execution of the so-called reconstruction act of March 2, 1868. Whereby he was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office on the 21st day of February, 1868. I have already stated, in commenting on the tenth article, that I do not consider the President's declaration, on the 18th of August, 1866, as fairly liable to the construction there put upon it and repeated in this article. There were no such words said, nor can they be fairly implied. The words were that it was not a Congress of the United States, but only of a || part of the States. Taken literally, these words were true. But a Congress of a part of the States may be a constitutional Congress, capa ble of passing valid laws, and as such the Pres ident has uniformly recognized the ThirtyNinth Congress. The declaration being per fectly susceptible of an innocent meaning, and all his official acts being consistent with that meaning, it would be unjust to suppose a dif ferent one, which he did not express. In this view the foundation of the article fails. But whether in pursuance of that declara tion or not, did he unlawfully devise means to prevent the execution of the law of March 2, 1867, in the manner charged? The first specification rests, if upon any thing, upon the letter to General Grant, dated February 10, 1868. This letter must be taken as a whole, and not considered by detached parts. From that letter I am satisfied that the President expected General Grant, in case the Sen ate should not concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton, to resign the office to him, so that he might have an opportunity to fill the office be fore Mr. Stanton resumed the performance of its duties, with a view of compelling Mr. Stanton to seek his remedy in the court. If the President had such a design, it could only be carried out legally by removing Mr. Stanton before he should have time to resume the fanetions of Secretary of War, if the President had a right to remove him. It has been seen by my remarks upon the first article, that I think the President had such right. The design, then, if the President entertained it, was not unlawful. As to the second specification, it has not, that I can see, any proof to sustain it; and if it had, it is not quite apparent how an attempt to prevent the execution of the act for the support of the Army can be considered as proof of an intention to violate the civil-tenure act, which seems to be the gravamen of this article. No evidence whatever was adduced to show that the President had devised means, or in any way attempted, to prevent the execution of the act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States." It has been assumed in argument by the managers that the President, in his answer, claims not only the right under the Constitution to remove officers at his pleasure, and to suspend officers for indefinite periods, but also to fill offices thus vacated for indefinite periods a claim which, if admitted, would practically deprive the Senate of all power over appointments, and leave them in the President alone. The President does claim the power of removal, and that this includes the power of suspension. But a careful examination of his answer will show that he claims no other power than that conferred by the act of 1795, to fill vacancies in the Departments temporarily, and for a period not exceeding six months, not by ap pointment without the consent of the Senate, but by designation, as described in the act-a power conferred by Congress, and which can be taken away at any time, if it should be found injurious to the public interest. Even, however, if the claim of the President did go to the extent alleged, it is not made a charge against him in the articles of impeachment. And however objectionable and reprehensible any such claim might be, he cannot be convicted of a high misdemeanor for asserting an unconstitutional doctrine, if he has || || made no attempt to give it practical effect, especially without a charge against him and trial upon it. I am unwilling to close the consideration-of this remarkable proceeding before adverting to some other points which have been presented in the argument. The power of impeachment is conferred by the Constitution in terms so general as to occasion great diversity of opinion with regard to the nature of offenses which may be held to constitute crimes or misdemeanors within its intent and meaning. Some contend, and with great force of argument, both upon principle and authority, that only such crimes and misdemeanors are intended as are subject to indietment and punishment as a violation of some known law. Others contend that anything is a crime or misdemeanor within the meaning of the Constitution which the appointed judges choose to consider so; and they argue that the provision was left indefinite from the necessity of the case, as offenses of public officers, injurious to the public interest, and for which the offender ought to be removed, cannot be accurately defined beforehand; that the remedy provided by impeachment is of a political character, and designed for the protection of the public against unfaithful and corrupt officials. Granting, for the sake of the argument, that this latter construction is the true one, it must be conceded that the power thus conferred might be liable to very great abuse, especially in times of high party excitement, when the passions of the people are inflamed against a perverse and obnoxious public officer. If so, it is a power to be exercised with extreme caution when you once get beyond the line of specific criminal offenses. The tenure of public offices, except those of judges, is so limited in this country, and the ability to change them by popular suffrage so great, that it would seem hardly worth while to resort to so harsh a remedy, except in extreme cases, and then only upon clear and unquestionable grounds. In the case of an elective Chief Magistrate of a great and powerful people, living under a written Constitution, there is much more at stake in such a proceeding than the fate of the individual. The office of President is one of the great coördinate branches of the Government, having its defined powers, privileges, and duties; as essential to the very framework of the Government as any other, and to be touched with as careful a hand. Anything which conduces to weaken its hold upon the respect of the people, to break down the barriers which surround it, to make it the mere sport of temporary majorities, tends to the great injury of our Government, and inflicts a wound upon constitutional liberty. It is evident, then, as it seems to me, that the offense for which a Chief Magistrate is removed from office, and the power intrusted to him by the people transferred to other hands, and especially where the hands which receive it are to be the same which take it from him, should be of such a character as to commend itself at once to the minds of all right-thinking men as, beyond all question, an