the Unionist and Imperialist brand, or that the Dublin Corporation, for example, would suddenly become a pure and disinterested body just because what is largely its own political persuasion had seized the reins of central Government. The very healthy suspicion is abroad that Sinn Feinism is no more immune than Nationalism, Unionism or any other political aspiration from the operations of commercial adventurers, who are far from desiring the establishment of an Industrial Commonwealth.

That this suspicion has been gaining ground among the Socialist rank and file would seem to be apparent from a declaration on the point made by Dr Dillon, one of the members of the Executive body, at the Sinn Fein Convention, held last October in Dublin. 'If it is imagined,' said Dr Dillon, that the Republic will be of a character which will exclude all possibility of social reform, and that the people who are engaged in starting the Republic all belong to the capitalist classes, this idea is not true. If this idea is allowed to spread it will seriously interfere with our movement.' And yet, as if to emphasise the fact that the leaders of the movement, if not hostile to Labour, are the veriest amateurs at industrial strategy, the only definite resolution brought forward at this Convention in regard to what should be the future Labour politics of Sinn Fein was that moved by the Countess Markievicz, calling on Irish trade unions 'to sever all connexion with British trade unionism'-the 'clean-cut' with a vengeance! It is not surprising that this quixotic suggestion has been laughed out of court by the main body of Irish trade unionists, who belong directly, or whose societies are affiliated, to the most powerful organisations in England, and who are not so completely mad as to suppose that they can afford to insist on a policy of 'splendid isolation' at the very moment that their brethren across the water are drawing closer and closer together. The practical minds, too, among the intellectuals, who are more deeply stirred by such a book as 'Labour in Irish History' than by a whole cartload of moonstruck, 'patriotic' poetry, see that the Connolly spirit is going to do more for the workers of Ireland than the spectacular heroics of the Pearses and Plunketts.

On the other hand, it has been said that Sinn Feinism

can never hope to accomplish its ends because there are no wealthy men on its side. It is, perhaps, a truer reading of the situation which maintains that its failure under present conditions is certain because it divides the Irish workers of the North and the South on the question of the supreme Government, while offering nothing in the way of a hopeful Labour policy which could bring them together. Wolfe Tone, though he, too, fell a victim to the 'invasion' idea, found the magic symbol more surely when he sought to unite the divergent sections of his poorer fellow-countrymen on a basis of social and economic rights, rather than on that of an exclusive political independence. 'And,' he wrote in the manifesto of the United Irishmen, 'if the men of property will not help us they must fall; we will free ourselves by the aid of that large and respectable class of the community—the men of no property.'

At that time Belfast, and not Dublin, was the centre of revolutionary agitation in Ireland. It is not impossible that it may be so again. Though free from the fœtid poverty that disfigures the capital city, Belfast, as Connolly graphically pictures it, has its own industrial horrors, which in many ways are more staggering than elsewhere. The workers of the northern capital are not so destitute or so hopeless as those who haunt the 'alleys of their ancestors' in Dublin. Municipal affairs in Belfast, too, are far better managed. But just because, perhaps, Belfast has no romantic glamour, and no ideals outside its own prosperity, the evil side of Capitalism is seen and realised in the raw. It is small wonder that the 'men of no property' in this Protestant stronghold should have been attracted to the Larkinite Socialism which so appealed to their Catholic brethren. More to the point, however, is the fact that even the skilled artificers on the Lagan are being steadily won over to the propaganda of advanced Trade Unionism, which abolishes craft distinctions and makes the industry the unit of organisation. The time may be drawing near in Ireland when the old political cries of 'die-hard' Unionism and 'die-often' Nationalism will both have lost their spell, so far as many large industrial groups are concerned; when the Dublin workers will see that Sinn Fein butters no parsnips, and the hefty 'boys' of

Queen's Island begin to get a glimmering notion of the fact that even in a separate Ulster they might run short of provisions.

But, whatever developments of Labour organisation may be witnessed in Ireland, the feeling is growing that the ancient barriers of race and religion, that have divided the workers for so long, are artificial and unreal beside the barriers that divide Labour from Capitalism. Given a form of Self-Government which the three provinces would agree to, and the fourth not reject, the strength of the former barriers might soon have to stand the test of a 'class-war' which would lack nothing in thoroughness because it was being fought by Irishmen in Ireland. Just as Labour in England is quite obviously groping towards a new alignment of its forces, so the Irish workers, laying their tribal animosities aside, may essay a grand amalgamation for economic purposes. Certainly if they seize and hold on to the class-conscious' idea with the same tenacity that they have seized and held on to the bone of Home Rule, their contribution to the industrial struggle should make a brilliant page of history.

