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Protocol, that the terms of the Protocol prohibit the use in war of chemical herbicides."

If the Senate should adopt that as a part of its resolution or should add to it or, alternatively, adopt a provisions of the same sort in regard to herbicides and riot control agents, then this would be a part of the approval. The Senate then would not have approved the treaty with the same interpretation the administration has put upon the protocol.

In this case, would the President complete the adherence of the United States to the treaty with the Senate's interpretation on it? Would the President do that or would the President not do it?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, our position is that we oppose.
Senator CASE. I know.

Secretary ROGERS. Such an interpretation.

Senator CASE. What the committee and the Senate are faced with is the question of how important does the administration regard its interpretation. I am just trying to find out how the administration would react to a course that the Senate might follow and how the Senate should guide itself in acting on the Geneva Protocol. The Senate would be influencd by a knowledge that the President would or would not complete the consummation of the protocol with certain interpretations on it. Thus, the Senate would know what answer to make to the question are we killing or not killing a treaty? Are we sacrificing the better for the best?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, no, I think all of us in the Cabinet have to be careful about predicting for sure what a President will do because lots of things can happen between now and that time. But we strongly oppose this interpretation and I think it is fair to say if that interpretation was included it would jeopardize, might well kill, our adherence to the protocol.

I can't say it any stronger than that.

Senator CASE. You don't absolutely say it, but you think that the President would not deposit the protocol if this interpretation were made part of it.

Secretary ROGERS. That is my judgment.

Senator CASE. I appreciate that you have undoubtedly gone as far as you can in response to my question.

Senator COOPER. Would the Senator yield?

Senator CASE. Yes.

POSSIBILITY OF CHARGE OF VIOLATION LACKING RESERVATION

Senator COOPER. Conversely, if a reservation is not made a formal declaration with the repository that we do not include tear gas and herbicides, other countries could charge that we are violating the protocol in Vietnam: they could make such a charge. I don't know what they could do about it; they could charge a violation and could submit it to the International Court for an opinion; is that correct? Secretary ROGERS. Well, they can charge it but having made it clear before our hearings I don't believe we would have a problem. Japan has done that; Australia has done it, and I don't believe we have a problem. We might have propaganda attacks against us. In terms of international law this is a question of how we would interpret our

obligations under the protocol-so the rest of the world knows what our understanding is. We are not kidding anybody or misleading anybody; we are stating it clearly.

APPROVAL OF PROTOCOL AS PRESENTED

Senator CASE. It would certainly be the administration position if the Senate approves the protocol as presented, considering your interpretation and your view of what the protocol means, you would say to all of the world, including Members of the Senate, that the Senate had accepted that interpretation n?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir; you would not necessarily have agreed to it but accepted it.

Senator CASE. And approved the protocol as so interpreted.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir. I do want to make it clear that you don't necessarily have to agree with the interpretation but you do agree with our presentation and you acquiesced to the ratification with that understanding.

Senator CASE. We would be giving our advice and consent to the President's making an agreement with his interpretation upon it. Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator CASE. And, therefore, in effect certainly we would have given our advice and consent. While we might be unhappy about it, we still would have given our advice and consent.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

OTHER NATIONS' WARTIME USE OF TEAR GAS AND HERBICIDES

Senator CASE. Gases and herbicides were not used in World War II, as has been brought out by you and by my colleague from New York. Have any other nations than the United States used either tear gas or herbicides in time of war? That is a rather serious matter. I understand the UAR is charged with having used certain gases in Yemen. Has any other country besides the United States used either tear gas or herbicides in time of war?

Secretary ROGERS. There have been some few instances. I think I prefer, if you don't mind, to submit the statement for the record on that point.

Senator CASE. I would be very happy to have you do that. In general hasn't the war in Vietnam brought this issue to a head?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, although I think there was some use of it for riot control in Korea.

(The information referred to follows:)

USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS OR CHEMICAL HERBICIDES IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

There are no fully documented instances of use of riot control agents or chemical herbicides by other governments in international armed conflicts (other than the Vietnam conflict) although some uses have been reported from time to time. Both agents have allegedly been used in civil wars or in overseas territories. Tear gas was used to some degree by both sides in World War I.

Senator CASE. Senator Javits, would you like to go ahead now?

PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR SUBMISSION OF PROTOCOL

Senator JAVITS. Yes. Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say the reason that this matter is brought up now after so many years is that the President considers it an element of the total effort to arrive at limitations of armament by the United States?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct, a very major step.

Senator JAVITS. And you were in full charge of this; nobody is giving you orders on this matter?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I would say the President is in full charge of it. I am next in line, if that is what you mean.

Senator JAVITS. Good.

Senator CASE. You come after the Speaker of the House, as I re-. member.

Senator JAVITS. Not in this case. He comes right after the President.

Secretary ROGERS. I will say seriously I have been a strong supporter of this position. I think we should have done it many years ago, and I think it is a very important step. I strongly support it personally.

Senator JAVITS. Doesn't it tie in also, Mr. Secretary, with the new development of the atom as an instrument of war? In other words, you no longer have to worry about retaliation with refined horrors like this. You have thermonuclear weapons and that has become the predominant balance of terror?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir; that is certainly a very major factor in the picture and I think that is one of, not necessarily the only, but that is one of the considerations that entered into our thinking in terms of renouncing the use of retaliation by biological weapons. We thought that if we were under attack with chemical and biological weapons that we would have other weapons that we could use other than biological weapons, because biological weapons have such a terrible permeating impact on the civilian population. It is a delayed effect. Disease may break out a month later and it may cover the whole society. So we thought that by taking initiative in this field and making it clear we thought biological weapons were such awesome and horrible weapons for the population as a whole that we might encourage others to disavow the use and even agree that they would not manufacture and produce biological weapons.

