virile people may decline to submit to the decision of a court composed of foreigners who might not be disinterested; or the decision might be such as to justify, in the opinion of one of the nations concerned, an appeal to force, which will remain, as it now is, the ultimate court of appeal. It is rarely that a conflict of interests affects only one nation; and we must, therefore, expect that, in the future, alliances will be formed, much as they have been in the past, for mutual support or for the pursuit of a common policy. The result may be wara war, not between nations in arms, but between groups of the international police, in which the Powers most successful in intrigue (after the German fashion) would start with an advantage. Moreover, given a suitable organisation, the expansion of a group of international police into an army of formidable dimensions would not be a difficult matter, as may be judged from our own experience with no organisation at all to build upon. With the requisite framework secretly prepared in time of peace, the Germans might rely on getting the start and outpacing their opponents. To prevent such an evasion of the conditions regulating the size of armaments would be no easy matter, even under terms of peace dictated by the Allies. It might well necessitate a resort to force; in short, it might lead to war.

As an object-lesson in the uncertainty of alliances, this war has but illustrated the usual fate of coalitions. The Grand Alliance against Louis XIV was only just saved from disruption by the Peace of Utrecht. The coalition against Frederick the Great broke down, when victory was in its grasp, through the defection of Russia. One coalition after another, formed against the French Revolution or Napoleon, failed; and the last, which triumphed at Leipzig, would have ended in violent disruption at Vienna had not Napoleon reappeared. The Franco-British alliance against Russia was rapidly wearing out when the Peace of Paris brought the Crimean War to a close. The Balkan League against Turkey had no sooner beaten the Turk than its elements fell out among themselves. Thus a historian could hardly have expected that the Quadruple Entente would bear the strain of a prolonged struggle. It has not done so. The cause of its disruption was not, indeed, and could hardly

be, foreseen; and, if political reasoning could ever hold a coalition together, that of 1914-15 should have stood fast. The necessity for union was obvious. All the Allies should have realised, as plainly as anything can be realised, that they were fighting for existence against German domination. One might have thought that no bond could be stronger than the principle of self-preservation. Yet, at least in Russia, it has failed.

The Quadruple Alliance, on the other hand, has stood the strain of war; and what is, perhaps, more remarkable, the Powers composing it have recognised Germany as the predominant partner, surrendering to her the supreme control of operations. Unity of command, and the freedom of inter-communication conferred by continuity of territory, enhance the value of the military forces at its disposal. It may even, after the war, be a factor to be reckoned with in European politics, for, so far as can be seen, there is no prospect of its dissolution. The military decadence of Austria has been demonstrated by the inability of her armies to keep the field without the aid of German troops; and she is probably as convinced as she was after Königgrätz that her interests are bound up with those of her more powerful neighbour. The future of the Greater Bulgaria' depends on the supremacy of the Germanic Powers. It is the same with Turkey, who, though she has lost much by the war, has shown no disposition to cast off the German yoke, realising that only the triumph of Germany can restore her position in the Middle East. Thus what is now the Quadruple Alliance must be reckoned with as an influence which may endure after the war as a league within the League of Nations, with forces at its command which, grouped under the direction of Germany, would provide a formidable nucleus for expansion.

If these anticipations are well-founded, the primary object of a League of Nations would be to curb the aggressive tendencies of the Germanic group; and it would differ in no essential particular from the Triple Entente except that armies would be limited in size, and that the League would, nominally, embrace all the European nations. It is hard to imagine that the lesser Powers on the borders of Germany would not fall under her influence, and, at the least, hesitate to take part in

punitive operations against their great neighbour, if, indeed, they should not side with her. The experience of Serbia and Rumania in the present war is not calculated to encourage small States to incur the hostility of the Central Powers, in reliance on the support of other Powers more remote. In any case the strategical conditions would be more complex than in previous wars, as the plans for the employment of the international police would have to provide for every probable grouping of the Powers. Needless to say, the command of the police would be a thorny question, unity of control being even more difficult to attain than it is now. The limitation of standing armies would cause war again to become mobile; for their expansion during war would be gradual, and the newly-trained troops would appear only as successive reinforcements, entrenchments would be relegated to their old value, as mere adjuncts of the defence; and strategy would resume its former supremacy.