BERTRAM CLAYTON.

NOTES TO PP. 243, 247 ABOVE.

(1) This policy is embodied in 'The Constitution' adopted by Sinn Fein as proposed by the Executive and set out in the agenda for the Convention held in the Mansion House, Dublin, Oct. 25, 1917. Arthur Griffith presided at this Convention, which elected De Valera as President and Griffith as Vice-President of the Sinn Fein organisation (Daily Papers, Oct. 26, 1917).

(2) This official statement appeared in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,' Nov. 20, 1914. The statement was sent out by the German Foreign Office by wireless to Sayville, Long Island, and circulated widely in America. It was republished in a violently anti-British volume, 'The King, the Kaiser, and Irish Freedom,' by James K. M'Guire (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1915), addressed to the millions of men and women of German blood in America,' and advocating the Sinn Fein policy.

Art. 15.-THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

The Western Front.

DURING the first three days of October the Germans persisted, but without success, in their efforts to drive our troops from the positions won, on Sept. 26, between the Menin road and the crest of the ridge north of Polygon Wood. On Oct. 4 our offensive was resumed on a front of about eight miles, from a point south of the Menin road to the Ypres-Staden railway, anticipating by a few minutes a hostile attack between Polygon Wood and Zonnebeke by five divisions, which were thrown back in disorder, and suffered heavy loss. The operations were hindered by unfavourable weather, rain falling heavily throughout the day, and low clouds, driven before a westerly gale, making flying almost impossible. In spite of these adverse conditions all the appointed objectives were gained before midday, and six counterattacks were repulsed during the afternoon. The progress made on this occasion, and in the principal stages of the subsequent fighting, is indicated on the accompanying map. In this brief outline it is only possible to notice the most prominent features of a series of engagements which, in the methods of attack and defence, the nature of the German positions, and the desperate nature of the fighting, did not differ from the earlier phases of the great battle.

With regard to the general design of the operations, we may accept the view of military writers in the German press that the intention was to capture the commanding position known as the Passchendaele ridge, and to squeeze the enemy out of the low-lying area between it and the Yser Canal, as the first step in an advance against the submarine bases on the coast. It will be observed from the map that the ridge in question trends in a north-westerly direction beyond Westroosebeke, enclosing on the north and east the forest of Houthulst, and terminating in the rearward defences of Dixmude. The ground south of the forest, over which our troops had to advance in order to cover the left flank of the attacks on the ridge, is intersected by several streams, which, swollen by the excessive rainfall, spread

over the valleys, and formed successive barriers of lakes and marshes. It was in this region, strongly defended by redoubts and 'pill-boxes,' that the severest fighting took place; for not only was movement slow and toilsome, but the prompt adaptation of captured positions for defence against counter-attack was impracticable in the prevailing quagmire. It was the resistance encountered on the western slopes, rather than on the ridge itself, that hindered the advance in the direction of Westroosebeke.

Houthulst Forest forms the principal defence of the low-lying area between the ridge and the canal. Covered in front by marshes, defended by concreted works and nests of machine-guns, and supported by the cross-fire of artillery placed on the higher ground between Terrest and Westroosebeke, it has proved a formidable position to attack. In a combined operation on Oct 22, French and British troops carried the southern defences on a front of nearly a mile and a half, and established themselves well within the boundary. On Oct. 26 and 28 General Anthoine's troops, in conjunction with Belgian detachments, which made their way across the inundations, made a remarkable flank movement between the forest and the canal, capturing an extensive system of entrenchments, and occupying the whole of the Merckem peninsula. This success, followed by raids and artillery activity in the Dixmude sector, caused the Germans some uneasiness; and it is evident from the Berlin communiqués that they were anticipating an attack in that quarter, when attention was diverted to Italy by the progress of the Austro-German invasion.

The anxiety with which the Germans regarded the approach of the Allied forces to their defensive centre in Houthulst Forest manifested itself in a succession of fierce counter-attacks, which were directed chiefly against the sector embracing the Staden railway, and the junction of the French and British lines near the south-west corner of the forest. The Germans would naturally consider the latter a weak point; but the close cooperation which existed between the Allied troops made all their efforts abortive. The Passchendaele sector was an equally tender spot; but here also the enemy's attempts to recover lost ground had no other result than to impose