weapons in retaliation after they had been used against us, and stated that it is the understanding of the United States that the protocol "does not prohibit the use in war of riot control agents and chemical herbicides."

What has caused this long delay in ratification of the protocol, a delay which has done considerable damage to the reputation of the United States around the world as a civilized and compassionate nation? I am sure none of you is in much doubt as to the reason, although your verdict and mine is not susceptible of legal proof. It is the military-industrial complex-the men in the Pentagon, particularly in the Chemical Warfare Service. Their jobs and careers depend on continuing the potential for the production, storage and use of these lethal weapons of destruction. Their industrial allies who profit from the manufacture and sale of these chemicals, join them in opposition to ratification. They justify their position by the pernicious "worst case" philosophy, which assumes that the capabilities and intentions of a potential "enemy" are such that the United States cannot afford to take a chance by ratification.

This is the sort of combined military and civilian vested interest lobby which you gentlemen on this committee have to defy almost daily in your efforts to bring the present belligerent foreign policy of the United States and its military proponents back to sanity. I congratulate you, particularly your chairman, for your valiant efforts in this regard. May they be more successful in the future than thay have been in the past. This protocol is a very small step which I believe you should now take without fear of substantial opposition, thanks largely to President Nixon's initiative in defying the military-industrial complex.

Assuming the desirabilty of reporting the protocol favorably to the Senate for its approval, there remains the questions of whether reservations and understandings should be attached to it.

Of the 85 states which are bound by the protocol, 39 have made reservations making it clear that their commitment is not unilateral and that the commitment is invalidated in the event of use of prohibited weapons by an enemy. While it would appear that such reservations are unnecessary and were so considered by 46 of the ratifying nations, there can be little objection to their inclusion as a matter of caution and to assure that the protocol receives the approval of the Senate. They would not, in my judgment, indicate any additional failure by the United States to show a decent respect for the opinion of mankind.

But the exceptions proposed by the Secretary of State, which would permit use in war of riot control agents and chemical herbicides, stands on a different foot. These chemical products were widely used in Vietnam by us with an attendant strong adverse reaction from both national and international public opinion, including the people of South Vietnam, whether allies or enemies.

None of the 85 states which has ratified the protocol has attached reservations limiting the type of chemical weapons to which it applies. Such reservations, if attached by this Committee or by the Senate itself, would stand out in defiance of the otherwise unanimous view of those civilized countries of the world which have ratified the protocol.

On December 16, 1969, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted by a vote of 80 to 3 with 36 abstentions, a resolution which provides, in part, that the protocol embodies the generally recognized rules of international warfare. The resolution went on to declare that "any chemical agents of warfare-chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid, or solid-which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals, or plants ***" are contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law as embodied in the protocol.

The three adverse votes which were cast against the resolution were those of Portugal, Australia, and the United States. Portugal's barbarous efforts to crush the aspirations of the inhabitants of its colonial empire are well known. Australia is our somewhat reluctant ally in Vietnam and is presently undergoing a governmental crisis. Again, the United States stands out as the only major nation indifferent to the opinion of most of mankind on the subject of chemical and biological warfare.

Senator Nelson has introduced an "Executive Understanding" which would make it clear "that the terms of the protocol prohibit the use in war of chemical herbicides." I urge this committee to adopt this understanding.

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The best relatively brief, but yet comprehensive, study of the control of the chemical and biological weapons was published this year by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I commend it to the committee.

Part of this report is a learned discussion of the international legal problems involved by two distinguished international lawyers. Profs. R. R. Baxter and Thomas Buergenthal. Since the Department of State has indicated a reluctance to permitting Professor Baxter to testify before this committee. I quote from his article in the Carnegie Endowment pamphlet (p. 14):

"It is clear, however, that by their conduct and declarations in the past four decades the parties to the Protocol have demonstrated their understanding that this prohibition bars the use in war of all chemical agents having a direct toxic effect on man that might be used as antipersonnel weapons, including tear gas and other forms of irritant chemicals." (Italic supplied.)

Referring to antiplant chemicals, Messrs. Baxter and Buergenthal state that the evidence is by no means as conclusive as in the case of antipersonnel weapons. However, they state (p. 16):

"On balance, and taking the 1969 resolution of the General Assembly into account, the case seems stronger for including antiplant chemicals within the prohibition of the Protocol than for excluding them."

These legal views would, of course, not prohibit this committee from specifically including tear gas and herbicides in the prohibition of the protocol, so far as the United States is concerned. This could be made abundantly clear by approving both the Nelson executive understanding and a similar understanding with respect to herbicides.

The Carnegie Endowment pamphlet also contains useful articles by David E. Brown on herbicides and by Stewart Blumenfeld and Matthew Meselson on riot control agents in warfare. Both of these papers come to the general conclusion that there is grave doubt as to the utility of the use of either chemical from a purely military point of view. Moreover, they point out the serious domestic political and arms control costs of continued use of these weapons.

Actually, the protocol is a relatively small first step in the elimination of chemical and biological warfare. It bans only the use of these weapons. Manufacture and storage are still permitted. I undrstand that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is opposed to agreements banning production and storage unless ironclad onsite inspection is part of the agreement. This is another example of the "worst case" philosophy with which the Pentagon has brainwashed ACDA.

It is hoped that at Geneva this summer a treaty can be negotiated prohibiting bacteriological warfare. This ACDA, I believe, would support on the ground nobody would use it anyway and, therefore, onsite inspection and prohibition is unnecessary.

I would hope that this committee would read with care the excellent article by Archibald S. Alexander, who served with ACDA during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, on "The Limitations on Chemical and Biological Warfare Going Beyond Those of the Geneva Protocol."

