tion should be circulated in every part of Europe: it is a compendium of the life of the Usurper; it is a summary of his policy; it holds him up, without a mask, to the naked eye; it is a powerful comment on the murderer of Jaffa, and the wood of Vincennes; it completes the climax of his guilt; and exhibits him, in his true colours, to the execration and abhorrence of an enraged world. If, after this damning proof of his views, his objects and designs, there can exist a single power on the habitable globe capable of becoming a dupe to his professions, and a partner in his crimes, he must either be afflicted with a judicial blindness, or adopt infamy as his voluntary choice.

Another signal advantage derived from this publication, is the commotion which it has produced in the mind of every Spaniard, that slavery was their destined, lot;-and that nothing now remains for them, but conquest or death. Providentially their courage and their prudence, which are so happily blended that we know not which predominates, afford the best grounds for confidence, and the strongest hopes of success. The French, closely pursued, have continued to retreat towards their own frontier, and probably, ere these reflections meet the public eye, a blow will have been struck, which will place Ney and his followers at Bilboa, in the same situation with Dupont and his army. The skill and caution of the Spanish commanders cannot be too much admired. They restrain the native impetuosity of their troops; risk not their lives in rash and ineffectual enterprises: but, seek to obtain by judicious manoeuvres, skilfully combined, and promptly executed, the most probable, as well as the most honourable of all advantages, a bloodless victory.

The conduct of our government, in affording all possible assistance to this brave people, thus nobly struggling for the preservation of their religion, their laws, their liberties, and their lives, continues to be marked by the same generous and manly policy, by the same disinterested and magnanimous spirit, which distinguished their first overtures to the oppressed Spaniards. In a few days an auxiliary force, of nearly fifty thousand British troops, will be prepared to face the Corsican hordes, on the frontier of Spain; and to renew the brilliant scenes of Aboukir, Maida, and.

Vimiera. Diversions too will, we trust, be made at other points, particularly in the Neapolitan territory.

The direction of the British forces, however, must depend on the movements of the French army, which have not yet taken a decided turn. That troops have been sent to the frontiers of Spain, and that Buonaparte will make a desperate attempt to subjugate the country, there is not the sinallest doubt. But still it is difficult to account for the tardiness of their motions; as no accounts have been received of the arrival of any reinforcements for the army actually in Spain. The meeting, however, between the Corsican and the Emperor Alexander, has taken place at Erfurth, and the policy of the two Courts will speedily begin to unfold itself. Conjectures on such a subject would be idle, when certainty will be so soon within our reach. The only consequence of this interview which is yet known, is the vague proposal to this country for a maritime peace; in other words, for a peace, which would exclude us from all interest and interference in the affairs of the Continent; resign the Spaniards to the vengeance of the Corsican; and leave Europe to be parcelled out at his pleasure. No expectation either was or could be entertained, by the Corsican or his Ministers, that such a proposal would be listened to for a moment by the British Cabinet. Its only object was to dupe the Russian Emperor; and to persuade, if possible, the degraded people of France, that he really wishes for peace, and that Great Britain is the only obstacle in the way of it. Happily the period of delusion is pastand though the abject state of slavery in which the French are brought, by the barbarous power of the Corsican, will prevent them from ascertaining the truth, he is too well known by them to obtain credit for any of his assertions; and as to the rest of Europe, the torch of Cevallos has so lighted their understandings, that, though they may be his slaves, they will never more be his dupes. Peace, at this time, is absolutely unattainable. The independence of Spain and Portugal, under their respective sovereigns, inust be a preliminary condition never' to be departed from; and the tyrant is not yet sufficiently hum bled to forego his schemes of conquest and revenge. Meanwhile he has nearly surrounded the territories of Austria with a hostile

force. From every quarter the troops of his tributary Kings are in motion, either to overawe, or to attack the Austrian Emperor. He seems, indeed, to be yet undecided, whether to direct his first attacks against Austria or against Spain. If, with the assistance of his Northern Minion, he can succeed in reducing Austria to a state of servility, he will probably employ his undivided force against the Spaniards, in which case the struggle will be dreadful, though we have little fears for the ultimate issue of the contest.-Austria ought, indeed, to be sensible, that the only chance which she has for recovering her former consequence in the scale of nations, or for ensuring her future safety, is by availing herself of the present opportunity for making a vigorous and desperate stand against the Usurper, while the whole force of Spain, Portugal, and Eugland, will be opposed to him in other quarters. But experience has unfortunately convinced us of the little reliance to be placed on the councils of Austria: and she has so often neglected the means of self-preservation, that it would be rash to build any sanguine expectation on her firmness and wisdom at the present moment.

