the record. I would make this observation, because we want to hear from you in a number of questions, if you could just summarize your observations to us in 5 minutes. I think we are going to vote at about 6 and we do not want to be cut short or keep you here while we go over and do that.

So with that, General Boyd, I would invite you to begin. STATEMENTS OF GENERAL CHARLES G. BOYD, USAF (RET.), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, U.S. COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY; LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES CLAPPER, JR., USAF (RET.), VICE CHAIRMAN, ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; FRANK J. CILLUFFO, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; DR. AMY E. SMITHSON, DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION PROJECT, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

General BOYD. Well, first of all, sir, as a citizen, may I compliment you on this process that is underway here. I wish every civics class in every school in America could be observing how the Congress is wrestling with a very tough problem and providing the forum for earnest debate. This is democracy at its best I think, and you are to be congratulated. And I am honored by participating in this process. I will, in fact, submit my written statement for the record. But let me highlight a few quick points and then we will get on to the question and answer period.

With respect to the three pieces of legislation that you have under observation, I think they all have merit and they all are working in the direction of an overall solution to this terribly dif ficult problem. I think they are all right in one degree or another. I think Mr. Gilchrest is right in that the solution begins with the President. I am not sure that a separate council needs to be created in that this is a national security issue and it ought to be thought as such. And, therefore, the National Security Council with the President as its head is the place where the solution begins. Mr. Skelton is right in the development of a strategy is the very first step. Unless we know what it is that we are trying to do, it is pretty difficult to figure out how to organize in order to get it done.

But I would be deeply dismayed if you stopped there and waited until some future time to address the type of organization or the organizational construct necessary to deal with the full dimension of this problem. I think Mr. Thornberry goes to the hard part, that of moving the existing capabilities into some kind of a coherent organizational construct vested with authority, responsibility, and by that, I mean accountability, and resources. He said it eloquently and I do not think I can improve on that.

But I would add, because it has been a separate discussion item, that somehow collecting all of the capabilities that we now have into a response structure is a radical solution. I do not see it that way. I think it is no different than putting the existing capabilities that we have, military capabilities into a Department of Defense in 1947. And if it is our choice to either disrupt existing bureaucratic comfort levels or improving the security of our Nation, I think I would opt for the latter choice.

May I suggest, sir, a couple of other points that if you were to put together a more comprehensive piece of legislation here that you might want to consider.

None of the pieces under consideration now addresses directly the role of the Department of Defense, tangentially yes, but not directly. And it is clear that DOD assets would have to be engaged in any weapons of mass destruction attack on U.S. soil. The HartRudman Commission recommends the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security to pull together the increased effort the Department must take in that area, and it also recommends that the National Guard be given more responsibility for homeland security missions without, of course, negating its overseas expeditionary capabilities.

Second, none addresses completely the issue of intelligence, although two of the pieces of legislation do address it in some way. In our view, this is not adequate. I think that the Commission's recommendation is that the National Intelligence Council include homeland security and asymmetric threats as a dedicated area of analysis and it assign that portfolio to a national intelligence officer, and that the community produce regular NIES, or National Intelligence Estimates, on these threats.

Third, none addresses adequately the issue of congressional oversight. Clearly, the reporting obligations embodied in these resolutions do address the issue of oversight to some degree. But the Commission believes that more needs to be done. It recommends that Congress deal with homeland security more or less as it has dealt with intelligence oversight. It should establish a special body including members of all relevant congressional committees as well as ex officio members from the leadership of the House and Senate. Members should be chosen for their expertise in foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations.

The proper legislative branch vehicle to oversee homeland security policy seems to us would go far to ensure that all homeland security issues are managed in such a way as to protect civil liberties. But because Mr. Kucinich has highlighted this terribly important concern, I would add that a complete bill would underscore the oversight responsibilities embedded in this institution, establishing the standards and reporting requirements any national homeland security agency must adhere to.