Mr. Alexander points out:

1. The need to secure the adherence to the protocol of other countries not now parties whose failure to be bound might endanger the effectiveness of the protocol. I would recommend to the committee that it inquire of the Department of State what it is doing bilaterally and through the United Nations to obtain such adherence.

2. The measures on biological warfare going beyond the Geneva Protocol. He contends that the best course of action for the United States would be to join other countries at the CCD Conference at Geneva in making improvements in the British Draft Convention and and then placing it for adoption before the countries of the world. This committee could perhaps urge State and ACDA to take this step this spring and summer.

3. Measures on chemical warfare going beyond the Geneva Protocol. Mr. Alexander, after pointing out that chemical weapons are of relatively secondary importance in national arsenals today, urges the United States to "take the lead in maintaining the momentum of arms control by proposing further CBW limitations and by seeking to attain their general acceptane."

I would urge this committee, perhaps through its Consultative Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization, to hold public hearings on these three recommendations and to call the heads of ACDA and State before it to determine to what extend the United States can be persuaded to take the lead in an area where, thanks to the Senate, its record in the past has been so totally unsatisfactory.

[From The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1971]

LIMITATIONS ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE GOING BEYOND THOSE OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

by Archibald S. Alexander

Chemical warfare (CW) occupies a special position of distaste in the public consciousness, originating during World War I. This distaste was shown also for biological warfare (BW) in the terms of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and in proposals for other treaties. It is renewed whenever the use of CBW weapons is proven or even charged. It should prove to be of psychological help in achieving further arms limitations in the field of CBW.

The feelings of distaste have lately been further reinforced as the public has become aware that the use of CBW agents may have secondary effects, some unpredictable, which may have serious consequences on man, animals, and the environment. As it was put in the conclusion of the unanimous report submitted on 30 June 1969 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by consultant experts:

Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live. This overriding danger would apply as much to the country which initiated the use of these weapons as to the one which had been attacked, regardless of what protective measures it might have taken in parallel with its development of an offensive capability. A particular danger also derives from the fact that any country could develop or acquire, in one way or another, a capability in this type of warfare, despite the fact that this could prove costly. The danger of the proliferation of this class of weapons applies as much to the developing as it does to developed countries.1

Note: This article deals with various means of controlling chemical and biological warfare (CBW), over and above the effect of United States ratification of the Geneva Protocol. It assumes that domestic use of tear gas and pesticides will continue to be permitted.

A similar feeling of revulsion against CBW was reflected in Resolution 2603 A (XXIV) of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted on 16 December 1969 (80 for, 3 against, 36 abstentions). This resolution, against which the United States voted, declared the use in warfare of any chemical or biological agent to be contrary to the "generally recognized rules of international law." The resolution clearly was intended to apply to riot control agents or defoliants as well as to lethal or incapacitating agents.

The subject will be considered in three parts:

I. The need to secure the adherence to the Geneva Protocol of the other countries not now parties whose failure to be bound might endanger the effectiveness of the Protocol.

II. Measures on biological warfare going beyond the Geneva Protocol.

III. Measures on chemical warfare going beyond the Geneva Protocol.

The Need To Secure the Adherence to the Geneva Protocol of the Other Countries Not Now Parties Whose Failure To Be Bound Might Endanger the Effectiveness of the Protocol

It is desirable to make the prohibitions of the Geneva Protocol, limiting both biological and chemical warfare, as effective as possible by securing universal adherence. Otherwise there are loopholes for use of CBW weapons-for instance in retaliation-which are likely to result in general escalation to more and more destructive weapons. Many countries have adhered to the Protocol on the basis that they are not precluded from retaliation, at least in measured or equivalent terms, and that they are bound by the terms of the Protocol only as to countries that have adhered to it. The possibility of removing these limitations on the ban imposed by the Protocol should be borne in mind. This will be considered later in this article. Meanwhile, however, every effort ought to be made to obtain further adherence.

The countries that have not adhered to the Protocol to date may be divided into three categories: countries with the in

dustrial base, the technical skill, and the military machinery that make them actual or potential major CBW powers; countries capable of mounting small-scale efforts that could threaten other smaller powers or that might permit limited or sneak attacks against larger countries; and the others, which are potential CBW victims without having a serious CBW capability themselves.

As to the first two categories, it is clearly important to bring all such countries into the fold. So long as a potential CBW power is not bound by treaty, there is a greater risk that it may be tempted to use CBW agents in war; and this risk will tend to induce concern, stockpiling of CBW weapons, and preemptive or other use by other powers having CBW weapons.

Despite the possibility that international law or a prudent respect for the opinion of mankind might protect one of the smaller powers from attack by a CBW power, it would seem to be in the clear interest of the smaller powers to secure the benefits of the Protocol. This would increase the inhibitions of the major powers as to use against smaller powers.

Furthermore, the possibility of use by a small power allied to a great power should be eliminated. This possibility has serious implications because of the reservations made by many countries adhering to the Protocol, releasing the adherent as to an enemy if either the enemy or its allies fail to respect the prohibitions of the Protocol. Thus, if major powers A and B have adhered to the Protocol, A would be released from its obligation not to initiate CBW against B if B's ally, small power N, should use CBW against A. Even in the absence of general hostilities, if a member of NATO or the Warsaw Pact alliance were involved, there would be the risk of spread of use of CBW weapons without violation of international treaty obligations.

Of the countries in addition to the United States that are not parties to the Protocol (as of mid-1970), some are specially significant, and their early adherence would be desirable. Some of these are Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in South America; all the Central American countries except Mexico; Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in the Middle East; and a number of African countries, including Algeria, Mor