adequate cause. It should be free from the taint of party; leave no reasonable ground of suspicion upon the motives of those who inflict the penalty, and address itself to the country and the civilized world as a measure justly called for by the gravity of the crime and the necessity for its punishment. Anything less than this, especially where the offense is one not defined by any law, would, in my judgment, not be justified by a calm and considerate public opinion as a cause for removal of a President of the United States. And its inevitable tendency would be to shake the faith of the friends of constitutional liberty in the permanency of our free institutions and the eapacity of man for self-government. to those charged in the articles, have been fully investigated in the House of Representatives, were at one time decided by a majority of the learned Committee on the Judiciary in that body to present no sufficient ground for impeachment, and were finally dismissed by the House as not affording adequate cause for such a proceeding, by a vote of nearly, if not quite, two to one. But it is enough to say that they are not before the Senate, and that body has no right to consider them. Against them the President has had no opportunity to defend himself, or even to enter his denial. To go outside of the charges preferred, and to conviet him because, in our belief, he committed offenses for which he is not on trial, would be to disregard every principle which regulates judicial proceedings, and would be not only a gross wrong in itself, but a shame and humili ation to those by whom it was perpetrated. It has been further intimated by the Man agers that public opinion calls with a loud voice for the conviction and removal of the President. One Manager has even gone so far as to threaten with infamy every Senator who voted for the resolution passed by the Senate touching the removal of Mr. Stanton, and who shall now vote for the President's acquittal. Omitting to comment upon the propriety of this remark, it is sufficient to say, with regard to myself, that I not only did not vote for that resolution, but opposed its adoption. Had I so voted, however, it would afford no justifica. tion for convicting the President, if I did not, on examination and reflection, believe him guilty. A desire to be consistent would not excuse a violation of my oath to do "impartial justice." A vote given in haste and with little opportunity for consideration would be a lame apology for doing injustice to another, after full examination and reflection. To the suggestion that popular opinion de mands the conviction of the President on these charges, I reply that he is not now on trial before the people, but before the Senate. In the words of Lord Eldon, upon the trial of the Queen, “I take no notice of what is passing out of doors, because I am supposed constitutionally not to be acquainted with it." And again, "It is the duty of those on whom a judicial task is imposed to meet reproach and not court popularity." The people have not heard the evidence as we have heard it. The responsibility is not on them, but upon us. They have not taken an bath to "do impartial justice according to the Constitution and the laws." I have taken that oath. I cannot render judgment upon their convictions, nor can they transfer to themselves my punishment if I violate my own. And I should consider myself undeserving the confidence of that just and intelligent people who imposed upon me this great responsibility, and unworthy a place among honorable men, if for any fear of public reprobation, and for the sake of securing popular favor, I should disregard the conviction of my judgment and my conscience. The consequences which may follow either from conviction or acquittal are not for me, with my convictions, to consider. The future is in the hands of Him who made and governs the universe, and the fear that He will not govern it wisely and well would not excuse me for a violation of His law. OPINION OF HON. GEORGE H. WILLIAMS. Deeply impressed with a sense of my responsibility and duty in the case now before the Senate, I shall vote for the conviction of the President upon the first three articles of imOther offenses of the President, not speci-peachment upon the ground that the removal fied in the articles of impeachment, have been pressed by the managers as showing the necessity for his removal. It might be sufficient to reply that all such were long prior in date of Secretary Stanton and the appointment of Adjutant General Thomas, as charged in said articles, were in violation of the Constitution of the United States. To decide otherwise would be to say that the President has the absolute and unlimited power, at all times and under all circumstances, to remove from and appoint to office, and that so much of the Constitution as provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate appoint," is of no effect. Nothing would be necessary to annihilate all participation by the Senate in appointments, except to call the appointee, in case of removal, an officer ad interim—that is, an officer to hold until it suits the purposes of the President to send a nomination to the Senate to which it is willing to agree. Untiring and exhaustive researches on behalf of the President do not show, and I venture to assert that not one single instance can be found in the history of the Government, where the head of a Department has been removed and a successor appointed while the Senate was in session without the advice and consent of that body. Nothing is clearer to my mind than that the power of the President over the offices of the country during the session of the Senate is one thing, and his power during the recess of the Senate is another and a different thing. When the Constitution says that the President may fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate it certainly confers upon hin a power which he does not possess and cannot exercise while the Senate is in session. When removals have been made during the recess of the Senate it has been argued that vacancies made in this way have happened; therefore they could be filled temporarily by the President; but now it is proposed, by building one inference upon another, to include a session as well as a recess, and so abrogate the authority of the Senate and invest the Executive with absolute and despotic power. I am very certain that the practice of removals and temporary appointments stands upon that clause of the Constitution which refers to the recess of the Senate, and in my judgment it is not only a total departure from the precedents, but a plain violation of the Constitution, to make one of its sections which applies exclusively to a recess apply also and equally to a session of the Senate. Congress, if it should try, could not delegate || any such power to the President. Congress may vest the appointment of certain inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments; but Congress