Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Farley, do you have an additional statement or are you here to back up the Secretary?

STATEMENT OF MR. PHILIP J. FARLEY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. FARLEY. I have a statement, Mr. Chairman. I am prepared either to read it at this time or, if you wish, to proceed with questions. I can read it later, as you choose.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you not file it for the record?

Mr. FARLEY. I can file it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it you do not disagree with the Secretary? Mr. FARLEY. I support what the Secretary has said and spell out in some greater detail the meaning of this action for future arms control negotiations.

Secretary ROGERS. It is not a particularly long statement. Unless the chairman objects, I think it might be helpful to have Mr. Farley read it.

The CHAIRMAN. I assumed he supported you generally. If there is some additional distinction, proceed.

Mr. FARLEY. Thank you.

At the outset, I should like fully to associate myself and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with the statement just made by the Secretary of State. We believe that the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by the United States and the other policy decisions announced by the President regarding chemical and biological weapons will, while promoting our national interests, assist our efforts in the arms control and disarmament field. On behalf of an agency that has devoted considerable study to this subject over the past 10 years, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today.

I believe that I can most usefully supplement the Secretary's remarks by describing for you briefly the current international discussions concerning chemical and biological weapons and how U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol will affect continuing negotiations. in this field.

POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL RESTRAINTS

As Secretary Rogers explained, the Geneva Protocol is considered generally as a prohibition on the first use in war of chemical and biological weapons. The possibility of additional restraints on these weapons, that is restraints going beyond the protocol, has been one of the principal topics at multilateral arms control talks during the past few years. Proposals regarding these weapons were, of course, included in comprehensive disarmament plans and other proposals put forth since the Second World War. But only recently has there been intensive consideration of specific measures to supplement the protocol and promote further restraints in this field.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva, which reconvened on February 23, is continuing its efforts to achieve sound arms control measures for chemical and biological weapons. Two draft conventions and other proposals advanced at the

Geneva Conference and the United Nations are currently under discussion.

The United Kingdom has taken a lead in this area. Following up proposals it had put forward in 1968, the United Kingdom formally submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Committee in 1969, a detailed draft convention prohibiting biological methods of warfare and the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. The Soviet Union and its allies have proposed a draft convention providing a sweeping ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of both chemical and biological weapons. These draft conventions, and suggestions made by other members of the Disarmament Conference, were discussed extensively in Geneva last year. This year we expect that the question of restraints on chemical and biological weapons will attract more interest than any other arms control topic.

U.S. POLICY

In November 1969, when the President announced his decision to resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate, he also made clear that the United States would renounce the use, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons and would positively associate itself with the United Kingdom Draft Convention. We supported the United Kingdom Convention actively last year, and continue to do so at the CCD session now in progress. Since today we are discussing the 1925 Protocol, I do not propose to go into the details of the United Kingdom Convention and alternative proposals.

I would like to explain, however, that the basic differences in chemical and biological means of warfare have convinced us of the desirability of approaching them differently in further arms control negotiations. Biological weapons could have massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences. Their use could produce global epidemics and impair the health of future generations. These are some of the factors that have led us to renounce such weapons ourselves and to hope for early progress in concluding a treaty banning biological weapons. The United Kingdom draft convention provides a sound basis for multilateral negotiations to this end.

It is also our policy to cooperate in efforts to achieve effective restraints on chemical weapons through international agreements. In this connection we have worked with the utmost seriousness on the complex problems whose solutions may permit us in time to achieve further prohibitions on chemical weapons. The central problem here is that the maintenance of a retaliatory chemical warfare capability is considered by many states to be necessary for effective deterrence of the wartime use of such weapons by others. As President Nixon made clear in his recent message to the Geneva Conference, "unless countries can have assurance that other parties to an agreement will no longer possess chemical weapons, there will not be a basis for a sound and reliable arms control measure." Such assurance involves appropriate verification.

We in the Arms Control Agency have done extensive research into the problems of verification, including the relationship of chemical warfare agents and the commercial chemical industries, economic data monitoring as a possible supplementary means of verifying com

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pliance with a ban on chemical weapons, and both on-site and off-site inspection. Our preliminary findings have been presented in a number of technical working papers at the CCD. We expect to contribute additional papers to this year's sessions in Geneva. We cannot predict how long it will take to develop a reliable and widely acceptable system for verifying a chemical weapons ban. Much work remains to be done, both in our own internal studies and in the international discussions that will be taking place in Geneva.

BEARING OF U.S. RATIFICATION ON FUTURE PROSPECTS

Against this background, what is the bearing of the U.S. ratification of the protocol on future prospects?

There are now 96 states which are parties to the Geneva Protocol. This makes it one of the most universally recognized agreements restraining arms use. With the accession of Japan in 1970, all the major powers except the United States are parties to it. The United Nations Ceneral Assembly has in several recent resolutions called upon all states to adhere to its provisions. The United States has supported these resolutions. As President Nixon has said, "The United States has always observed the principles and objectives of the Protocol." The absence of the United States, one of the original signatories of the protocol, from the ranks of adhering states has been conspicuous. If there is one point on which there has been a broad consensus in recent debate in this field, it is that the Geneva Protocol is a measure which should receive universal support as a fundamental underpinning for any additional agreements on chemical and biological weapons. The nonaligned countries have emphasized this idea. The Soviet Union and its allies have taken the same position and have indicated that broad adherence to the protocol would facilitate progress on further measures. The basic importance of the Geneva Protocol is also clearly recognized in the preamble of the United Kingdom draft convention which we and the other NATO participants in these talks support.

