weight is definitely on the side of making this interpretation as required in the national interest and in the national security?

Secretary ROGERS. That is the administration position, Senator, exactly.

U.S. RENUNCIATION OF PRODUCTION AND STORAGE

Senator COOPER. Not only has the United States renounced any biological agents with toxins, it has renounced the production and storage of these agents; is that correct?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct. The only exception would be a very minor production for defensive purposes so that we can tell how to defend ourselves against it in the event an enemy uses it against us. But with that very minor exception we will not have any biological weapons and we will not stockpile any and we will not have any research programs leading to offensive weapons in this field.

HAVE SOVIETS RENOUNCED FIRST OR SECOND USE?

Senator COOPER. There have been stories from time to time in the papers, and I think also in statements made by the Soviet Union that the Soviets have produced and are in possession of agents which could be very destructive to human life. Has the Soviet Union made any similar renunciation of the use, either first or second use of these agents?

Secretary ROGERS. While they are a party to the protocol, they have not renounced retaliatory use of any agents. As I have indicated, I do not expect that they will.

Senator COOPER. I followed Senator Javits' leading question a while ago. You have had a great part to do with this development of this position; haven't you?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir.

MUTUAL FREEZE ON DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS

Senator COOPER. I want to ask one other question. When the SALT talks began 2 years ago, the Senate adopted by a vote of 72 to 6 a resolution which came out of this committee that asked for a freeze on the further deployment of all defensive and offensive strategic weapons. The freeze was to apply for the duration of the talks and perhaps permanently. Why would not a freeze on further deployments of offensive and defensive strategic weapons be a good procedure to follow during the fourth round of talks? It is obvious that the continued deployments of strategic weapons would make any possible SALT agreement more difficult.

Has a mutual freeze been considered?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir; that has been considered. It is a very, fairly involved subject. I would be glad to discuss it sometime.

Let me say, because I am sure you don't want to get into a long discussion, the problem really is one of verification which goes to the heart of all of these disarmament problems. In a sense the proposals

that we make are in a way standstill proposals except in the areas that can't be verified.

In other words, we have made, as you know, proposals dealing with offensive and defensive missiles, but those proposals are dealing with matters that we can verify, and the difficulty with the other, there are a lot of things you can't verify. So we have given a great deal of thought to it and the position that the President has taken, I think, is a sound position and he referred to it again last night.

U.S. CONDITION CONCERNING MIRV LIMITATIONS

Senator COOPER. It is well known that you can't verify the production and deployment of MIRV. We have made that a condition, haven't we, on any MIRV limitations?

Secretary ROGERS. I didn't quite get the question.

Senator COOPER. We have proposed as a condition in the negotiation on verification of what the Soviet Union might be doing on MIRV which they will not accept; namely, we have said there must be onsite inspections.

Secretary ROGERS. That is right.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING HIGH SEAS AND SEABEDS

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, before you go, Senator Pell was not able to be here this morning, but he has given us nine questions to be submitted to you dealing primarily with the use of chemical and biological weapons with reference to the high seas and seabeds. I will give them to you and you can supply the answers for the record.

Secretary ROGERS. Very well, Mr. Chairman.

(The information referred to appears on p. 47.)

Senator SPARKMAN. I have about four questions here that I think can be answered very briefly. It won't take much more of your time.

REVIEW OF USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND CHEMICAL HERBICIDES

You refer in your statement to the initiation of a new review of the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in the Vietnam conflict.

Could you tell us something more about the kind of data which is expected? When do you expect a study to be completed and will you make this study available to the committee for its use in assessing the effectiveness and use of these agents?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, it is going to be a study conducted by those agencies primarily concerned, State, Defense, ACDA, the President's Science Adviser, and it will include a fairly comprehensive study which will deal with the effects on the ecology of use of these agents and their military usefulness, and we will make a study based on the effects that we find in Indochina, which is a good opportunity to try to find out as much as we can about the effects of herbicides, the different herbicides that have been used on the ecology, and we are going to start that right away.