can no more vest the power in the Pres ident of removing and appointing the head of a Department without the advice of the Senate than it can vest the power in the President to make a treaty without the concurrence of the Senate. The practice of the Government has not been inconsistent with this view of the Constitution. Pickering's case, in 1800, is cited, but there the removal and nomination to the Senate were simultaneous acts. President Adams did not attempt to make any appointment. Some cases of ad interim appointments to provide for casualties have been produced, but no case can be found where the President, uno flatu, removed and appointed the head of a Department while the Senate was in session without its consent. ion of 1789, which is made the head and front of the defense in this case, it may be said that it was brought about by the arguments of James Madison in the House and the casting vote of Vice President Adams in the Senate, both of whom at the time expected to fill the executive office, and both of whom, it has been said, looked upon a contrary decision as expressing a want of confidence in the then administration of Washington. Most, if not all, of the distinguished legislators and judges of the nation, such as Webster, Clay, Calhoun, Kent, Story, and the Supreme Court of the United States, with Marshall at its head, have affirmed the incorrectness of that decision, and experience has demonstrated its mischievous and corrupting tendencies and effects. Webster, commenting on this decision, and speaking of the framers of the Constitution, in 1835, said: "I have the clearest conviction that they looked to no other mode of displacing an officer than by impeachment, or by the regular appointment of another person to the same place." I think it wholly unnecessary to discuss the acts of 1792, 1795, and 1863, because they have been swept out of existence by the tenure-ofoffice act of March 2, 1867. This is established by the application of two familiar rules of law. One is, that the act of March 2, 1867, embraced and provided for the temporary and permanent appointment and removal of every officer whose appointment is vested in the President and the Senate; and the other is, its clear re pugnancy to all preceding legislation on the subject. Great effort has been made to show that the removal of Stanton and the appointment of Thomas were unimportant infractions of the statute, and therefore the President ought to be acquitted. Adopting the views of the President that this Senate is a court, and finding that the accused has committed an act which the law declares to be a high misdemeanor, then it follows, according to all rules governing judicial tribunals, that a judgment for conviction must be given, no matter what Senators may think of the wisdom of the law or the nature of the offense. Much of the argument for the defense proceeds upon the ground that the President has a right to decide for himself as to the constitutionality of an act of Congress. Whatever may be the correct view of this question, it must be admitted that if the President violates a penal law of Congress he does so at his peril. When impeached for such an act, if the Senate upon the trial holds the law to be unconstitutional and void, he must, of course, be acquitted; but if the Senate holds the law to be constitutional and valid, it must necessarily convict. Any public officer or private citizen may test the validity of a criminal statute by its violation, but in so doing he undertakes to suffer its penalties, if, upon his trial, it is upheld and enforced by judicial authority. To allow any person not acting judicially when arraigned for crime to plead, in bar of the prosecution, his mistaken opinion of the justice or validity of the law, would be to deliver over the land to anarchy and crime. Two questions only as to this law are before the Senate. One is, Is it constitutional? and the other is, Has it been violated by the President? Webster said, in one of his great speeches, that "the regulation of the tenure of office is a common exercise of legislative authority, and the power of Congress in this President Johnson cannot say that he was mistaken as to this point, for, in addition to what he must have learned from many years of public service, he declared in a speech which he delivered in the Senate on the 10th of Jan-particular is not at all restrained or limited by uary, 1861, in the most emphatic manner, that the President had no such power as he has exercised in the removal of Stanton and the appointment of Thomas. I do not find that the act of 1789 or subsequent acts upon this subject have ever been so construed as to warrant the executive acts in question, and they could not be so construed without ignoring the clear distinction which the Constitution makes between a recess and a session of the Senate Concerning the decis anything contained in the Constitution, except as to judicial officers;" and I am very sure that the Senate, after having three times decided by more than a two-thirds vote of the members present each time that the tenure-of-office act is constitutional, will now regard that question as res adjudicata. Has the President broken any of the provisions of the act? Nobody denies that the body of the first section, which provides that every person appointed to office by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall hold until his successor is in like manner appointed and qualified, embraces the Secretary of War; but an attempt is made to construe the proviso to the section so as to exclude that officer from the protection of the act. To maintain this construction reliance is chiefly placed upon some remarks of Senator SHERMAN, in connection with the bill. I presume, on this account, it may be proper for me to say that I introduced the original bill, and had the honor to be chairman of the committee of conference by whom this proviso was reported. When the bill passed the Senate the heads of Departments were expressly excepted, but the House of Representatives amended it by striking out that exception, and the conference committee agreed to the House amendment, with a modification as to the time during which such officers should be under the protection of the law. There was no suggestion or intimation in the committee that the act did not apply to Mr. Johnson's Cabinet, and the only purpose of the proviso was to put a limitation upon the holding of Cabinet officers, and that is its fair construction. Great stress has been put upon the words except as herein otherwise provided" just preceding the proviso, but the fact is that these words were in the bill before the proviso was attached and refer to the fourth section, and, therefore, instead of being an exception, the proviso is a mere qualification of the general words of the section. I do not see how it is possible to conclude that Mr. Stanton is not protected by the body of the section or the proviso. If he is within the proviso, then