Tennessee; William M. Evarts, Esq., of New York, and Hon. William S. Groesbeck, of Ohio, appeared and took the seats assigned to them, on the right of the Chair.

The Sergeant-at-Arms announced the presence of the House of Representatives; and the Committee of the Whole House, headed by Mr. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois, the chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and the Clerk of the House, entered the Chamber, and the members were conducted to the seats assigned them.

The Secretary called the name of Mr. DooLITTLE, who had not heretofore been sworn, and the oath prescribed by the rules was administered to him by the Chief Justice.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Secretary will read the minutes of the proceedings of the last sitting.

The Secretary read the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, March 13, of the Senate sitting for the trial of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on articles of impeachment.

On the Journal of those proceedings occur the following entries as to the proceedings of the Senate on that occasion, when it had retired for deliberation:

"The Senate, with the Chief Justice, having retired to their conference chamber, proceeded to consider the motion submitted by Mr. EDMUNDS; and, After debate,

"On motion by Mr. DRAKE to amend the motion submitted by, Mr. EDMUNDS, by striking out all after the word ordered,' and in lieu thereof inserting:

That the respondent file answer to the articles of impeachment on or before Friday, the 20th day of March instant,'

"It was determined in the affirmative-yeas 28, nays 20.

On motion by Mr. DRAKE,

"The yeas and nays being desired by one fifth of the Senators present,

Those who voted in the affirmative are"Messrs. Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness. Corbett, Drake, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey. Sherman, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Trumbull, Willey, Williams, Wilson, and Yates.

Those who voted in the negative are'Messrs. Anthony. Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Edmunds, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Maine, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Saulsbury, Van Winkle, and Vickers.

So the amendment of Mr. DRAKE to the motion of Mr. EDMUNDS was agreed to.

"On the question to agree to the motion of Mr. EDMUNDS, as amended,

"After debate,

'On motion of Mr. TRUMBULL, that the Senate reconsider its vote agreeing to the amendment proposed by Mr. DRAKE to the motion of Mr. EDMUNDS, It was determined in the affirmative-yeas 27, nays 23.

On motion of Mr. DRAKE,

"The yeas and nays being desired by one fifth of the Senators present,

"Those who voted in the affirmative are

"Messrs. Anthony, Bayard, Buckalew, Cattell, Corbett, Davis, Dixon, Edmunds, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Saulsbury, Sherman, Sprague, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, and Willey.

Those who voted in the negative are-"Messrs. Cameron, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Drake, Ferry, Harlan, Howard, Howe, Morgan, Morrill of Maine. Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Williams, Wilson, and Yates.

"So the Senate reconsidered its vote agreeing to the amendment of Mr. DRAKE to the motion of Mr. EDMUNDS; and,

The question recurring on the amendment of Mr. DRAKE,

"On motion of Mr. TRUMBULL to amend the amendment of Mr. DRAKE, by striking out the words 'Friday, the 20th,' and inserting the words 'Monday, the 230

It was determined in the affirmative; and, "On the question to agree to the amendment, as amended on the motion of Mr. TRUMBULL,

"It was determined in the affirmative. "The question again recurring on the motion of Mr. EDMUNDS, as amended on the motion of Mr. DRAKE, as amended by Mr. TRUMBULL, in the following words:

Ordered, That the respondent file answer to the articles of impeachment on or before Monday, the 23d day of March instant,'

"It was determined in the affirmative. Thereupon,

"The Senate returned to its Chamber."

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise to make the same question to the Court which I made in the Senate, and I think that now is the appropriate time before the court has de

cided to take up the case. I therefore submit to the Court a motion in writing.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Secretary will read the motion.

The Secretary read as follows:

Mr. DAVIS, a member of the Senate and of the Court of Impeachment, from the State of Kentucky, moves the court to make this order:

The Constitution having vested the Senate with the sole power to try the articles of impeachment of the President of the United States preferred by the House of Representatives, and having also declared that the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State chosen by the Legislatures thereof;" and the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas having, each by its Legislature, chosen two Senators who have been and continue to be excluded by the Senate from their seats, respectively, without any judgment by the Senate against them personally and individually on the points of their elections, returns, and qualifications, it is

Ordered, That a Court of Impeachment for the trial of the President cannot be legally and constitutionally formed while the Senators from the States aforesaid are thus excluded from the Senate; and this case is continued until the Senators from these States are permitted to take their seats in the Senate, subject to all constitutional exceptions to their elections, returns, and qualifications severally.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. PresidentThe CHIEF JUSTICE. The rule does not admit of debate.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. President, I object to the receiving of the paper as not in order.