From the perspective of the United States' interest in current arms control and disarmament negotiations, ratification of the Geneva Protocol would unquestionably be a positive step. It could only improve the prospects for further progress, and it would strengthen the voice of the United States in the forums where efforts to this end are being made.

Finally, ratification would promote the broad, long-range interest of the United States in working out effective arms control measures. In recent years we have played a leading role in helping to devise such measures.

As cochairman of the Geneva Disarmament Committee, at the United Nations, and in bilateral discussions, we have sought to negotiate sound agreements that would enhance our security and the security of all concerned. We are one of the depositary governments for several treaties dealing with nuclear weapons. We have actively encouraged the broadest possible adherence to them. The Geneva Protocol is one of the most significant international limitations on the use of weapons. The United States now is the only major power that is not a party to this agreement. It is thus entirely fitting, and consistent

with our past role and future expectations in the arms control field, that the United States, as the original sponsor of the Geneva Protocol, should join the 96 other states that are now parties.

This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Farley.

Mr. Secretary, I will try to clarify it a bit before we go to the questions.

PROPOSED RESERVATION

In your last line you say "ratification with the reservation proposed by the President." Is that reservation set out in so many words?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman, in my report to the President which is printed in Executive J, 91st Congress, 2d Session. It is the reservation that says this applies to first use. We would be prohibited from first use, but it would reserve our right to retaliate with chemical weapons in the event of attack against us by either chemical or biological weapons.

I might say that a reservation on no first use is included in many ratifications or accessions.

The CHAIRMAN. I was wondering, for the record, if the exact language could be inserted. Could you give it to the reporter or read it?

Secretary ROGERS. I can read it.

The reservation is: "That the said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of the United States with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, in regard to an enemy state if such state or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol."

So it reserves our right to retaliate in the event of a first use against us.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN LETHAL, INCAPACITATING, AND RIOT

CONTROL AGENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I note in your statement and in the President's statement that distinctions are made as between lethal, incapacitating and riot control agents. The language of the protocol, however, does not contain such terms. What is the significance of making this distinction?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, we pointed out and I pointed out in my statement, we think this protocol covers lethal and incapacitating agents, but not riot control agents, and I have attempted to explain in the prepared statement why that is so.

There is a difference of view on whether riot control agents are included or not-tear gas really is what we are talking about-and we feel it should not be included for the reasons that I have stated.

DEFINITION OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Can you or Mr. Farley define a riot control agent? Secretary ROGERS. Yes, we have a definition of it. I can give it to you in just one minute.

Before we get to the precise definition, what it is, of course, is tear gas, and we are talking about two kinds of tear gas that we use now, CS-1 and CS-2.

CS-1 is the kind of tear gas that is used by police in this country for riot control.

CS-2 has the same effect except it is a finer powder and it lasts longerin the area.

CS-1 has only a short time. CS-2 apparently permeates the foliage around and it lasts longer, but both of them have very temporary effects on humans and usually in terms of minutes, and it affects the eyes. The exception, of course and this has been pointed out in the press-the exception is that if the gas is applied too intensively for too long a period, then it causes blisters and burns. But in the ordinary case, it has a temporary effect and the temporary effect is not lasting. It creates no lasting injury.

The CHAIRMAN. This aspect of the dose raises some very difficult. questions of interpretation.

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, riot control agents are those of a type which are widely used by governments for law enforcement purposes, because in all but the most unusual circumstances they produce transient effects that disappear within minutes after removal from exposure.

any in

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned two types of gas. Is there stance of CS-2 being used in this country on domestic riots? Secretary ROGERS. I do not believe so. I do not believe that police departments use CS-2 in this country. They use CS-1. The reason is because CS-2, as I say, stays around longer and they use it in Vietnam because if you apply it in the perimeter of a fire base to prevent the enemy from attacking the fire base, it lasts for several days. But ordinarily, police departments do not have that need in this country for that kind of an agent.

The CHAIRMAN. This poses the real dilemma with which we are faced, because the riot control agency, using that term, seems to apply only to those that we would use on our own people.

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, could I say it is the same agent, it is just finer dust and the effect is the same. So it is not different in terms of its composition.

REDUCING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES BY USING TEAR GAS QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. I would put in the record so it will be available an article by Mr. Robert Smith of the New York Times of September 29, 1969, entitled "U.S. Command in Saigon Rejects Pentagon View That Tear Gas Reduces Civilian Casualties."

(The information referred to follows:)

[The New York Times, Sept. 29, 1969]

U.S. COMMAND IN SAIGON REJECTS PENTAGON VIEW THAT USE OF TEAR GAS REDUCES CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

(By Robert M. Smith)

WASHINGTON, Sept. 28-Private assessments by the United States Army of the use of tear gas in South Vietnam have contradicted public statements by the Defense and State Departments that the gas has been used as a means of reducing civilian casualties.