FEAR of darkness is an inherent human rait. When the eye cannot see, the imagitation takes hold and conjures up a thouand dangers lurking in the unknown larkness. This fear is aggravated in batle by the loss of direction and control. Consequently, operations in darkness have been undertaken with some reluctance by nodern commanders. Frederick the Great ad resolved never to attack by night and Napoleon had very little faith in night perations. Clausewitz, writing on war, onsidered that “a night attack also as a ule can only take place with secondary ombats, and seldom with great battles," xcept when the enemy is so near "as to ave him completely under our eyes, as he Austrians had Frederick the Great efore the Battle of Hochkirch (1758)." or many years the unpopularity of night perations was transfixed by these proouncements.

The Russians and Japanese believed dif

ferently. In 1794, under Field Marshal Aleksandr Suvorov, the Russians defeated a superior Polish force in a night attack near Warsaw, and in 1878 overwhelmed the Turkish fortification at Carso. The Russo-Japanese War saw much fighting at night. The Japanese studied the Russian methods and developed their own techniques to overcome Russian superiority in firepower. During World War II, night operations were a common feature of Russian and Japanese tactics.

In the west, however, operations in darkness, except for minor attacks and raids, were rare even during World War I. This was more surprising as the tremendous development in defensive fire, particularly of the machinegun, had made daylight attacks prohibitive. Yet, as Captain B. H. Liddell Hart explains:

Commanders were so obsessed with the risks of confusion that they habitually

chose the more certain risk of annihilation for their troops and stultification for their plans.

Nevertheless, the night attack by the Fourth Army on 14 July 1916, in the second phase of the Somme offensive, was strikingly successful despite many misgivings. The remarkable success of some of the other attacks during that war can be attributed to fog conditions which shrouded the attacker from the defender's aimed or observed fire. But mainly neither the British nor the Germans undertook many large-scale night attacks until World War II.

The lesson learned from World War I had proved conclusively the importance of night attacks. A British War Office committee appointed to investigate the lessons of the war reported that:

... as a result of our study we are impressed with the paramount importance of surprise both in attack and defense. ... The conclusion is that movements by night may often be the only way of obtaining a tactical surprise, and attack by night the most economical way of crowning it by tactical victory.

World War II

However, there is no evidence to show that many commanders were entirely convinced by this report when World War II broke out, for night attacks were undertaken only with reluctance on a minor scale at first.

The first large-scale night attack was the El Alamein battle on 24 October 1942. In March of the following year the Eighth Army smashed its way through the Mareth Line mostly by night, and scored a great success. After the New Zealand Corps had broken through the defenses along the Djebel Melab Gap to the west of Mareth successfully, the 1st Armored Division followed through. It was pitch dark by the time the division had penetrated to a depth

of 6,000 yards, but as soon as the came up the division continued its ad through the bottleneck and passed th the enemy, including the entire G 21st Panzer Division.

There are some other noteworth amples of night attacks. The Sangro was crossed at night. At Caen, the 1 nadian Corps started Operation To at 2330 on 7 August 1944, and had re its objectives successfully four to five away by 0600 the next day. During nights of 25 and 26 February 1945 US 3d Infantry Division attacked: a 6,700-yard front with two regin (brigades) abreast, and penetrated depth of 9,800 yards, capturing eight lages defended by German Panzer tr The crossing of the Rhine and the es lishment of the bridgehead was un taken at night (2100, 23 March 19 Many more examples could be quoted.

More recently in the war in Ko night attacks were much in favor, e cially with the Chinese. On 26 Novem 1950 the Chinese launched a violent overwhelming night attack over a fi of approximately 100 miles against Corps of the Republic of Korea (RO Army. By the morning of the 27th ROK Corps had practically been destroy despite a very determined stand.

Requirements

The development of artificial obstac and firepower make modern defenses w nigh impregnable. Without overwhelmi superiority in firepower and absolute co trol of the air, a daylight attack, esp cially over open ground, has but the fi siest chance of success. Even if the enen defenses are pierced on a narrow fro in daylight, the attacking forces will fir it difficult to hold the objective in the fac of an armored counterattack unless ant tank weapons can be brought up in tim Without breaching the mine obstacle, thes weapons cannot be brought forward; and

less aimed and observed fire can be elimated, the breaching of the obstacle is hazardous undertaking. On the other and, conditions of darkness provide a ak which can be used for avoiding med and observed fire for breaching the stacle.

Then there is the important factor of #prise: "the more the attack partakes the nature of surprise, the more successwe may expect to be," wrote Clausez. One of the surest means of achieving rprise is by attacking under the cover darkness.