Mr. CONNESS. Mr. President, I desire to submit a motion, which will cover the case, perhaps. I move that the paper be not received, upon which I call for the yeas and nays.

Mr. HOWE. Mr. President, I rise to submit a question of order.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. HOWE. I submit if the motion offered by the Senator from Kentucky be in order.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The motion comes before the Senate in the shape of an order submitted by a member of the Senate and of the Court of Impeachment. The twenty-third rule requires that "all the orders and decisions shall be made and had by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record, and without debate, subject, however, to the operation of rule seven."

The seventh rule requires the Presiding Officer of the Senate to "submit to the Senate, without a division, all questions of evidence and incidental questions; but the same shall, on the demand of one fifth of the members present, be decided by yeas and nays." By amendment this rule has been applied to orders and decisions proposed by a member of the Senate under the twenty-third rule. The Chair rules, therefore, that the motion of the Senator from Kentucky is in order.

Mr. CONNESS. Mr. President

The CHIEF JUSTICE. No debate is allowed.

Mr. CONNESS. Is the motion submitted by me in order in connection with it?

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The chair thinks not.

Several SENATORS. Let us have a square vote.

Other SENATORS. Let us have the yeas and nays on the order proposed.

The yeas and nays were ordered; and being taken, resulted—yeas 2, nays 49; as follows: YEAS-Messrs. Davis and McCreery-2.

NAYS-Messrs. Anthony, Buckalew, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling, Conness, Corbett, Cragin, Dixon, Doolittle, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Fessenden, Fowler, Frelinghuysen, Grimes, Harlan, Henderson, Hendricks, Howard, Howe, Johnson, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Norton, Nye, Patterson of New Hampshire, Patterson of Tennessee, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Ross, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Vickers, Willey, Williams, Wilson, and Yates-49.

ABSENT-Messrs. Bayard, Saulsbury, and Wade

-3.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. On the motion to adopt the order of the Senator from Kentucky, the yeas are 2, and the nays 49. The motion is lost.

Are the counsel for the President ready to file their answer.

Mr. STANBERY. Mr. Chief Justice, in obedience to the order of the honorable court,

made at the last session, that the answer of the President should be filed to-day, we have it ready. The counsel, abandoning all other engagements, some of us quitting our courts, our cases, and our clients, have devoted every hour to the performance of this duty. The labor has been incessant and exhaustive. We have devoted, as I say, not only every hour ordinarily devoted to labor, but many required for necessary rest and recreation have been consumed in this work. It is a matter, Mr. Chief Justice, of profound regret to us that the honorable court did not allow us more time. Nevertheless we hope that the answer will be found in all respects sufficient within the law. Such as it is, we are now ready to read and file it.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The counsel will read the answer of the President.

Mr. CURTIS proceeded to read the answer to the close of that portion relative to the first article of impeachment.

Mr. STANBERY read that portion of the answer beginning with the reply to the second article to the close of the response to the ninth article.

Mr. EVARTS read the residue of the answer. The answer is as follows:

Senate of the United States, sitting as a Court of Impeachment for the trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.

The answer of the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, to the articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives of the United States.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE I.

For answer to the first article he says: that Edwin M. Stanton was appointed Secretary for the Department of War on the 15th day of January, A. D. 1862, by Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, during the first term of his Presidency, and was commissioned, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, to hold the said office during the pleasure of the President; that the office of Secretary for the Department of War was created by an act of the First Congress in its first session passed on the 7th day of August, A. D. 1789, and in and by that act it was provided and enacted that the said Secretary for the Department of War shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on and intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeably to the Constitution, relative to the subjects. within the scope of the said Department; and furthermore, that the said Secretary shall conduct the business of the said Department in such a manner as the President of the United States shall, from time to time, order and in

struct.

