THE INFORMATION THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to add to that that I think the information given to the President justified it. I have a similar question-I am not quite as positive as to where the truth lies-but I do have a question in my mind about the accuracy of the judgment of our representatives in the Dominican Republic at the time and particularly on the 26th and 27th.

Senator MORSE. Bill, I don't say I don't believe the President believed what he was told. I want to say the President was grossly misled by misinformation.

The CHAIRMAN. To the Governor I want to say that any President confronted with the kind of wires and telegrams he had been given would have taken the action he did and would be justified if those facts were as represented. There is in our testimony, I think, some question about the wisdom of the judgment, the accuracy and wisdom of the judgment exercised by our representatives immediately after the outbreak on the 25th, for the next 3 days, I will say up to the 28th.

Unfortunately, these judgments have a way of influencing what actually took place, so that there was a very changeable and fluid situation. It could well be that after we had refused to mediate on the 27th, a train of events took place that brought the Communists into much greater power and positions of influence.

This is an area on which I know you are not qualified to testify because you weren't there. It is a very difficult thing for even us, although we have had the people who were there to testify.

INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

There is one thing that was brought to my mind just for the record. You were talking-this intervention I thought was right interesting about Mexico. You said there is a hard core of noninterventionists in Mexico.

Mr. Holt gave me this article in the present Foreign Affairs relating to Wilson's policy in Mexico when we intervened back in 1913 and up to 1917. His Ambassador was relating to the English Foreign Minister what our policy was. I will read just a paragraph. He said, that is, he refers to the President:

He wanted to give the Mexicans a chance to try it. Walter Hines Page, his Ambassador in London, put the policy even more simply when talking to Sir Edward Gray. "Suppose you have to intervene, what then?" Gray asked.

"Make them vote and live by their decisions."

"But suppose they will not so live?"

"We will go in again and make them vote again."

"And keep this up 200 years?"

"Yes. The United States will be here 200 years and it can continue to shoot men for that little space until they learn to vote and to rule themselves."

So, I can see where the Mexicans might have some feeling about intervention if that is an actual statement of policy.

Mr. Muñoz. I can certainly understand it historically. I do think that the word and concept and semantics of antintervention is a hindrance to arrangements that could work well for democracy in the hemisphere if undertaken in good faith.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. Muñoz. Of course, the thing is that many people in Latin America are suspicious that it would not be in good faith or it might start in good faith and then get infiltrated by special interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

HOW TO RUN A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IN THE CARIBBEAN

One other thing. I noticed this morning, in fact, we had the nominee this morning, where the President has drafted a Supreme Court Justice to go to the U.N. You mentioned technical assistance to the Dominican Republic; it seems to me it would be a good suggestion that I might consider having drafted to give technical assistance to the Dominicans as to how to run a democratic system in the Caribbean.

Mr. MUÑOZ. If this three-man team that was talked about had taken place, I think probably-this I am saying more off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is off.

Mr. MUÑOZ [continuing]. Because it is not completely serious, but it has significance, I think. You should have delegated Mr. Betancourt to deal with the army. I think we would have delegated Mr. Figueres to deal with Communists and I would be delegated to deal with the elections and with economic development.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be a very good division.
Senator CASE. It would be a beautiful layout.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

OVERBURDENED THE OAS

Senator CHURCH. I just wanted to ask one further question. It seems to me that if it is possible to deal with the army and Communist elements and establish the beginnings of a democratic regime in the Dominican Republic through external intervention, the best prospect for doing this is under the aegis of the OAS. But it seems to me, on the other hand, that the problem that we have handed the OAS is greatly exacerbated by the fact that the intervention in the first instance was unilateral, American intervention which in effect we have now asked the OAS to ratify and to support for the public opinion of Latin America. Perhaps we have overburdened the OAS in this first venture by asking it to move in and take over in the wake of a purely American intervention. What would be your view of that?

Mr. Muñoz. I think it would have been better if the OAS had been the one that took action in the beginning. However, this seems to have been practically impossible under the emergency situation in which the administration found itself. It is my understanding from reading in the papers that the U.S. Ambassador was asked to mediate the day before this situation, and he said he didn't have any authority to mediate. Then the next day the situation, as reported, got so bad, so far as the danger to lives is concerned, principally because of the indiscriminate arming of thousands of civilians of all kinds, that the emergency as it came up to the knowledge of the administration was such that quick action

had to be taken to avoid these tragedies, even not considering the Communist takeover part of it.

I understand that the President tried to inform, but he didn't have time to consult. This is the way it comes out in the paper. You gentleman can go more into detail as to this because you can get a lot of witnesses here.

WHO IS REALLY IN CHARGE?

Senator CHURCH. The thing that troubles me now is who is really in charge?

The U.S. Government is putting up the money to maintain this Imbert junta. We have a force that is supposedly under the command of the OAS which is almost entirely American in makeup, and you have suggested decisions that seem to me to be eminently reasonable, such as progressively reducing and eliminating the army as the dominant factor in the

Mr. MUÑOZ. Nonpoliticizing the armed forces.
Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Who makes these decisions and who implements them? Is it really the OAS which makes these and decides where our money will be spent? Is that the present arrangement or is it just the window dressing?