he has a right to hold for one month after the end of some presidential term, and cannot in the mean time be removed without the consent of the Senate. That is the time expressly fixed by the proviso when a Secretary ceases to be under the protection of the Senate, and it makes no difference whether the present is Lincoln's or Johnson's presidential term. If Mr. Stanton is not affected by the proviso, then he is necessarily within the body of the section, for that includes every officer in the United States appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, which is exactly Stanton's case. The idea that this act took effect two years before it was enacted, so as to remove anybody from office at that time, is a simple absurdity. Considerable discussion has taken place as to whether or not the present is Mr. Lincoln's or Mr. Johnson's presidential term. This, as it seems to me, is an unimportant but not doubtful question. When the Constitution speaks of the term of the President, it means a definite period of four years, not an uncer tain time dependent upon the death, resignation or removal of the person who takes possession of the office; and therefore the present is Mr. Lincoln's term, unless there can be two presidential terms between the 4th of March, 1865, and the 4th of March, 1869. Let us look at the second section of the tenure-of-office act. That provides that when any officer appointed as aforesaid, that is, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, is suspended, and the Senate do not concur in the suspension, such officer shall forthwith resume the functions of his office. E. M. Stanton was appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He was suspended. The Senate did not concur in his suspension. It was then his right and duty forthwith to resume the functions of his office; but the President would not allow him so to do, for he not only cut off all official relations with Mr. Stanton, but appointed, received, and recognized another person as Secretary of War. What quibble can be found to excuse this plain violation of the law? Admitting, for the sake of argument, that the President could legally remove Mr. Stanton, then I deny that he could legally appoint Thomas ad interim, for the reason that the second section of the tenureof-office act declares that upon the suspension THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE. of an officer an ad interim appointment may be made, "and in no other case." When Stanton was suspended, the ad interim appointment of General Grant was legal; but any ad interim appointment upon a removal is absolutely prohibited. Vacancies in office can only be filled in two ways under the tenure-of-office act. One is by temporary appointment, as provided in the Constitution, during the recess of the Senate, and the other is by an appointment by and with the advice and consent of the Senate during the session. One might reasonably suppose that the construction of this act was settled, so far as the Senate was concerned. forms, there has been that concurrence be- Much discussion has taken place in this case On the 12th of December the President com. municated to the Senate the fact that, on the 12th of the preceding August, he had suspended Mr. Stanton, and gave his reasons therefor; and the Senate, assuming that Mr. Stanton was within the protection of the tenure-of-office act, proceeded to consider the President's reasons, and, under the leadership of the distinguished Senator from Maine, [Mr. FESSENDEN,] refused, by an overwhelming vote of thirty-five to six, to concur in the suspension. Every one of the majority then understood that the effect of that vote was to reestablish Mr. Stanton in his office under the provisions of the tenure-of-moved, then the appointment of Thomas was office act. On the 21st of February, 1868, the President informed the Senate that he had removed Mr. Stanton and appointed Adjutant General Thomas Secretary of War ad interim, and the Senate proceeded to consider that communication, and, after protracted argument, decided, by a vote of twenty-seven to six, "that, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the President has no power to remove the Secretary of War and to designate any other officer to perform the duties of that office ad interim." Among those who voted to affirm this doctrine was the distinguished Senator from Illinois, [Mr. TRUMBULL.] Now, after these proceedings, which go upon the express ground that Mr. Stanton is within the provisions of the tenure-of-office act, we are asked to eat up our own words and resolutions and stultify ourselves by holding that the act did not apply to Mr. Stanton. One question made is that the President has a clear violation of the sixth section of the Assuming that the tenure-of-office act is Suppose Stanton, to avoid conflict under the orders of the 21st of February, had given posHe session of the War Office to Thomas. would still have been Secretary of War, because those orders were illegal and void. What the tenure-of-office law intended to prohibit and punish was the action of the President as to removals and appointments without the consent of the Senate, though, of course, such action, being in contravention of law, would have no force. Great effort has been made to show that the removal of Stanton and the appointment of Thomas were insignificant acts. They might possibly be so regarded if there were harmony and peace in the country. Congress has passed laws for the reconstruction of the States lately in rebellion, and the President Johnson is also fully committed to On the 12th execution of these falls within the jurisdiction the same construction of the act. of the War Department. The President holds of August he suspended Mr. Stanton, a prothem to be unconstitutional, and is bitterly ceeding provided for by said act, but otherwise unwarranted by law and unknown to the prac-opposed to their existence. Stanton is undertice of the Government. On the 14th day of August, 1867, he notified the Secretary of the Treasury, as follows: "SIR: In compliance with the requirements of the act entitled 'An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices,' you are hereby notified that on the 12th instant, Hon. Edwin M. Stanton was suspended from his office as Secretary of War and General U. S. Grant authorized and empowered to act as Secretary ad interim." He also reported his reasons to the Senate for the suspension of Mr. Stanton within twenty days from its meeting, as required by said act. Having vainly tried to oust Mr. Stanton by an observance of the act, he boldly determined upon its violation by Stanton's removal. This he admits, but says it was with a view to test the constitutionality of the act, forgetting, as it seems, that such a question could not possibly arise if the act did not apply to Mr. Stanton. To argue, in view of these facts, that the President removed Stanton through a mistaken idea that the law did not apply to him, is