a severe strain on the endurance of our troops, and to retard their progress. After the fall of Passchendaele village (Nov. 6) the Germans abstained from further counter-attacks in the Flanders zone of operations, contenting themselves with subjecting our positions, especially those in the Passchendaele sector, to continuous bombardment.

On Nov. 20 the scene of action shifted to the Cambrai front, where troops of the 3rd Army took the offensive between the Scheldt and the Canal du Nord, in conjunction with subsidiary attacks, of the nature of diversions, east of Epéhy, and between Bullecourt and Fontaine lez Croisilles. The concentration of the striking force was effected with remarkable secrecy; and, although the activity of their patrols and raiding parties indicates that the Germans were apprehensive of an attack some days before its delivery, it is evident from the sequel that they had no suspicion of the novel form it would take. According to the correspondent of the 'Hamburger Fremdenblatt,' airmen, during the previous week, had reported a continuous southward movement of troops, but had been unable to determine their destination, dull, foggy weather having interfered with observation. As to the time of the attack the Germans were in complete ignorance; for General Byng dispensed with the usual preparatory bombardment, and the general quietude of the night before the battle probably led them to expect an uneventful day.

The positions attacked, which formed part of the Hindenburg system, comprised three lines of exceptional strength. The main trench of the advanced line was deep and narrow, with numerous strong points and snipers' posts. The second, or main line, situated from 500 to 1000 yards in rear, consisted of a trench some ten feet deep, with a width designed to stop tanks, and provided with numerous trench-mortar emplacements and dug-outs. The third, or support line, was placed a similar distance in rear of the main line, and was of similar construction; and a deep tunnel, running parallel to and behind it, provided at once free communication and secure cover for reserves. In front of each line were broad belts of entanglement, formed of steel wire half an inch thick, with barbs an inch long; and between the

lines, and for a couple of miles in rear of the system, there were a network of communication trenches, countless strong points, and a profusion of wire.

The main infantry attack was preceded by a line of tanks, for whose employment the ground, undamaged by bombardment, and dried by a spell of fine weather, was exceptionally favourable. Surmounting every obstacle, they flattened out the wire entanglements, and prepared the way for the infantry without creating the general havoc which, when artillery is used for that purpose, impedes the subsequent movement of guns and transport. In the first stage of the attack Lateau Wood, La Vacquerie, Welsh Ridge, Ribecourt, and Havrincourt were carried, and a footing was gained in Flesquières. In the second stage Masnières, Marcoing, Neuf Wood, Graincourt, and Anneux were occupied; and, on the west of the Canal du Nord, where tanks were not employed, progress was made as far as the Bapaume road by bombing along the trenches. Thus, on the first day, the triple line of defence was surmounted on nearly the whole of the front attacked.

The weather, which had favoured the preliminary arrangements, broke on the morning of the battle, and rain fell almost continuously for three days. German reinforcements having begun to arrive by the morning of Nov. 21, the subsequent advance encountered gradually increasing opposition. Progress was made towards Crévecœur and north-east of Masnières; Noyelles and Cantaing were captured; and a footing was gained in Mœuvres. In the evening Fontaine was entered, but was lost to a counter-attack. After an interval of two days, spent in consolidating the captured positions, the offensive was resumed on the front from Fontaine to Mœuvres ; and for three days the battle raged about the dominating height crowned by Bourlon Wood, where positions changed hands again and again. Desultory fighting continued until Nov. 29, at the end of which our line included the outskirts of Banteux, Lateau Wood, Masnières, the outskirts of Fontaine, Bourlon Wood, and the southern parts of Bourlon, Mœuvres, and Tadpole Copse. The Hindenburg line had been broken through and left some miles behind, but strongly-fortified villages and localities, and the energetic action of fresh German

forces, which had appeared in large numbers, barred further progress.*

The disadvantages of the position were obvious. It formed a salient some eight miles in breadth, and five in depth, the greater part of which was exposed to the cross-fire of the hostile artillery. The enemy had full freedom of movement, and ample space outside the periphery for the employment of large forces, while our troops suffered corresponding disadvantages. It was clearly desirable to gain greater freedom by expansion to the west; and attempts appear to have been made to advance in the direction of Inchy with that object, but it may be surmised that sufficient forces were not available. It was an important factor in the situation as it existed on the morning of Nov. 30, that these attempts, and the heavy fighting which had taken place in the region of Fontaine and Bourlon, had resulted in the bulk of our troops being concentrated in the north-west portion of the salient, the south-eastern flank of which was, in consequence, but weakly held.

In the meantime the Germans had assembled large forces opposite both flanks of the salient, with the object of recovering the lost ground by an encircling counteroffensive. The nature of the country favoured concealment, a series of long parallel spurs extending from south to north throughout the region from the east of the Scheldt Canal to the Agache. On the east flank troops could be brought under cover within striking distance of our positions; while, on the west, the valley of the Agache afforded concealment for large forces. The first notice of impending attack was a heavy bombardment with gas shells, directed chiefly on Bourlon Wood, and the deluging of the back areas with shrapnel and high-explosive projectiles. Simultaneously, about 8 a.m. on Nov. 30, an attack was launched against our positions from Vendhuile to the neighbourhood of Crévecœur; and our troops being taken by surprise, and being unprotected by wire, the Germans made rapid progress in the sector embracing the junction of the new line with the old, capturing Villers-Guslain, Gonnelieu, and Lateau Wood, and penetrating to Gouzeaucourt and

* 12,000 prisoners and 130 guns were taken in these operations. Vol. 229.-No. 454.

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