: I am quite certain that to make public all the facts of that report would be to the definite disadvantage of the Chinese Government and also to the American Government; and also I would not agree with everything that General Wedemeyer stated.

Mr. FULTON. That is all.

Chairman EATON. Mr. Javits.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, I would like to identify myself to you as having been a member of the subcommittee of which Mr. Fulton was the chairman.

Now a good many travelers went to Europe this summer and some of them have come back with this statement: That the need of interim aid in Europe was not so acute, in view of the fact they saw no one starving on the streets in Europe. Now, do you believe, Mr. Secretary, that is a fair criterion, and if not why not, in determining whether or not we should give interim aid?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would say that our approach to that matter has been in part based on the food content that the average person in Europe is obtaining, and what is the basis of their heating, we will say, in their dwellings, and that sort of thing, because that has a direct relationship to food requirements as well as assisting us in determining what is needed.

All of the evidence points to the fact that these people that we are concerned with have been living on a much lower basis of calories. to put it in a more technical way, than had been formerly the case and that there exists now an acute disparity, if you can express it that way, which results first in inertia and in continued low morale, which I think is now significant.

Let us take specifically the case of the French: The bread ration I think was formerly 300 grams, and I believe during most of the German

occupation it was almost 300 grams. Now, they reduced that to 250 grams, and then when the summer season came along, thinking that the vegetables and other products indigenous to their own farms would help out, they went down to 200 grams. That is a very low content even for people who are accustomed to that, and quite inadequate when it comes to winter use, which should be a minimum of at least 250. As for other portions of the population, I believe in Italy they went down to 1,500 calories.

They tell me that they cannot continue indefinitely on such a base as that without suffering debilitation, run-down health, and probably sickness, and in many cases probably death.

Now, whether a person is literally and actually starving on the streets, we will say, or whether he is in the process of physical, gradual debilitation are rather two things, and I think all of the evidence points to the fact that in Germany, and particularly in France and Italy, as I have just recounted, and also in Austria, they are suffering from lack of sufficient food, and it becomes more serious with every day there is a prolongation of that lack.

Mr. JAVITS. I might say to you, Mr. Secretary, that my colleague and I found many people in Europe who were obviously so affected. Now may I ask you, Mr. Secretary, whether you believe that the people in Europe will wait until actual starvation sets in before becoming impressed with some extreme philosophy, whether it is communism or fascism?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it is recognized by everyone that when a husband finds his family in a condition such as you have developed he will turn to anything that gives promise, however fantastic it might be, for their benefit, and that goes parallel with any depression.

Mr. JAVITS. I notice, Mr. Secretary, in presenting the proposal that you have submitted to the committee for the contemplated use of funds under the program, purchases would be made anywhere in the world, and this differs very materially from the previous relief bill of $350,000,000, which said that 94 percent of the money should be spent with the United States.

Do you, Mr. Secretary, believe that the provision containing the present proposal to the committee would have any material effect on restraining inflationary forces operating on the food supply in the United States?

Secretary MARSHALL. Very definitely we think that; because wherever there are shortages in this country and we can procure wheat, for example, in other countries, that lessens the probability of continually rising prices which, of course, means inflation.

Mr. JAVITS. And would you attribute at least certain of the inflation in food prices that we have had to the restrictions contained in the $350,000,000 relief bill to the effect that 94 percent of the money must be spent in the United States?

Secretary MARSHALL. I would not wish to make a definite statement regarding that. I think I can understand its purposes, but I think in the long run, from what I have learned from the Department of Agriculture and the Secretary of Agriculture himself, that our situation would be improved, always when supplies are in short supply, if there was some way of turning from this country to procure them el where to meet a definite need we felt we were committed to.

I have here a statement carefully prepared in relation to this matter which, with your permission, I will read into the record:

It will be clearly contrary to our own interest to limit procurement in this way to certain of the commodities required in the interim aid program that are in short supply. If we were forced by the restrictions in the legislation to concentrate the buying of such commodities in the United States, it would merely aggravate the shortage and stimulate price inflation.

It should also be kept in mind that the purchases of needed goods at fair prices in other countries, which are in short supply in the United States, would tend to ease the stringent dollar shortage problem in those countries, which is acting as a serious drag on trade in the world.

Mr. JAVITS. May I say, Mr. Secretary, that I, too, do not question the intention. The intention was undoubtedly good and patriotic, but it just has not worked out that way.

I would like to ask two other questions. First, does the United States Government contemplate endeavoring to restore confidence by Europeans in their own governments and in their own currencies by assuring the European governments we desire to help that we will stay in Europe with our forces, our prestige, our forces of men, military forces, until our international responsibilities are discharged? Secretary MARSHALL. Would you mind repeating the first part of that question?

Mr. JAVITS. I asked if it is the intention of the United States Government to undertake to restore confidence by the western Europeans in their governments and currencies by giving them assurance we will stay with our forces and prestige until the job is done?

Secretary MARSHALL. We have that issue coming up in a meeting in London in the Conference of Foreign Ministers, and it is our intention to make another effort to secure a four-power pact, which is for the very purpose of giving to those people a feeling of assurance that they will not be left in the lurch of great danger by the withdrawal of all interests of the United States.

