Art. 15.-THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

SINCE the irruption of the German armies into France, there has been no event so momentous, or so pregnant with possibilities, as Russia's desertion of the Allied cause. Its immediate results are now plainly visible in France, where, at the time of writing, our gallant troops are at death-grips with an adversary more formidable, by virtue of long experience both of offensive and defensive war, than he was in 1914. But, while its effect on the military situation is apparent at a glance, a closer consideration suggests that it may lead to consequences more permanent and far-reaching than seem, at present, to be generally supposed. It not only affects the present aspect of the war, but it appears likely to exercise a profound influence on the potential military situation after the war-in other words, on the balance of power in Europe, and throughout the world.

The immediate consequence of Russia's secession has been the reversal of the balance of forces on the western front by the transfer of a large number of hostile troops from Russia and Rumania. The German armies in France and Belgium, which, in September 1917, comprised 147 divisions, were reinforced during the winter by 35 divisions from the eastern, and 4 divisions from the Italian front. The arrival of Austrian troops in Belgium was rumoured as far back as January last; and, though it may be doubted whether the German General Staff would venture to pit Austrian divisions against French or British troops in battle, they would serve to relieve Germans in garrisons, on the lines of communication, and, perhaps, in sequestered sectors of the front. It has been remarked that the German divisions brought from Russia are of inferior quality. It is true that the pick of the troops which had taken part in last year's winter campaign had been transferred to France at the close of the operations; and that, since the disintegration of the Russian army, the eastern front has been used as a sanatorium, to which worn-out divisions were sent to recuperate, and as a training-ground for new levies. It would be a mistake, however, to depreciate the value of these reinforcements. Rest, change of scene, and the

infusion of new blood, soon restore the efficiency of warworn units; and those not considered fit for battle would be of use to replace troops of better quality in sectors outside the battle-zone. Nor should too much be made of the reduction of the German divisional establishment from four to three regiments, this expedient not having been confined to the German army. In the exodus from Russia, guns are an item not less important than men; for there is no further use for heavy artillery on the eastern front. Moreover, the German resources have been augmented by practically the whole of the Russian artillery, as well as by a large number of guns taken from the Italians, and by a vast quantity of ammunition and other material of war, the acquisition of which will have relieved the strain on the German munition-factories, releasing labour for employment in other directions, such as the building of submarines and aeroplanes, and the repair of railways and rolling-stock.

With these advantages at their command, the Germans have seized the opportunity to strike what is evidently intended to be a decisive blow before the American armies can take the field in force. It seems to be generally supposed that this is a last desperate effort, and that, in the event of failure, their losses will be so heavy as to oblige them to acknowledge defeat. The Germans are, perhaps, equally justified in expecting that, if they should fail, the Allies will be incapacitated from taking the offensive this year; and it would be quite in accordance with their methods to draw the Americans into action in detachments, with the object of impairing their value as a complete and organised force. Hitherto they have confessedly been counting on the economic factor and the political offensive against the home fronts, rather than on force of arms, to compel the Allies to accept peace, as the Russians have done, on German terms. These influences have not fulfilled their expectations; and it is probably for this reason that they have embarked on a supreme effort to destroy the Allied Armies, which, if it should not succeed, might result in a renewal of the deadlock on the fighting front. In short, they hope either to win a decisive victory, or to bring about a period of stagnation, during which they would exploit the resources of the occupied

Russian provinces, and devote their energies to the prosecution of their economic and political campaigns.

The past three months have been a period of ceaseless activity, both on the fighting fronts and in large areas in rear of the opposing lines. Bombardments, raids, and minor attacks have been reported from every sector of the front between Nieuport and Alsace, increasing in magnitude and frequency as time went on. Battletraining was conducted on a large scale behind the German lines; and, on our side, extensive arrangements were made for meeting the expected attack by strengthening existing positions, and constructing successive lines of defence. All necessary preparations and dispositions were understood to have been completed when, on Thursday, March 21, the storm burst.

The German infantry attack, which was preceded by four hours' intense bombardment of the forward lines and back areas, extended from the neighbourhood of the Scarpe to the Oise, a front of about fifty miles. The main attack appears to have been launched between Cherisy and the Cambrai-Bapaume road, where our troops, though heavily outnumbered, made a very gallant defence, holding the enemy back on the greater part of the front, and, on the remaining portion, only falling back on the main positions. Between Hargicourt and Epehy, and in the sector between St Quentin and the Omignon, there were also retirements, which necessitated a readjustment in the adjoining sectors; but the rest of the front appears to have undergone little change on the first day. But fresh divisions were massing behind the German front, while, so far as can be judged from the reports available at the time of writing, our reserves had not come up in any appreciable numbers to reinforce the weakly-manned fighting front.

