Congressional Testimony on Combating Terrorism: Options to Improve the Federal Response [H.R. 525, H.R. 1158, and H.R. 1292] for the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, Hazardous Materials and Pipeline Transportation William W. Ellis Congressional Research Service April 24, 2001 Congressional Research Service Washington, D.C. 20540-7000 Testimony on Combating Terrorism: Options to Improve the Federal Response General Comments The governmental structures and procedures for combating terrorism have been a concern of the Congress for a number of years, and each of these three bills represents an attempt to improve national efforts in this area. (Table 1 presents the basic facts.)' However, the proposals accomplish this in different ways. I have been asked to take two perspectives on these differences. • First, by commenting on how each bill might produce a more effective and efficient organization of the federal government to counter terrorism. • Second, by commenting on which specific provisions of each bill could be used to enhance the others. At the outset, let me note that Congressional guidelines on objectivity and non-partisanship for the Congressional Research Service require me to confine my testimony to technical, professional, and non-advocative aspects of matters under consideration, and to limit my comments to questions within my fields of expertise. How Might Each of the Bills Make Government More Effective and Efficient in Combating Terrorism? H.R. 525, The Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001. This bill provides for the creation of a President-headed group to coordinate existing federal agencies in the development and implementation of federal policy to combat terrorism, the President's Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness. In providing specific mechanisms, this bill could increase the coherence of national policy and reduce non-productive inter-agency overlaps in programs. It would do this without changing the existing agency framework. H.R. 1158, National Homeland Security Agency Act. This bill could also increase national policy coherence and reduce program overlaps. However, its approach is to combine many units from existing agencies, rather than to work within the existing agency framework. The new National Homeland Security Agency would include the Federal Emergency Management Agency — now a free standing agency; the Border Patrol, National Infrastructure Protection Center, and the National Domestic Preparedness Office from the Justice Department; the U.S. Customs Service from the Treasury Department; the U.S. Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation; and the Critical 'The basic facts on the three measures are presented in Table 1, page 6. CRS-3 Infrastructure Assurance Office and the Institute of Information Infrastructure Protection from the Department of Commerce. Table 2 shows the particulars.2 Any significant reconfiguration in a large-scale organization — whether business, non-profit, or government generates considerable costs. Such costs may include the cost of reduced effectiveness of some of the units involved for as long a year or more, the cost of additional staff time required to form and integrate new organizational sub-units, the cost of staff time to rewrite materials documenting organization structure and procedures, the cost of reorienting service units such as those performing personnel, accounting, and congressional liaison functions to accommodate the changes, and the cost of organizational name changes. In the case of organizational changes in government agencies with missions related to national security, such as these, until the new organization settles down, there may be a temporary increase in the vulnerability to attack before the longer-term enhancements in preparedness are fully effective. It should be noted that such costs would be minimized by the bill's requirement that certain relatively large units—namely the Border Patrol, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard - would be maintained as distinct entities within the new National Homeland Security Agency. Without making any judgement about the likely dimensions of these costs, I would suggest that Congress may find it prudent to weigh the long-term and short-term costs of such a reorganization against its long-term and short-term benefits. H.R. 1292, the Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001. This bill would require the President to systematically coordinate the development and implementation of national policy to combat terrorism, using the existing organizational framework, and generally leaving him to work out the specifics. The cost of this measure would be minimal, and if vigorously implemented, it might well be effective. This raises a basic point. The extent to which each of these options would provide for better coordination depends a great deal on its implementation. As I have noted, it is quite conceivable that H.R. 1292, the approach with the least change, could be implemented to enhance coordination by vigorously applying the budgetary and personnel powers inherent in the Presidency. And conversely, it is conceivable that the approach requiring the most change, H.R. 1158, could do little to increase coordination if the significant structural changes were not accompanied by changes in the relevant activities of the agencies not central to the restructuring, such as elements of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Environmental Protection Agency, all of which have significant roles in combating terrorism. This underscores the notion that Congress may find it beneficial to consider the costs and benefits of each of these proposals in its deliberations. Which Specific Provisions of Each Bill Could Be Used to Enhance the Others? Among the many provisions in each bill that could be productively added to the others, I bring the Committees' attention to seven: (1) Some have suggested that the threat assessment required for systematic policy development is lacking. Both H.R. 525 and H.R. 1292 specifically call for this, while H.R. 1158 does not. H.R. 1158 might benefit from the addition of this component. 2 See Table 2, page 7 below. CRS-4 (2) All three bills require the development of a national policy to combat terrorism and an implementation plan for it. H.R. 1292 requires the President to develop a multiyear implementation plan, and the other bills may benefit from the addition of this longer time dimension. (3) H.R. 525 has specific requirements to guide the making of federal grants to the states. The other bills might benefit by the inclusion of more specific language in this area. (4) In the area of federal to state liaison, H.R. 525 specifies the creation of a state and local advisory board. Something on this order might be added to the other bills. (5) In the area of standards for equipment, training, and other aspects of domestic preparedness, H.R. 525 provides for the establishment of voluntary guidelines for terrorist attack preparedness programs of state and local governments, and for the development of national equipment and facilities standards for emergency preparedness. H.R. 1158 includes a requirement for national training and equipment standards for federal, state, and local governments. H.R. 1292 has no mention of this, and the addition of language on guidelines and standards might be appropriate. (6) All three bills have requirements for the centralized development of the budget for combating terrorism. The requirements of H.R. 525 and H.R. 1292 are more explicit than those of H.R. 1158. H.R. 1158 might benefit from more specific language. (7) All of the bills require reports to Congress, but there are some differences. There might be some benefit in comparing these requirements to determine the best configuration for Congress. Comparison of the Bills These bills are titled and referred as noted in Table 1.3 The Preparedness Against Terrorism Act of 2000 was passed by the House in the 106th Congress, but Senate deliberations were incomplete. These three bills resume this legislative effort. The bills are also related to a series of recent commission reports covering, among other things, national policy to combat domestic terrorism.* Here are the essentials of the three measures: • The Gilchrest bill, H.R. 525, creates a President's Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness headed, at least nominally, by the President. Its purpose is to coordinate policy development and implementation using existing federal agencies 3 See Table 1, page 6. * The three most relevant ones are: (1) The United States Commission on National Security/21a Century, Seeking a National Strategy, April 15, 2000, and Building for Peace, March 15, 2001; (2) Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, December 15, 2000; and (3) Center for Strategic and International Studies, Defending America in the 21a Century · New Challenges, New Organizations, and New Policies-Executive Summary of Four CSIS Working Group Reports on Homeland Defense, December 14, 2000. CRS-5 and coordinating with state and local governments as needed. It resembles the Preparedness Against Terrorism Act of 2000, H.R. 4210 (the Fowler bill), passed by the House in the 106th Congress. • The Thornberry bill, H.R. 1158, provides for significant changes in Executive Branch agencies in an effort to enhance the government's ability to deal with the domestic terrorist threat. It creates a new National Homeland Security Agency by combining number of existing Executive Branch organizations, as noted in Table 2.' This new agency would coordinate activities to combat terrorism across the entire government. • The Skelton bill, H.R. 1292, requires the President to work with federal, state, and local governments to meet homeland security objectives by developing and implementing coherent policy in this area. It requires far less change than the other two measures. A detailed comparison of the three bills is provided in Table 3 below. 5 See Table 2, page 7. "See Table 3, page 8. |