The Armistice which has been unexpectedly concluded in Finland, between the Swedes and Russians, has given rise to various conjectures and reports. It affords almost equal grounds, indeed, for two opposite conclusions. On the one hand, it may be imputable to the restoration of Alexander to his senses, and to the consequent return of a right understanding between him and the gallant King of Sweden. On the other hand, it may be, with equal probability at least, ascribed to the wiles of the Corsican, whose object in promoting the war between the two powers was to weaken them both; and, by confining their attention to each other, to prevent the interference of either with his ambitious schemes. But he may now want the assistance of Russia in Germany, and must therefore have Alexander to posthis atrocious attack upon the Swedish territories to a future period. All however is uncertainty at present, though a short time will suffice to dispel the clouds which now obscure the poli

pone

tical horizon, when every object may be distinctly seen, and grounds for natural conclusions be supplied.

October 26th, 1808.

The preceding observations were intended, as our readers will perceive by the date, for appearance in our last number, but the pressure of other matter, and, still more, certain arrangements made by our printer for forwarding the publication, caused them to be omitted. We have two reasons for inserting them, and without alteration;-First, to shew how far subsequent facts have corresponded with our opinions, at that time; and, secondly, to prove the falsehood of a foolish report, that we had been bribed to discontinue our observations on the Convention of Cintra. No, though we differ, most probably, from the greater part of the public, as to the proceedings at the public meetings convened on this subject, still nothing has yet occurred to alter our opinion of the convention itself. As far as we could judge from the documents published in the Gazette, the Convention appeared to us most ill-judged and disgraceful; and so it still appears. Some facts, however, have come out, in the course of the Inquiry instituted by his Majesty, which throws more light on the transaction, than the feeble pen of Sir Hew Dalrymple was able to do. On these facts it would be as highly improper to comment, as it would be to decline our opinion respecting the whole of Sir Hew's conduct in Portugal, as stated in his own declaration. That conduct is at least in a train of inquiry, which may terminate in proceedings of a more serious nature. On a future day, those legal impediments to a free discussion of the whole, which at present subsist, may be removed; when we shall not be found backward in delivering our sentiments upon it.

We must, however, observe, that it is now fully established, that Sir Arthur Wellesley, immediately after the victory of Vimiera, strenuously urged Sir Harry Burrard, on whom the command had then devolved, to lose no time in pursuing the French. And we are also in possession of his decided opinion, that the British force in Portugal was fully competent to the

purpose of engaging and destroying Junot's army. It remains to be seen what reasons Sir Harry Burrard can assign for his refusal to listen to advice apparently so judicious and wise. That part of the army which had not been engaged was peculiarly well situated for intercepting the flying army of the French, and for attacking them with advantage. In exact proportion, indeed, as their situation was hazardous before the battle, was it favourable after the victory. That appears to us to have been the moment when a decisive blow might have been struck. But it does not necessarily follow, that, because at that precise period of time, it would have been highly proper to pursue and to attack the French, it was equally proper at the moment, when Sir Arthur Wellesley was called upon by his superior officer to sign the Armistice. Indeed, by the neglect of Sir Arthur's advice, the French had been enabled to take up a very strong position, from which they could not have been driven without a most obstinate and sanguinary conflict. Thus, a material change had taken place, in the relative situation of the two armies, between the moment when Sir Harry Burrard assumed the command, and the day when General Dalrymple concluded a suspension of arms with Kellermann. The real question for consideration, therefore, is this, as it respects Sir Hew Dalrymple-Was he justified, at that period, in concluding any Convention with the French, having a sufficient army to reduce them? and, if justified, was he excuseable for granting such terms to the enemy as those granted by the Convention of Cintra? Another question, however, arises out of the transaction, which affects only Sir Harry Burrard. Was he, when commander of the British army, justified in retarding the pursuit of the French, as advised by Sir Arthur Wellesley, immediately after their defeat at Vimiera? These are questions that must be asked, and must be answered, before the British public can be satisfied.

As to the public meetings, since the institution of the Inquiry, they have, in our opinion, all acted upon a false principle. We differ alike from those who think it proper and decent to address the King, in the language of remonstrance, after an Inquiry has been really began; as we do from those who contend that such