I await your questions respectfully, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, General Boyd.

General Clapper.

General CLAPPER. Mr.Chairman, members of the subcommittees, I am pleased to be here today representing Governor Gilmore who is out of the country on a mission for the Commonwealth of Virginia. I would like to offer three general comments.

First, before getting into the specifics of what you asked us to talk to, like General Boyd, I would like to commend the two subcommittees and the sponsors and cosponsors of the bills that are under consideration for their recognition of the importance of the issues and their dedication in keeping them visible to the public and to the rest of the Congress. I would point out also that the fact that these bills have been introduced is probably yet additional testimony to the widespread discomforture with the current setup we

have and the recognition that we as a Nation are not optimally postured to combat terrorism in all its dimensions.

In the interest of truth in advertising, I would like to point out a crucial characteristic of the Gilmore panel, which I represent today, and that is that it is heavily populated and influenced by professional representatives of the State and local levels whose perspective, in my view, is absolutely critical in any such deliberation. They, in fact, represent our first line of defense against a terrorist attack in this country, and the composition of our panel has driven and shaped our approach accordingly.

To many at the State and local levels the structure and processes at the Federal level for combating terrorism appear uncoordinated, complex, and confusing. In fact, the charts on display here are extracted from our first annual report that we issued some 14 months ago. I think they are illustrative of at least the perception of the problem at particularly the State and local level. Many State and local officials believe that Federal programs intended to assist them are often created and implemented without their input. I would hope that whatever legislation emerges from this body considers that input first.

We acknowledge that a lot of good work has been done to foster Federal interagency coordination in the last administration. As one example, let me commend the national plan for combating acts of terrorism in America developed by the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability. However, overall, we believe the current structure and processes are inadequate for the following reasons, a lot of which we have already talked to today: Lack of political accountability, insufficient program and budget authority, lack of staff resources, and, from our perspective particularly, lack of State, local, and functional expertise.

For the purposes of this hearing, we used 12 major attributes of the recommendations that we made as criteria for assessing all three bills under consideration. In my written testimony I discuss each bill in the context of these attributes. Also included is a functional comparative matrix that we drew up to better illustrate those differences and similarities visually, in comparison to what the Gilmore panel has advocated.

One area where all three bills seem to agree, as do we, is on the need for a true national strategy. We have talked about that quite a bit already.

All three bills, again as we do, seem to endorse the need for improved intelligence assessments and dissemination of critical information, an area which is particularly near and dear to my heart, having spent 37 years in one capacity or another in the intelligence business.

I want to comment specifically on one aspect of H.R. 1158, introduced by Congressman Thornberry, which endorses the recommendation of the Hart-Rudman Commission pertaining to the organization of a Homeland Security Agency. The Gilmore panel looked hard at several organizational models for the Government, one of which was an embellished FEMA. In fact, we considered recommending FEMA as an 11th cabinet department but which, at the end of the day, we rejected.

We came to the conclusion that, given the wide range of capabilities that must be included in the totality of thwarting and responding to terrorism horizontally across all the Federal departments and agencies as well as vertically with the State and local levels, we did not think it feasible, necessary, or appropriate for any of these organizations necessarily to abrogate their responsibilities. Furthermore, even if a Homeland Security Agency were established, it would still be in the awkward position of attempting to discipline or police those cabinet rank departments which have responsibilities for combating terrorism and would continue to do so even with forming a Homeland Security Agency.

We have reservations about the concept of selectively moving some law enforcement agencies-but not all-to a Homeland Security Agency. This will disrupt the agencies being transferred and will, we believe, jeopardize the tremendous working relationship with FEMA. In the minds of some, such an organization begins to suggest a ministry of interior, which potentially raises the specter, if not the reality, of jeopardy to constitutional and civil rights.

Rather, what we contend is needed is a national strategy that functionally synchronizes these elements and has someone who is authoritatively in charge, who is politically accountable, and who reports to the President or the Vice President.