trifling with common sense. Taking the ground of the President that the present is his presidential term, then, I say, to all intents and purposes, he has appointed Stanton Secretary of War. Time and again, in official communications to the Senate, he has declared Mr. Stanton to be Secretary of War, and in his message of December 12, 1867, he submitted to the Senate the question as to whether or not Mr. Stanton should continue to be Secretary of War, and the Senate confirmed him in that position; so that, without the usual stood to be friendly to this legislation. He stands, therefore, in the way of the President, and his removal and the appointment of an executive puppet in his place may involve the lives and liberties of thousands of citizens, and perchance the peace and integrity of the nation. During this trial we have been treated to much from the writings of James Madison. Arguing about executive power in the Congress of 1789, he said: "If an unworthy officer be continued in office by an unworthy President, the House of Representatives can at any time impeach him and the Senate can remove him, whether the President chooses or not." Speaking again of the President, he says: "I contend that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject him to impeachment and removal from his high trust." No man can deny that E. M. Stanton, by his ability and experience, his patriotism and personal integrity, is eminently fitted for the head of the War Department. Andrew Johnson has removed him because his unbending loyalty made him an obstacle to the President's ambitious and partisan purposes, and appointed to his place a man wholly incompetent, whose only merit is abject servility to the will of his master. If James Madison was a judge here to-day he would vote for impeachment upon that ground alone. We have been earnestly warned by the President's counsel not to encroach upon the executive department of the Government. Considering that the President usurped the legis lative control and reconstruction of the States lately in rebellion; that he has vetoed fifteen acts of Congress, to say nothing of those he has pocketed; that he comes now by his confidential counsel to say what he has before said, that there is no Congress and we are no Senate; that, without acknowledging our authority, he appears simply to avoid civil commotion, and we are prepared to appreciate the modesty and grace of this admonition. I am surprised to find so many holding the opinion that the President is not impeachable for anything that the law does not declare a crime or a misdemeanor. Cannot he be impeached for a violation of the Constitution? Suppose he should declare war or borrow money or levy taxes without authority of law? Is there no remedy? Suppose, for partisan purposes, he should veto all the acts of Congress, or in some mad freak pardon all the criminals of the United States. Suppose by drunkenness and debauchery he should become incompetent to perform the duties of the office. Is Congress bound to tolerate wickedness, corruption, and treachery in the executive office so long as there is no violation of a penal statute? I shall vote for conviction on the tenth article. Whenever the Chief Magistrate of this country, whose wisdom and virtue ought to exalt the nation, makes a public blasphemer of himself, and going about the country in speeches excites resistance to law and defends mob violence and murder, I think he ought to be removed from office. This is no question of taste or good manners or of unfriendly criticism upon Congress. Those speeches were crimes. When they were delivered they took the wings of the wind. They were published and read throughout the violence and revenge, and I have little doubt turbulent South. They imparted boldness to that many a poor man is sleeping in a bloody grave in consequence of those speeches. Official duties and relations impose restraint upon freedom of speech as well as upon freedom of action. Suppose a judge of the Supreme Court should go about making speeches and telling the people that the reconstruction or other acts of Congress were void, and that he would so decide when opportunity should arise, is there duct so indecent and so disastrous to the peace any doubt that he could be impeached for conand good order of society? West H. Humphreys, United States district judge for Tennessee, was convicted by the unanimous vote of this Senate of high crimes and misdemeanors for what he said in a public speech in the city of Nashville on the 29th December, 1860. case. Whether Andrew Johnson shall be removed from office or not is the least question in this Made up as the issues are, to acquit is to decide that the President may at any time, irrespective of the provisions of the Constitution, and in open and undisguised contempt of the authority and will of the Senate, remove from and appoint to office. To acquit is to hold that the laws of the land are not what they are written down in the statute-books of the country to be, but are the unwritten and, it may be, unknown will of one man who happens to fill the executive office of the nation. All courts may take judicial notice of history, and by what I have a right to know in this case I have been sorrowfully and reluctantly brought to the conclusion that Andrew administration has been to rule or ruin; that Johnson is a bad man; that the policy of his he has endeavored by usurpation and the abuse of his veto to subordinate the legislative power to his personal views and purposes, and that his official career and example have been to injure, degrade, and demoralize the country; and I believe that his removal from office will invigorate the laws, vindicate the Constitution, and tend greatly to restore unity and peace to the nation. High misdemeanors may or may not be vio. lations of the laws. High misdemeanors may, in my judgment, be misbehavior in office detrimental to the interests of the nation, dangerous to the rights of the people, or dishonoring | to the Government. I entertain the conviction that the framers of the Constitution intended to impose the high duty upon the House of Representatives to arraign the Chief Magistrate for such misbehavior in office as injured, dishonored, or endangered the nation, and to impose upon the Senate the duty of trying, con victing, and removing the Chief Magistrate proved guilty of such misbehavior. Believing this to be the intention of the framers of the Constitution and its true meaning; believing that the power should be exercised whenever the security of the country and the liberties of the people imperatively demand it; and be lieving by the evidence adduced to prove the charges of violating the Constitution and the tenure-of-office act, and by the confessed and justified acts of the President, that he is guilty of high misdemeanors, I unhesitatingly vote for his conviction and removal from his high office. The past seven years have been to gentlemen occupying seats in this Chamber years