So that it seems to us that to say now that it is clear that the language applied to antiplant weapons is not accurate. Maybe it should. That is a perfectly arguable position, but certainly at the time of the Versailles Treaty and this Geneva Protocol, no one was talking about protection of plants, they were talking about protection of people.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, I am shown from "The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons," the document prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I will read page 37 for the record.

In 1924 the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, whose report served as a preparatory document for the 1925 Geneva Conference, examined the effect of gas and biological agents on plants. It concluded that only the latter could be used against plants. (League of Nations, Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments (1924), p. 28.) This conclusion, besides explaining why anti-plant chemicals were not discussed at the Geneva Conference, indicates that the draftsman of the Protocol cannot be assumed to have wished to limit its scope to anti-personnel chemicals.

WORLD COURT OPINION IN VIEW OF NEW DEVELOPMENT SUGGESTED

I did not wish to argue with you in that sense. It is simply to suggest that perhaps because of this new development it might simplify the whole matter if the World Court might be brought in to it and everyone who is already a member or who subscribes to it could then feel that they had a universal agreement. Instead of prolonging the matter, it might shorten it. I hope you would consider that approach. Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, we will consider it. I think a better prospect would be an agreement amongst the nations themselves, because if the World Court gave an advisory opinion, although we think it is authoritative, it is not mandatory, it still would not be binding on the part

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have explored it I think quite well. I wonder if I may ask this question.

LAG IN U.S. INTEREST AND CONCERN

I notice reference is made several times to the fact that the United States was an original signatory and initial sponsor. If that is true, why have we lagged in our interest and concern in later years? This was initiated in 1925; was it not?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct, and it was before the Senate from 1925 to 1947. And I think it is only fair to say that this committee approved it in 1926. So this committee acted with expedition.

The CHAIRMAN. We always do that. [Laughter.]

Senator SPARKMAN. I think most of us on this committee can say we were not on it at that time. I believe Senator Aiken and Senator Fulbright would be the only two. I think Senator Fulbright came on as a brand new member in 1947.

The CHAIRMAN. 1949.

Senator AIKEN. I never heard of it before.

TEN-MONTH DELAY IN SUBMISSION TO SENATE

Senator SPARKMAN. I think we all can excuse ourselves. We were not members of the committee in those days. The President brought up

this question in 1969, I believe. It was in 1969 that he announced that he was planning to take these steps. Then, it was 10 months before it was submitted to the Senate. Was there any particular reason for that 10 months' delay? I am not trying to be critical.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, there was one subject that was neglected in the study and that was toxins-whether we could consider toxins along with other biological weapons or not, and whether we would refuse to use toxins in the event of an attack against us by biological weapons. And after additional study we concluded that we would bar the use of toxins even in the event of an attack against us by toxins.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is included in the final recommendation? Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Now that is not a part of the protocol and not explicitly part of our proposed no-first-use reservation. It is just a statement by the President of our national policy. We will not use biological weapons, including toxins, in retaliation of first strike against us even if the first strike is with biological weapons or toxins.

PROPOSED RESERVATIONS BY UNITED STATES AND OTHERS

Senator SPARKMAN. You gave us the essence or maybe you read the reservation that is recommended.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not ask you to repeat it. But I note that several other countries have proposed reservations, too; have they not? Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do they not all follow pretty much the same line, not the same wording but the same principle?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, it is really all the same. All these reservations are reservations saying in effect that this protocol does not bar retaliation against the first strike.

Senator SPARKMAN. They reserve the right to defend themselves against attacks that are in violation of this protocol?

Secretary ROGERS. That is right. Our reservation plus the President's statement about biological weapons means that we will not retaliate except with chemical weapons. We will not use biological weapons regardless of the nature of the attack against us.

USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN PAST WARS

Senator SPARKMAN. This had been agreed to by a great number of nations at the time of World War II; had it not?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was there any violation during World War II?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, we do not have any verification of violations in World War II. We are inclined to think there were no violations in World War II.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course poisonous gases were extensively used during World War I?

Secretary ROGERS. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. In a beginning nature.

Secretary ROGERS. There are unverified reports of use of chemicals in a couple of instances, but not during the war, not during World War II.

Senator JAVITS. If the Senator would yield, I may be able to help on that.

That was my branch of the service and I was deputy planning officer. I do not recall any verified important use of chemical agents in war; there were mistakes in the use of gas. Occasionally a shell might have been confused with other shells, but it was very inconsequential and on the whole it absolutely struck us on the inside with awe that there was no slip-up. The mutual restraint of both sides and this is all it was, mutual restraint, prevailed.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, we had it ready.

Senator JAVITS. Yes.

Senator SPARK MAN. We had it in reach.

Senator JAVITS. We did.

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe they said the biggest chemical warfare arsenal that had ever been built was built at my home town during World War II.

Senator JAVITS. Huntsville.

Senator SPARKMAN. At one time during the war I was in Belgium near the frontlines and I saw some of the shells that came from Huntsville Arsenal in the ammunition dumps there.

When the war was over we had to get rid of all of those chemicals. A great part of it I think we dumped into the sea and the other we sent over to Arkansas. I guess it is still over there. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Pine Bluff Arsenal.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. That has been turned over to the making of missiles and space vehicles.