And this respondent, further answering, says that by force of the act aforesaid and by reason of his appointment aforesaid the said Stanton became the principal officer in one of the Executive Departments of the Government within the true intent and meaning of the second section of the second article of the Constitution of the United States, and according to the true intent and meaning of that provision of the Constitution of the United States; and, in accordance with the settled and uniform practice of each and every President of the United States, the said Stanton then became, and so long as he should continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War must continue to be, one of the advisers of the President of the United States, as well as the person intrusted to act for and represent the President in matters enjoined upon him or intrusted to him by the President touching the Department aforesaid, and for whose conduct in such capacity, subordinate to the President, the President is, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, made responsible. And this respondent, further answering, says he succeeded to the office of President of the United States upon, and by reason of, the death of Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, on the 15th day of April, 1865, and

the said Stanton was then holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War under and by reason of the appointment and commission aforesaid; and, not having been removed from the said office by this respondent, the said Stanton continued to hold the same under the appointment and commission aforesaid, at the pleasure of the President, until the time hereinafter particularly mentioned; and at no time received any appointment or commission save as above detailed.

And this respondent, further answering, says that on and prior to the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, this respondent, the President of the United States-responsible for the conduct of the Secretary for the Department of War, and having the constitutional right to resort to and rely upon the person holding that office for advice concerning the great and difficult public duties enjoined on the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States-became satisfied that he could not allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the office of Secretary for the Department of War without hazard of the public interest; that the relations between the said Stanton and the President no longer permitted the President to resort to him for advice, or to be, in the judgment of the President, safely responsible for his conduct of the affairs of the Department of War, as by law required, in accordance with the orders and instructions of the President; and thereupon, by force of the Constitution and laws of the United States, which devolve on the Presi dent the power and the duty to control the • conduct of the business of that executive department of the Government, and by reason of the constitutional duty of the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, this respondent did necessarily consider and did determine that the said Stanton ought no longer to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. And this respondent, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him as President of the United States, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to give effect to such his decision and determination, did, on the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, address to the said Stanton a note, of which the following is a true copy:

"SIR: Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted."

To which note the said Stanton made the following reply:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, August 5, 1867. SIR: Your note of this day has been received, stating that "public considerations of a high character constrain you" to say "that my resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.

In reply I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this Department, constrain me not to resign the office of Secretary of War before the next meeting of Congress, Very respectfully, yours,

EDWIN M. STANTON.

This respondent, as President of the United States, was thereon of opinion that, having regard to the necessary official relations and duties of the Secretary for the Department of War to the President of the United States, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and having regard to the responsibility of the President for the conduct of the said Secretary, and having regard to the permanent executive authority of the office which the respondent holds under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it was impossible, consistently with the public interests, to allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War; and it then became the official duty of the respondent, as President of the United States, to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by him, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was informed and verily believed that it was practically settled by the First Congress of the United States, and had been so considered and, uniformly and in great

numbers of instances, acted on by each Con- || gress and President of the United States, in succession, from President Washington to, and including, President Lincoln, and from the First Congress to the Thirty-Ninth Congress, that the Constitution of the United States conferred on the President, as part of the executive power and as one of the necessary means and instruments of performing the executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by the President alone. This respondent had, in pursuance of the Constitution, required the opinion of each principal officer of the Executive Departments upon this question of constitutional executive power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including the said Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under the Constitution of the United States this power was lodged by the Constitution in the President of the United States, and that, consequently, it could be lawfully exercised by him, and the C Congress could not deprive him thereof; and this respondent, in his capacity of President of the United States, and because in that capacity he was both enabled and bound to use his best judgment upon this question, did, in good faith and with an earnest desire to arrive at the truth, come to the conclusion and opinion, and did make the same known to the honorable the Senate of the United States by a message dated on the 2d day of March, 1867, (a true copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked A,) that the power last mentioned was conferred and the duty of exercising it, in fit cases, was imposed on the President by the Constitution of the United States, and that the President could not be deprived of this power or relieved of this duty, nor could the same be vested by law in the President and the Senate jointly, either in part or whole; and this has ever since remained and was the opinion of this respondent at the time when he was forced as aforesaid to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by this respondent, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of "an act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," passed March 2, 1867, by a constitutional majority of both Houses of Congress, it was enacted as follows:

"That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General, shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and intended to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by which that act was passed, that the power to remove executive officers for cause might, by law, be taken from the President and vested in him and the Senate jointly; and although this respondent had arrived at and still retained the opinion above expressed and verily believed, as he still believes, that the said first section of the last-mentioned act was and is wholly inoperative and void by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of the United States, yet, inasmuch as the same had been enacted by the constitutional majority in each of the two Houses of that Congress, this respondent considered it to be proper to examine and decide whether the particular case of the said Stanton, on which it was this respondent's duty to act, was within or without the terms of that first section of the act; or, if within it, whether the President had not the power, ac

cording to the terms of the act, to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and having, in his capacity of President of the United States, so examined and considered, did form the opinion that the case of the said Stanton and his tenure of office were not affected by the first section of the last-named act.

