chemical operation, we have done so without the sort of military analysis that would tell us whether this defoliation is really useful. Like so many programs, defoliation had an impetus of its own in Vietnam.

The best illustration is the use of defoliants along the Rung Sat Canal. Defoliants were used to kill plant life on both sides of the 60mile-long Rung Sat Canal on the basis it would prevent attack on ships. The argument for the use of this defoliant was that its effects prevent attacks on ships. Although no ships had been sunk in the Rung Sat Canal, as of a year ago, either before or after defoliation, the military argue that they cannot afford to have even one sunk. They go on, however, to point out that the canal is only narrow enough to permit serious attack for about 1 kilometer. When questioned on this, the military acknowledged that they really only need to defoliate for 1 kilometer, but the broad-brush approach to decisions led to the much wider and more destructive use of this chemical over 60 miles. As it is we don't know for sure whether defoliation is militarily effective. I was also informed that no studies had been made of the effectiveness of the harassing or tear gases in warfare in Vietnam up to a year ago. We have the subjective opinions of some military that have used it in combat, but we do not have the type of weapons analysis that usually precedes the adoption of any weapon. One of the few studies that has been made on the use of tear gas, done by the Rand Corp., pointed out that civilians were particularly vulnerable to injury when tear gas is used since it drives them out of their protective shelters into the line of rifle and artillery fire. This is certainly a far cry from the justification that we have used in the past that tear gas cuts down casualties.

AWAITING COMPLETION OF REVIEWS RECOMMENDED

My understanding is that the administration, after sending this treaty up here, now is planning a policy review on CS and other tear gases and on herbicides but that they had not started at least as of earlier this week. It could be said that the White House has not done its homework, and your committee might want to consider voting to send the treaty back to the President suggesting that he return it here after their reviews are completed and, hopefully, with a recommendation that it be ratified without any understandings or exclusions regarding the use of tear gas and defoliants, or you might want to simply keep the treaty here until these reviews are completed by the executive branch and the other studies to which Senator Nelson alluded are made public.

I believe that in-depth reviews would reveal that these weapons are of such marginal value that they would not be worth the propaganda disadvantage we would reap by excluding them in the overwhelming face of opposite international opinion.

I understand that there is a possibility that some nation may ask for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the applicability of the protocol to tear gas and defoliants. If the General Assembly votes to ask for such an opinion, and the International Court of Justice rules that tear gas and defoliants are covered, it would place us in an isolated position if we had excluded these two chemicals.

Officials who have studied the issues worry that (CS-2 could more aptly be called a "lung gas") if tear gas is permitted in war this could escalate into lethal gas as it did in World War I.

I believe tear gas can be used for humanitarian purposes as it was in the Korean war to help quell a prisoner uprising.

I noted in the statement of Secretary Rogers to which you alluded, Mr. Chairman, that he defended it on a humanitarian basis, but the DOD no longer does this on humanitarian grounds; and it seems to me that the absence here this morning of the Defense Department suggests that this administration is not speaking with one voice on this

Issue.

The fact that they have not completed these studies, I don't think they are clear in their own minds of just what their position is.

STUDIES INFLUENCING U.S. PHASE-OUT OF DEFOLIANTS

It will be recalled that White House officials indicated that the phaseout of defoliants would be completed by this spring.

No explanation was given for this action initiated by Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams, but I assume that they were influenced by the studies of Prof. Matthew Meselson of Harvard and Dr. Robert Cutting of the Walter Reed Army Research Institute on the effects of defoliants on the people, land, vegetation, and forestry of Southeast Asia, to which Senator Nelson has alluded.

EFFECTS OF U.S. USE OF HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM

I might add that independent scientists, other scientists, who studied the Cutting report subtracted Saigon hospital figures-where only a sixth of the population are refugees from the provinces-and found the stillbirth rate 32 per thousand in 1960-65 and had risen to 38.5 per thousand in 1966-69 when the heavy defoliation was underway. Moles, in the same periods, rose from 3.1 to 5.3, and malformations in the same periods jumped from 2.3 to 3.1 per thousand births. Another effect of our widespread use of herbicides in Vietnam has been an apparent proliferation. There is evidence, as Senator Nelson mentioned, that Portugal has used herbicides to destroy food crops raised by rebels in Angola.