I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

PROPOSED UNDERSTANDING PROHIBITING USE IN WAR OF CHEMICAL

HERBICIDES

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Secretary, you are familiar with the understanding proposed by Senator Nelson of Wisconsin:

At the end of the resolution of ratification, insert the following: It is the understanding of the Senate, which understanding inheres in its advice and consent to the ratification of the Protocol, that the terms of the Protocol prohibit the use in war of chemical herbicides.

Do you support the amendment?

Secretary ROGERS. No. Senator, as I have indicated, we do not support that amendment.

Senator AIKEN. You would not support that.

Since the adoption of the Geneva Protocol do you know of any other nations except the United States which have used herbicides? Secretary ROGERS. The only other problem is the one we are talking about is riot control agents. In the case of herbicides, I do not believe I mentioned that we are phasing out the use of herbicides in Vietnam. We are using them very carefully.

The Defense Department can explain with more detail about the use. But we are phasing them out in an orderly way. We do not use them for crop destruction at all any more.

ORDER NOT TO USE DEFOLIANTS ON RUBBER PLANTATIONS

Senator AIKEN. In that respect I was given information the other day by a person owning a foreign-made car, a Mercedes, here in the United States. He had to have a new tire. The tires were Michelin tires and they could not buy another Michelin tire. A communication with the company in France indicated that the source of natural rubber supply for this company, which was in Indochina, had been destroyed by the Americans using herbicides and defoliants.

I asked a representative of the Defense Department if this was so. He said strict orders had been issued not to use defoliants on these rubber plantations, but he did not say when the order was issued.

Do you know when it was issued and whether it has been observed and whether defoliants had been used on the rubber plantations in South Vietnam?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, rubber plantations have not been defoliated even though they have been used by the North Vietnamese and VC. There have been a few accidental sprayings which occurred in the early years of the program, but the plantations have recovered and now they are operating at 95 percent of their normal production. There has been very little really accidental damage to the rubber plantations and when you talk to those who have been involved in this they point out that there are two ways to defoliate.

One is to use herbicides and another is to chop down the foliage, including trees. And they say that in most instances the trees recover. In fact that is one of the reasons they have to use herbicides periodically. They want to keep the place defoliated and it also apparently does not kill very much of the smaller growth; so it is certainly not a desirable thing as far as the ecology is concerned, but I think it is probably better than the alternative.

Senator AIKEN. I am advised by one of the staff that much of this damage occurred in Cambodia, but the difficulty comes in proving whose planes did this damage. It was assumed they were our planes. The question I asked was when was the order issued not to use defoliants on rubber plantations?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, the order

Senator AIKEN. General Vogt told me such an order had been issued, a strict order. I was wondering when.

Secretary ROGERS. I am sure it was before Cambodia, before the incursion of Cambodia, but he will be here. You can ask him the date of the order. I do not know the exact date of the order.

COMPENSATION TO PROPERTY OWNERS NOT INVOLVED IN WAR

Senator AIKEN. If damage had been done to property owned by citizens of another country which was not involved in the war, would we be responsible for recompensing them?

Secretary ROGERS. I think maybe what you have reference to is a claim by Prince Sihanouk that he made several years ago about defoliation of a rubber plantation. Senator Mansfield spoke to us and we had an investigation underway of that claim and we were going to negotiate with him and if it was verified we were going to compensate him, but there have been a lot of events since then so I do not know where we stand on that.

Senator AIKEN. I have not heard a thing from Prince Sihanouk in this regard.

Secretary ROGERS. I am saying probably the reference you have is to that instance because we have not had any claims from the Cambodians to this effect since Lon Nol's administration. I think this goes back to the time that Sihanouk made a claim against us and he talked, he wrote to Senator Mansfield about it and we investigated, in fact. Senator Mansfield was there; he talked to Sihanouk about it.

Senator AIKEN. This complaint came from a good American citizen who had to have a spare Michelin tire and found out you cannot fit an American tire to this foreign-made car. You have to get a whole set of American tires instead, which would be rather expensive.

I did not know to what extent we were responsible for this situation. If you get the owners of the Mercedes and the other foreign cars all up in arms in this country, you have another problem.

EXTENT OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY DEFOLIATION

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, I gather you think that the defoliation causes little permanent damage. There have been articles in the paper saying that we have been responsible for very widespread destruction of forests. Is that not correct? Could you put a statement in the record?

Secretary ROGERS. There have been articles in the paper. I do not want to take the position that there is no permanent damage. I think it is one of those questions that has not been decided yet.

As a matter of fact, President Nixon has asked that we-in fact, he has ordered a study made of the effects of herbicides in Vietnam and we are going to have a very active study underway and we are going to send people out to do the best we can to determine the effect of herbicides in Vietnam because it is an important subject not only for the present, but for the future.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have any information about it, I think it would be good to have it in the record if you could submit it.

Secretary ROGERS. I think at the moment it is pretty inconclusive, but as soon as we do have this study completed, we are going to do it as fast as we can, I will be happy to submit it to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. If you could submit whatever you have on it, it would be relevant at least to this question.

Secretary ROGERS. We do have some preliminary studies that I will be glad to submit to the committee.

(The following information was subsequently supplied.)

We understand, in response to a written request from the Committee, the Department of Defense has provided several studies relating to the use of chemical herbicides in Vietnam. No additional studies are expected to be available until the completion of the study being undertaken by the National Academy of Sciences, pursuant to agreement with the Department of Defense as required by Section 506 (c) of Public Law 91-441. This study will be transmitted to the Congress not later than March 1, 1972.

(Committee staff note: As of the date of publication, October, 1972, the study referred to had not been received.)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.