And this respondent further answering, says, that although a case thus existed which, in his judgment as President of the United States, called for the exercise of the executive power to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and although this respondent was of opinion, as is above shown, that under the Constitution of the United States the power to remove the said Stanton from the said office was vested in the President of the United States; and although this respondent was also of the opinion, as is above shown, that the case of the said Stanton was not affected by the first section of the lastnamed act; and although each of the said opinions had been formed by this respondent upon an actual case, requiring him, in his capacity of President of the United States, to come to some judgment and determination thereon, yet this respondent, as President of the United States, desired and determined to avoid, if possible, any question of the construction and effect of the said first section of the last-named act, and also the broader question of the executive power conferred on the President of the United States, by the Constitution of the United States, to remove one of the principal officers of one of the Executive Departments for cause seeming to him sufficient; and this respondent also desired and determined that, if from causes over which he could exert no control, it should become absolutely necessary to raise and have, in some way, determined either or both of the said last-named questions, it was in accordance with the Constitution of the United States and was required of the President thereby, that questions of so much gravity and importance, upon which the legislative and executive departments of the Government had disagreed, which involved powers considered by all branches of the Government, during its entire history down to the year 1867, to have been confided by the Constitution of the United States to the President, and to be necessary for the complete and proper execu. tion of his constitutional duties, should be in some proper way submitted to that judicial department of the Government, intrusted by the Constitution with the power, and subjected by it to the duty, not only of determining finally the construction and effect of all acts of Congress, but of comparing them with the Constitution of the United States and pronouncing them inoperative when found in conflict with that fundamental law which the people have enacted for the government of all their ser

vants.

And to these ends, first, that through the action of the Senate of the United States, the absolute duty of the President to substitute some fit person in place of Mr. Stanton as one of his advisers, and as a principal subordinate officer whose official conduct he was responsible for and had lawful right to control, might, if possible, be accomplished without the necessity of raising any one of the questions aforesaid; and, second, if this duty could not be so performed, then that these questions, or such of them as might necessarily arise, should be judicially determined in manner aforesaid, and for no other end or purpose this respondent, as President of the United States, on the 12th day of August, 1867, seven days after the reception of the letter of the said Stanton of the 5th of August, hereinbefore stated, did issue to the said Stanton the order following, namely:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 12, 1867. SIR: By virtue of the power and authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same.

You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all

WASHINGTON CITY, August 12, 1867. "SIR: Your note of this date has been received, informing me that by virtue of the powers vested in you, as President, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, I am suspended from office as Secretary of War, and will cease to exercise any and all functions pertaining to the same; and also directing me at once to transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in my custody and charge. Under a sense of public duty, I am compelled to deny your right, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate, and without legal cause, to suspend me from office as Secretary of War, or the exercise of any or all functions pertaining to the same, or without such advice and consent to compel me to transfer to any person the records, books, papers, and public property in my custody as Secretary. But inasmuch as the General commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed ad interim, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force."

To the PRESIDENT.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that it is provided in and by the second section of "an act to regulatethe tenure of certain civil offices," that the President may suspend an officer from the performance of the duties of the office held by him, for certain causes therein designated, until the next meeting of the Senate and until the case shall be acted on by the Senate; that this respondent, as President of the United States, was advised and he verily believed and still believes, that the executive power of removal from office confided to him by the Constitution as aforesaid, includes the power of suspension from office at the pleasure of the President and this respondent, by the order aforesaid, did suspend the said Stanton from office, not until the next meeting of the Senate, or until the Senate should have acted upon the case, but by force of the power and authority vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, indefinitely and at the pleasure of the President, and the order, in form aforesaid, was made known to the Senate of the United States, on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be more fully hereinafter stated.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that in and by the act of February 13, 1795, it was, among other things, provided and enacted that, in case of vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War, it shall be lawful for the President, in case he shall think it necessary, to authorize any person to perform the duties of that office until a successor be appointed or such vacancy filled, but not exceeding the term of six months; and this respondent, being advised and believing that such law was in full force and not repealed, by an order dated August 12, 1867, did authorize and empower Ulysses S. Grant, General of the armies of the United States, to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, in the form in which similar authority had theretofore been given, not until the next meeting of the Senate and until the Senate should act on the case, but at the pleasure of the President, subject only to the limitation of six months in the said last-mentioned act contained; and a copy of the lastnamed order was made known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be hereinafter more fully stated; and in pursuance of the design and intention aforesaid, if it should become necessary, to submit the said questions to a judicial determination, this respondent, at or near the date of the last-mentioned order, did make known such his purpose to obtain a judicial decision of the said questions, or such of them as might be necessary.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that in further pursuance of his intention and design, if possible to perform what he judged to be his imperative duty, to prevent the said