On the second day (March 22) the Germans broke through our defensive system west of St Quentin; and, by the following evening, the troops in this region had retreated to the Somme, a distance of fifteen miles, involving a corresponding withdrawal between the Somme and the Oise. The front between Hargicourt and Epehy, which had been strained on the previous day, also gave way, with the result that the 9th Division, which had maintained a solid front in the Gouzeaucourt sector,

narrowly escaped being outflanked, and the 24th Division, which had made a gallant defence about Le Verguier, was also endangered. The gap between Epehy and Gouzeaucourt was closed by reserves; but the double failure necessitated the withdrawal of the centre of our front (approximately) to the line Roisel-Doignies. On the 23rd the Germans captured Chauny, Ham, and Péronne; and, at the close of the day, our front lay, roughly, on the line Chauny-River Somme-BiachesSailly-Haplincourt-Sapignies. North of the last-named village the enemy had taken Henin, Wancourt, and the heights above Monchy le Preux. They claimed 30,000 prisoners, and 600 guns.

On March 24, the enemy having brought up fresh troops in great numbers, the battle raged furiously about Bapaume. Late at night the town fell to concentric attacks from the north-east, east and south-east. South of the Somme the Germans entered Guiscard and Nesle; and French troops, who had taken over the Nesle-Noyon front, were heavily engaged about the latter town. The enemy crossed the Somme at Brie, St Christ, Falvy and Voyennes. Throughout the following day violent fighting continued on the entire battle-front, in the course of which the Germans made progress both north and south of the Somme. During the night of March 25-26, which was comparatively quiet, the Allies took up new positions on the line Noyon-Roye-Albert. In the morning of the 26th the Germans resumed their attacks south of the Somme, where they had brought up several fresh divisions, and captured Roye and Chaulnes. At the end of the day the battle-front was roughly defined by the line Noyon-Beauvraignes-Rosières-Sailly le Sec-Mericourt-Albert-Puisieux-Boiry-Wancourt. The enemy were in Albert. On March 27 the Germans again attacked with great violence on the entire front, but only made slight progress about Roye, and gained a footing in Ablainzeville; while our troops, counter-attacking astride of the Somme, advanced their line to Proyart, and recaptured Chipilly and Morlancourt. During the night the Germans made their way across the river near Chipilly, intercepting our troops at Proyart, who, however, cut their way back to Hamel.

The loss of Albert, and the enemy's progress further

north, having deprived us of direct communication between Amiens and Arras, the Germans appear to have thought the opportunity favourable for an attempt against our positions in the Arras quarter. Attacking, on March 28, with seven divisions astride the Scarpe, they penetrated our advanced positions, but were stopped by the main line of defence Neuville-Fampoux-Arleux. Severe fighting continued on the rest of the front without material change, except at Montdidier, which fell into the enemy's hands, and between that place and Lassigny, where the French made some progress in a counter-offensive. On the following day there were no serious attacks north of the Somme; but the Germans, in the course of severe fighting, pressed the French back to the line Gratibus-La Neuville-Mezières, whence we prolonged the front through Demuin and Hamel. The French counter-offensive was checked. At this stage the Germans claimed to have captured 70,000 prisoners and 1,100 guns, of which 40,000 prisoners and 600 guns were taken by von Hutier's army between the Somme and the Oise.

On March 30 the Germans threw in fresh divisions between Albert and Boiry, but without gaining ground. South of the Somme, where their principal efforts were again made, they entered Demuin and Moreuil (but were expelled later) and captured Aubvillers, Cantigny, Mesnil, and Le Monchel. They also attacked furiously in the Montdidier-Lassigny sector, but without success. On the 31st their efforts appeared to slacken, their attacks being restricted to the zone between the ProyartAmiens road and the Avre. North of the Luce they gained a footing in Hangard; and, south of Moreuil, they made some progress in the direction of Mailly. In the Montdidier-Lassigny sector the French threw them back, recapturing Le Monchel and Plemont, and advancing about Orvillers and towards Canny sur Matz. The Germans, however, claimed to have captured Mont Renaud (south-west of Noyon), and to have thrown the French back across the Divette. At the end of the day the Allied line was roughly as follows:-River DivetteOrvillers-Le Monchel-Cantigny-Grivesnes-Aubvil

lers-Demuin-Hangard-Marcelcave-Hamel.

of the Somme the situation was unchanged.

North