Mr. NUTTER. The policy of the administration as enunciated by the President at the end of last year, Mr. Chairman, is that there will be no expansion or extension of the existing herbicide programs on the part of this Government without his approval and authority.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You should be able to determine whether or not we are supplying them with these weapons; should you not? Mr. NUTTER. We certainly are not currently supplying herbicides. The CHAIRMAN. We are not what?

Mr. NUTTER. We are not currently.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean you have been in the past, but are discontinuing it?

Mr. NUTTER. I would have to get the precise information on that point.

The CHAIRMAN. You could supply that for the record precisely? Mr. NUTTER. I would be glad to supply it.

(The information referred to follows:)

HERBICIDES AND RCA'S: U.S. TRAINING OF AND SUPPLYING TO SOUTH

VIETNAMESE

(Supplied by Department of Defense)

In the past herbicide agents were tranferred to the custody of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) upon arrival in that country. All shipping of herbicides to South Vietnam, however, has ceased and any further U.S. assistance will require Presidential authorization. The GVN does currently possess some herbicide stocks and spray equipment.

Riot control agents (RCA's) are currently being supplied to the GVN along with other types of equipment and weapons.

No formal training in the use of herbicides is presently being given to the South Vietnamese. There is some limited training in the use of riot control agents.

HERBICIDES AND TEAR GAS SHIPPED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us the amount of herbicides that have been shipped to Southeast Asia in recent years? Do you have that available in the Department?

Mr. NUTTER. Yes, sir. I am not sure we have the exact figures on shipment, but we do have figures on procurements, and we can supply that information to you.

The CHAIRMAN. You could give us the amounts of both herbicides and CS, which have been shipped each year for the last, say, 4 or 5 years.

Mr. NUTTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of tear gas, would you indicate the amounts of each type of tear gas munitions. I understand some of these are very large bombs. I mean it is delivered by bombs weighing as much as 200 or 500 pounds; is that correct?

Mr. NUTTER. I am not sure of the exact size of those, but we can provide that information for the record, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Put it in the record. I think it will be very useful in the record of the hearings.

Mr. NUTTER. I will, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

1 Upon the discontinuance of orange use in Vietnam, somewhat under 1,000,000 gallons of orange was halted in transit and is being stored presently in the United States.

2 This amount was procured for testing at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

USE OF TEAR GAS AND HERBICIDE IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA

The CHAIRMAN. Have tear gas and/or herbicides been used in Laos and Cambodia?

Mr. NUTTER. There have been no uses that I am aware of in Cambodia. There have been some uses, I understand, in Laos.

The CHAIRMAN. Of which, of gas?

Mr. NUTTER. Of herbicides.

The CHAIRMAN. Of herbicides.

FIELD STUDIES OF HERBICIDE PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

Could you tell us what field studies have been made of the herbicide program in Vietnam?

Mr. NUTTER. Yes, sir. There have been a number of studies in the past.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

Mr. NUTTER. By representatives of the administration and by, I suppose we have this could I consult the experts?

The CHAIRMAN. They can sit up there by you if you would like. Mr. NUTTER. They have been made, as I understand it, by the State Department, the Department of Defense, and by the AAAS, the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us what the studies concluded with regard to the effect of the programs on the attitude of Vietnamese farmers? How did they react to the use of herbicides?

Mr. NUTTER. No, sir; I can't give you that information right off the top of my head; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any of your associates there who can advise you about that?

Mr. NUTTER. Just a moment. Yes, sir. Well, I can give you a very small capsule impression here. From the herbicide policy review study of 1968, it was discovered that there was some political and psychological effect on the population, particularly in the rural areas, that was attributed to the use of herbicides. There was a feeling that some of this adverse effect was also due to other conditions in the countryside, insects, and so on. In any event, there was such a reaction, but it was not considered to be sufficiently strong to overrule their use.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the study indicate that the crop destruction program had resulted in a significant denial of food surplus to the North Vietnamese or the Vietcong?

Mr. NUTTER. I can't answer that. Let me consult.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly. They can sit up by you if you would like.

Mr. NUTTER. According to that study, there was found to be a significant effect on the food supply of the enemy, and it would have had an effect, therefore, on their morale and fighting ability.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Rand studies on herbicide indicate the same thing? Was it in agreement with the study that you referred to in May of 1968? Was that by the State Department?

Mr. NUTTER. Yes, sir; I believe it was. I regret I cannot comment on the degree of agreement between the studies because I am not familiar with the results of the Rand study.

The CHAIRMAN. I have been informed that the Rand study reaches the opposite conclusion, that the data that have been gathered suggest that the crop destruction program has not in any major sense denied food to the Vietcong. This again goes to whether this is a marginal weapon and whether it really is worth all the adverse reactions from the farmers.