Mr. Muñoz. I should say in this case the almost decisive influence is that of the United States. Your trouble of getting a decision at the OAS comes when the ministers meet up here and speeches take place and the interests of the different countries-the small ones, the big ones, those with dictatorships, those in fear of dictatorships, those with a large legal Communist element in their political makeup-all these things must somehow be put to work together. But I suspect that down in Santo Domingo Mr. Bunker is being pretty influential.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you talked to Mr. Bunker?

Mr. Muñoz. I can sense this from the papers in their reports on this three-man commission.

Obviously, when he thinks he can't do something he probably doesn't try, but he is a pretty able man and he is probably basically leading that commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you talked to Mr. Bunker?

Mr. Muñoz. Briefly, a long time ago, several months ago.
The CHAIRMAN. Not since he has had this mission?
Mr. MUÑOZ. No.

Senator MORSE. Governor, if I may take 30 seconds to say in regard to the comment about the Ambassador and emissaries attempting to mediate, I don't think that was the fact at all. I think at the time he didn't mediate. He thought the military was going to win and he was very desirous to have the military win and that is why he didn't intervene. I think when he failed the use his good offices at that time he failed his President.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the committee proceeded to discuss the possibility of a new Central American canal. The committee adjourned at 5:05 p.m.]

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

TUESDAY, JULY 27, 1965

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding. Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Senator Kuchel.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. St. Claire, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tillman, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased to have our old colleague and friend Cabot Lodge, who has been nominated as Ambassador to Vietnam.

Mr. Lodge, would you care for a brief introduction, to say a few things, or shall we start right in with questions?

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM

Mr. LODGE. Start right in with questions, so far as I am concerned, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I will start out and ask that you be the devil's advocate for the moment.

CHANCES OF VICTORY IN VIETNAM

Do you really think there is any remote possibility of what you call victory for the United States in Vietnam?

Mr. LODGE. It depends to some extent on how you define victory. The CHAIRMAN. What you mean by victory?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

I define victory as a condition in which the young Viet Cong fighter wakes up one morning and says, "I am not going back today." And the reason he doesn't go back is that, first, he is scared, he thinks he will get killed if he goes back, and second, he looks around him and he sees the rice and the fish and the ducks and the coconuts and the American aid coming in and life looks pretty good to him. So, he decides to settle down and be a farmer or he takes off into the hills where they still are in Luzon, and in Malaysia, where they do very little harm.

Now, I do think it is possible to bring about a condition like that, and I think that would be a satisfactory outcome. I think we have to learn how to overcome this subversion and terrorism which is a

greater external threat to us, to the United States, than the nuclear where we have a greater superiority, where we have a procedure for handling it. If we don't learn how to cope with Communist subversion and terrorism we are going to have extremely unfortunate results, not only in Asia but in Africa and Latin America.

So, this is a political technique that we have to learn. I think if we do and I think we can learn it--that we can get a satisfactory outcome. It won't be a victory in the occidental sense of the word, but it will be a satisfactory outcome.

What the military does is give us the opportunity to teach these people how to stand by themselves, how to carry out the revolution for a new and better life, which is what they all want, which is what they talk about, and which the Communists offer them, but only at the price of brutality and suppression of all human rights.

EISENHOWER'S ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I have been reminded of a passage in General Eisenhower's book, "The Mandate for Change." I would like to read it to you. It is very brief, but he did go through very serious consideration of this situation in Vietnam, as I recall it, at the time of Dien Bien Phu because there was a lot of talk, I think-it was seriously considered at that time whether or not we should intervene directly in favor of the French, is that not correct?

Mr. LODGE. I believe so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is from page 372.

"What lessons or benefits, if any, accrue to the free world as a result?"

This is preliminary talk about the French. This is a quote:

I am convinced that the French could not win the war because the internal political situation in Vietnam, weak and confused, badly weakened their military position. I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bao Dai was a factor in the feeling prevalent among the Vietnamese they had nothing to fight for.

I won't read it all. I don't want to clutter the record, although anyone is welcome to read it.

In the earlier stages of the conflict, the fighting was mostly conducted where rough terrain made it impossible to seek out the enemy and bring him to a pitched battle. Later, even when the battle lines became so located that the groupes mobiles could be effective, there still existed within the Red River Delta a condition in which the French could control even the main roads for only about 2 or 3 hours a day. The rest of the time all lines of communications were in the hands of the Vietminh. This meant that the mass of the population supported the enemy. With such a feeling prevalent, it was inevitable that the French would find it impossible to retain the loyalty of their Vietnamese troops.

The next page, 373:

Willingness to fight for freedom no matter where the battle may be has always been a characteristic of our people, but the conditions then prevailing in Indochina were such as to make unilateral American intervention nothing less than sheer folly.

That is a pretty strong statement on Vietnam.