After 2 years of pretty intense study and debate, the Gilmore Commission has concluded the existing organizations-Federal, State, and local-possess the respective capabilities needed to defend our homeland. What we are missing are the vision, the strategy, the leadership, and what I would call the authoritative coordination apparatus and processes to bring all these disparate pieces together when the situation demands that we do so.

Finally, on a personal note, I "got religion" about terrorism as a member of the commission which investigated the Khobar Towers terrorist bombing in 1996. This is an issue, as you have heard today, that is not partisan politically. It goes to the very heart of public safety, our values, and our way of life.

On behalf of Governor Gilmore and the other members of our panel, we urge the Congress and the executive branch to come together and bring some order to this issue. As I said when I testified before Congressman Shays' subcommittee last month, our most imposing challenge centers on policy and whether we have the collective fortitude to forge change both in organization and process. I would again respectfully observe that we have studied the topic to death and what we need now is action.

Thank you very much for this opportunity. I stand ready to address your questions.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, General.
Mr. Cilluffo.

Mr. CILLUFFO. Chairman LaTourette, distinguished members, I appreciate the opportunity to be before you today on this important matter. My parents taught me that if I do not have anything nice to say about someone else's ideas then I should not say anything at all. And that rule goes double if it comes from Congressmen. believe that by now my parents have forgiven me, and I hope that after today you will too.

These three legislative proposals and the recent set of hearings on the subject clearly demonstrate the issues surrounding terrorism and homeland defense and are receiving the attention they demand. Congress has recognized that a vacuum exists and is taking active steps to fill it. I would especially like to commend Congressmen Gilchrest, Thornberry, and Skelton for their leadership and for subjecting their legislative proposals to public examination and comment. We have before us a rare opportunity for cooperation, not just within Congress but also with the executive branch, and we should take full advantage of it.

Cooperation with the executive branch is crucial to turn concepts into capabilities. I think we need to have the bumper sticker "Need to Cooperate, Not Mandate." The United States is now at a crossroads. As things presently stand, there is neither assurance that we have a clear capital investment strategy nor a clearly defined end state, let alone a clear sense of the requisite objectives to reach this goal. The dimensions, as we have heard, are enormous. No single Federal agency owns the strategic mission completely. At the moment, however, many agencies are acting independently in what needs to be a coherent response. Unfortunately, to date, the whole has been less than the sum of its parts.

In considering how to proceed, we should not be afraid to wipe the slate clean and take a fresh look at the issue. We must ask ourselves what has worked to date, what has not worked, and what are the gaps and shortfalls in our current policies, practices, procedures, and programs. In so doing, we must be willing to press fundamental assumptions of our Nation's security: Are our organizations and institutions adequate? We cannot afford to look at the world through our current alphabet soup of agencies and their respective organizational charts. In their proposed legislation, Congressmen Gilchrest, Thornberry, and Skelton have done just that. I offer these comments in the spirit of the hearing; namely, to determine the best course of action. And in order to keep my remarks within the time allotted, I am going to touch only on some of the recommendations for improvement and not discuss their many strengths. And ultimately, of course, it remains up to you, Congress, and the executive branch to jointly decide which of these avenues or combination thereof should be pursued.

First, some over-arching objectives. In short, our antiterrorism and counterterrorism capabilities must be strengthened, streamlined, and then synergized so that effective prevention will enhance domestic response preparedness and vice versa. A complete CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) counterterrorism strategy involves both preventing an attack from occurring, which includes deterrence, nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and preemption, and two, preparing Federal, State, local, and private sector capabilities to respond to an actual attack.

All too often these elements of strategy are treated in isolation. It must incorporate both the marshalling of domestic resources and the engagement of international allies and assets. It also requires monitoring and measuring the effectiveness of the many programs that implement this strategy so as to lead to common standards, practices, and procedures.