Stanton from longer holding the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and at the same time avoiding, if possible, any question respecting the extent of the power of removal from executive office confided to the President by the Constitution of the United States, and any question respecting the construction and effect of the first section of the said "act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices," while he should not, by any act of his, abandon and relinquish, either a power which he believed the Constitution had conferred on the President of the United States, to enable him to perform the duties of his office, or a power designedly left to him by the first section of the act of Congress last aforesaid, this respondent did, on the 12th day of December, 1867, transmit to the Senate of the United States, a message, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked B, wherein he made known the orders aforesaid and the reasons which had induced the same, so far as this respondent then considered it material and necessary that the same should be set forth, and reiterated his views concerning the constitutional power of removal vested in the President, and also expressed his views concerning the construction of the said first section of the last-mentioned act, as respected the power of the President to remove the said Stanton from the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, well hoping that this respondent could thus perform what he then believed, and still believes, to be his imperative duty in reference to the said Stanton, without derogating from the powers which this respondent believed were confided to the President, by the Constitution and laws, and without the necessity of raising, judicially, any questions respecting

the same.

And this respondent, further answering, says, that this hope not having been realized, the President was compelled either to allow the said Stanton to resume the said office and re

main therein contrary to the settled convictions of the President, formed as aforesaid, respecting the powers confided to him and the duties required of him by the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid, that the first section of the last-mentioned act did not affect the case of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief of the President that he could no longer advise with or trust or be responsible for the said Stanton, in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or else he was compelled to take such steps as might, in the judgment of the President, be lawful and necessary to raise, for a judicial decision, the questions affecting the lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the said office, or the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to quit the said office if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the same; and to this end, and to this end only, this respondent did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, issue the order for the removal of the said Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing the said Lorenzo F. Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, in the said second article set forth.

And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifically each substantial allegation in the said first article, says: He denies that the said Stanton, on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession of the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. He denies that the said Stanton, on the day last mentioned, was lawfully entitled to hold the said office against the will of the President of the United States. He denies that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was unlawfully issued. He denies that the said order was issued with intent to violate the act entitled "An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices." He denies that the said order was a violation of the last-mentioned act. He denies that the said order was a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of any law thereof, or of his oath of office. He denies that the said order was issued with

an intent to violate the Constitution of the United States or any law thereof, or this respondent's oath of office; and he respectfully, but earnestly, insists that not only. was it issued by him in the performance of what he believed to be an imperative official duty, but in the performance of what this honorable court will consider was, in point of fact, an imperative official duty. And he denies that any and all substantive matters, in the said first article contained, in manner and form as the same are therein stated and set forth, do, by law, constitute a high misdemeanor in office, within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE II.

And for answer to the second article this respondent says that he admits he did issue and deliver to said Lorenzo Thomas the said writing set forth in said second article, bearing date at Washington, District of Columbia, February 21, 1868, addressed to Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General United States Army, Washington, District of Columbia, and he further admits that the same was

so issued without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, then in session, but he denies that he thereby violated the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or that he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States, or the provisions of any act of Congress; and this respondent refers to his answer to said first article for a full statement of the purposes and intentions with which said order was issued, and adopts the same as part of his answer to this article; and he further denies that there of Secretary for the Department of War, or was then and there no vacancy in the said office that he did then and there commit, or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office, and this respondent maintains and will insist:

1. That at the date and delivery of said writing there was a vacancy existing in the office of Secretary for the Department of War.

2. That, notwithstanding the Senate of the United States was then in session, it was lawful and according to long and well established usage to empower and authorize the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim.

