apply to toxins; that is, biologically produced chemical substances. As you know, on December 18, 1970, the Department of Defense announced its detailed disposal plans for existing stocks of biological agents and toxins not required for defensive research purposes. On January 27 this year, the President announced that, following destruction of the stocks, the biological facilities at Pine Bluff Arsenal would be taken over by the Food and Drug Administration for a major new health project to investigate the effects of a variety of chemical substances such as pesticides and food additives.

These decisions, together with the President's decision to resubmit the protocol to the Senate, are truly significant steps of reason and restraint.

ADMINISTRATION DECISIONS BEARING ON SENATE'S DELIBERATIONS ON PROTOCOL

Also as a result of the review of chemical warfare and the biological research program in 1970, the administration made a number of decisions in this area which bear on your deliberations on the protocol. They include the following:

To continue support for the United Kingdom draft arms control convention banning the development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents and toxins.

To continue our own efforts to achieve effective control of development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and means of warfare through international agreement.

To initiate a new review of the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in the Vietnam conflict so that the additional data obtained from the field can be used for an examination of the implications and consequences for U.S. policy of their future use in war.

To continue provision of riot control agents to military forces to a level to be determined by relevant military and economic considerations, with the agents carefully controlled.

With respect to chemical herbicides, the administration's decisions included:

The immediate termination of all use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam for crop destruction purposes, and a phaseout of the use of chemical herbicides for purposes of defoliation. During the phaseout, our herbicide operations will be limited to defoliation operations in remote, unpopulated areas or to the perimeter defense of fire bases and installations in a manner currently authorized in the United States and which does not involve the use of fixed-wing aircraft.

The preparation of disposition plans for the stocks of agent "Orange" presently in Vietnam.

AGENT ORANGE

The CHAIRMAN. What is agent Orange?

Secretary ROGERS. There are really three kinds of agents, Orange and White and Blue. Orange is the one that draws a good deal of controversy in this country and other places, and there is indication that that one might be harmful; so we have discontinued its use and we are going to dispose of the stocks.

EFFECTS OF RATIFICATION

As a result of these decisions, we are now this morning considering the question of advice and consent to ratification of the protocol in a situation vastly changed from what it was several years ago. We believe U.S. ratification of the protocol would be an important step in advancing the President's new policy in this area.

Ratification would also:

Strengthen the legal prohibitions against the use in war of chemical weapons and of biological weapons and toxins;

Constitute a positive and constructive movement toward arms control and a direct response to United Nations General Assembly resolutions urging all members to become parties to the protocol;

Reinforce past U.S. policy statements on no first use of these agents, and confirm past U.S. votes in the General Assembly in favor of strict adherence to the principles and objectives of the protocol; and

Enhance the U.S. position in developing initiatives for future arms control measures in the chemical and biological warfare

area.

SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE OF PROTOCOL

Let me turn to the protocol itself, its scope and its importance. The United States and 29 of the other states which participated in the Geneva Conference of 1925 were original signers of the protocol. There are now 96 parties to the protocol. Since January 1970, 12 countries, including Japan and Brazil, have become parties. All our NATO allies are parties. The Soviet Union and all but one of its Warsaw Pact allies are parties, as is Communist China.

France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and 30 other countries which have become parties have entered similar but not identical reservations which made clear that the effect of the protocol was to prohibit only the first use of the weapons covered, leaving unaffected the right of retaliatory use of such weapons. Accordingly, the protocol is considered for those parties, and more generally, as a prohibition on the first use of chemical and biological weapons. As you know, the Geneva Protocol does not prohibit research, development, testing, manufacture, and stockpiling of chemical or biological agents.

When President Nixon formally resubmitted the protocol to the Senate on August 19 of last year, he recommended that the U.S. ratification be subject to a reservation making clear our right to retaliate with chemical weapons should any enemy state or its allies use either chemical or biological weapons against us.

Our proposal to ratify without assertion of a right of retaliation in the area of biological weapons and toxins even in the event of a first strike against us with biological weapons or toxins offers, as you said, Mr. Chairman, a constructive U.S. initiative in accord with the President's policy decisions.

PROTOCOL IS NOT FREE FROM AMBIGUITY

The protocol is not free from ambiguity-with some differences in viewpoint still unresolved after 45 years.

As I indicated in my report to the President on the protocol, the United States considers the term "bacteriological methods of warfare" as used in the protocol to embrace all biological methods of warfare and the use in warfare of toxins, however produced. This broad interpretation, though not clear from the language of the protocol, is generally accepted by the international community.

I also noted in my report that it is the U.S. understanding of the protocol that it does not prohibit the use in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents. This interpretation, as you know, is one upon which there are differences of opinion in the international community.

On December 16, 1969, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution to the effect that the use in war of all chemicals is contrary to the protocol. Although not specifically stated, the intent was to include riot control agents and chemical herbicides. We took the position that the General Assembly was not the proper forum for resolving this question of treaty interpretation and, in addition, made clear we disagreed with this interpretation.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 80 to three, with 36 abstentions. Participating in the General Assembly vote were 80 of the 84 states at that time parties to the protocol. Twenty-nine of them were among the 36 who abstained on the resolution and two of them, Australia and Portugal, joined the United States in voting against it. This split vote among the parties to the protocol reflected not only the divergency of views on whether or not the protocol covers the use of riot control agents and herbicides, but also whether the General Assembly is an appropriate or competent body to interpret international law as embodied in a treaty.

PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING UNDERSTANDING

Since then Japan, which, like the United States, was one of the original signatories in 1925, has ratified the protocol. In the debates in the Diet, the Japanese Government made clear its view that the use in war of riot control agents was not prohibited. Japan did not formally transmit its view to other parties. We propose to follow the same procedure.

We have chosen to handle our understanding in this way because we believe this to be a question of setting forth our views on a disputed issue. We do not believe that a formal reservation would be appropriate. A reservation is used by a country ratifying or acceding to a treaty when that country does not wish to undertake all of the obligations set forth in that treaty. Because we do not believe that the protocol imposes any obligations concerning the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides, it would be both unnecessary and inappropriate for the United States to enter a reservation on this point.

Occasionally a country transmits to the depositary government, along with its instrument of ratification or accession, a formal statement explaining its interpretation. It does this to insure that all states party to a treaty will be aware of its interpretation of the obigations it is undertaking. We are not proposing that this procedure be followed in this case for two reasons: First, as a result of our public

statements at the United Nations and elsewhere, as well as the position set out in the documents transmitted to the Senate along with the protocol, the international community is already well aware of our interpretation. Second, if we did enter a formal interpretation, other states parties might feel obligated to take exception to our statement in order to preserve their own understanding of the protocol. We believe it is well understood that a difference of opinion exists among the parties on this point. We do not believe an exchange of conflicting formal positions at this time would contribute to a resolution of this issue.

I would also note that no party to the protocol thus far has made a formal interpretation or formal reservation with respect to riot control agents or herbicides. For these reasons I hope this committee, and the Senate as a whole, will also accept this approach.

RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND CHEMICAL HERBICIDES

I would like to emphasize in connection with riot control agents that the key words of the protocol-the phrases "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases"-are far from clear in resolving whether the protocol was intended to apply to "all other" or "similar other" gases. The equally authentic French language text uses the words "gaz similaires". This has caused a good deal of conflict among the signatories.

The CHAIRMAN. To make the record clear, that sentence does not stop at "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases." The protocol reads, "Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating poisonous or other gases." which you have quoted. Then it goes right on to say, "and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world: . .

I think that whole sentence ought to be included.

Secretary ROGERS. That is perfectly satisfactory, Mr. Chairman. As you know, there has been a good deal of debate on this subject over the years. As a matter of fact, the French Government construes those words as meaning "other" gases, whereas I believe the Belgians say "similar" gases.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me the words, at least as it is printed in English, "analogous liquids, materials or devices," are very broad language, whatever the French may think about it.

Secretary ROGERS. I think you can argue it both ways, there is no question about that.

It is our view that the protocol was not intended to cover the ugo in war of riot control agents. The United States Representative to the Preparatory Commission for the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1930 stated that:

I think there would be considerable hesitation on the part of many governments to bind themselves to refrain from the use in war, against any enemy, of agencies which they have adopted for peacetime use against their own population, agencies adopted on the ground that, while causing temporary inconvenience, they cause no real suffering or permanent disability, and are thereby more clearly humane than the use of weapons to which they were formerly obliged to resort in time of emergency.

The Preparatory Commission report itself noted it was "unable to express a definite opinion of the question of interpretation" on whether the protocol should cover tear gas. This issue remains unresolved today among the parties.

It is difficult to see how it can be argued, however, that the words "other gases," plus the phrase, which you referred to a moment ago, Mr. Chairman, "all analogous liquids, materials or devices"-all of which were taken from the Treaty of Versailles of 1919were intended to cover the use in war of chemical herbicides. Chemical herbicides were, of course, not in general use until the late 1940's. And, most significantly, the negotiating history does not suggest any intention to cover the general class of antiplant, as opposed to antipersonnel, chemicals.

Our position on both riot control agents and chemical herbicides is, of course, without prejudice to the position the United States might take in any future international agreements dealing with chemical agents. Such agreements would have to be negotiated on the basis of all considerations which the parties might consider relevant at the

time.

EFFECT OF U.S. FAILURE TO RATIFY

The failure of the United States to ratify the protocol has obscured the leading role this country has played since World War I in urging the international community not to resort to chemical or biological warfare.

Widespread acceptance of the obligations of the protocol through formal ratification or adherence has been accepted as an important goal by all members of the United Nations. Our ratification would also constitute an important step in our efforts to seek further disarmament measures relating to development, production and stockpiling of biological warfare and chemical warfare agents.

We would hope to achieve at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, first, acceptance of the draft United Kingdom Convention banning all biological means of warfare; and, second, development of more effective controls over production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. However, until we have become a party to the protocol, our ability to guide and influence the development of these further measures-measnres which we consider important to our own security and to further progress in the arms control field-will be seriously undermined.

NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

The ratification of the Geneva Protocol will have no adverse effect on our national security. The security of the United States and its allies is dependent, not on our use of biological agents or our first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents, but, rather, on our ability to deter the use of these weapons against us. Therefore, ratification is very much in the interests of the United States. As I have indicated, the protocol is a vital part of existing restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons and a key step in the effort to develop more effective international arms control measures in this

area.

ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION WITH RESERVATION URGED

I believe it is of critical importance to our efforts in this area that the United States now become a party to the protocol. Accordingly, I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification with the reservation proposed by the President.