Whether you can be successful with that I do not know. It is very important, I feel, that the people of France, for example, should have such assurance, especially because of their fear of a rehabilitated Germany. And that fear, of course, becomes a highly complicated issue when we feel it is essential absolutely to restore Germany to a condition of self-dependence and also to a condition where it can provide from its own economy the important contributions that are necessary, we think, for the general economy of Europe.

Mr. JAVITS. I have one last question. Does the United States Government intend to make a condition of interim relief for any government, that government's undertaking or not undertaking the socialization of any part of its economy? In other words, it is a condition of not aiding socialistic governments as distinguished from Communist governments?

Secretary MARSHALL. That is not in the recommendation. We feel that would be a very unfortunate procedure in dealing with sovereign nations and particularly this special group of nations. We feel that we would defeat ourselves at the start.

Mr. JAVITS. Thank you very much.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that Greece can be rehabilitated economically while the guerrilla war continues?

Secretary MARSHALL. My own estimate from the reports I receive is that the guerrilla war can prevent relief, and, unless that is considerably abated, the prospects of improvement in the implementation of the relief program are very seriously diminished.

Mr. LODGE. Do you then feel that interim aid and also long-term rehabilitation will in themselves be sufficient? In other words, granted the need for this aid, can this aid rehabilitate Europe, particularly aid under the so-called Marshall plan, until the destructive forces. which are working in opposition to rehabilitation have somehow been disposed of?

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not know exactly what you mean by "somehow disposed of." Are you talking of just in Greece?

Mr. LODGE. No, sir. I was referring more specifically to this: Do you feel, with respect to France and Italy, that this aid can prevent a seizure by internal forces, internal Communist forces, of the Governments of France and Italy?

Secretary MARSHALL. Specifically, we feel that by this aid we will enable the people of France and the people of Italy to proceed with the election of their choices in a free-handed manner; whereas, if they have been reduced to a degree of despair, they are subject to any influence that promises them anything better, which is the ordinary procedure of the subversive forces we are thinking about.

Mr. LODGE. In other words, Mr. Secretary, the economic aid is directed to combating the growth of the popularity of communism? Secretary MARSHALL. It is directed, as I construe it, to preventing a desperate situation regarding human life to develop to a point where people will turn to desperate remedies which are no remedies at all. Mr. LODGE. What I have in mind is this, that in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia there are probably not more than 5 percent Communists in the population; yet those Governments are now well behind the iron curtain. I personally believe that the Communists in France and Italy have abandoned the attempt of taking over those countries by constitutional means. I feel that they have decided to resort to internal force, although not to war.

The purpose of this line of questioning, therefore, is to inquire of you whether you feel under those circumstances that this type of aid is sufficient to protect the legality of those two Governments from extra-legal, internal forces?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have no comment to make on that beyond what I have already said.

Mr. LODGE. Do you feel that the negotiation of an Austrian treaty will affect the interim aid to Austria in any way?

Secretary MARSHALL. By "negotiation," you mean a successful negotiation of the Austrian treaty?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, sir.

Secretary MARSHALL. I do not see how it would affect the interim aid except possibly to make it more helpful.

Mr. LODGE. In other words, you feel that the withdrawal of all the armies of the four powers from Austria would make.this aid more successful?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think so, in that the people there are in despair from long-continued occupation.

Mr. LODGE. Do you believe, if the Russians agree to withdrawal, that they will, in fact, withdraw?

Secretary MARSHALL. I believe they would, in fact, withdraw the troops. The influence is another matter.

Mr. LODGE. That is the point I had in mind, Mr. Secretary. I wondered whether you felt they would not do as they have done in other countries, that is, to put their troops into civilian clothes and retain their hold.

Secretary MARSHALL. I have nothing to say beyond my previous

comments.

Mr. LODGE. Do you feel that the publicity clause in the post-UNRRA relief bill, Public Law 84, is being satisfactorily administered at this time in the countries included in that legislation?

Secretary MARSHALL. I think it could have been done better, and I think it is very important that this present interim aid proposal be carried out in such a way that there will be a decided improvement in relation to that particular phase of the matter.

Mr. LODGE. Do you feel that the best way of administering this aid is through the governments concerned, or do you think that we might consider administering it through private agencies in those countries by means of our diplomatic representatives?

Secretary MARSHALL. Oh, I think we will have to deal with the governments, sir.

Mr. LODGE. I would like to call your attention to the fact that in Italy there seems to be some equivocation with respect to that particular aspect of the matter, because of the way in which some Italian Government agencies are being undermined. I presume you are aware of that.

Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. For example, ARAR is not a wholly reliable organization. Organizations of this kind have made it increasingly difficult for us to see to it that our assistance reaches those whom we wish it to reach. Furthermore, aid handled on a government level is not widely recognized by the people as coming from America. I thought perhaps you might be considering a change along those lines in connection with this legislation.

Secretary MARSHALL. Mr. Dort will be on the stand later, and he has gone into that particular aspect.

Mr. LODGE. Do you feel it would be desirable to eliminate the date in the Greco-Turkish aid in order that (a) the Communists would not be able to use that date as propaganda against us; in other words, to say our aid would cease on a certain date; and (b) in order that our mission there should not be compelled to spend this entire sum in that period?

Secretary MARSHALL. I have not read the papers in the last 24 hours, but the President, I believe, sent a report to Congress on that yesterday.

Mr. LODGE. I was not aware of that. The reason for asking was that I wondered what you felt about putting a date on this bill; in other words, whether you feel it is desirable to have a final date in legislation of this kind.