It should be noted that Portugal and Australia were the only nations to vote with the United States on December 19, 1969, when the United Nations General Assembly-by a vote of 80 to 3-declared that the Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of herbicides and tear gas in war.

ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON PROTOCOL

Unfortunately, Secretary of State Rogers has stated, "It is the United States understanding of the protocol that it does not prohibit the use in war of riot control agents and chemical herbicides."

While I applaud several of the actions taken by this administration in the area of CBW, including the biological warfare termination and the phaseout of herbicide use in Vietnam at least by the United States, I believe it should also move to halt all gases-including CS and CS-2 in Vietnam. These steps would help clear the way for U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol without "understanding."

By taking the position it has taken, this administration is closing out an opportunity for progress, a chance to exert some leadership in setting a standard of international behavior. Because of the position that it is taking, the United States has been involved in trying to convince other nations to modify their stands on tear gas and defoliants. Our diplomatic pressures have been applied to support a position that is not tenable. It was particularly distressing to me to find the British changing their position on whether or not tear gas was covered by the protocol. Britain has said as early as 1930 that tear gas was covered. But only last year we learned that the Home Office and the War Office used their influence to change this policy. This action flies in the face of their treaty obligations. Every effort should be made to see that signers such as Great Britain live up to the letter of the protocol. Although the nuclear clouds overshadow chemical warfare, it still remains a weapon of mass destruction and should be eliminated from the arsenals of man. If we are successful in abandoning biological warfare and in ratifying the Geneva Protocol with reservations or understandings, perhaps we can then move on to a verifiable system of inspection that would permit us to abandon chemical weapons altogether. In view of the marginal military effectiveness of these weapons I believe that we might succeed in this effort.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

COMMITTEE OPTIONS

You heard the question that Senator Aiken raised with Senator Nelson as to whether or not it would be preferable just to let this lie in the committee. In fact, I asked a question whether or not it should be sent back to the President. I believe you suggest in your statement that it might be well to send it back with a request that these studies that are available be reviewed.

How would you answer Senator Aiken's question?

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, I added another option. I think you have at least two choices. One is to send it back and ask that the President return it after the administration has completed its reviews. Another is to just retain it here until they have completed these reviews.

I think that is clearly up to you and the other members of the committee on how you would decide.

I suppose it could be construed as a little insulting if you did send it back down to the White House. It might be preferable to keep it here.

Another thing is if you send it back, you might never get it back up here. So maybe you should keep it and wait until they complete their reviews and come up here with a single voice and say what their position is.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Javits.

SHOULD WE RATIFY WITH ADMINISTRATION INTERPRETATION OR DEFER?

Senator JAVITS. I have no particular questions, I came as a courtesy to hear Congressman McCarthy who was one of our Congressmen from New York. But I was going to ask you this.

Suppose we did ratify the treaty. Is it a fact that the United States, as this understanding is unilateral, could at any time modify, withdraw, deal with it as it chose? It seems to me that the larger gain is to be found in the ratification of the treaty at a time when the climate is right rather than for this reason, which I respectfully believe to be a lesser one than the main thrust of the treaty, to defer ratification with a possibility that you will run into something or other tomorrow and you won't ratify it at all.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, the only thing is, Senator, that if we ratify it with the understanding that the administration has asked for I think that this is going to lead to a proliferation. If the greatest nation in the world, I think we are, does this, why shouldn't Portugal go ahead and continue using it in Angola and then why shouldn't other nations that have insurrections and so forth begin engaging in environmental warfare?