of pressing duties and stern trials. In the trying times through which the nation has passed and is passing it has sometimes happened that Senators of large capacity, ripe experience, and eminent public service have widely differed in the interpretation of the Constitution and the construction of the laws. Whenever the high duties imposed upon Senators by the exigen: cies of the country have pressed for action, and our deliberations have been distracted by the diverse opinions of Senators learned in the law, I have striven to discharge my duty by giving whatever doubts clouded my judgment or embarrassed my action to patriotism, to liberty, and to justice-to the security of my country and the rights of all its citizens. In glancing back over these years I find few votes I would recall by following this rule of action. In this great trial, imposed upon the Senate by the Constitution of our country and the Repre- The President is charged by the House of sentatives of the people, I shall give whatever Representatives with violating the Constitution doubts have arisen to perplex or embarrass to and the tenure-of-office act in removing Mr. my country rather than to its Chief Magistrate, Stanton from the office of Secretary of War now arraigned as a violator of the Constitution, and in appointing Adjutant General Thomas a violator of the laws, and a violator of his oath Secretary of War ad interim. The removal of to faithfully execute the laws. By a too rigid Mr. Stanton and the appointment of Adjutant | adherence to forms and technicalities the sub- General Thomas, and the violation of the tenstance is often lost. Discarding forms and ure-of-office act, if Mr. Stanton be within that technicalities and looking only to the substance, act, stand confessed and justified in the answer I shall so vote as to secure the ends of justice. of the President to the charges of the House I am not, I trust, unmindful of the gravity of Representatives. The answer of the Pres of the occasion, of the solemnity of my oath, ident, without any other evidence, is to my nor of the obligation ever resting upon me "to mind conclusive evidence of his guilt. Upon be just and fear not." I know that the vote I his answer, confessions, assumptions, and just shall give in this great trial will be criticised ifications I have no hesitation in recording my sharply in our age and in ages to come. The vote of "guilty." The assumptions of power President is on trial before the Senate-the put forth by the President in his defense canSenate is on trial before the present age and not but startle and alarm all men who would before the coming ages. I intend to vote for maintain the just powers of all branches of the the conviction of the President and for his Government. Had the President inadvertently removal from his high office, and to submit violated the Constitution and the laws; had my motives and my action to the judgment of he pleaded in justification misconstruction the present and of the future. From the ver of the Constitution and the laws, I might dict of the Senate the President has no appeal; have hesitated to vote for his conviction. But from the verdict of posterity the Senate has he claims the right to remove civil officers and no appeal. I propose to state, with brevity, appoint others ad interim during the session some of the reasons why I shall vote for the of the Senate. If that claim of power is adconviction of the President of the United mitted by a vote of acquittal, the President can States upon the charges preferred by the Rep-remove during the session of the Senate tens resentatives of the people. The framers of the Constitution well knew the seductive, grasping, and aggressive nature of executive power. They knew that for ages the contest had been "to rescue," in the words of Daniel Webster, "liberty from the grasp of executive power," and that "our security was in our watchfulness of executive power." They knew that the champions of human freedom in the Old World, though often baffled, had struggled for generations to limit and restrain executive power. They sought to make the executive power of the nation useful to the country, but not dangerous to the liberties of the people. They gave to the President a short term of office, and clothed the Representatives of the people with power to arraign him before the Senate, not only for high crimes, but for high misdemeanors, too. Jealous of executive power, the framers of the Constitution gave to the House of Representatives-a body repre senting the interests, the sentiments, the opinions of the people, and their passions, toocomplete authority to arraign the Chief Magistrate of the nation before the tribunal of the Senate. They clothed the Senate of the United States, composed of gentlemen quite as liable as are the members of the House of Representatives to be influenced by the interests, the opinions, the sentiments, and the passions of the people, with ample power to try, convict, and remove the President, not only for the commission of high crimes, but for high misdemeanors. of thousands of civil officers, with their millions the laws according to his own caprices, whims, and sovereign pleasure. Never can I assent, by a vote of acquittal, to executive assump. tions so unconstitutional, so subversive of the Government, so revolutionary in their scope and tendency, These assumptions will introduce into our constitutional system, into our Government of nicely-adjusted parts, derangement, disorganization, and anarchy. Criminal acts raise the presumption of wrong motives, intentions, and purposes. The Presi dent's acts, claims, and assumptions, made against the well-known protests of vast masses of the people, the organs of public opinion, the Congress of the United States, and the laws of the land, afford ample evidence that his motives, intentions, and purposes were unworthy, if not criminal. We are sworn to give this arraigned President a trial as impartial as the lot of humanity will permit. But we cannot close our eyes to the records of the past three years, nor can we wholly shut out from all influences our personal knowledge of his intentions, purposes, and acts. The framers of the Constitution, when they empowered Senators to sit in judgment upon an arraigned Chief Magistrate, must have presumed that Senators would know something of the motives, intentions, and purposes, and be familiar with the public record of him who should exercise executive power in their time. The framers of the Constitution knew, when they gave Senators the power to try an arraigned Chief Magistrate, the country knows, and we know, that personal knowledge and the historic records of the country cannot but influence in some degree the feelings and judgments of men. The Four years ago eleven States were wrenched from the Union, their governments were arrayed against the country, the land was des olated with civil war, the nation was stroggling to restore and maintain the unity of the country, the