3. That, if the said act regulating the tenure of civil offices be held to be a valid law, no provision of the same was violated by the issuing of said order or by the designation of said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE III.

And for answer to said third article this respondent says that he abides by his answer to said first and second articles, in so far as the same are responsive to the allegations contained in the said third article, and, without here again repeating the same answer, prays the same be taken as an answer to this third article as fully as if here again set out at length; and as to the new allegation, contained in said third article, that this respondent did appoint the said Thomas to be Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, this respondent denies that he gave any other authority to said Thomas than such as appears in said written authority set out in said article, by which he authorized and empowered said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim; and he denies that the same amounts to an appointment and insists that it is only a designation of an officer of that Department to act temporarily as Secre tary for the Department of War ad interim until an appointment should be made. But, whether the said written authority amounts to an appointment or to a temporary authority or designation, this respondent denies that in any sense he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States, or that he thereby intended to give the said order the character or effect of an appointment in the constitutional or legal sense of that term. He further denies that there was no vacancy in said office of Secretary for the Department of War existing at the date of said written authority.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE IV. And for answer to said fourth article this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Lorenzo Thomas, or with the said Thomas and any other person or persons, with intent by intimidations and threats unlawfully to hinder and prevent the said Stanton from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the provisions of the said act of Congress in said article mentioned, or that he did then and there commit or was guilty of a high crime in office. On the contrary thereof, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there lawfully the Secretary for the Department of War, this respondent states that his sole purpose in authorizing the said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim was, as is fully stated in his answer to the said first article, to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to hold said office, notwithstanding his said suspension and notwithstanding the said order of removal and notwithstanding the said authority of the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War ad interim, to the test of a final decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in the earliest practicable mode by which the question could be brought before that tribunal.

This respondent did not conspire or agree with the said Thomas or any other person or persons to use intimidation or threats to hinder or prevent the said Stanton from holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, nor did this respondent at any time command or advise the said Thomas or any other person or persons to resort to or use either threats or intimidation for that purpose. The only means in the contemplation or purpose of respondent to be used are set forth fully in the said orders of February 21, the first addressed to Mr. Stanton and the second to the said Thomas. By the first order the respondent notified Mr. Stanton that he was removed from the said office, and that his functions as Secretary for the Department of War were to terminate upon the receipt of that order, and he also thereby notified the said Stanton that the said Thomas had been authorized to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, and ordered the said Stanton to transfer to him all the records, books, papers, and other public properly in his custody and charge; and by the second order this 'respondent notified the said Thomas of the removal from office of the said Stanton, and authorized him to act as Secretary for the Department of War ad interim, and directed him to immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office, and to receive the transfer of all the records, books, papers, and other public property from Mr. Stanton then in his custody and charge.

Respondent gave no instructions to the said Thomas to use intimidation or threats to enforce obedience to these orders. He gave him no authority to call in the aid of the military or any other force to enable him to obtain possession of the office, or of the books, papers, records, or property thereof. The only agency resorted to or intended to be resorted to was by means of the said executive orders requiring obedience. But the Secretary for the Department of War refused to obey these orders, and still holds undisturbed possession and custody of that Department, and of the records, books, papers, and other public property therein. Respondent further states that, in execution of the orders so by this respondent given to the said Thomas, he, the said Thomas, proceeded in a peaceful manner to demand of the said Stanton a surrender to him of the public property in the said Department, and to vacate the possession of the same, and to allow him, the said Thomas, peaceably to exercise the duties devolved upon him by authority of the President. That, as this respondent has been informed and believes, the said Stanton per

ANSWER TO ARTICLE V.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE VI.

And for answer to the said sixth article, this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas by force to seize, take, or possess, the property of the United States in the Department of War, contrary to the provisions of the said acts referred to in the said article, or either of them, or with intent to violate either of them. Respondent, protesting that said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, not only denies the said conspiracy as charged, but also denies any unlawful intent in reference to the custody and charge of the property of the United States in the said Department of War, and again refers to his former answers for a fullstatement of his intent and purpose in the premises.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE VII.

And for answer to the said seventh article respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time and place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas with intent unlawfully to seize, take, or possess the property

of the United States in the Department of War with intent to violate or disregard the said act in the said seventh article referred to, or that he did then and there commit a high misdemeanor in office. Respondent, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, again refers to his former answers, in so far as they are applicable, to show the intent with which he proceeded in the premises, and prays equal benefit therefrom, as if the same were here again fully repeated. Respondent further takes exception to the sufficiency of the allegations of this article as to the conspiracy alleged upon the same grounds as stated in the exception set forth in his answer to said article fourth.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE VIII.