No fallacy could be more absurd, or more fraught with danger, than the assumption-accepted as axiomatic by the Inter-Allied Labour Conference in February-that the settlement of frontiers according to the principle of 'self-determination,' coupled with the establishment of a League of Nations, would eliminate strategical considerations from all international questions. The destruction of the enemy's armed forces, which has proved impracticable in the case of the huge armies of the present day, would again become the primary object of military operations; and, with the small forces which would take the field at the outset, it is quite possible that an initial advantage might prove decisive. To make the frontiers between contiguous States conform to the racial boundaries would be to deliver one into the hands of the other. For example, as some Italian observers have pointed out, the inclusion of Italia Irredenta, without a further readjustment in places, would make the frontier of Italy even more disadvantageous than it was before the war. Weakness invites attack; and to minimise the risk of future wars it would be essential to ensure that no State, great or small, should be at the mercy of its neighbours. The question is a practical one, which cannot be decided offhand by Labour delegates or politicians in accordance with academic dogmas.

Such are the chief military problems which would have to be solved in connexion with the inauguration of a League of Nations; and there are others of a political nature which would tax the ingenuity of politicians and diplomatists. But, regarded as a whole, the problem may not be so impracticable as it appears from the purely military point of view. There are other means besides force, by which the League might assert its authority, chief among which is economic pressure, the power of which has been brought into notice by the war. An embargo on trade, which could be adjusted to various degrees of intensity, from a complete boycott to the prohibition of certain imports, would be a powerful deterrent. Such questions, however, lie beyond the scope of our subject; as do also various political delusions accepted in certain quarters, such as the view that democracies are not pugnacious, and that they will be scrupulous in the observance of treaties. It may, however, be remarked that these assertions are not borne out by the actions of such democratic organisations as Labour combinations, which have not hesitated to coerce non-unionists by force or the threat of force, and have shown little regard for agreements. Nor would it be wise to pin our faith to such phrases as the democratisation of Germany,' the 'triumph of internationalism' over patriotism, or the destruction of militarism.' The German people, although for three years they have suffered privations many times more severe than ours, appear, on the whole, to have been staunch, loyal, and patriotic; and their political and military systems have stood the stern test of war, and proved extraordinarily efficient. Had it been otherwise, Germany would long since have 'gone under,' and the Germans are well aware of the fact. Let us not allow ourselves to be deluded by specious catchwords and untried political theories, the truth of which is, to say the least, doubtful. Peace, if it is to be lasting, must rest on surer foundations.

W. P. BLOOD.

Art. 16.-GREECE AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT. IN the October number of the Quarterly Review' appeared an article which advocated a 'Final Settlement of the Balkans,' 'imposed from above, and maintained under penalties, perhaps even manu militari, for a certain time.' To the friends of Greece and Serbia the very phrase 'settlement from above' is suspect, apart altogether from the terms of such a settlement. They remember that the only time the Balkan States have ever come to an amicable agreement was in the creation of the League of 1912, to which the Great Powers contributed nothing. The League was broken up by the impatience of Bulgaria, but Serbia and Greece effected a compromise that still forms the only solid basis for our hopes of a Balkan Confederation. Who would have thought, ten years ago, that Greece would acquiesce cheerfully in the loss of Monastir, the watchword of its Irredentism, the test case for the argument that town should weigh more than country in determining ethnology? The spirit of that compromise could not be more nobly set forth than in the speech that Venizelos delivered in the Boulé in March 1913:

'I have a conviction that the partition of the conquered territory will not be made by the military authorities, who have a limited horizon and look at matters from a merely military point of view, nor by the too fervid patriots of this State or that, but by these States' responsible Governments. . . . I hope their patriotism will be so lofty that they will not shrink from such sacrifices as will be inevitable if the partition is to ensure the continuance of the Alliance, even if they are bound to be called traitors by the fervid patriots of their own race.'

Venizelos was at the time speaking of concessions to Bulgaria. Twice in three years he has been willing to make her great concessions; first, at that time, to maintain the Balkan League, and secondly, in the first months of 1915, to recreate the League as an ally of the Entente. By those who cannot conceive of renunciation as a possibility of statecraft it has been argued that Venizelos then admitted the right' of Bulgaria to the Kavalla district west of the Strymon. Mr Alexander Pallis, of