In the present state of public knowledge, any comment on the operations can only be of a general nature, and subject to correction when the facts become fully known. The most salient features of the German offensive are the large forces employed, the crushing superiority established in certain sectors, the rapidity of the advance in the earlier stages, and the methods by which the Germans sought, on nearly every occasion, to give their attacks a converging form by throwing the weight of their forces principally on either flank of the objective aimed at. Of 186 divisions on the Nieuport— Belfort front, 77 were in reserve; and nearly one-half of the entire force-some 90 divisions-came into action on the British battle-front. On the first day the enemy had 17 divisions to our five on the Cherisy-Boursies front, and 8 to 3 in the St Quentin sector; 40 divisions, in all, being engaged in the first attack. Later, when they had decided on their line of action, the discrepancy was even more pronounced. Their rapid progress was due to skill in executing the 'leap-frog' method of attack; each division in the fighting line, so soon as it began to flag, being promptly replaced by a fresh one which, passing through its ranks, carried on the attack till it, in turn, was similarly relieved. Thus the defence was given no respite, and there was little time to coordinate the action of the reserves. The general objective was, no doubt, Amiens, the capture of which, together with Abbeville, would separate the Allied Armies north and south of the Somme, and deprive them of all means of inter-communication except by This accomplished, the Germans probably intended to throw their weight against the smaller group of armies north of the Somme, which would be in danger of being hemmed in against the Channel coast.

sea.

But, while this was probably the general design, the method of its execution would depend on the course of the early stage of the battle. The distribution of the forces seems to indicate the intention of throwing the wings forward in a great converging movement; but the attack of the right wing failed, while a weak spot was found between Epehy and Hargicourt, which the enemy proceeded to exploit on the second day. The situation, however, was by no means so favourable as

the Germans had hoped. The inflexible attitude of our divisions on the Cherisy-Boursies front (among which the 3rd, 40th, 51st, and 19th were specially commended) and, subsequently, the solid resistance of our line southwards to the Somme, have caused the Germans serious embarrassment by narrowing their offensive front, and causing it ultimately to assume a pronounced salient in the region of Montdidier. Had the French been able to throw more weight into their counter-offensive between Montdidier and Noyon, things might have gone badly for the enemy.

It

It is hardly necessary to refer to the advantage conferred on the Germans by the fine weather during the first week of their offensive. They were able to push their artillery and supplies forward with far greater freedom than we have enjoyed in any of our battles on the western front; and in the bright moonlight movements were effected as expeditiously as by day. might, perhaps, seem that the Allies were equally favoured by these circumstances; but there was this difference, that the Germans could only move by the roads, or across country (the railways having been destroyed), while the Allies' defence depended largely on the movement of reserves from a distance by rail, which was less dependent on light and weather. Whether the Allied forces were originally distributed to the best advantage must remain an open question until all the circumstances become known. The Germans, having the initiative, could have attacked either towards Amiens or Paris, their initial dispositions lending themselves to either course; and the difficult task of so adapting the Allied dispositions as to provide for both eventualities, and of controlling the subsequent operations, devolved on the Allied War Council, as recently constituted. The appointment of General Foch as virtual Generalissimo, announced on March 30, seems to indicate that the proverbial inefficiency of such a body for the supreme direction of operations had again been demonstrated.

As events proved, the front was not held in sufficient strength, and the local reserves were inadequate to adjust the balance, the Commander-in-Chief having been left with insufficient forces at his command. It cannot, however, be said that the strategic reserves were unduly Vol. 229.-No. 455.

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long in coming up, when it is recalled that the Germans took ten days to prepare their counter-stroke at Cambrai in November last—an operation relatively insignificant. It was, no doubt, largely owing to the unexpected rapidity of the enemy's progress that these reserves were used in driblets, to repair weak places, instead of coming into action as a compact force, which, had it been available in the Montdidier-Noyon sector on March 28, might have produced a decisive effect. The ability of our troops to hold the line against greatly superior numbers was doubtless overestimated. In fact, Sir Auckland Geddes voiced the general belief when, on Jan. 14, he assured the House of Commons that the Allied forces in numbers and moral were 'in a position to face the enemy at least on equal terms.' Since the first battle of Ypres, when our troops held out against enormous odds, we have had little experience of the defensive. In the meantime the Germans have learnt much; and the development of artillery, and various new inventions, have changed the conditions of attack and defence. Moreover, the value of the troops and artillery brought from the Russian front was evidently under-estimated.

The defection of Russia has not merely changed the balance of forces in the western theatre of operations; it has changed the whole aspect of the war. It has rid the Central Powers of the embarrassment of having to conduct the war on two fronts. It has, in fact, done, in an unforeseen manner, what the Germans set out to accomplish at the beginning. Faced by the unready millions of Russia in the East, and by the combined forces of France and Great Britain in the West, they endeavoured first to get rid of the Western allies, as a preliminary to dealing with the Russians at their leisure. The plan failed, for various reasons-the German defeat on the Marne, the unexpected rapidity of the Russian mobilisation, the collapse of the Austrian offensive in Poland, and the invasion of East Prussia by Rennenkampf's army. The situation was well-nigh desperate; but it was saved by another unforeseen developmentthe practical impregnability of scientifically designed entrenchments, supported by heavy artillery and machineguns. Curiously enough, the war of positions' which