So that you are absolutely right, nuclear weapons and chemical weapons are major developments which we think make even the contemplation of the use of biological weapons a horror.

Senator JAVITS. So in the lexicon of war, even as used by the super powers, you feel that we and even the Soviet Union wish to stop short of measures which endanger really the survival of civilization as such, no matter what country wins?

Secretary ROGERS. That is our position. We would hope that is the position of the Soviet Union.

Senator JAVITS. That is the philosophical basis for what you are presenting to us now?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

NO QUESTION OF U.S. SECURITY BEING JEOPARDIZED

Senator JAVITS. Is it a fact also that there is really no question involved of U.S. security being jeopardized?

I must tell you as one who had a lot to do with this in other days, there was then a big question of security involved. That is why we had these enormous stocks and training and spent, I suppose, hundreds of millions during the war. Then it was a matter of elementary security. Now you would remove the security consideration; would you not?

Secretary ROGERS. I don't think it has any security consideration at all.

Senator JAVITS. Indeed, if there is any security question now, it is how you are going to get rid of the stuff.

Secretary ROGERS. That is right.

SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. RATIFICATION

Senator JAVITS. Finally, in view of the fact that this is brought up as an element, kind of obsolescent armament and, therefore, of limitation of armament, could we find out-has this in any way been cranked into the negotiations in respect of limitations of armaments with the Soviet Union? Do we have any idea as to what the Soviet reaction will be to this kind of ratification?

Secretary ROGERS. No, I don't think we have.

Mr. FARLEY. I think we do have indications, Senator, of the Soviet reaction. It is clear that the Soviet Union will welcome U.S. action to ratify the Geneva Protocol. We can expect continued propaganda attacks on the fact that we do not agree that riot control agents and chemical herbicides are included. I don't think that will affect their attitude toward the basic action.

Senator JAVITS. They will, you feel, express satisfaction with the basic adherence to it?

Secretary ROGERS. They may not express it, but they have indicated they hope we do. I don't think it would be fair to leave the impression we have had any understanding with them about what they might do in the event that we adhere to the protocol. On the other hand, I think the more we do along these lines the easier it is to take the next step, and here we are the last major nation that has not ratified the protocol and I think the fact we are on the threshold of doing this will strengthen our disarmament program.

APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE

Senator JAVITS. I agree, of course, with the President in this and, as a matter of fact, wrote a letter with other Senators greatly approving his initiative and I ask unanimous consent that that letter may be made a part of the record.

Senator SPARKMAN. Without objection it may be a part of the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

58-743-72- 4

U.S. SENATE, Washington, D.C., December 3, 1969. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We believe that your statement of November 25, 1969 setting forth a new United States policy with respect to chemical and biological weapons will rank in our country's history as one of the most important arms control initiatives of this century and reflects great credit upon the nation and upon you. Your decision to renounce the use of biological weapons and to dispose of existing stock-piles, to extend the renunciation of "first use" of chemical weapons to include incapacitating chemicals as well as lethal chemicals, your decision to resubmit the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and your endorsement of the principles and objectives of the United Kingdom Draft Convention-all are in our highest tradition of statesmanship.

This reassertion of the moral and humanitarian leadership of the United States on pressing world issues comes also at an opportune moment. We share the hope that your declaration of November 25, 1969 will give added encouragement to the negotiators of the United States and the Soviet Union who are now conducting the strategic arms limitations talks in Helsinki.

As Senators, Mr. President, we wish to record our gratification that your policy decision with respect to chemical and biological weapons reflects so closely the principles voted by the Senate and goes even beyond what we proposed in the form of amendments to the recent military procurement measure. With our personal best wishes,

Respectively,

William B. Saxbe, Jacob K. Javits, Charles E. Goodell, Clifford P.
Case, Mark O. Hatfield, Hugh Scott, Richard S. Schweiker, James
B. Pearson, Edward W. Brooke, Marlow W. Cook, Charles H.
Percy, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Len B. Jordan, John Sherman
Cooper, Robert W. Packwood, J. Caleb Boggs, Robert P. Griffin,
Howard H. Baker, Jr., Ralph T. Smith, Robert Dole, Clifford P.
Hansen, Ted Stevens, Paul J. Fannin, George Murphy, Henry
Bellmon, Milton R. Young, John G. Tower, George D. Aiken,
Roman L. Hruska, Carl T. Curtis, Gordon Allott, Hiram L. Fong,
Norris Cotton, Edward J. Gurney, and Winston L. Prouty.

RUSSIAN REACTION TO PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE

Senator JAVITS. Do you think they are likely to follow with an announcement of a similar interpretation regarding these two items, tear gas and herbicides?

Secretary ROGERS. No: I think my judgment is that they will not. Senator JAVITS. They will just use the tear gas and herbicide issue to beat us over the head with it?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct. I think if they had that then they would be giving us in their eyes undue credit for the initiative we have taken, so the likelihood is they will criticize us for not including tear gas and herbicides.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S EVALUATION OF NEED FOR RESERVATION

Senator JAVITS. We have a right to assume, have we not, that the President and the Secretary, our general apparatus of government in the executive department, has scrupulously and carefully evaluated the need for this reservation and certifies to us that (1) it is essential in their judgment to our national security interest, and (2) that weighing the propaganda, the adverse propaganda benefit against the substance of this interpretation, intention of the right to use these instruments in connection with war, that you ask us and advise us that the

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