supremacy of the Government, and the freedom of millions made free by executive proclamation and a constitutional amendment. The faith of the nation was plighted to restore the broken Union on the basis of loyalty, and to maintain the freedom of millions of emancipated bondmen. men pledged to liberty and union accepted Andrew Johnson, supported and trusted him. Coming into power, he at once, in spite of the fears and protests of the loyal men who had confided in him, entered upon a policy that placed the conquered rebel States in the keep ing of traitors, and put loyal men and the freedmen completely under the authority of men who had striven for four years on bloody fields to destroy their country, to perpetuate the slavery of the very men surrendered to their control. To lighten the burdens and partially protect and defend the endangered rights of the freedNot content with this assumption of power, men, Congress passed a Freedmen's Bureau the President claims the right to pronounce a bill; the President arrested it by a veto., Conlaw of Congress unconstitutional, to refuse to gress passed another Freedmen's Bureau bill; execute it, although he is sworn to do so, and the President endeavored to defeat it by another to openly violate it with a view of testing its veto, and when it passed into law he strove to constitutionality in the courts, although no embarrass and thwart its operations. To promeans may exist for months or years to come tect the freedmen he had wickedly abandoned to test the constitutionality of the law so vio- to the control of their enemies and the nation's lated in the judicial tribunals of the country. enemies, Congress passed a civil rights bill; the The President claims and has exercised the President attempted to arrest it by a veto; and right to declare Congress an unconstitutional failing in that, he has utterly neglected to enbody, incapable of enacting laws or of propos force it. Congress endeavored, by submitting ing amendments to the Constitution; to hold an amendment to the Constitution, to secure the laws in abeyance; to refuse to execute the reconstruction of the Union; the President them, and to defiantly violate them in order to met it by a denial of the authority of Congress test their constitutionality. These are the po- to submit an amendment, and by an invocasitions assumed by Andrew Johnson. These tion to his governments in the rebel States to assumptions, if admitted, radically change the reject it. The rebel States having failed to character of our Government. If they are sus- adopt the constitutional amendment, Congress tained by a verdict of acquittal the President passed the reconstruction measures over Exceases to be the servant of the law and becomes ecutive vetoes. Those measures of restoration the master of the people, and a law-non-exe- have encountered in their execution the hos cuting power, a law defying power, a law- tility of the President. Faithful generals have breaking power is created within the Govern been removed for their fidelity and efficiency, ment. Instead of an Executive bound to the and others have been rebuked and thwarted. faithful execution of the laws of Congress the The history of the past three years records nation has an Executive bound only to execute li it, and our personal knowledge attests it, that THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE. the President has sought to prevent the enforcement of the laws passed over his vetoes. In every form he has striven to prevent the restoration of the Union on a basis of loyalty to the country and the equal rights and privileges of the people. The evidences legally before us, the records of the country, the personal knowledge of Senators, show the motives, intentions, and designs of President Johnson. To accomplish his purposes and designs, Mr. Johnson sought, by the use of executive patronage, to corrupt the American people. When Congress, by the casting vote of Vice President Adams, decided, in the beginning of Washington's Administration, that the Senate was a part of the appointing power, but not of the removing power, the office-holders of the country were but a few hundred in number, and received a compensation amounting to but a few thousand dollars. In our time the Federal office-holders are counted by tens of thousands, and their compensation amounts To defeat the will of the to many millions. people, the President, in the interests of disloyalty, inequality, and injustice, sought to use the corrupt and corrupting influences of The Postmaster Genexecutive patronage. eral made the shameless declaration, that offi cers who ate the President's bread should support the President's policy. To maintain the cause of the country, as well as to protect honest public officers who would not betray their country, Congress enacted the civil-ten ure act. It met the executive veto, the executive denunciation of unconstitutionality, and the executive violation. Mr. WILLIAMS, of the House of Representatives, who drew the proviso to the first section of the act, tells us that he intended that the act should protect Mr. Stanton. The Senator from Oregon, [Mr. WILLIAMS,] who introduced the original bill, and who was on the committee of conference, and the Sen. ator from Vermont, [Mr. EDMUNDS,] who reported the bill from the Committee on the Judiciary, and who was also on the committee of conference, both claim that Mr. Stanton is protected by the act. A fair and logical construction of the language of the act gives its protection to Mr. Stanton. A large majority in Congress voted for the bill in the belief that it threw its protection over the great War Secretary, who stood before the country one of the foremost champions of Congress in its struggle against the anarchical, disorganizing, and unpatriotic action of the Executive. Mr. Stanton was suspended by Mr. Johnson; the reasons for his suspension were submitted to Congress; the reasons were pronounced insufficient by more than a three fourths vote of the Senate; Mr. Stanton returned to his office; the President refused to acknowledge him; and, after several days, issued the order for his removal, and he appointed Adjutant General Thomas Secretary of War ad interim—all in direct violation of the tenure-of-office act. Johnson and his counsel hostile to the spirit OPINION OF HON. GEORGE VICKERS. The Constitution secures to the President of the United States the nomination of civil officers and their appointment, if the Senate shall advise and concur. He is the initiating and acting power, and gives character and form to the proceeding before it is presented to the consideration of the Senate, which body has no power to present the name of any one to the President as an object of official favor. The act of 1789, which created the Department of War, does not limit the tenure of the office of the Secretary of that Department, but as signs such duties as shall be enjoined upon and intrusted to him by the President, agreeably to