And for answer to the said eighth article this respondent denies that on the 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time and place, he did issue and deliver to the said Thomas the said letter of authority set forth in the said eighth article, with the intent unlawfully to control the disbursements of the money appropriated for the military service and for the Department of War. This respondent, protesting that there was a vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War, admits that he did issue the said letter of authority, and he denies that the same was with any unlawful intent whatever, either to violate the Constitution of the United States or any act of Congress. On the contrary, this respondent again affirms that his sole intent was to vindicate his authority as President of the United States, and by peaceful means to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary of War to a final decision before the Supreme Court of the United States, as has been hereinbefore set forth; and he prays the same benefit from his answer in the premises as if the same were here again repeated at length.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE IX.

And for answer to the said ninth article the respondent states that on the said 22d day of February, 1868, the following note was addressed to the said Emory by the private secretary of respondent:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., February 22, 1868. GENERAL: The President directs me to say that ho will be pleased to have you call upon him as early as practicable. Respectfully and truly yours,

WILLIAM G. MOORE,"
United States Army.

General Emory called at the Executive Mansion according to this request. The object of respondent was to be advised by General Emory, as commander of the department of Washington, what changes had been made in the military affairs of the department. Respondent had been informed that various changes had been made, which in nowise had been brought to his notice or reported to him from the Department of War or from any other quarter, and desired to ascertain the facts. After the said Emory had explained in detail the changes which had taken place, said Emory called the attention of respondent to a general order which he referred to and which this respondent then sent for, when it was produced. It is as follows:

[General Orders No. 17.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, March 14, 1867. The following acts of Congress are published for the information and government of all concerned:

eral of the Army shall not be removed, suspended, or relieved from command or assigned to duty elsewhere than at said headquarters, except at his own request, without the previous approval of the Senate; and any orders or instructions relating to military operations issued contrary to the requirements of this section shall be null and void; and any officer who shall issue orders or instructions contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office; and any officer of the Army who shall transmit, convey, or obey any orders or instructions so issued contrary to the provisions of this section, knowing that such orders were so issued, shall be liable to imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty years, upon conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction.

Official:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General. Assistant Adjutant General. General Emory not only called the attention of respondent to this order, but to the fact that it was in conformity with a section contained in an appropriation act passed by Congress. Respondent, after reading the order, observed, "This is not in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, which makes me Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, or of the language of the commission which you hold." General Emory then stated that this order had met respondent's approval. Respondent then said in reply, in substance, "Am I to understand that the President of the United States cannot give an order but through the General-in-Chief, or General Grant?" General Emory again reiterated the statement that it had met respondent's approval, and that it was the opinion of some of the leading lawyers of the country that this order was constitutional. With some further conversation, respondent then inquired the names of the lawyers who had given the opinion, and he mentioned the names of two. Respondent then said that the object of the law was very evident, referring to the clause in the appropriation act upon which the order purported to be based. This, according to respondent's recollection was the substance of the conversation had with General Emory.

Respondent denies that any allegations in the said article of any instructions or declarations given to the said Emory then or at any other time contrary to or in addition to what is hereinbefore set forth are true. Respondent denies that, in said conversation with said Emory, he had any other intent than to express the opinions then given to the said Emory, nor did he then or at any time request or order the said Emory to disobey any law or any order issued in conformity with any law, or intend to offer any inducement to the said Emory to violate any law. What this respondent then said to General Emory was simply the expression of an opinion which he then fully believed to be sound and which he yet believes to be so, and that is, that by the express provisions of the Constitution this respondent, as President, is made the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, and as such he is to be respected, and that his orders, whether issued through the War Department or through the General-in-Chief, or by any other channel of communication, are entitled to respect and obedience, and that such constitutional power cannot be taken from him by virtue of any act of Congress. Respondent doth therefore deny that by the expression of such opinion he did commit or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office; and this respondent doth further say that the said article nine lays no foundation whatever for the conclusion stated in the said article, that the respondent, by reason of the allegations therein contained, was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

In reference to the statement made by General Emory that this respondent had approved of said act of Congress containing the section referred to, the respondent admits that his formal approval was given to said act, but accompanied the same by the following message, addressed and sent with the act to the House of Representatives, in which House the said

act originated, and from which it came to respondent:

To the House of Representatives:

The act entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes," contains provisions to which I must call attention. These provisions are contained in the second section, which, in certain cases, virtually deprives the President of his constitutional functions as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and in the sixth section, which denies to ten States of the Union their constitutional right to protect themselves, in any emergency, by means of their own militia. These provisions are out of place in an appropriation act, but I am compelled to defeat these necessary appropriations if I withhold my signature from the act. Pressed by these considerations, I feel constrained to return the bill with my signature, but to accompany it with my earnest protest against the sections which I have indicated. WASHINGTON, D. C., March 2, 1867.

Respondent, therefore, did no more than to express to said Emory the same opinion which he had so expressed to the House of Representatives.

ANSWER TO ARTICLE X.

And in answer to the tenth article and specifications thereof the respondent says that on the 14th and 15th days of August, in the year 1866, a political convention of delegates from all or most of the States and Territories of the Union was held in the city of Philadelphia, under the name and style of the National Union Convention, for the purpose of maintaining and advancing certain political views and opinions before the people of the United States, and for their support and adoption in the exercise of the constitutional suffrage, in the elections of Representatives and Delegates in Congress, which were soon to occur in many of the States and Territories of the Union; which said convention, in the course of its proceedings, and in furtherance of the objects of the same, adopted a 66 declaration of principles" and " an address to the people of the United States,". and appointed a committee of two of its members from each State and of one from each Territory and one from the District of Columbia to wait upon the President of the United States and present to him a copy of the proceedings of the convention; that on the 18th day of said month of August this committee waited upon the President of the United States at the Executive Mansion, and was received by him in one of the rooms thereof, and by their chairman, Hon. Reverdy Johnson, then and now a Senator of the United States, acting and speaking in their behalf, presented a copy of the proceedings of the convention, and addressed the President of the United States in a speech, of which a copy (according to a published report of the same, and as the respondent believes substantially a correct report,) is hereto annexed as a part of this answer, and marked Exhibit C.

That thereupon, and in reply to the address of said committee by their chairman, this respondent addressed the said committee so waiting upon him in one of the rooms of the Executive Mansion; and this respondent believes that this his address to said committee is the occasion referred to in the first specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech or address of this respondent upon said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion, but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said first specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office, within the intent and meaning of the Constitntion of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that said article and specification contain or correctly or justly represent.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article and the specifications thereof, says that at Cleveland, in the State of Ohio, and on the 3d day of September, in the year 1866, he

was attended by a large assemblage of his fellow-citizens, and in deference and obedience to their call and demand he addressed them upon matters of public and political consideration; and this respondent believes that said occasion and address are referred to in the second specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech of this respondent on said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion; but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said second specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office, within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this repondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that said article and specifi cation contain or correctly or justly represent.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article and the specifications thereof, says that at St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, and on the 8th day of September, in the year 1866, he was attended by a numerous assemblage of his fellow-citizens, and in deference and obedience to their call and demand he addressed them upon matters of public and political consideration; and this respondent believes that said occasion and address are referred to in the third specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech of this respondent on said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion; but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said third specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office, within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that the said article and specification contain or correctly or justly repre

sent.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article, protesting that he has not been unmindful of the high duties of his office, or of the harmony or courtesies which ought to exist and be maintained between the executive and legislative branches of the Government of the United States, denies that he has ever in-* tended or designed to set aside the rightful authority or powers of Congress, or attempted to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, or reproach the Congress of the United States or either branch thereof, or to impair or destroy the regard or respect of all or any of the good people of the United States for the Congress or the rightful legislative power thereof, or to excite the odium or resentment of all or any of the good people of the United States against Congress and the laws by it duly and constitutionally enacted. This respondent further says that at all times he has, in his official acts as President, recognized the authority of the several Congresses of the United States as constituted and organized during his administration of the office of President of the United States.

And this respondent, further answering, says that he has, from time to time, under his constitutional right and duty as President of the United States, communicated to Congress his views and opinions in regard to such acts or resolutions thereof as, being submitted to him as President of the United States in pursuance of the Constitution, seemed to this respondent to require such communications; and he has, from time to time, in the exercise of that freedom of speech which belongs to him as a citizen of the United States, and, in his political relations as President of the United States to