Furthermore, many successful daylight tacks have enabled the enemy to use the llowing night as a cover for escape. Had e attacks been at night in those situams, the enemy reaction would have set at or near daylight, thus providing an cellent opportunity for the attacker's obile element and air force to turn the thdrawal into a rout. This aspect in elf merits consideration more often than the past.

Problems

The main problems of a night attack e fear of darkness, loss of direction, loss control, difficulty of fire support, and afusion during reorganization.

Fear of darkness is both common and tural. Loss of direction and control have I to the doctrine of limited objectives in night attack. However, defenses often e organized in depth, especially on ound of tactical importance. It follows, erefore, that the attack must be organed in depth and the momentum mainined if success is to be ensured without Es of time and manpower.

Fire Support

Fire and movement are the very basis an attack. If movement has been stopped fire, the attacker must bring down eftive fire to neutralize the enemy weaps. Supporting fire can only be effective ovided the target is located accurately.

It is not easy to do this quickly at night.

The safety factor also comes into the picture, for it is extremely difficult to ascertain the actual location of the attacking troops during the battle. The supporting fire might hit friendly troops that may have made a deeper penetration in one place than those held up elsewhere.

There is also the question of fire support during reorganization. A fair margin of safety generally is allowed in the planning of defensive fire tasks. This margin, unless adjusted quickly, may allow the enemy to launch a counterattack without serious interference; also, if it has not been possible to capture the entire objective or direction has been lost, defensive fires must be adjusted accordingly. But such adjustment is difficult, takes time, and usually has to await daylight.

The fire support, therefore, is rigid. Consequently, the plan for the attack has no scope for flexibility and movement must conform to a rigid fire plan, unless there is scope for a silent attack.

Reorganization

The success of an attack depends not only in overrunning the enemy defenses but equally in holding the objective against the inevitable counterattack. In this the defender is at an advantage: he knows the area of ground; his counterattacks would have been rehearsed; and it would be comparatively easy for him to exercise control in the execution of his plans.

If an objective is to be held against a counterattack, the attacker must be able to take the following actions very soon after capturing that objective:

1. Resume control of the assaulting troops and post them along the approaches of the counterattack so that they can start digging in quickly.

2. Send out protective patrols. 3. Move up the reserve echelon.

4. Coordinate the defensive layout on the objective and adjust defensive fires.

5. Establish signal communications. 6. Bring up supplies including ammunition.

7. Move up and site machineguns, antitank guns, and tanks and coordinate their tasks.

8. Prepare for exploitation.

Loss of direction and control already have been emphasized. The rapidity with which troops can be organized to offer effective resistance to a counterattack is inversely affected by this loss. Furthermore, darkness makes it difficult to site weapons for most effective fire. The preparation of the defensive position takes time and serious disadvantages in weapons siting may be revealed at first light, necessitating adjustments and further loss of time.

It is not easy for patrols to operate effectively in darkness over ground which they have not seen in daylight. Friendly patrols may clash among themselves or be subject to their own defensive fire through mistaken identity or inaccuracies in adjustments. But patrols are an essential measure for security during reorganization.

Once the objective has been gained, the movement forward of the reserves is not a major problem; although the difficulty in the maintenance of direction and control are there. Darkness, however, is an impediment to the employment of reserves for such tasks as mopping up, which usually are accomplished in daylight.

Defense

To withstand a well-planned counterattack, the attacker must coordinate his defenses rapidly. The implication is the same as in the coordination of a normal defensive position, but with special emphasis on rapidity of execution. This is not easy in darkness when subunits may have lost direction and are scattered over the entire objective. A commander carrying out the coordination not only has to locate these subunits, but carry out such

adjustments in dispositions and d fire as will ensure effective resista

The outcome of a defensive batt has been decided by the state o communications. Even if the ra have survived the fighting for th tive, wire lines must be laid down pany and even platoon level, and gers must know their way about ground. The establishment of sign munications over mines and boo and in darkness has obvious hazar

The preparation of the defensi tion on the objective will require ad equipment and supplies which ca carried into battle by the assaulting Ammunition must be brought up place the expenditure. These item come forward without undue delay ever, their transportation across a area to the intended destination in ness is no small problem.

Much the same applies to the mo forward of medium machineguns tank guns, and tanks. The mediu chineguns will have to be manhand they must arrive on the objectiv after its capture. The antitank gu the tanks, however, will await the ance of a gap through the minefield ever, the siting and coordination m done before first light; it is here tha fusion so often results.

It is sometimes possible for the at to take advantage of the state of sion on the battlefield when the ener fenses have been overrun and he is off balance. This is exploitation. It cess depends on quick action base accurate information. Darkness, hov prevents the prompt and rapid ac tion of information.

These factors affect the rapidity smoothness with which reorganization be carried out. Unless troops are trained and planning is extremely ough, snags will arise resulting in co sion.