The President has already decided on it and we are going to set up the group and get started soon.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you have any idea when it will be?
Secretary ROGERS. I can't give you

Senator SPARKMAN. Not even a guess?

Secretary ROGERS. We will do it as soon as we can.

Senator SPARKMAN. The results, I presume, will be available to this committee.

Secretary ROGERS. That is right.

U.S. POSITION CONCERNING TEAR GAS AND HERBICIDES

Senator SPARKMAN. If the United States is interested in strengthening barriers against chemical and biological weapons, why is it opting for the most restrictive interpretation as regards tear gas and herbicides? Why, before seeking new agreements, do we not first work to establish and clarify a broader interpretation of the protocol?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I have tried to make that clear in the answers I have given.

Senator SPARKMAN. These questions were written out before you gave that.

Secretary ROGERS. I understand. We think that the use of tear gas is more humane than other weapons we might use under similar circumstances. We think it protects in many instances the lives of the enemy and furthermore we think the use of tear gas protects American lives. And we fail to understand, we certainly don't accept the logic that says you can't use tear gas in the war, but you can use other ons which obviously are more lethal.

We just don't understand the logic of it.

weap

Secondly, we use tear gas as do many other nations, in domestic matters. Generally speaking we do. We do it for riot control. So we have difficulty understanding why there should be this drive to prevent its use in war. We are not saying that that is forever the position. If we can get to some agreement of some kind with other nations down the road a bit, then we will think about it.

Now, as far as herbicides are concerned, as I have said, we are phasing out the use of herbicides in Vietnam but we think that they are very useful in some instances.

For example, if you are traveling down a particular highway you can use herbicides to destroy the foliage along side to prevent ambushes. That is very useful. Or if you have a fire base and you defoliate the area around the fire base that protects our men in the fire base. If the enemy can come up under cover of the foliage, get very close to the fire base, it makes it much more dangerous for our men.

We respect the criticisms that have been made about the use of herbicides. We are trying to limit them very carefully. We don't think the use we are making of herbicides now has any serious impact on the ecology in the way we are using them and, therefore, we do not think it should be included.

Furthermore, we think that if we continue to argue about these two matters, it is probable that we won't adhere to the treaty at all and we have been talking about it and delaying it now since 1925, and our

position is let's go ahead and ratify and let's get the advice and consent of the Senate and deal with these other problems a bit down the road.

HUMANENESS OF WEAPONS AND POSSIBILITY OF CROSSING THRESHOLD

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary, you have said that in some cases use of antiriot weapons would be more humane than use of other weapons. That isn't necessarily a complete answer; is it? The same reasoning would be true of small nuclear weapons, which might well be more humane and less devastating and more directed to a particular target than great conventional weapons.

We do not use any kind of nuclear weapons because it is pretty generally felt that such action on our part would represent crossing a threshold. This is an important consideration which could apply to herbicides and tear gas, not just that in some cases these weapons might or might not be more humane than other weapons which might still be used.

Is that an analogy which has validity?

Secretary ROGERS. I think it has some. The point I was making is taking the case of a cave or tunnel.

Senator CASE. There is no question that in some cases these weapons would be humane, if humanely used. If you were going to flush people out and arrest them and put them in jail and treat them like normal prisoners that would be one thing.

If you are going to flush them out and then shoot them or if you use artillery shells filled with tear gas closely followed by antipersonnel weapons, then it would not be humane.

Much depends upon how the weapon is used.
Secretary ROGERS. That is right.

EFFECT OF RATIFICATION BASED ON ADMINISTRATION'S UNDERSTANDING

Senator SPARKMAN. Two more brief questions. If the United States were to ratify the protocol on the basis of your understanding, what would prevent other parties from charging the United States with violating the protocol by our use of tear gas in Vietnam?

Senator ROGERS. I think I have answered that precise question. Senator SPARKMAN. All right. You say that ratification of the protocol, and I quote your words, "strengthen the legal prohibitions against the use in war of chemical weapons."