Senator JAVITS. I don't think that I made my point clear. I am not challenging you on the disadvantages. I am not challenging you at all, because it is an axiom of international law that if we express an interpretation others may use that interpretation, too, as far as we are concerned. I am only questioning the argument that Senator Aiken raised, as our chairman said. I am trying to get your expertise specifically on this question. What is the balance of the public interest? Shall we ratify, even though the interpretation is made on the ground it is unilateral and can more easily be modified or lifted than if we fail to ratify and some intervening state of facts takes place while it is sitting here and we can never ratify it at all.

Mr. MCCARTHY. I would opt for the latter, not ratify, and hopefully that these studies that administration says it is embarking on will reveal that these weapons are of such marginal value that they would eventually conclude that it would be better to ratify without any reservations or understandings.

I just don't think, based on my own study and having written a book about it, that they are worth that much, that the tear gas, and it still could be used for humanitarian purposes as it was used in the Korean war, I don't see any problem with that, and defoliation has so many adverse effects that it really isn't worth what they do, and if they really studied it, which they never have as far as I can see in depth, they can say "well, it is just not worth it." In his review of the Vietnam war, covering 1964 to 1968, the Army Chief of Staff did not even assert that chemicals played a significant role.

I would rather wait and take my chances on that, that they would come to that conclusion after analysis. To go ahead and see the Senate ratify it with that understanding, I think it would be a very adverse thing. I think it would end up really wrecking the protocol.

"WRECKING" THE PROTOCOL

Senator JAVITS. When you say "really wrecking," what does that mean?

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, really wrecking it. It is the only arms control agreement that really worked. It worked for the entire period from World War I to Vietnam, with some minor exceptions, and you know it. You were in the Chemical Warfare branch.

Senator JAVITS. In the service.

A re you representing to us then your view that if other nations used tear gas and defoliants that that would wreck the agreement notwithstanding that they did not use poison gases or biological warfare?

Mr. McCARTHY. Yes. Because I believe that, first of all, it would wreck it in the sense that 80 nations have said that they are banned. Secondly, I think the use of it could lead to an escalation-from tear gas to poison gas. That is how the use of poison gas started in World War I. They first used nonlethal gases. This environmental warfare, I think, poses tremendous future catastrophes. If we take the view that it is permitted, as I say, Portugal has already used it, other nations might, and eventually the protocol would seem to have little prohibitive value. Chemical warfare is, after all, defined very simply as: The use of chemicals in warfare. For us to say that we will forbid all forms of chemical warfare except the two we are using in Vietnam is to ridicule the very purpose of the protocol and erode the moral and political barrier which the treaty has raised.

Senator JAVITS. Of course, in World War I we had no such treaty; did we?

Mr. MCCARTHY. That is right. But we did in World War II, and for various reasons we never used it, one of which, I think, was the protocol. I mean the military say, well, it was mainly the fear of retaliation, but I think, my study any way of it showed, that the legal restraint did have some restraining value.

Senator JAVITS. I was only addressing myself to your argument that opening the door would mean that everything would move out. We have had no such experience. The experience in World War I is not relevant; is it? We had no treaty.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, to take your analogy which, I think, is a good one, in World War II we didn't even use tear gas.

Senator JAVITS. Well, we don't know really what would be the effect; isn't that true? You are giving us what you believe would be what happened, but we have no real experience.

Mr. MCCARTHY. We have one real precedent. In World War I they started tear gas, nonlethal gases, and it was escalated into lethal gases. Senator JAVITS. But no one was bound by a treaty.

Mr. MCCARTHY. No, but that was the inevitable result.

We also have the precedent, the opposite of that, World War II where no, not even tear gas was used.

Senator JAVITS. But then there was a treaty.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Right. And it was then construed by the United States to preclude tear gas as well as poison gas.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

WILL RATIFICATION WITH UNDERSTANDING HELP ACHIEVE
NEW UNDERSTANDINGS?

Senator SPARK MAN. The committee has been told by the administration that ratification of the protocol is a necessary first step toward more comprehensive agreements to control chemical and biological weapons. Do you believe that ratification with an understanding will help achieve new understandings?