the Constitution. Soon after the Government went into operation the power of removal from office was exercised by the Executive during the session as well as in the recess of the Senate; the com> missions to the Secretaries and many other officers contained the statement that they held at the pleasure of the President. A practice immediately arose and prevailed, and was continued down to the year 1867, of removal from office by the Executive; the power of removal was claimed as an incident to that of appoint ment, and as essential to a faithful execution of the laws, on the ground that unless the President possessed it he could not remove a faithless officer who might be engaged in obstructing the execution of the laws or in embez zling the public funds; the duty of the Presi dent under the Constitution, to take care that the laws should be fashfully executed, could not be efficiently discharged unattended by the power of removal. Although differences of The President refused to send a nomination opinion may have existed upon this as well as other provisions of that instrument, yet the to the Senate, knowing that it was the will of the Senate and of the nation that Mr. Stanton practice uninterruptedly continued, with the should remain at the head of the War Depart-implied assent of the Legislature, for upward ment. He had vainly sought to induce General Grant to be a party in thwarting the will of the Senate by preventing the return of Mr. Stanton to the War Office. He had failed to persuade Lieutenant General Sherman to aid him in removing Mr. Stanton from his office. He then took Adjutant General Thomas, through whom all communications must go to the Army, and made him Secretary of War ad interim. The law requires all communications to the Army to go through General Grant, Might it not have been, by placing Thomas in the War Department, while holding the office of Adjutant General, the purpose of the President to have the means of communication with the Army under his control, and substanstantially to set aside the law requiring such communications to go through the General of the Army? In support of the acts of the President, claims are made and powers asserted by Mr. of seventy-five years, and constituted a legis- The acquiescence by Congress in that construction, whether originally correct or not, was fully sufficient to justify President Johnson in its exercise. Although it may be termed an implied power, it is as valuable and essential to a coördinate department as an express grant, The power to create banks and of erecting custom and light-houses is derived by implication. The concurrent authorities of Kent and Story refer to the power of removal of officers by the President, as established by usage and acquiescence, as well as by the opinions of the most eminent lawyers, judges, and statesmen, as the settled construction of the Constitution. It was advocated and practiced by Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Van Buren, and other Presidents, down to Mr. Johnson. The elder Adams removed. Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, during the ses sion of Congress, and without consulting it; he requested Mr. Pickering to resign, and on his refusal removed him by a peremptory order, and nominated John Marshall his successor. The right of Mr. Adams does not seem to have been questioned. The act of 1789, in its second section, provides for the appointment of a chief elerk in the Department of War, who, whenever the principal officer, the Secretary, shall be removed by the President, or in any other case of vacancy, shall have the charge and custody of all the records and papers in the office. The language of this act recognizes an existing right in the President, under the Constitution, to remove a Secretary at his discretion. The debates in Congress in 1789, by the ablest men of the nation, show that the power of removal from office was conceded to be in the President, and the bills establishing the Departments and regulating the duties to be performed were framed purposely to conform to that construction of the Constitution. Thus, in the act relating to the Treasury Department, the seventh section provides that the assistant shall take charge of the records, books, and papers "whenever the Secretary shall be removed from office by the President of the Uni ted States, or in any other case of vacancy.' In the same year the Department of Foreign Affairs was created, and in the second section of the act it is declared that there shall be ap pointed an inferior officer, to be called the chief clerk, and who, whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy, shall, during such va cancy, have the charge and custody of the records," &c. These three statutes do not confer the power of removal, but they treat it as existing in the executive department, and were designed and drafted to exclude the presumption of implication of a grant of that power to the President by legislative authority, 66 The act of the 2d March, 1867, regulating the tenure of civil offices, and passed over the President's veto, was intended to alter and change the settled construction of the Constitution, and to empower the Senate to continue a Cabinet officer in commission against the will and wishes of the Executive, and to rethe statute trenched upon and materially imstrain and check his wonted power of removal; paired what the President and his legal advisers, including the Secretary of War, believed and declared to be a constitutional right and prerogative of the executive department. The President having sworn to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States," considered it to be his duty, as custodian of the executive department, to treat the act as unconstitutional, and to exert the power claimed and exercised by all his predecessors. The statute of 2d March, 1867, essays to create an offense of high iisdemeanor in any one who may attempt to violate it, and for this effort of the President to maintain the integrity of his to determine a question of such magnitude in department until the judiciary, the only arbiter the last resort, should decide, the impeach ment is predicated. If one department shall attempt or do what another department shall believe to be an essential and vital encroachment upon its high powers or functions, the law of self-defense is as applicable as it would be to a personal attack by one upon another. It cannot be expected that the executive department is to be the agent for executing a statute upon itself which is to dismember and deprive it of half its vigor.or vitality; the duty enjoined upon the President to see that the laws are executed was not designed to operate in such a case, for the practical recognition of such a principle might be used to work the destruction of the whole frame of the Government and make the Constitution its own destroyer. The allegation that if the President shall be permitted to contravene a statute which he and his Cabinet |