Mr. NUTTER. I think we will know

CLASSIFICATION OF RAND STUDIES QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand why, in view of the subject before us, these Rand studies should be considered classified or con

fidential. I don't know why this kind of a study in any way endangers the security of our troops; do you?

Mr. NUTTER. I don't know what is in the study, sir, precisely; so I am not able to comment on why it should be classified. Of course, the originating office, the classifying office, would have to rule on it.

CAN RAND STUDIES BE DECLASSIFIED?

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us whether they can be declassified? It seems to me now that the war is about to be over, you ought to be able to declassify this information.

Mr. NUTTER. Yes, sir; we will make an inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you see if they can be declassified?

Mr. NUTTER. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

POSSIBILITY OF DECLASSIFYING RAND STUDIES (STATEMENT BY DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE)

The Rand studies will be reviewed for possible declassification. Some data on herbicide operations have already been declassified, and possibility of declassifying others is being studied. At present, for example, the herbicide policy review study of 1968 is undergoing such a review. Most and probably all of these studies will become available to the public as soon as military security permits.

The CHAIRMAN. Taking up this protocol was not intended to be directed against the war in Vietnam, but since it is the major war going on, it could be instructive to what is the proper course for us to pursue in dealing with the protocol. The protocol has been here 45 years, and this is, we hope, the last of a long time.

ADEQUACY OF PAST AND PRESENT STUDIES

Mr. NUTTER. I would, if I might, Mr. Chairman, just make this point, that we know there have been studies. We have made studies. Other people have made studies. We do not consider that any of these has provided an adequate review of the situation needed to make a final decision on such an important issue as renouncing the use of herbicides. We feel that the studies now underway, including one by the National Academy of Sciences will be more carefully conducted and will therefore give better answers to these questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I misunderstood your opening statement then. In your statement, you say the following:

The most exhaustive study and review of policy on military use of chemical and biological agents ever undertaken in this country.

That would indicate a very far-reaching study has been done. Mr. NUTTER. Yes, sir. We have undertaken a very far-reaching study, but it hasn't accomplished everything. We had to attend to those subjects which were most critical and important, and they had to do with lethal and incapacitating chemical agents, biological agents, and toxins. Of course, we have investigated the questions of riot control agents and of herbicides, but we don't believe that the evidence that has been gathered to this time is adequate for a careful dispassionate judgment on this subject.

POINT OF INQUIRY ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS OF HERBICIDES

The CHAIRMAN. I am really trying at the moment to develop the herbicide point of view for various reasons. The subject has, I think, great public appeal. To go out and deliberately do what we have inadvertently done to ourselves through the use of pesticides, I think, has appealed to the public mind. It has to mine. Unless these are really useful and really effective, it would again strike me as being commonsense to agree to prohibit them. If it is a fact that the studies are of the view that this has had a marginal effect, that it really hasn't seriously denied the enemy food, that this was an exercise in futility, then I would think that the administration could be persuaded to withdraw their objection to prohibiting herbicides. This was really the only point of the inquiry, because I have a very grave doubt from what I have read that they have been really effective in denying food to the enemy. They certainly have managed apparently to keep going a pretty long time in spite of all our use of herbicides.

Mr. NUTTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We had these same problems arising here. We are discovering now that the use of pesticides and herbicides on our crops is having fallout effects in poisoning the streams and elsewhere. This is causing great concern among our own people. This is not by design, but inadvertent. It is because we didn't know enough, in other words, when we started using them, and they are reviewing that very seriously in the domestic scene. It seems to me quite proper to review and to consider most seriously the effect of these herbicides upon the farmers, upon the political situation and economic situation in a country such as Vietnam. I would hope you could make this exhaustive study available to the committee, all that you have, and see if in our consultation process maybe we can refine the matter to reach the best decision possible.

OTHER USES OF HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM

Mr. NUTTER. May I comment for a moment on the herbicide question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. NUTTER. Herbicides have been used for crop destruction. That was only one use, and I might point out that is one use that has now ceased by orders from this administration. Herbicides are no longer being used for that purpose because there have been suspicions about possible dangerous side effects, but there are other important uses of herbicides.

For instance, in the case of Senator Aiken's takeoff from the airport, if there had been sufficient time, I think herbicides could have made sure that the path was clear for that takeoff so that the enemy wouldn't be there and so on.

The herbicides have been used primarily to improve surveillance of the enemy; to reduce the danger of ambush along lines of communication; to improve defenses around fire support bases, base camps, and other installations; to help locate the enemy communications network; to reduce enemy freedom of movement; to detect enemy base areas; and to assist in reconnaissance. These have been the primary uses, not crop destruction.