Homeland Security Agency, the National Security Council will still play a critical role in coordinating the various government departments and agencies involved in homeland security. The National Security Council also must play the key role in the government's overall strategy function. The Commission proposed three components for a homeland security strategy-to prevent, to protect, and to respond to the problem of terrorism and other threats to the homeland. We believe that H.R. 1292 would facilitate the development of a serious integrated strategy for homeland security at the NSC level, even if its specific conclusions may differ from those of the Commission. Having a strategy, and a coherent budget process to match that strategy, is in our view a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to repair the inadequacies in current U.S. Government organization. We believe that the United States stands in dire need of stronger organizational mechanisms for homeland security. We need to clarify accountability, responsibility, and authority among the departments and agencies with a role to play in this increasingly critical area. We need to realign diffused responsibilities because, frankly, several critical components of U.S. homeland security policy are located in the wrong places. We also need to recapitalize several of these critical components, not least the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol. Unlike H.R. 525, which establishes a policy council that duplicates existing NSC mechanisms, H.R. 1158 contends that we need a Cabinet-level agency for this purpose, and the Commission agrees. The job is too big, and requires too much operational activity, to be housed at the NSC staff. It is too important to a properly integrated national strategy to be handled offline by a "czar." Certainly, no council or interagency working group that lacks a permanent staff will suffice. We believe that the importance of this issue requires an organizational focus of sufficient heft to cooperate with the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice in an efficient and effective way. H.R. 1158 is consonant with this aim. The purpose of realigning assets in this area, as proposed in H.R. 1158, is to get more than the sum of the parts from our efforts. It does not propose vast new undertakings. It does not propose a highly centralized bureaucratic behemoth. It does not propose to spend vastly more money than we are spending now. It does propose a realignment and a rationalization of what we already do, so that we can do it right. It proposes to match authority, responsibility, and accountability. It proposes to solve the "Who's in charge?” problem. Most important, it proposes to do this in such a way as to guarantee the civil liberties we all hold dear. More specifically, H.R. 1158 would consolidate border protection. It would institutionalize in coherent fashion many of the critical infrastructure protection mechanisms established by PDD-63 that have been subsequently scattered across various departments and agencies of government. It would increase the federal capacity to rationalize and coordinate its aid to those local, state, and regional responders who almost invariably will be the first to contend with natural disaster or terrorist events. In our view, however, even all three of the measures before the Congress, taken It 2 First, none addresses directly the role of the Defense Department. This is a significant omission. It is clear that DoD assets would have to be engaged in any weapons-of-mass destruction attack on U.S. soil. The Commission recommends the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security to pull together the increased effort the Department must make in this area. It also recommends that the National Guard be given more responsibility for homeland security missions, without, of course, negating its overseas expeditionary support function. Second, none addresses completely the issue of intelligence for homeland security. H.R 1158 does discuss the matter, and it is implied in H.R. 1292, for assigning intelligence priorities is part of the strategy process. But in our view, this is not enough. The Commission recommends that the National Intelligence Council include homeland security and asymmetric threats as an dedicated area of analysis, that it assign that portfolio to a National Intelligence Officer, and that the Intelligence Community produce regular National Intelligence Estimates on these threats. Third, none addresses adequately the issue of congressional oversight. Clearly, the reporting obligations embodied in these resolutions address the issue of oversight to some degree. But the Commission believes that more needs to be done. It recommends that Congress deal with homeland security more or less as it has dealt with intelligence oversight. It should establish a special body including members of all relevant congressional committees as well as ex-officio members from the leadership of the House and Senate. Members should be chosen for their expertise in foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, law enforcement and appropriations. Having a legislative branch vehicle to oversee homeland security policy would also ensure that all homeland security issues are managed in such a way as to protect civil liberties. Ove way ne final point, if I may. All fourteen members of the Commission are united in the common defense. All fourteen, without dissent, agreed to put this subject first and foremost in the final Phase III report. All fourteen, seven Democrats and seven Republicans, are ready to promote this recommendation on a fully bipartisan basis. All agree, too, that some combination of the three bills under discussion today, modified somewhat, would constitute the fulfillment of the Commission's recommendations on homeland security at least in large part. But we know that we are asking for big changes. We know that what we are proposing requires complex and difficult congressional action. Taken together, the proposals before you stretch over the jurisdiction of at least seven committees of the House and Senate. That is why the work of these committees, particularly working jointly as is the case today, is so critical to the eventual success of this effort. Congress of the United States House of Representatives Joint Hearing of the Committee on Government Reform SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS And the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Testimony of JAMES CLAPPER, JR. Vice Chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 24 April 2001 TESTIMONY OF JAMES CLAPPER, JR. Mr. Chairmen, Members of the Subcommittees, I am honored to be here today. I come before you as the Vice Chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, also known as the "Gilmore Commission" (after its Chairman, Governor James S. Gilmore, III, of Virginia). Thank you for the opportunity to present the views of the Advisory Panel. Governor Gilmore was invited to appear today, and would liked to have been here personally, but was already scheduled to be out of the country on a Commonwealth of Virginia trade mission. He asked that I appear in his stead. The Advisory Panel was established by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105–261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). That Act directed the Advisory Panel to accomplish several specific tasks. It said: The panel shall- 1. assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for 2. assess the progress of Federal training programs for local 3. assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving 4. recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with 5. assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in The Act requires the Advisory Panel to report its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction to the President and the Congress at three times during the course of the Advisory Panel's deliberations on December 15 in 1999, 2000, and 2001. issues: Mr. Chairmen, you have asked that we provide testimony today on three specific • The current organization of the federal government for counter terrorism and the reasons improvement is necessary How each bill (H.R. 525, Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act • Which specific provisions of each bill could be used to enhance the others Let me start by commending the sponsors of the bills-Congressmen Wayne Gilchrest, Mac Thornberry, and Ike Skelton-and their cosponsors, for their initiative and dedication in keeping these issues before the Congress. Each of these bills contributes significantly to the public debate, and all will help in eventually finding the best possible solutions to some very difficult issues. Current Structure and Need for Improvement To many at the State and local levels, the structure and process at the Federal level for combating terrorism appear uncoordinated, complex, and confusing. Our first report included a graphical depiction of the numerous Federal agencies and offices within those agencies that have responsibilities for combating terrorism. |