If by our action we legitimize the use of tear gas and chemical herbicides in war, are we not in effect eroding the barriers against the chemical weapons?

Secretary ROGERS. No, I don't think so.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. At this time the committee stands in adjournment.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

STATE DEPARTMENT RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PELL

Question 1. Since the enactment of that provision (Sec. 409 (c) (2) of P.L. 91-121), what determinations has the Secretary of State made regarding the subject matter of that law?

Answer. By letter dated July 30, 1970, Acting Secretary Johnson notified the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House that no basis has been found for a determination that transport and ocean disposal of 418 vaults containing obsolete chemical munitions would violate international law:

On December 4, 1970, Acting Secretary Irwin notified the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House that he had found no basis for a determination that the shipment of lethal chemical agents from Okinawa to Johnston Island would violate international law. Secretary Rogers had previously sent a similar notification by letter dated February 27, 1970 in connection with the thenproposed shipment of such agents from Okinawa to the continental United States.

Question 2. How many times and on what occasions has the Secretary of Defense consulted with the Secretary of State regarding the testing, development, transportation, storage, or disposal of any chemical or biological agents outside the United States?

Answer. Such consultations take place on a continuing basis as warranted by the plans and foreseeable needs of the Department of Defense. The following specific communications have previously been reported in connection with the notifications referred to in the answer to Question 1:

On December 1, 1969 Secretary of State Rogers received a letter from Under Secretary of the Army, Thaddeus R. Beal, advising him on behalf of the Secretary of Defense the transportation requirements regarding the Defense Department plan to relocate to the Umatilla Army Depot, Hermiston, Oregon, certain chemical munitions and agents stored on Okinawa. This plan was not implemented. On July 23, 1970 Secretary Rogers received a letter from Assistant Secretary of the Army J. Ronald Fox, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, advising him of Department of Army plans to move chemical munitions and agents located on Okinawa to Johnston Island for storage.

On June 25, 1970 Secretary Rogers received a letter from Assistant Secretary of the Army J. Ronald Fox, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense advising him that due to the potential danger of continued storage and in the absence of a reasonable alternative other than sea disposal, the Army had decided to proceed with the ocean disposal of 418 vaults containing chemical munitions as soon as possible in an ocean dump site in the Blake Basin.

Officials of the Department of State met and discussed on a number of occasions the details of these plans and the Defense Department responded to detailed written inquiries from the Department of State regarding the proposed shipment and disposal plans.

Question 3. Presently are there any chemical or biological agents, either lethal or non-lethal, being carried on American ships on the high seas? If so, on what ships and for what purposes?

Answer. (The information referred to is classified and in the Committee files.) Question 4. In what locations have chemical and biological materials been dumped in international waters by the United States in the past ten years? Answer. We have been informed by the Defense Department that the United States has never disposed of biological agents at sea. Obsolete or unserviceable chemical munitions and agents have been disposed of in international waters in the past ten years by the United States in five instances. The dates and locations of operations in which obsolete hulks were scuttled are June 15, 1967latitude 39° 37.9 mins. N., longitude 70° 57.0 mins. W.; June 19, 1968--latitude 39° 38.5 mins. N., longitude 71° 02.2 mins. W.; and August 18, 1970-latitude 29° 23.1 mins. N., longitude 75° 58.0 mins. W. In addition, two other dumping operations on July 19, 1962 and August 6-7, 1964 disposed of chemical agents at latitude 38° 30 mins. N., longitude 72° 10 mins. W., and an undetermined location in the Atlantic Ocean respectively. While records do not indicate the location of the August 6-7, 1964 operation, it is believed that the chemical agents were disposed of in one of the designated disposal areas in the Atlantic Ocean: On August 7, 1968, a hulk containing conventional explosives and cylinders previously used to store chemical agents was scuttled at latitude 39° 32.7 mins. N., longitude 76° 00 mins. W.